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ABSTRACT

The Failure of Post-war Reconstruction in Jaffna, Sri Lanka:
Indebtedness, Caste Exclusion and the Search for Alternatives
by
Ahilan Kadirgamar

Advisor: Michael Blim

Reconstruction of contemporary war-torn societies can lead to further dispossession
and social exclusion, particularly through neoliberal development policies and financialized
indebtedness. This dissertation analyses post-war reconstruction of the Jaffna District in the
Northern Province of Sri Lanka after the end of a brutal three decade long civil war in May
2009, through a survey and ethnographic study of one village, Pathemany and its oppressed
caste quarter, Bharathy Veethy. Drawing on a study of Pathemany village on agrarian change
before the war, this study addresses contemporary questions about land, rural incomes, rural
debt and caste structure. The study evaluates reconstruction policies through analysis of
national and regional data and reports, and scrutinizes indebtedness and new forms of
dispossession. It situates the failure of reconstruction in Jaffna within a broader frame of
historical changes starting in the late colonial period and the current influences of global
economic forces including the impact of the Great Recession of 2008.
This work argues that reconstruction policies were an extension of a second wave of
neoliberalism in Sri Lanka soon after the war in 2009, which accelerated the liberalization
trajectory set by the open economy reforms starting in 1977. An extensive process of
financialization with integration of Sri Lanka’s state and private finance with the global
iv

capital markets, expansion of credit by national banks and new financial products at the rural
level have led to predatory lending and tremendous indebtedness in the countryside. Social
institutions and the rural economy in agriculture and fisheries are undermined as development
emphasizes infrastructure build-out, credit expansion and self-employment schemes.
Reconstruction-led dispossession is leading to outmigration for remittances and contributing
to further social exclusion. Caste structure weakened by war-time displacement is
strengthening by stealth as public silence on caste relations prevails. The vibrant history of
producer co-operatives, including of caste-based occupations in Jaffna, is explored to provide
an alternative vision for reconstruction. A critique of the post-conflict discourse of transition
reframes reconstruction as a political question, with the war-torn society likely to be shaped
by future struggles.
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PREFACE

On what intellectual ground does one stand to ask questions about a war-torn society
such as in the North and East of Sri Lanka? How do disciplinary and other frames shift the
questions we ask about societies? And what does it mean to write about a war-torn society
and for whom? Critical social research and the process of writing should begin with such
questions of self-reflection. A war-torn society in particular cannot be studied through its
current empirical reality alone, rather a longer historical perspective of the continuities and
shifts from the pre-war, war-time and post-war periods is necessary. Furthermore, the
questions about such a society and the character of those changes are shaped by powerful
local and international discourses.
My own intellectual engagement with Jaffna, the North and Sri Lanka more broadly
started with activism and an effort to address the condition of exile. My activist interests and
my research finally brought me back to live and write in Jaffna, and to engage in research on
the social and economic lives of rural people. For almost ten years prior to departing on field
research I had been writing extensively on the political issues in the public domain,
influenced by frequent visits to the country and engagement with various actors. While my
dissertation research and related engagement was qualitatively different, my scholarly
concerns were shaped by my activism during the previous decade and linked to my own
personal and familial history.

From Activism to Research
I left Jaffna in July 1983, soon after completing my primary schooling as I was about
to turn twelve. My father’s political involvement and human rights work in Jaffna, and our
vi

fortuitous travel to Japan for my father’s sabbatical from Jaffna University, changed my life
permanently. Within days after we left the island, Colombo was burning with the pogrom of
July 1983 and the civil war had started. My father was in self-imposed exile and many of his
colleagues were fleeing the country as a crackdown by the state ensued. Leaving Sri Lanka at
that tragic moment and hearing stories of the war, of deaths, of displacement and of
assassinations, my family’s story was like many others in the Tamil community. Those
fortunate enough to leave the country, nevertheless, struggled to find employment and
meaningful social life in distant lands, and were haunted by the news of a place which day by
day became distant even as it descended into the anarchy of war.
My father’s political involvement, my two years of boarding school in India and
travels to India during my formative years kept me engaged on developments in Sri Lanka.
The assassination in 1985 of C. E. Anandarajan, my uncle and principal of St. Johns College
where I had studied, then the assassination of Rajani Thiranagama in 1989, my cousin and
neighbor, and Marxist feminist activist and co-founder of University Teachers for Human
Rights (Jaffna) (UTHR(J)), shook our family and made me question the politics of the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In subsequent years, during my late teens, I read
two books, the Broken Palmyrah by UTHR(J) and Pudhiyathor Ulagam by Kovinthan which
provided me a critique of Tamil nationalism and a more systematic understanding of the
dreadful political turn taken by the armed struggle. Both works were written hurriedly amidst
the heat of brutal conflict to alert Tamil society of the disastrous direction of Tamil
nationalism and the armed struggle.
I visited Colombo after a span of ten years in 1993; and I was a twenty-one-year-old
who found it hard to connect to a city I did not know much about. However, it was during
that visit that thanks to Ben Bavinck, a retired Dutch missionary and former teacher at the
Jaffna College involved in humanitarian work during the war, that I was introduced to
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UTHR(J), particularly Rajan Hoole and K. Sritharan. I travelled with all three of them to war
devastated Trincomalee. That three-day trip and the discussions with them on their critique of
Tamil politics initiated a collaboration that became crucial for my future activism on Sri
Lanka.
From 1993 to 2000, I made yearly visits to Colombo and struggled with ways of
connecting politically with developments in Sri Lanka from the distance of Tokyo and then
New York. My parents had moved back to Colombo in 2000, and the familial connection to
Sri Lanka became stronger. Finally, in August 2002, during the internationalised ceasefire, I
visited Jaffna with my mother, followed by another visit with my brother in August 2004. By
the early 2000s, I became more and more engaged with activism from New York, through the
co-editing of lines magazine, a quarterly social justice magazine that lasted five years and
then co-founding the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum, an international network of voluntary
activists involved in solidarity work for eight years
These years of activism from 2002 to the end of the war in May 2009 were intense
and shaped me profoundly. I was essentially involved in full-time activism, even as I
managed to maintain my engineering job in New York. In January 2006, I had to leave my
job, and until I started my PhD in 2008, I travelled continuously to various capitals of the
world for advocacy. That intense period of voluntary international advocacy on behalf of the
Sri Lanka Democracy Forum, gave me an understanding of the international actors and the
international media and how they shape the discourse on conflict, human rights, security and
reconstruction. After the war came to an end in 2009, I began visiting Jaffna regularly during
most summer and winter breaks, writing on emerging political and economic developments.
My dissertation research and writing were linked to my return to Jaffna, living in the very
same house in which I had grown up as a school boy.

viii

Place and Time of Research
The location of research, Jaffna, was important for me, as it was inaccessible for
decades for many intellectuals and activists who cared deeply about the social life of the
people in the war-torn districts. Furthermore, research also took an important place in my life,
as I attempted to become more reflective about my own political engagement. My interest in
political economy was two-fold. First, I wanted to understand historical changes with the war
in relation to labor, land and capital. Second, I wanted to engage people in the countryside on
their continuing day-to-day social and economic challenges in the post-war context. Such
engagement was not possible in the past due to the security situation. Furthermore, the
community of activists I belonged to were preoccupied with the war; including addressing the
humanitarian crisis, mass human rights abuses, a constitutional political settlement, shrinking
democratic space and the attacks on dissent.
I fully realize that the ability to choose to return after the war and to live and work in
the war-torn place of my childhood is a privilege. The situation of the people who had
endured the war, particularly the subaltern classes, is of another order. The trauma of the war
and the hardship is etched on their faces. I have all my life lived in cities, whether it is
Colombo, Tokyo, Bangalore, Atlanta or New York. My childhood in Jaffna, in proximity to
the town, was the closest I would come to understanding the problems of rural people. But
my social and class origins, and my parents’ liberal views, remained distant from the
oppressive social structures of rural Jaffna. Thus when I returned to Jaffna for my visits and
eventually to live amidst field research and writing, I had to learn much by way of
communicating with rural people.
I was fortunate that I had retained my Tamil, having studied in the Tamil medium for
my primary education. The two years in boarding school in India between the age of fourteen
and sixteen allowed me to study Tamil and ensured my Tamil reading and writing skills were
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intact. But it was activism during my thirties that advanced my Tamil, as I gained a mature
political vocabulary engaging working-class diaspora forums and others in Sri Lanka. But I
also realised and continue to realise every day that speaking the language and engaging a
people, who inhabit rural and socially different worlds, are of a very different order. The
world that has opened to me of engaging farmers, fisher-folk and rural workers through my
research has been greatly rewarding.
I continue to learn bit by bit about the challenges of dealing with the trauma of war
and how the everyday struggles of the war affected people who inhabit rural Jaffna. I sense a
huge gulf between the middle-class Tamils residing in Jaffna town and the neighboring
towns, and those whose lives are shaped by village life with rural provisioning and
production. I will not pretend to understand the wounds of those condemned to multiple bouts
of displacement and their horrific losses of loved ones over three decades of war. I realize
that I am barely beginning to scratch the surface of their social predicament and I am only
attempting to understand the character of productive relations that lie underneath the changes
that have swept through this population over the last many decades.
This is where I am also wary of those who rush to record the trauma of the war-torn
population. There has been a rush of writings, as if worried that the crisis in the North and
East of Sri Lanka will flee elsewhere. But these writings come with lens imported again of
global discourses, including of conflict, reconciliation and transitional justice. As I read about
Biafra, and the tragedy there, written close to four decades later by writers like Chimamanda
Adichie and Chinua Achebe, I wonder how we would look at our own Biafra three or four
decades later. Nationalist thinking and the related social imagination lingers on, and the
memories of war and suffering trouble people for decades. There is a need for the space of
time to understand such suffering. The people who went through it also need time to reflect
on what it means to them, before we rush in and try to excavate.
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When the issue of war-time abuses are raised with ordinary people, the discourse in
the media is initially regurgitated as that is what they assume they are expected to say. The
people have yet to find their own vocabulary and their own terms to speak about their
suffering. There is a significant difference, when one talks to them about their economic
problems. Perhaps my interest in political economy, including the social and economic life of
the survivors of the war, falls short of understanding their suffering. However, I also sense,
how their day to day economic struggles are an entry point of engagement about their past.
The attempts to understand their daily challenges and uncertain future are connected to how
they see the past.

Political Engagement and Research
In a place such as in Jaffna, particularly in the militarized post-war context, with
tremendous surveillance on one side and polarization by nationalist local discourse on the
other side, it is difficult for research to remain neutral. Soon after I started living in Jaffna, I
was often invited to give talks on a range of issues from analysing the national budgets to
critiquing economic policies in various forums. I was also invited to write in the national
English and Tamil newspapers and magazines. This was in part due to the dearth of writings
on political economy in Sri Lanka in recent years. While such engagement inevitably took on
a political character, it also opened many doors to dialogue and debate with local
intellectuals, greatly expanding my understanding of local developments and thus informing
my research. Given that the culture of academic and public writing had deteriorated with the
war, the opportunity to participate in discussions with intellectuals hosted by local forums
provided many insights.
In this context, my two research assistants, first a young journalist, Nirosh
Thiagarajah and then a graduate of Jaffna University, Akalya Francis-Glaim proved
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extremely valuable. Akalya in particular, in coming from Pathemany where I had initiated my
research was insightful about local developments and we became collaborators; writing
articles in the Tamil press, leading reading groups for university students and graduates and
co-teaching a course on contemporary social issues to recent graduates of St. Johns College.
Akalya’s own political development by participating in my research project, including her
eagerness for field research, was admirable.
The question that has troubled me over the last few years is the broader silence in the
media on post-war economic issues. The overwhelming nationalist discourse, which silenced
or twisted a number of economic and social concerns, became a challenge to begin
conversations much less discussions about the post-war rural economy, particularly in Jaffna
town. Political issues and the role of the military of course remained a taboo topic given the
climate of fear until regime change in January 2015 after my field research was completed.
On the other hand, I found a warm reception in rural Jaffna to discuss the range of social and
economic issues, particularly among the oppressed caste communities. And I also found some
local bureaucrats, once they had asked a number of questions about my motivation and
background, to speak candidly about the local social and economic situation, even critiquing
state policy, however, they all wanted to speak off the record and were reluctant to provide
documents. I understood their careful avoidance of any attribution due to the restrictions on
the bureaucracy from Colombo, and the strict regime under a Governor, who until January
2015 was a military General.
In this context, I was particularly encouraged by the genuine engagement of local
community leaders whether they were from co-operatives, farmers’ organizations or
community centres. Many of them had lost much during the war and wanted to see their
communities rebuilt in some way. This dissertation owes much to the resilience and vision of
those leaders and people in rural Jaffna.
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INTRODUCTION

How does one explain a society devastated by war for three decades that continues to
suffer seven years after the war? Was it the decisions of the victorious regime in control of
state power, or was it the conjuncture of national and global developments that led to postwar deterioration, or is it the inevitable predicament of survivors of protracted civil wars to
suffer for years after the war? While increasing evidence of the failure of post-war
reconstruction emerges in Sri Lanka, the question arises about the relationship of
reconstruction to dispossession, including the extraction of assets and the deprival of
livelihoods and entitlements. Is reconstruction a period of transition including with economic
difficulties for the war-torn people as claimed by policymakers, or is transition itself a
legitimizing and prescriptive discourse for new forms of dispossession and social exclusion?
Dispossession, social exclusion and violence characterize Sri Lanka’s postcolonial
history with the disenfranchisement of the Up-Country Tamils, the tea estate workers brought
over as indentured labor from India, soon after Independence in 1949, and the periodic riots
starting in 1956,1 particularly in Colombo and the southern districts, looting Tamil homes and
displacing Tamils (Vittachi 1958). The early signs of the state’s brutality were evident from
the manner in which it crushed the insurrection by rural Sinhala youth in 1971. With
escalating ethnic repression, the pogrom of July 1983 when Colombo burned and over 2,000
Tamils were murdered initiated a protracted civil war (Tambiah 1986). A second insurrection
in the south between 1988 and 1990 with more brutal practices by the Sinhala youth
attempting to grind the state to a halt, brought out the most ruthless counter-insurgency
1

These riots in 1956, 1958 and 1977 by Sinhala mobs, where loss of property and the displacement of thousands
of Tamils – some of them permanently others temporarily – from their homes were early signs of the violent and
tumultuous future of the country.
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measures by the state, with widespread torture, abductions and disappearances by death
squads, resulting in the deaths of tens of thousands of mainly Sinhala people (Hoole 2001).
The armed struggle in the North was initiated by a number of armed groups with
various Tamil nationalist positions, particularly after the Federal Party, the largest
parliamentary Tamil party, took on a separatist project in 1976. The escalation of the conflict
became a full blown civil war with Tamil armed movements gaining considerable support
from India after the pogrom of July 1983. By 1990, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), the most militarist of the Tamil armed movements, had wiped out all the other
movements, assassinated the leadership of the Federal Party and carried out a purge of left
activists, to ensure its total control over the Tamil community (Thiranagama et al. 1990). The
LTTE’s extreme Tamil nationalist project and its fascist political culture2 of unconditional
allegiance to its leader, V. Prabhakaran, claims that the movement was the sole representative
of the Tamil community and its suicidal commitment towards a separate Tamil state, called
Tamil Eelam, led to the silencing of dissent through assassinations and had a tremendous
impact on the political possibilities for the Tamil community during the war years and
subsequently on post-war politics and reconstruction (Hoole 2001).
Tamil intellectuals who could have contributed to political and economic
revitalization after the war were either killed or forced into exile, removing them from any
role even after the demise of the LTTE in 2009. Furthermore, many other intellectuals who
survived the war living in Sri Lanka were willingly or unwillingly made complicit in the
LTTE’s project, and short of public repudiation of their past positions, they are unable to
chart a different path for political work and scholarship. The predicament of the Tamil
2

Tamil dissent critical of Tamil nationalism, such as the Sri Lanka Democracy Forum of which I was a member
and the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) have characterized the LTTE as a movement with a
fascist political culture. In other words, that its practices of naming those who do not agree with it as traitors,
and attacking if not assassinating them, as well as its attacks on other minorities including the ethnic cleansing
of the Northern Muslim population are reflective of a political project, the culmination of which would have
ended in a fascist state.
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community, including the lack of engagement by its political leadership and intelligentsia
with respect to issues such as post-war reconstruction, is constrained by the legacy of the
LTTE and requires a public debate within the Tamil community on the LTTE’s politics and
separatist project.3
The protracted civil war in the North and East led to longer and multiple bouts of
displacement sometimes spanning decades, periodic and unpredictable bombings, mass
disappearances, massacres and counter-massacres of civilians by the state and the armed
Tamil formations was a time of tremendous misery for the civilian population. The
cataclysmic end to the war in May 2009, on a small strip of land on the eastern coast of the
Vanni, the districts in the mainland south of the Jaffna peninsula consisting of forest and
agricultural lands, with the Tamil civilians held hostage by the LTTE and mercilessly
bombed by the Sri Lanka military had put a few hundred thousand people through the worst
experiences of war in any part of the world.4
The communities that survived this devastating long war, mustering all their courage
and strength, are now giving up. If during the war their survival instincts and hope that the
guns will become silent kept some social cohesion, in the post-war years only a directionless
dark future stares at them.
It is not that there was no forewarning of the LTTE’s politics and its disastrous course and the need for a
different politics after the LTTE’s demise. The authors of Broken Palmyrah belonging to the University
Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), were prophetic two decades earlier in 1989, and it is for the publication of
this book and the analysis below that Marxist Feminist Dr. Rajani Thiranagama was assassinated by the LTTE
in 1989:
“It was now the end of an era. A struggle that had, in its dawn, been fired by several noble ideals, and called
forth courage and much sacrifice from young persons irrespective of group, had now reached a point where the
community was powerless and voiceless. How long could a military force that claimed to represent them retain
any degree of real autonomy with such a weak base?” (Thiranagama et al. 1990, 184)
“The Tigers’ history, their theoretical vacuum, lack of political creativity, intolerance and fanatical dedication
will be the ultimate cause of their own break up. The legendary Tigers will go to their demise with their legends
smeared with the blood and tears of victims of their own misdoings. A new Tiger will not emerge from their
ashes. Only by breaking with this whole history and its dominant ideology, can a new liberating outlook be
born.” (Thiranagama et al. 1990, 367)
4
Estimates vary on the number of civilians killed during the various insurrections and phases of the war. UN
Sources estimated forty thousand people dead during the final phase of the war, others put it much higher, while
the Government claimed much lower figures. I avoid citing numbers of those killed for the most part, as
research on it is a project in itself.
3
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The backdrop to this social crisis is also the state’s repressive militarization and
dispossessing development policies as well as the bankruptcy of the Tamil political
leadership in the post-war years. Political leadership and engagement with the war-torn
people to provide them a vision for post-war restoration is lacking. The reconstruction of the
war devastated economy is mired in problems. Rural livelihoods remain precarious, incomes
fall far below expenditure and employment opportunities are minimal. Social institutions
such as co-operatives, farmers organizations and co-operatives have not been rejuvenated,
communities lack cohesion and individuals are left to suffer on their own.
Within a few years after the end of the war, household assets were further depleted.
Families are torn apart as there are no assets to hold them together and there is no way out of
the widespread indebtedness. Women have to increasingly take up the economic burden. The
vulnerability of girls and women is related to their economic marginalization. The youth
don’t have the routine of work. Day wage work is irregular. These developments reflect
social and economic disorder.
Caste structures disrupted by displacement for years are strengthening. The
demographic changes with the war and migration have led to an increase in the relative
population of the oppressed castes, but socially and economically they are powerless with
landlessness and lack of social mobility, including access to decent work. The mobilizations
against caste exclusion were silenced during the war in the name of the Tamil nationalist
struggle. The silencing of public discussions on caste oppression continues.
In the north new forms of social exclusion and oppression of minorities continue. The
Muslim community ethnically cleansed from the North in 1990 by the LTTE finds it hard to
resettle and receives little support from the Tamil bureaucracy in Jaffna. A significant section
of the population in the Vanni districts consists of Up-Country Tamils from the tea
plantations displaced by riots from the 1950s into the 1980s. They form a large section of the
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oppressed caste landless labor exploited in the Vanni, even as their belonging in the region
and even their citizenship in the country had remained uncertain for decades.5
In this context, what is the role of the state and the donor agencies in reconstruction?
Is it a return to prewar social relations or construction of a new and in fact a troubling social
order that is the consequence of post-war development policies? For those troubled by the
recent economic changes these are questions about the agency of powerful actors and the
paths not taken. These developments also raise questions about internal differentiation of the
war-torn population and its institutions, particularly of caste exclusion and the post-war
character of temples, schools, community centers and co-operatives. The social and economic
life of these long suffering people provide important lessons for Sri Lankan society to
consider and for other regions devastated by protracted war.
My central argument is that reconstruction in Jaffna and the north more broadly has
led to further dispossession and social exclusion. There are three causes that set the path of
reconstruction and the misery readily apparent in the war-torn regions: first, the historical
trajectory of post-colonial state formation and capital in Sri Lanka; second, the contingent
factors of an authoritarian regime at the helm of a militarized state at the end of the war; and
third, global forces characterized by market-oriented donor regimes and the increasing flows
of global finance capital following the Great Recession of 2008. These factors initiated a
second wave of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka characterized by an extensive process of
financialization, where integration with the global capital markets and transformation of
credit at the rural level are creating new mechanisms of financial accumulation and a state
focused on urbanization and infrastructure development that increasingly places the
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The predicament of the returning Northern Muslims is central to my activist work in Jaffna. I have written
about them in media; see for example, ‘The Other Oppressed Minority’ (Kadirgamar 2014). Similarly, the UpCountry Tamils in the Vanni are another minority that I am hoping to work with in the near future. The social
standing of both these communities, long excluded by the Tamil middle classes, will determine the plural and
democratic future of society in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka.
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responsibilities and risks of economic activities on individuals. The reconstruction policies to
address the war-devastated regions are embedded in this second wave of neoliberalism with
tremendous expansion of credit, infrastructure for market connectivity and efforts to revive
incomes and livelihoods through individualized self-employment schemes. The effects of
reconstruction policies have been tremendous indebtedness that creates a new circuit of
accumulation with financialization linked to global finance capital siphoning rural assets and
even the remittances of migrant labor in the Middle East. Reconstruction-led dispossession
puts new pressures on rural provisioning and livelihoods, and changes the workings of social
institutions and caste relations. Furthermore, caste relations weakened by war-time
displacement is strengthening with the return to caste wards in villages, and this process of
caste exclusion is reinforced by the dispossessing dynamics of reconstruction policies. A
critique of reconstruction can draw from the legacy and potential of co-operatives in Jaffna.
And in the face of silence on the crisis of this war-torn society, avenues of reviving the
politics of struggle and resistance become the urgent task.
Through such an analysis, I address the problematic path of reconstruction
characterized by dispossession and social exclusion. The silence on the widely felt
indebtedness in the war-torn countryside reflects the hegemonic power of international and
national discourses of post-conflict development. Furthermore, the silence on caste exclusion
reinforced by Tamil nationalist opinion makers contributes to the persistence and
strengthening of caste oppression through stealth under the rebuilding of social institutions.
The dearth of critical perspectives on development and a progressive vision for reconstruction
have also undermined the search for alternatives. The vibrancy of co-operatives in Jaffna
before the war provides some possibilities for reconstructing the war-torn society in an
equitable direction. Finally, I address the importance of resistance including against caste
oppression, in reshaping the failed path of reconstruction.
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Global Frames of Research
Beneath the seeming isolation of three decades of civil war, flows of people, arms,
finances and political discourses connected through the humanitarian circuit and the diaspora,
internationalized the devastated region of the north and east of Sri Lanka. And before the
war, centuries of colonial domination successively by the Portuguese, Dutch and British had
transformed the landscape. This transformation brought about by colonial rule including
modern state institutions and a modern economy linked through the market and forms of
capital accumulation had determined the social relations of this post-colonial society.
Global forces are significant in determining developments in Sri Lanka. However, the
global discourses of development, conflict resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, rule of law
and constitutional reform downplay how global forces shape the problems of this island.
Research and scholarship have also been shaped by such biases that attempt to look at
problems within the nation-state framework. In other words, it is assumed that international
engagement and frameworks only contribute to alleviating national problems and that they
will not aggravate or create new problems. In reality, such global discourses often seek to
integrate Sri Lanka into an unequal international order, whether it be a liberalized economy
for the accumulation of global capital or the repressive stability and legal regimes promoted
by imperial geopolitical interests, for example the “war on terror.”
This was not always the case. Earlier generations of intellectuals in Sri Lanka
influenced by leftist movements had an internationalist perspective of both anti-imperialism
and anti-colonialism. Similarly, researchers influenced by Marxist political economy and
historiography contextualized problems in relation to global developments. Their analysis
was shaped by grounded and committed engagement towards social change, which in the
process recognized the constraints by global forces. In other words, critical social research of
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that era did not merely import global frames of analysis including the Marxist variety and
impose it on Sri Lanka, but evolved their analyses to understand global forces through
engagement with the concrete situation in Sri Lanka.
Postcolonial state formation involved debating and negotiating the different strands of
nationalist forces that were consolidating after Independence. In Sri Lanka, state formation
and its relationship to its various minorities became central to what is popularly known as the
national question. The decade following Independence, beginning with the
disenfranchisement of the Up-country Tamils and culminating in the Sinhala Only Act of
1956, led to the framing of the national question around concrete issues of language, land,
devolution of administrative powers and citizenship of Up-country Tamils (Hewage and
Kadirgamar 2008). While Sri Lankan scholarship addressed the national question in historical
and concrete terms culminating in the devolution debate of the 1990s (Siriwardena1996),
international engagement and donor-funded research eventually limited the debate to
concerns of contemporary liberal constitution making with an emphasis on comparative
work.
In Sri Lanka, where caste agitations had begun during the period of decolonization it
is only during the brief period of the 1960s to the 1970s in Jaffna that major anti-caste
struggles took place (Senthivel 2009). While caste has been an important determinant of
social structure both within the Sinhala and Tamil communities, its workings have been
different from that in India. Unlike in India, there are no caste censuses and for that matter
any form of affirmative action. In recent decades, caste identities are not even spoken of
publicly in Jaffna and caste exclusion continues by stealth, particularly with landlessness and
inequitable land ownership, subtle segregation in education and discrimination in
employment. While in India, major anti-caste struggles and the construction of a “Dalit”
identity to unite the untouchable castes has been central to resistance, in places like Jaffna
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such a political identity has not been consolidated. Therefore, some of the activists in Jaffna
draw on the concept of “oppressed castes” constructed during the anti-caste struggles in the
late 1960s (Senthivel 2009). The “oppressed castes” in Jaffna consist of the untouchable
castes, and the political relevance of this term, is the emphasis on their caste position as a
consequence of oppression that requires resistance. While there is much that research on caste
in Jaffna can draw from the scholarship on caste in India and more recently the Western
academy, there is need for extensive research on caste in Sri Lanka that can in turn inform
international scholarship and debates on caste. The silence on caste oppression and subtleness
of its workings in Jaffna, reflect new mechanisms of caste oppression. Furthermore, new
methodologies for studying caste oppression can also be developed contributing to social
science research on contemporary forms of social exclusion.
By the mid-1970s, despite Sri Lanka’s low per capita income, it was internationally
considered a model for its high human development indicators and relatively equitable
distribution of wealth. Sri Lanka was the first country in Asia to implement universal adult
franchise in the early 1930s and this contributed to policies of free education and health
starting in the 1940s, and eventually a social welfare state and progressive social
development. However, the legacy of this social welfare state strengthened by an import
substitution regime for close to two decades and the challenges posed to it by the global
economic downturn in the 1970s are rarely discussed in contemporary analysis of the war and
its aftermath in Sri Lanka.
Ironically, it is with liberalization in the late 1970s commonly known as the “open
economy” reforms in Sri Lanka, that research was narrowed and the boundaries of analyzing
the economic problems were circumscribed by framing questions within the nation-state.
Undoubtedly, neoliberalism, both as an ideology and through its processes including the
shaping of discourses, has had its impact in narrowing the questions of research. One aspect
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of this reduction is the lack of attention to global developments and a focus on prescriptive
solutions within the terms set by a liberalized economy. The problems with the contemporary
economy in Sri Lanka are not analyzed by critically scrutinizing the turn towards
liberalization, rather, it is claimed to be one of the war having contributed to a major lost
opportunity towards high growth and development (Kelegama 2006). Thus the war cast a
form of amnesia over social research and strengthened the deployment of neoliberal solutions
at the cost of grounded specific analysis.
Following the “open economy” reforms of 1977, there were a number of Marxist and
other scholars who analyzed it as emblematic of a structural adjustment program as it came to
be known later. The brazen attitude of the regime that brought about liberalization, where
President J. R. Jayawardena famously stated, “Let the robber barons come!”—necessarily led
to critical analyses (Kelegama 2006, 52). However, few analysts have used neoliberalism as
the frame of analysis of economic reforms in Sri Lanka. The lack of scholarship on
neoliberalism including both Sri Lanka’s relationship to neoliberal globalization and the
dearth of comparative analysis of the workings of neoliberal capitalism in similar contexts
have muted scholarly critiques of the problematic economic development trajectory in Sri
Lanka.
I draw on the works of David Harvey, Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, Loïc
Wacquant, Jayati Ghosh, and C. P. Chandrasekar6 among others to frame the economic
trajectory in Sri Lanka as one shaped by neoliberal globalization (Harvey 2003, Harvey 2005,
Duménil and Lévy 2011, Wacquant 2012). In particular, I claim that finance capital and
financialization are central to this economic transformation from a country with a strong
social welfare state and equitable distribution of wealth to one with dispossession of

6

See regular interventions by Jayati Ghosh and C.P. Chandrasekhar on financialization in India through a series
of articles: http://www.macroscan.org/
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entitlements and livelihoods and increasing inequalities. Furthermore, this process has
featured authoritarian regimes that often crush labor and peoples movements resisting these
economic developments.
Critical scholarship on the political economy of Sri Lanka was diverted by the midnineteen eighties, as intellectuals shifted their attention to the civil war. When the concept of
ethnicity was introduced in the late 1970s and into early 1980s, by the Social Scientists
Association to complicate the political economic narratives that could not provide a fuller
analysis of the social and political changes, it was a productive turn (Social Scientists
Association 1984). There was also extensive historical and anthropological work on Sinhala
Buddhist nationalism, including the nationalist ideologies and institutions that shaped modern
Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988, Seneviratne 1999). However, the
concern for ethnicity soon replaced all others, as it became linked to donor funded research
and internationalized discourses of conflict and peace, and drastically altered the
development of scholarship on Sri Lanka.
The internationalized Norwegian Peace Process of 2002 – 2005, and the funds that
came in with it, led to research and programs on conflict resolution and peace building
supported by international NGOs and Western academies. Similarly, models of federalism
and state reform from the West, alien to the long-standing debate on the national question in
Sri Lanka, were imported and proliferated through workshops in Colombo. By the early
2000s, for some youth, a job in a NGO and diplomas in human rights, peace and conflict
studies, became tied to depoliticized job aspirations. In the meantime, the problems of state,
society and war were reduced to questions of ethnicity and the once strong tradition in
political economic analysis became non-existent in Sri Lanka. This predicament of research
and scholarship has continued in the post-war era. The horrific end to the war froze the
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debates on Sri Lanka as a place of unresolved ethnic conflict within a militarized Sinhala
Buddhist regime.
The Rajapaksa regime attempted to shift the domestic discourse to one about
economic transformation and prosperity through development. This development push
worked well with militarization, as development and security were merged, with the military
as the so-called “war heroes” given some supervision over development. And Sinhala
Buddhist nationalist mobilizations, including repression of minorities and xenophobic
rhetoric and campaigns, became the cover and diversion when development related
dispossession led to social protests. In this political landscape, challenging militarization as
well as Sinhala Buddhist nationalist and majoritarian politics has been important.
Furthermore, the less engaged topics of self-criticism and a critique of Tamil nationalism has
been a central challenge within the Tamil community. However, contemporary research and
scholarship has remained silent on issues of class and a much needed political economic
critique of neoliberal development. Moreover, an assessment and serious critique of
problematic reconstruction policies in the war-torn North and East has been lacking.
The global frame of understanding civil wars and post-war Third World societies, is
also dominant in the scholarship on Sri Lanka, with an emphasis on transitional justice,
constitution-making and the rule of law (Arthur 2009). This legal frame of understanding
state, society and post-war developments displaces questions about class, caste, gender and
labor. It is assumed that building a strong legal foundation, including a new constitution and
an impartial criminal justice system, will address the grievances that have torn apart Sri
Lanka (Arulingam and Kadirgamar 2016). This legal frame is extended and is complicit in
the building of a market-oriented property regime, restructuring the once strong labor laws
and the institutional basis for a modern banking and financial system (Nagaraj 2016).
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Research on Reconstruction
I step outside the received frame of the war in Sri Lanka, which substitutes the
political economy of the North and East before, during and after the war, and employs instead
a narrative of ethnic conflict. Questions about how communities and certain institutions
survived the war relate in part to the social and economic ground before the war. Therefore, I
want to distinguish between the continuities in the war-torn regions despite the war-time
destruction and the political economic shifts with the war.
In this context, what is the economic future of the war-torn population in the North?
Where does their incomes come from? To what degree are their fates tied to agriculture, the
state sector, and foreign remittances? And how important is land as an asset? However, such
research proved to be a challenge, as research on land and agriculture in Sri Lanka, which
was vibrant in the 1970s and into the 1980s, had come to a standstill with the war.
My research on rural incomes and debt draws on field research in Pathemany, a
village near the small town of Atchuvely in Jaffna. I decided to study this village, because it
was the only case study in Northern Sri Lanka in one of the most extensive research projects
on agrarian change conducted from 1980 to 1982 by the Social Scientists Association. The
principal researcher of the project, Newton Gunasinghe,7 claimed the many village studies in
Sri Lanka, “do not make a theoretical contribution to the understanding of the socioeconomic processes at work in our countryside” (Gunasinghe 1985, vii). They showed that
anthropological thinking and research on rural communities and village studies require
analysis of broader national and international political economic processes. My field study of
Pathemany after the war, is an attempt to ground my own research in relation to a research
effort at a crucial historical moment before the war.
He was one of Sri Lanka’s most prominent Marxist social scientists and introduced many of the Marxist
debates in the 1970s as well as the works of Gramsci and Althusser into the Sri Lankan scholarship. I have been
greatly influenced by his work and theoretical orientation.
7

13

I began my field research, even as most households had returned to their livelihood
activities, which they had been practicing before the war, and where possible during the war.
In Jaffna, that meant mainly cash crop cultivation particularly in what is referred to as the red
soil belt in the fertile northern area of the peninsula and to a lesser extent paddy cultivation
on the periphery of the peninsula. Small holder agriculture for the landed castes and fishing
for the coastal communities consisting of the fisher castes are the main forms of rural
livelihoods. There is also the large population of landless labor, mainly from the oppressed
castes dependent on wage labor when it is available. Others are involved in cottage industries,
work relating to palm trees, masons in construction, transporting produce and government
jobs including in administration, education and healthcare.
The significant challenge to my research was that the post-war economy was in flux
and I was always behind fast changing developments. When I conceived my research project
in 2010 and 2011, I was interested in the revival of agriculture and rural incomes as they
emerged with reconstruction. Six months into field research and by early 2013, I found that
post-war indebtedness had become the crucial issue. I learned that the other side to household
assets was household debt, and that payments on loans were a drain on household incomes,
and when such debt deepened, it depleted household assets. Dispossession through policies of
financialization became my preoccupation as the problems of reconstruction became more
and more apparent.
While most people in Jaffna were conscious of this crisis of indebtedness, few spoke
about it in public. And even when some opinion makers in Jaffna began articulating worries
about rising indebtedness, the policymakers and other actors in Colombo did not
acknowledge the problem. There are difficulties of recognizing debt and even more analyzing
its dynamics. First, debt is not limited to the flows of incomes, but relates to the stock of
assets and is accumulated over time. Second, debt has cascading effects, where debt can be
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leveraged to get more debt, and additionally, more debt can hide previous debt. Like the
leveraged derivatives in financial markets, rural debt is also hidden during a period of easy
credit until a crisis hits.
Even as the local economy is in crisis in recent years, class, gender and caste relations
are changing in the post-war years with migration and ties to the now strong Tamil diaspora.
The middle and lower-middle classes particularly in the towns in Jaffna peninsula see the
future of their next generation to be linked to the Tamil diaspora in the West. Households
prefer that young women marry men in the West. While migration to the West has become
difficult with tightening immigration policies, increasing numbers of youth from all sectors of
society go for temporary work in the Middle East bringing in regular remittances to sustain
their families.
There are a large number of households led by women with dependents – including
children, the elderly or the disabled – placing a heavy social burden on women. Their
predicament often depends on wage labor and NGO livelihood initiatives, both of which are
inadequate. Though their plight is acknowledged by all quarters, the causes are not
sufficiently addressed by mainstream analysis. Women’s work in cottage industries prior to
the war has not resumed as the local markets for their goods are flooded with cheap imports.
Furthermore, new microfinance schemes targeting women have proliferated in the post-war
years leading to further indebtedness.
Caste oppression is taking on new dynamics extending beyond the relationship to
land. There is increasing caste exclusion and discrimination in education and job
opportunities in the post-war years, which in part due to their subtle character are continuing
without contestation. Oppressed caste children are segregated into schools falling apart and
the economic possibilities for those households diminish as they are thrown further into
downward cycles of poverty. There are changes to the workings and make-up of social
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institutions such as temples, schools and community centers that further reinforces forms of
caste exclusion. The temples were the sites of major anti-caste struggles in the 1960s, but
such conflicts over temples seem to have receded into the background with each caste
investing more and more into its own temples.
These changes to class, gender and caste, reflect the broader reconfiguration of social
relations in the post-war era, and are tied to both the consequences of the war and the path of
reconstruction in recent years. These changes are also linked to changes in the global
economy and the policies proposed by international agencies and donors. Dispossession and
social exclusion are the consequences of what I characterize as the failure of post-war
reconstruction.

Methodology
I employ a variety of methods for my inquiry with historical, qualitative and
quantitative approaches. My research was grounded in a field study of one village,
Pathemany, and its oppressed caste ward, Bharathy Veethy, in Jaffna. I also interviewed
many officials in the Jaffna District. Furthermore, I examined many reports by the
government and international agencies on reconstruction in Jaffna that were not in public
circulation. Finally, I also analyzed published government data including the census and
surveys carried out in Jaffna and the North after many decades.
My field study in Pathemany village and Bharathy Veethy ward draw on an earlier
research project between 1980 and 1982. Pathemany has its own unique history. Its proximity
to Atchuvely town and one of the main bus routes in Jaffna peninsula make it less isolated
than other villages. Educational, health and state institutions and services are easily
accessible. Its caste demographics are different from the average village, with a relatively
large oppressed caste population. Pathemany, like many other villages in Jaffna, went
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through considerable change with the cash crop boom and the anti-caste struggles in the
1960s and 1970s. It has also gone through drastic changes with war, displacement and
migration. My field research analyzes the rural economic life and the social institutions in
Bharathy Veethy and to an extent Pathemany with close to its seven hundred households.
My field research consisted of a quantitative survey, interviews linked to a
questionnaire and ethnographic research. The questionnaires and surveys were carried out
through snowball and convenience methods relying on the contacts that my research assistant
and I had in the village, and therefore they cannot be considered a complete representation of
the village. The questionnaire was carried out on 10% of the households in Pathemany village
and the survey was carried out on 25% of the households in Bharathy Veethy oppressed caste
ward. The purpose of the quantitative aspects of my field research were to generate questions
and trends that could be explored along-side government data. The data from my survey is
corroborated with data from the Census and Statistics Department, the Central Bank, the
Finance Ministry and the District Secretariats. It should be noted, that historical data from the
government and other sources for Jaffna District and Northern Province were limited by the
difficulties of access during the war.
Next, the decades of displacement, return and migration have also made the task of
collecting accurate data difficult, particularly given that I undertook field research just three
years after the war and when the process of resettlement was ongoing. Furthermore, the
continuing militarization and surveillance during the period of my field research deterred
many villagers and officials from participating in my research or speaking candidly on a
number of issues. Indeed, a similar research conducted in the same place, five or ten years
later may provide more accurate findings and evidence of the state of rural economy and
social relations, both due to the stabilization of rural social and productive relations after the
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war and the openness that is emerging with democratization after regime change, including
the confidence people are gaining year by year after the war to express their concerns.
There were some issues that were either taboo or self-censored by most people in
post-war Jaffna for various reasons. War-time mortality, abuses and the role of the military
were subjects people avoided discussing due to the climate of fear. Historically articulated
caste identities have derogatory connotations and are rarely mentioned in Jaffna in recent
times. Furthermore, there is widespread reluctance to discuss caste relations in public.
Therefore, I had to analyze caste, without explicitly referring to it many interviews, and
particularly my questionnaire and survey.
Unless otherwise specified, the Sri Lanka Rupee to US Dollar exchange rate
conversion used in the dissertation is Rs. 130 = US$ 1. That is a good estimate of the
exchange rate during the years of my field research between 2012 and 2014.

Theorization and Implications of Research
My theoretical orientation comes from Marxist political economy, both from the
works of Marx and subsequent debates among Marxists. These debates on the state,
imperialism, the peasantry and in recent decades about neoliberalism are central to my
scholarly interests (Arrighi 1994, Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2012, Harvey 2005). I also draw
from a historical perspective in understanding the various global conjunctures, such as the
end of the Second World War, decolonization, the economic downturn in the 1970s and the
Great Recession of 2008, including how they have shaped the political economy of Sri
Lanka.
I draw on the distinction Marx makes between regime and state in The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Marx 2004). While the conceptual distinction between
government and state is more apparent, in countries like Sri Lanka where there are large
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coalition governments of a wide spectrum of political parties, state power is concentrated in a
ruling group.8 In Sri Lanka, such regimes were able to consolidate even more power with the
initiation of the executive presidency in 1978, where one individual was elected with
considerable power. I argue that regimes with their particular characteristics and social bases
have considerable influence on the manner in which state power gets deployed and the
consolidation of the political and economic trajectory of the country. Therefore, issues
ranging from economic development policies to support for nationalist majoritarian
mobilizations are determined by the politics of such regimes.
I argue, post-war reconstruction in war-torn Sri Lanka, despite its many apparent
problems, is legitimized through the discourse of transition. The discourse of transition makes
unwarranted parallels with other situations, for example that Sri Lanka can transition onto a
Malaysian model of development (Biller and Nabi, 2013), and justifies economic harm as
part of the cost of advancing the path of capitalist development (Sanyal 2007). While there
has been considerable scholarly scrutiny of the concept of transition as it is deployed in
transitional justice mechanisms relating to accountability and constitutional issues, critiques
of economic transitions, particularly as they are articulated for post-conflict reconstruction
are wanting (Paige 2009, Guilhot 2002). I critique the legitimizing and prescriptive character
of the discourse of transition in order to address the silence on the failure of post-war
reconstruction.

8

Michal Kalecki put forward a theory on the consequences of the weakness of the bourgeoisie in the Third
World by analysing the relationship of different classes which seem to come together to control state power
(Kalecki 1972). This theory of Kalecki on intermediate regimes stimulated a vibrant debate in Sri Lanka, by
scholars such as Amita Shastri, Newton Gunasinghe, Sunil Bastian and Jayadeva Uyangoda (Shastri 1983a).
This debate also sought to explain the prominence given to the rural economy by successive regimes, the
emergence of robust welfare policies and the implementation of import substitution policies in Sri Lanka
between 1956 and 1977. However, it is my view, that this debate did not place adequate importance on the role
of external forces, particularly, global political economy including global capital and market forces that affected
the sustainability of the economic policies during the import substitution decades. My discussions with
Thushara Hewage have shaped my ideas on this important debate in Sri Lanka (Hewage and Kadirgamar 2008).
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I draw on David Harvey’s broader definition of dispossession to include both the
extraction of assets including land and the deprival of livelihoods and entitlements (Harvey
2005). Other scholars have argued for a more restrictive understanding of dispossession,
particularly the importance of coercion and the appropriation of land (Levien 2013).
However, I find a broader definition of dispossession to be relevant for analysis of neoliberal
development and reconstruction. For example, dispossession in post-war Jaffna is systemic
including through financialized indebtedness, neglect of the rural economy and diminishing
entitlements. While there are instances of targeted take-over of land for example by the
military, however, the broader economic harm on rural people in Jaffna comes from multiple
dynamics and processes. Next, dispossession is not limited to the take-over of land.
Contemporary forms of dispossession in Jaffna include pawning that has led to extraction of
rural people’s liquid assets in the form of gold jewelry and the failure of reconstruction has
led fisher folk and farmers to abandon their way of life.
The consequences of dispossession I argue are often social exclusion, both through
targeted measures such as the denial of infrastructure and entitlements and systemic processes
of exclusion from participation in social and economic life. I find the Amartya Sen’s
articulation of social exclusion as active and passive forms to be helpful for my research (Sen
2000). In post-war Jaffna, caste exclusion is aggravated by both rural economic dynamics and
oppressive caste relations: the rural economic crisis including widespread indebtedness has a
disproportionate impact on marginalized oppressed caste communities and reinforces their
social exclusion; and the discriminatory actions of officials towards oppressed caste wards
and refusal of upper caste people to sell land to the oppressed caste people, leads to the
further social exclusion of oppressed caste communities. .
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Neoliberalism and Periodization
Neoliberal policies have been in place in Sri Lanka and many other countries for close
to four decades, and they take on different characteristics at different points in time and in
different places. Therefore, I articulate a new periodization of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka. In
1977, Sri Lanka became the first country in South Asia to go through liberalization, and
preceded the election of Reagan and Thatcher as well as the Washington Consensus in the
1980s. Therefore, the history and periodization of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka has important
implications for understanding the emergence of neoliberalism in South Asia and other parts
of the world. While the influence of the United States during the conjuncture of the 1970s
cannot be discounted in terms of its impact on Sri Lankan politics, the resurgence of the
United National Party (UNP), the leadership of J. R. Jayawardena and the push for
liberalization were also historically constitutive of a Sri Lankan elite vision. In fact, there was
an earlier historical moment of Sri Lankan opening its economy during the conjuncture
between 1948-1953, which was foreboding of the later neoliberal turn, and what I
characterize as the first of wave of neoliberalism starting in 1977. I further claim, it is the
global conjuncture with the Great Recession of 2008 leading to global financial flows to the
emerging markets, the end of the civil war in Sri Lanka with militarized stability and the
consolidation of an authoritarian regime that led to a second wave of neoliberalism in 2010.
This periodization of the major historical shifts in the political economy of Sri Lanka
is paralleled by the World Bank’s changing policies over the course of Sri Lanka’s
postcolonial history. The first World Bank mission to Sri Lanka in 1951 emphasized the
development of agriculture and discouraged industrialization as its central recommendation.
With liberalization in the late 1970s, the World Bank’s emphasis had shifted to the massive
Mahaweli irrigation scheme and promotion of the garment sector in the free trade zones.
More recently, after the end of the war in May 2009, the World Bank in addition to
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emphasizing urban and infrastructure buildout, is calling for further cuts in state support for
agriculture. These shifting priorities of the World Bank have greatly influenced economic
policies in Sri Lanka, and I would argue contributed to successive economic crises and
political conflicts. The major general strike of 1953 in response to the cuts to rice subsidies
recommended by the World Bank, the political grievances of the Tamil parties about
colonization schemes in the Tamil regions linked to the World Bank funded Mahaweli
project and more recently the struggles around slum demolitions linked to the World Bank
funded urban development projects, are a few instances of how the World Bank’s economic
projects have serious political consequences.
Next, authoritarianism, an active security apparatus and a strong role for the state in
development are linked to models from South East Asia – particularly, Singapore and
Malaysia – to influence the vision of national and international actors during both waves of
neoliberalism in Sri Lanka. Authoritarian use of state power has been crucial to quell any
resistance, including from organized labor and social movements, to neoliberal policies
leading to tremendous social and economic changes including urbanization, infrastructure
build-out and cuts to social services. Furthermore, during each wave of neoliberalism, there
are different economic policy packages depending on the character of the authoritarian
regime and its social base. Therefore, each neoliberal wave sets different priorities on
urbanization and infrastructure build-out, on privatization, on trade and on cuts to subsidies
and state services.
A significant shift during the second wave of neoliberalism is the structure and depth
of financialization, which reaches deeper into the rural economy and results in the creation of
tremendous rural debt. Financialization linked to global finance capital through the floating
of sovereign bonds and corporate bonds of banks in the global capital markets have led to a
tremendous expansion of credit with a variety of financial products from pawning, lease-hire
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purchasing, self-employment loans, microfinance schemes to name a few, which have in turn
greatly increased the levels of indebtedness of the rural population.
I place importance on the critique of the global order from the periphery. For instance,
while the Great Recession of 2008 led to an increase in global gold prices, it is from studies
in the periphery that its consequences such as increases in pawning and the transfer of rural
household assets in the form of gold jewelry to the financial system can be analyzed. More
generally, global flows of capital, national processes of financialization and financialized
indebtedness are leading to processes of social-differentiation at the rural level as evident
from my village study. The changing character of rural debt has been characterized by a shift
from public and subsidized loans to increasingly private and high interest loans. The
increasing forms of predatory loans with high interest rates target the vulnerable, including
women and the oppressed caste people who lack other means of credit for example from the
co-operatives. In this way, economic anthropological inquiry can elucidate changes at the
rural level and its relationship to global processes through such micro-level analysis of
economic processes and social differentiation.
I hypothesize a new circuit of accumulation by global capital. Increased rural
indebtedness from the formal financial sector – connected to the global capital markets
through the national banks and finance companies that reach down to the rural households –
is leading to out-migration of labor to the Middle-East. The remittances of migrant workers
are necessary for sustaining rural life, but part of the remittances are siphoned off for the
accumulation of global finance in the form of debt payments. In this new circuit of
accumulation by global capital, there are multiples points of dispossession and exploitation,
workers are first dispossessed of their livelihoods even as they are mired in indebtedness,
they incur debts to migrate for work, they are exploited in their new work settings in the
Middle East, and then their remittances are siphoned off as debt payments.
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Caste Exclusion and the Co-operative Vision
These economic dynamics in the countryside are linked to the aggravation of caste
exclusion. The failure of reconstruction has caste implications in that it is the oppressed caste
people consisting of the landless wage laborers that are more susceptible to the monetization
of the rural economy increasing pressures on rural provisioning, the reducing levels of wage
work with the falling agricultural incomes and in turn increasing levels of indebtedness due to
fall in household incomes relatives to expenditure. Next, new forms of the social exclusion
with increasing educational costs have a bearing on caste exclusion particularly in the rural
make-up of segregated schools. Furthermore, the discriminatory practices of upper caste
Tamil bureaucrats and officials deny access to state services and infrastructure for oppressed
caste households and wards.
In this context, I address the long history of producer co-operatives, including of
caste-based occupations, to argue an alternative vision of reconstruction. Indeed, cooperatives
were some of the most vibrant social institutions engendered by Jaffna society, and have
become casualties of both the war and now reconstruction. Their difficulties and in many
cases their disappearances have created deep tears in Jaffna’s social fabric. Their history and
their workings provide a different vision for the relationship of post-war economic life to
finance and market. Their revival, I argue, can greatly contribute toward economic and social
recovery in Jaffna. Furthermore, if the macro-conditions including a reversal of
financialization and the attendant indebtedness is possible, co-operatives could also lead the
revival of rural production. Finally, I argue, that a change in the continuing trajectory of the
neoliberal reconstruction, dispossession and social exclusion will depend to a large extent on
broader resistance including of anti-caste struggles in war-torn Jaffna.
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Paths Not Taken
My research engages the question of how the survivors of the war in northern Sri
Lanka continue to suffer in the post-war era. Breaking the silence is the first step in
reconsidering the failed path of reconstruction. This silence has a caste and class character.
The refusal to recognize caste relations and the subtle but significant discriminatory actions
of the Tamil elite perpetuates caste oppression. Furthermore, it is the class character of the
Tamil political elite, who are not affected by the rural economic crisis, which allows them to
neglect the failure of reconstruction and continue with a singular focus on the Tamil
nationalist political goals. These silences are also related to the legacy of the LTTE and the
conditioning of Tamil political discourse, where it is only through a self-critical evaluation of
the LTTE’s politics that a progressive Tamil politics can emerge.
The Rajapaksa regime saw through the end of the war and shaped the post-war
trajectory of further militarization, undermined the political process to address minorities’
political grievances and implemented problematic reconstruction policies. However, the
regime was in control of a state that had strong colonial lineages and had undergone
significant development in the post-colonial era. The Sri Lankan state was also greatly
debilitated by the war, resulting in the deterioration of state institutions, particularly the
criminal justice system. The Rajapaksa regime fell in January 2015, but the state apparatus
shaped by colonialism, civil war, and a new relationship with finance capital continues. The
state-finance nexus has become central to the workings of the state and the economy, where
state expenditure requires sovereign debt in the global financial markets and the inflow of
global capital is necessary to avoid a balance of payment crisis. Therefore, the reversal of
both financialization and dependence on global finance capital is central to changing the
relationship between state and society
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The inability to consider alternatives to the current trajectory of reconstruction,
whether it be through co-operative production and distribution or a revitalization of the rural
economy enhancing rural provisioning and social rejuvenation, are related to the dearth of
critical social research. The implementation of neoliberal blue prints of economic
reconstruction by powerful donors has pushed the war-torn regions again towards the brink of
economic abyss, where people are left without even ideas of alternative approaches to
rebuilding society. Therefore, charting progressive research agendas and more importantly
intellectual engagement in the countryside on questions about alternatives are urgently
needed.
The subaltern sectors of the war-torn society facing dispossession and social
exclusion are indeed likely to engender resistance in the future. The crucial question is the
politics of their resistance. Would oppressed caste politics join forces with and even provide
leadership to progressive forces towards challenging Tamil nationalism? Would a new
progressive and democratic Tamil politics join forces with other minorities such as the
Muslims and the Up-Country Tamils as well as progressive actors in the Sinhala community,
towards both resolving the national question and addressing the mounting inequalities and
uneven development in Sri Lanka? What are the prospects of class politics gaining center
stage after decades of neoliberal attack and displacement by the civil war? These questions
relate to the lost bearings of scholarship on Sri Lanka that underpin my inquiry.
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CHAPTER 1
Post-colonial State, Capital and the Civil War

The problems facing Sri Lanka today, including its institutions relating to its state,
society and economy, were shaped by over four centuries of colonial rule. Indeed, Sri Lanka
is certainly not an island when it comes to its political economy, but an appendage
historically of the Portuguese, Dutch and British empires, and finally decades of United
States’ over-lordship in the post-colonial era. Sri Lanka was also transformed by its proximity
to India with migration and conquests during the precolonial era, economic flows including
of indentured plantation labor during colonial times and then eventually constrained by its
regional hegemony in the post-colonial era. The political economic transformation
accelerated during late colonialism and decolonization created modern social, economic and
political institutions that instituted welfare measures in health and education as well as
supportive schemes for the small holding peasantry. And it is with this period of
decolonization that I begin my political economic analysis of the recent war, its consequences
and the troubling efforts at reconstruction in Sri Lanka.9

9

These political and economic changes also led to extensive research and scholarship. In the 1970s, extensive
work by liberal and Marxist scholars addressed the legacy of colonialism and the process of decolonization in
Sri Lanka. Here, my own scholarly interests have gained from a return to and engagement with the research and
works of scholars such as Kumari Jayawardena, Newton Gunasinghe, S.B.D. de Silva, Vijaya Samarweera and
Michael Roberts (Jayawardena 2002, Jayawardena 1972, Gunasinghe 1985, De Silva 1982, Samaraweera 1981,
Roberts 1982). Much of that perceptive scholarship, grounded in a political economy approach is fast receding
from intellectual memory. While there have been some critical works over the last two decades by scholars such
as Nira Wickramasinghe, Sunil Bastian, Qadri Ismail, Pradeep Jeganathan and Jayadeva Uyangoda, this recent
scholarship has been preoccupied with the questions of the recent past; including those of war, conflict,
ethnicity, nationalism and peace (Wickramasinghe 2015, Bastian 2007, Ismail 2005, Jeganathan 1998,
Uyangoda 2001). My engagement with the political economy scholarship in the 1970s is not to directly address
the questions posed by those earlier generation of scholars. Rather, I believe there is much to be gained in
returning to that scholarship on political economy with new questions that have emerged in contemporary Sri
Lanka.
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The colonial transformation led to far reaching changes in society. The administrative
structures and economic institutions including the forts, the ports and the estates are visible
remnants of such colonial transformation and extraction. However, changes also occurred in
educational opportunities, religious practices and caste relations that are less visible but no
less important effects of colonial rule. Communal representation during the first century of
British rule and eventually universal adult franchise after 1931, shaped the politics of both the
Sinhala and Tamil elites. The cultural and religious movements led by these elites starting in
the late nineteenth century had, by the late colonial period increasingly taken on the narrow
characteristics of Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil nationalisms, as opposed to a broader anticolonial nationalism. These social developments had a direct bearing on caste relations within
the Tamil community in particular, raising the possibilities of an anti-caste movement.
The great challenge during the decades of decolonization starting in the 1930s was to
find land for a peasantry that had grown substantially in population in the South Western Sri
Lanka region called the Wet Zone. In the agriculturally rich Wet Zone there were both
plantations for the production of tea and rubber but also extensive cultivation of paddy and
cash crops. Colonization schemes along with irrigation projects in the Dry Zone to mainly
cultivate paddy, particularly after the eradication of malaria in the 1930s, became the
dominant policy idea to address demands of the peasantry during late colonialism, and
became central to postcolonial state policies during the three decades after independence. The
exports particularly tea came mainly from the labor of plantation workers imported from
southern India. These Tamil workers of Indian origin were restricted geographically and
ethnically isolated to the plantations in the hill country of central Sri Lanka. Sadly, one of the
first major acts of discrimination by the post-colonial state in 1949 was to disenfranchise
these plantation workers to undermine the left base that was emerging in the plantations.
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There was a small base of urban working class in Colombo, which was increasingly
vocal as it was mobilized by newly formed trade unions and left parties. This working class
in industrial belt around Colombo, the ports and state infrastructure was multi-ethnic in its
emergence from the late 19th century into the mid-20th century, but Sinhala Buddhist
nationalism and anti-minoritarian tendencies began to emerge within the trade union
movement as early at the 1920s (Jayawardena 1972). While a thin stratum of the Sri Lankan
elite had been privileged by colonial policies, for the mass of the population educational and
social mobility remained distant and the standard of living was low. Nationalist struggles and
campaigns, more reformist in character than the militant anti-colonial struggles in the rest of
South Asia, mobilized society around economic and social concerns. Greater representation
in State Councils with universal suffrage in 1931 set the direction of policies for the emergent
postcolonial state.
Sri Lanka went through tremendous changes in tandem with the transformation in the
global order during the decolonization decades between the 1930s and 1970s. Its economy,
largely dependent upon tea and rubber, shifted with the ups and downs of global demand
brought on by depression, war and world economic recovery. Global powers through trade
and aid policies tried to steer its economy. The creation after independence in 1948 of state
educational and health institutions, a modern banking system, powerful trade unions and a
widespread co-operative movement have left an indelible mark on contemporary Sri Lanka.
The emergence of left-leaning coalition governments a decade after independence led
to import substitution policies along with efforts at land reform and an emphasis on rural
development. The state with its social welfare bent had a significantly different role in society
and economy, both in terms of promoting agricultural production and state-owned enterprises
and industries. However, the governments in power during import substitution used this
active and expanding presence of the state to build a Sinhala rural base and alienated the
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Tamil population through discriminatory policies with the respect to language, education and
employment.
In 1977, under the influence of the United States, Sri Lanka undertook so-called
“open economy” reforms, a package of measures later known as the Washington Consensus,
which dictated the elimination of tariffs, capital controls, and social subsidies in exchange for
development assistance. The Sri Lankan economy was in a deep crisis in the mid-1970s, with
a balance of payments problems curtailing even essential goods, leading it to seek the
assistance of the IMF. Regardless, the new government led by J. R. Jayawardena was
committed to liberalization and its alleigence to the United States. Liberalization of the
economy was paralleled by the centralization of the state under a newly formed executive
presidency. State repression was not only unleashed on organized labor but also attempted to
crush Tamil mobilizations and resistance, resulting in a civil war with Tamil movements
supported by Soviet-leaning India.
This chapter explores the political economy of Sri Lanka, by outlining the legacy of
British colonialism, the decades of decolonization and the formation of the postcolonial state,
in order to analyze the emergence of a liberalized economy and the civil war in Sri Lanka.
This analysis of the long historical arch of twentieth-century Sri Lanka seeks to contextualize
the challenges in post-war Sri Lanka.

Commission of Capitalist Transformation
Successive colonial powers starting in the 16th century, first the Portuguese and then
the Dutch, weakened existing social structures resulting in the slow but significant historical
changes to create modern Sri Lanka. Local rulers were defeated or co-opted by the colonial
powers and the economic and social power of the local clergy were also reduced. New forms
of trade, taxation and compulsory labor for colonial extraction were enforced with
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administrative institutions developed to facilitate colonial rule. The political economic
transformation by colonial power led to coastal development around the island with fortified
centers of trade and administration. Uneven development characterized by agricultural
extraction from the inlands and investment along the coast for the colonial economy shaped
caste relations, religious practices and conversion, and the emergence of an indigenous elite
whose fortunes were linked to the colonial administration. The predicament of the peasantry
and the castes oppressed by the peasantry, exploited for colonial extraction, became in time
the central political and economic problem in modern Sri Lanka (Arasaratnam 1982, de Silva
1981, Ludowyck 1962).
While such colonial processes were steadily transforming Sri Lankan society, it is
with the consolidation of British colonial power in the early 19th century that Sri Lanka is
subject to a significant capitalist transformation. British colonial rule expanded on the earlier
coastal economy and introduced the estates with the necessary infrastructure. The plantations
in time transformed the Sri Lankan economy into one dependent on exports of commodities
produced in estates, bringing a new dimension to the uneven development of Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka became a crown colony under direct rule of the British in 1802, resulting in
a different political economic trajectory from the rest of South Asia, which until the Mutiny
of 1857 was controlled by the East India Company (De Silva 1981). Far reaching reforms put
forward by three significant commissions between the early 1830s to Independence in 1948
constituted a British colonial experiment in Sri Lanka. These commissions sent from London
were meant to transform governance in the island going far beyond the regular workings of
the Governors.
The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission arrived in 1829, close to three decades after
the capture of the island from the Dutch, and Ceylon gaining the status as a Crown Colony,
and just over a decade after the entire island came under the control of British after it
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defeated the Kandyan Kingdom in 1818.10 While the later Donoughmore Commission of
1927 and Soulbury Commission of 1945 were to primarily address constitutional changes, the
Colebrooke-Cameron Commission was mandated to address three issues; administration,
revenues and judicial establishment and procedures. The political changes that came with
Commission set the climate for unified rule of the colony; balanced by the powers of the
executive, judiciary and a nascent legislature. The economic changes proposed by the
Commission were deeper in character with major reforms in relation to labor, land and
property.
The radical character of the economic reforms was influenced by the convictions of
the commissioners who were influenced by the liberal thought and economic philosophies of
Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith. They wanted to see much greater proliferation of private
enterprises and wanted the state to limit its economic activities inside the country, with
revenues being collected as taxes or customs as opposed to being an exploitative agent in
production.
William Colebrooke, the chair of the Commission, recommended that the colonial
government should relieve its role in the trade of cinnamon and that: “the growers of
cinnamon may be allowed the option either of selling to the government, or of freely
disposing of the cinnamon for consumption in the island, or for exportation from the ports of
Colombo and Galle, and that export duty be levied on its equivalent to the net profit of the
government on its sales” (Colebrooke-Cameron Report 1832, 41). Thus cinnamon – the main
export commodity from Ceylon prior to the emergence of coffee and then later tea plantations
– exploited by the Colonial officials was to be encouraged as a tradeable commodity
promoting private enterprise.

10

The last stronghold of Sri Lankan kings in the central highlands.
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Colebrooke also specified the kind of government intervention that is desirable,
particularly with respect to distillation of alcohol:
While the object of raising a revenue on the consumption of spirits is generally to be
approved, it is desirable to remove any restrictions which unduly affect the value of
property and check the industry of the inhabitants. With this view, I would
recommend that the license to distil, under certain regulations, either from toddy or
rice, should be granted in all the districts, and that distillers should be licensed to sell
their spirits to persons engaged in the retail trade at Colombo (Colebrooke-Cameron
Report 1832, 47).
In this way, the expansion and workings of the market was considered to be important even
with the lucrative industry of alcohol which brought high revenues for the state. These
policies expanding and regulating the arrack industry contributed to the emergence of the Sri
Lankan bourgeoisie, who first accumulated wealth through the arrack industry.11
The Colebrooke-Cameron Report also made extensive recommendations towards the
transformation of a labor market and the peasantry. The custom of compulsory local labor
practiced until then in colonial public works was also opposed by the Commission. They
recommended such labor should be hired voluntarily and where necessary “advertisements
should be published throughout the country, and even on the neighboring coasts of India,
announcing the nature, the terms, and the duration of the employment.” (ColebrookeCameron Report 1832, 22) Furthermore, in addition to calling for changes in land tenure,
they also made recommendation that: “The application of capital to agriculture will gradually
remove the inconvenience arising from the poverty of the cultivators, and the subdivision of
lands.” (Colebrooke-Cameron Report 1832, 27)
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Kumari Jayawardena traces the emergence of the Sri Lankan bourgeoisie through the sale of arrack, the local
liquor, in the 19th century. This arrack industry exploited the wages of the plantation workers (Jayawardena
2000).
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The implementation of the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms coincided with the
emergence of coffee plantations and the rapid advance of a plantation economy. The colonial
government addressed the labor shortages and the unwillingness of the local peasantry to
work in the plantations by importing indentured labor from poverty stricken villages in South
India. Despite the harrowing conditions in the plantations, these captive workers for the most
part remained in Ceylon. A European planter community managed these lucrative plantations
and trading houses in Colombo. With the rapid increase in exports in coffee and then tea, first
road connectivity and then railroads were built connecting the estates to the growing port in
Colombo during the second half of the 19th century. Thus the plantation economy contributed
to an increase in production, trade and infrastructure.
The capitalist development of Sri Lanka in the 19th century created an indigenous
wealthy class involved in the distillation and sale of arrack for local consumption, particularly
in the highlands where the estates were situated. The capital thus accumulated by the local
elite was invested in lower cost coconut plantations. This emergent Sri Lankan bourgeoisie
was represented in the Legislative Council and began agitating for greater powers of
representation. The advances in education along with religious and cultural revival among the
Sinhala Buddhists and Tamil Hindus created constituencies that by the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century slowly began to question the Anglicized and Christian make up of a
section of the Sri Lankan elite and their colonial allegiance (Wickremesinghe 2015). Trade
unions emerged in the late nineteenth century and began agitating for workers’ rights and
higher wages for the working class in urbanized Colombo (Jaywardena 1972). Therefore, the
capitalist transformation over the century after the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms slowly
created a number of political challenges for the colonial government.
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Commission of Suffrage
The Donoughmore Commission arrived in 1927 to address the decades of agitations
by the local elite, whose demands centered on the reform of the Legislative Council and
greater Sri Lankan representation in colonial governance. The Donoughmore Commission
was influenced by the Labor Government in power in London, and its far reaching reforms in
Sri Lanka were an exception in the British Empire, as it sought to carry out a major
experiment in colonial governance transforming representative politics in Sri Lanka.
The mandate of the Donoughmore Commission was to examine the problems between
the Legislative Council with communal representation and the Executive Council which was
for the most part the arm of the Governor, and to come up with constitutional reforms that
could result in the efficient administration of the colony. The Donoughmore Commission
considered the major political and economic changes since the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms.
Indeed the Donoughmore Commission saw its work as one relating to a more general
problem: “that the history of modern constitutional development is one continuous record of
attempts to adjust accepted parliamentary practice to the realistic requirements of social and
economic progress.” (Donoughmore Report 1928, 19) One of the chief obstacles they felt
was the lack of well-formed political parties to promote the “good government” of the
country.
The challenge they saw in light of economic changes was the need to create the kind
of parliamentary practice where political power would come with responsibility, where the
existing scheme had troubled both the local elite and the colonial officials with “divided
responsibility”. The Donoughmore Commission did recognize the risks to the Empire in
addressing the issue of divided responsibility, and they balanced it by actively listening to the
concerns of minorities and women’s groups in Ceylon. They believed increasing the power of
the Ceylonese would also put the onus of responsibility on the Ceylonese, subject to some
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safeguards: “The management of their affairs must therefore be handed over to them, subject
only to certain safeguards, which should be designed to protect the minorities in their midst
and the interests of the Empire of which Ceylon forms an important part.” (Donoughmore
Report 1928, 35) The Donoughmore Commission had a clear argument, it was going to
“protect the minorities” and guard the “interests of the Empire,” the former out of
benevolence and the latter out of necessity.
With such confidence and clarity, the Donoughmore Report recommended
“administrative devolution” to the Ceylonese with “constitutional reform.” However, this
understanding of devolution reducing colonial power was coupled with the idea of devolution
of power to the provinces to reduce the centralized power of the local elite in Colombo.
The primitive character of the provincial government, as against the comparatively
advanced system of central government, is very noteworthy. Any further grant of
central government will emphasize and increase this contrast; and such opportunity,
as may be afforded, must be given under the new constitution to redress the balance
by the encouragement of local self-government as a first step in the elaboration of
measures to diminish the poverty and ill-health which in some provinces is the lot of
many villagers. It is essential to emphasize, at the risk of reiteration, the importance
of keeping in sight the lot of the rural worker. The great gulf fixed between him and
the educated and westernized classes of Colombo forms a dramatic contrast
(Donoughmore Report 1928, 44).
Thus the Donoughmore Commission related provincial devolution12 to poverty reduction and
the amelioration of economic inequalities between city and countryside.

12

This discussion of provincial devolution in the Donoughmore Report is fascinating as it later becomes central
to the constitutional debates on the “national question” in the postcolonial era and to this day. The
Commission’s use of this concept of devolution in Sri Lanka under direct rule of the British, was a step towards
engaging federal forms of government with decolonization. The devolution debate in Sri Lanka in the 1980s and
1990s, went well beyond the issue of decentralization and local level democratization, and became a debate
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The solution to these social and economic problems was their recommendation for the
extension of the franchise. They state: “We have already indicated our belief that a wider
franchise would expedite the passing of such social and industrial legislation as is now in
force in every progressive country.” (Donoughmore Report 1928, 83) The Donoughmore
Commissions placed overwhelming emphasis of solving various social, economic and
political problems through the greater extension of the franchise. Thus with a new
constitution in 1931, Sri Lanka became the first country in Asia to gain universal adult
franchise, and only two years after universal suffrage in Britain. This change in franchise
came despite the opposition of both the Sinhalese and Tamil elites. The genius of the
Donoughmore Commission was its willingness to take on the argument against franchise
head on. They turned the argument that only those men who are educated and own property
can vote responsibly to say only those who gain the vote will be able to resist various forms
of oppression such as gender and caste discrimination.
Here the Donoughmore Commission’s argument for women’s franchise related it to
the health and social conditions in the country. It claimed, in addition to the “general
principle of sex equality, we have been impressed by the high infantile mortality in the
Island, the need for better housing, and for the development of child welfare, midwifery and
ante-natal services”, and that women’s franchise could address some of those problems
(Donoughmore Report 1928, 88).
The Commission similarly addressed the benefits of the extension of franchise to the
“70,000 or 80,000 of low caste or of depressed classes among the Tamil community”. It
claimed the low caste people, “by receiving the vote, will not only be placed in a better
about the minorities’ stake in state power. The shift with this debate was from district level decentralization
versus provincial level devolution (Siriwardena 1996). Interestingly, the Donoughmore Commission, in order to
strengthen its argument of devolution as a check on the Ceylonese elite’s power, in addition to articulating the
concerns of minorities, also relates it to issues of class and poverty. However, in contemporary Sri Lanka, liberal
and legal discourse has increasingly reduced devolution to an issue of powers for regional ethnic minorities,
with little engagement on class issues.
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position to obtain redress for their grievances but will gain a new status and self-respect as
possessing one of the highest privileges of citizenship” (Donoughmore Report 1928, 86).
This emphasis on those oppressed by caste among the Tamil community, their franchise and
self-respect is significant for subsequent developments in northern Sri Lanka. The
representations made by the oppressed caste communities to the Commission itself were an
important step towards building an anti-caste movement (Senthivel 2009). In this way, the
Donoughmore reforms linked the questions of social and economic progress to the idea of
citizenship and the extension of franchise. This was the context for the emergence of free
health and education as well as food subsidies in Sri Lanka, which were promoted by the
newly elected representatives with universal suffrage during the late colonial period.

Soulbury Commission and Independence
The Colebrooke-Cameron Commission and the Donoughmore Commission were
perhaps the two most significant commissions in Sri Lanka as they encouraged capitalist
development and inaugurated liberal democratic state structures. However, the Soulbury
Commission of 1945 set in motion the process of decolonization and handover of power to
the local elite. Thus, the Soulbury Commission stands as an important milestone in
postcolonial capitalist development and the formation of the postcolonial state.
The Donoughmore reforms in 1931 led to the tremendous colonial experiment of
implementing universal adult franchise in Ceylon. However, a few years after the
implementation of the Donoughmore Constitution, the local elite in the Legislative Council
began agitating for more powers. Delayed by the priorities of the Second World War, by the
time the Soulbury Commission was appointed in 1944, the war was almost over and Britain
was set to decolonize India and Burma. For Sri Lanka, the Soulbury Commission sought to
ensure that state power was handed over to a loyal local elite to continue British hegemony in
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the neocolonial era. Indeed, the tone and substance of the Soulbury Report are focused on
safeguarding the British interests of control over defense and external relations of Ceylon
after decolonization.
After reflecting that “the economic development of the Island under British initiative
added further elements to the complex of communities … (and) indentured labor was
imported from India to build roads and clear land for the establishment of plantations, where
first coffee, and later and more extensively tea, was grown,” the Commission elaborated a
vision of decolonized Ceylon as a developmental state (Soulbury 1945, 6). The Report
suggests the implementation of state policies such as “budgeting for development” and “tax
system into one which produces some means for development” (Soulbury 1945, 33). The
Commission emphasized agricultural policy and development and was concerned that the
government may not incur the expenditure necessary to develop uncultivated lands. It
recommended “long range policy in the matter of land development and in the extension of
irrigation and agriculture” and “schemes of colonization and land development” and
“agricultural development of the Island” (Soulbury 1945, 46).
The exposition of development in the Soulbury Report was both a review of the
economic changes brought about by the British colonial experiment in Sri Lanka as well as
setting the stage for the economic development policies that should be pursued after
independence. The Soulbury Report addresses three key themes of development: (1) the
continuing importance of the plantation economy; (2) the need to build modern state
institutions of budgeting and taxation: and (3) the need for extensive land development
policies including the introduction of irrigation agriculture in the less populated dry zone.
The Soulbury Report was clearly constrained by the Second World War and the
decline of the British Empire. In two exhaustive volumes, K. M. de Silva has edited many of
the communications (telegrams) between the Colonial Office in London and the Governor in
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Colombo between 1939 and 1948. In de Silva’s long introduction and in the telegrams,
imperial priorities of war dominate Britain’s engagement with the colony. Furthermore, with
the banning early in the war of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP)13, the British enjoyed
full support for the war from the nationalist elite. The timing of the Soulbury Commission at
the end of the war and eventually its recommendations were meant to bolster loyal support
from the Sri Lankan elite both during the latter part of the war and then with the handover of
power to an independent Ceylon.
Labor Party Under-Secretary of State Gordon Walker represented the UK government
at the Independence celebration in Sri Lanka on 4th February 1948. He circulated a report
about the celebrations and political situation to members of the British Cabinet on 17th March
1948:
Ceylon is settling down as a genuine Dominion. Present Ministers are extremely
friendly and want to maintain and deepen the British connexion. They want, for
instance, to preserve English as the official language in Parliament and courts. … It is
hardly too much to say that if we treat them strictly as a Dominion, they will behave
very like a loyal colony: whereas if we treat them as a colony we may end in driving
them out of the Commonwealth. … Socially, Ceylon is a mixture of feudalism and
Eighteenth Century landed aristocracy. There is relatively little caste and practically
no communal tension. … A great need in Ceylon is a genuine radical Labor
Movement based on proper Trade Unions. … If no serious land reforms are
undertaken the Left Parties will remain of some importance, though I doubt whether
they will make electoral headway. The United National Party is beginning for the
first time to take local organization seriously. Buddhism and Catholicism will become
13

A Trotskyite party formed in the mid-1930s, which was the first Marxist party in Sri Lanka. The Moscow
leaning Communist Party split from the LSSP in the early 1940s. The LSSP was far more militant with an anticolonial and anti-imperalist orientation than the natioanalist elite. The British banned the LSSP during the war to
squash agitations that could undermine the war effort.
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increasingly stubborn obstacles to Marxism. If reforms were undertaken, the Marxist
opposition would cease to be serious: but this would be a slow process (De Silva
1997b, 365).
Under-Secretary of State Walker’s communication is a reflection of British interests, albeit
from a Labor Party point of view, and also of the British consensus on the formation of the
postcolonial regime in Sri Lanka. The dominion status of independent Sri Lanka discussed by
Walker relates to the former colony as part of the Commonwealth remaining under British
influence with the Queen as head of state, and more importantly control over defense, foreign
affairs, the currency and even law through appeals to the Privy Council in London.14 The
Marxist left was perceived as the greatest threat to the legacy of the colonial order. The
possibility of mobilization along language and religious lines was disregarded; the
tremendous ethno-nationalist mobilizations that would shake Sri Lankan society did not
figure. The caste structure and its continuing impact on social inequalities were ignored.

Emergence of the Postcolonial State
The postcolonial state and its modern institutions embodied the politics of the
nationalist elite during the late colonial period, including the policies that emerged with
universal adult franchise and the powers devolved to the State Council in the 1930s.
Therefore, progressive state policies of food subsidies, free education and health, and
agricultural policies favoring the peasantry were in effect before Independence. The
nationalist elite at the helm of state power took forward progressive welfare policies. They

14

While the British lost control over many aspects in subsequent years, Sri Lanka became formally a republic
under the left government in 1972.
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also began attacking those they claimed to be outsiders such as the Indian origin Tamils in the
plantations and eventually the English speaking elite.15
The peasantry was put at the center of the nationalist elite’s campaign for
Independence during decolonization; an anti-colonial campaign that was relatively weak
compared to the rest of South and South East Asia.16 The nationalists claimed to be the
trustees of the Sinhalese small holder peasant even as they attacked the plantation laborer as
an outsider. Samaraweera, one of the perceptive scholars of colonial Sri Lanka, emphasizes
the importance of the peasantry and land policy for nationalists, including their most
prominent leader D. S. Senanayake in the late colonial period:
Senanayake was not alone in this orientation towards the rural society at the expense
of the urban; this facet of nationalist perspective was to be a significant feature in
politics, then as later, for the nationalists were largely committed to drawing their
political support from the rural masses. The land policy was but one plank of a broad
program which the nationalists evolved for the benefit of the peasantry. The wider
measures of welfarism adopted during the State Council era could be subsumed under
a term which came into vogue then, 'rural reconstruction' (Samaraweera 1982, 151).
Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake’s first move soon after Independence was the
disenfranchisement of the Up-Country Tamils, thereby revoking the citizenship of the most
exploited estate workers, despite their significant contribution to the national economy and
15

The nationalist elite themselves were part of this Anglicized English speaking elite, including many who were
educated in England, but they changed their attire, religion and switched to using Sinhala to engage the Sinhala
Buddhist and rural constituencies (Manor 1989).
16
Moore claims the Sri Lankan elite took up the concerns of the peasantry not due to the pressure from the
peasantry but for the elite’s own ideological positioning: “The alienation of state land to villagers has been
conducted on a very large scale since the Sri Lankan elite became and an effective challenger for state power in
the 1920s. The program has been conducted in the name the peasantry, but owes little in origin or in detail to
political pressure from the villages. Instead, the elite seized upon and articulated what appeared to be a potential
or actual grievance in such a way as to give moral and ideological support to its own claims to rule. The issue of
Crown lands was placed within an interpretation of Sri Lankan history and society which served both to boost
the elite’s claim to leadership and obfuscate its own responsibility, via plantation enterprise, for some of the
alleged ills of that society. The notion of a homogeneous peasantry played, and continues to play, an important
part in this interpretation” (Moore 2008, 48).
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foreign earnings. This severe move was also meant to break the political base of the left in the
plantations. Furthermore, it was a deeply worrying development also for the future of
minorities in Sri Lanka.
The relationship between the postcolonial state and national capital, or the national
bourgeoisie in Sri Lanka at Independence was shaped by two factors. First, the postcolonial
state in Sri Lanka was a product of the state structures imposed by colonialism, particularly
policies of the British Empire including the outcome of the three Commissions discussed
above. Second, Sri Lanka had a weak bourgeoisie due to the prominence of English planters
and British companies in the plantation sector.17 Therefore, the post-colonial state’s policies
were to a large measure influenced first by British capital controlling the plantations and
eventually donor agencies such as the World Bank and IMF under US hegemony (Lakshman
1985). In this context, with a politically weak Sri Lankan bourgeoisie and extensive state
structures, there were tremendous swings in the politics of the governments that came to
power in subsequent decades.

Post-colonial Capitalist Development and Global Integration
The West-leaning United National Party (UNP) government prioritized the formation
of institutions relating to finance and development, as part of a broader process of
postcolonial state building. While Sri Lanka had the support of the British, the Finance
Minister J. R. Jayawardena in creating the Central Bank did not seek the help of the Bank of
England. Rather, he requested support from the Federal Reserve in Washington. Perhaps the
17

Class formation in Sri Lanka is charactersised by a weak bourgeoisie, which is the reason why I refer to the
nationalist elite, which consists of both upper class professionals as well as an emerging bourgeoisie. According
to Ponnnambalam: “The three-fold class system – bourgeoisie, middle class, and proletariat – of Western
industrial societies does not fit the Sri Lankan case directly, for whereas a middle class and a working class (not
an industrial proletariat) were present, there was practically no national (i.e. independent) bourgeoisie with the
means to defend its interests internationally. The Sri Lankan middle class sharply bifurcated into an upper
middle class, which was an embryonic bourgeoisie, and a lower middle class, the bulk of it only marginally
better off than the working class.” (Ponnambalam 1981, 15)
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shrewd politician that he was, Jayawardena, who would in the late 1970s liberalize and
transform the economy, already saw the importance of aligning with the United States.
The Federal Reserve sent John Exter, who wrote the ‘Report on the Establishment of
a Central Bank for Ceylon’ in November 1949. Exter, the first Governor of the Central Bank
in Sri Lanka, said in his Report that “in taking steps to establish an independent monetary
system to be administered by a central bank the Government has demonstrated unmistakably
its intention to achieve genuine economic freedom as a corollary of the political freedom
achieved a year and a half ago” (Exter 1994, 1). Thus independent monetary and economic
policies were linked to state formation. Furthermore, Exter ideologically maneuvered the
fashioning of Sri Lanka’s monetary authority and control of banking away from stronger
links to both India and Britain: “In fact, whenever a country voluntarily links its currency to
another, it establishes a satellite-planet relationship which in effect proclaims that the satellite
will always move with the planet. This is tantamount to a renunciation of a basic element of
monetary sovereignty” (Exter 1994, 4). Thus the concept of sovereignty is now evoked in
relation to even banking. Exter nevertheless makes a distinction between different countries
and their economies, including the notions of underdevelopment and development:
“Experience of central banks in underdeveloped economies reveals that such banks need
different and wider powers than those in developed economies” (Exter 1994, 9).
Exter articulated his arguments not only in terms of domestic needs but of global
changes, including the global capital and goods markets, and emphasized Sri Lanka’s
economic dependence on the prices of a few primary commodities in foreign markets. He
went onto say that Sri Lanka is “dependent upon economic conditions abroad, and is
especially sensitive to the world business cycle” (Exter 1994, 9-10). This reference to
dependence on foreign markets and the business cycles as the rationale for monetary and
economic policies is important. Exter went onto discuss the short-term and long-term
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implications, justifying the role of the Central Bank as one relating to the long run through
directing savings and foreign capital towards agricultural development and new industries to
diversify the economy.
In addition to the Central Bank created with US support, various other international
initiatives shaped postcolonial developments in the early 1950s. In January 1950 the Foreign
Ministers of the UK and of many other commonwealth countries arrived in Colombo to
initiate the Colombo Plan resulting in a report later in the year titled ‘Colombo Plan for
Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia’. A year later, in the
context of the Korean War, the United States decided to participate in the Colombo Plan,
merging support for international development with geopolitical security concerns (Blackton
1951). The Colombo Plan drew up extensive six-year plans for development first in 1950 (Rs.
1,400 million, US$ 294 million) and then revised in 1952 (Rs. 3,200 million, US$ 672
million).18 The priorities were very much agriculture, transport, communications and power
(IBRD 1953, 107). However, the funds for such development were not assured, and these
were merely blue prints to develop the South and South East Asian regions in the context of
the Cold War.
Next, in late 1951, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
commonly known as the World Bank, sent a large mission to Sri Lanka. The mission,
consisting of fourteen officials and staff, was headed by Sir Sydney Caine, who was Financial
Secretary of Hong Kong in the late 1930s and an economist who was a World Bank
consultant before he became the Director of the London School of Economics between 1957
and 1967. The extensive report running close to 800 pages titled “The Economic
Development of Ceylon,” made a number of recommendations focusing on agricultural

18

The Rupee to US$ conversion for the 1950s used here is 1 Rupee = 0.21 US Dollars from the World Bank
report (IBRD 1953).
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development, particularly development of the uncultivated regions of the dry zone. The
Report promoted the colonization of landless peasantry in the dry zone and recognized the
importance of institutions such as co-operatives and Rural Development Societies. The
Report also addressed the need for infrastructure including transport and communications as
well as power generation and transmission.
The Report’s recommendations for investment in economic development from 1953
to 1959, in the various sectors totaling Rs. 1,600 million (US$ 336 million) were more
conservative than the Colombo Plan, but were considered more realistic given the funds
available (IBRD 112-113). Significantly, the Report emphasized investment in agriculture
and neglected industries in their vision of development as evident from the priorities
summarized in Table 1.1.19

Table 1.1 IBRD Report Priorities (1951)
Recommendations
Agriculture including Colonisation and Irrigation
Transport and Communications

Rs. (Mn)
460

US$ (Mn)
97

430

90

Power including Plants and Distribution

209

44

Health

195

41

Education

145

30

Industry
75
Rural Development
60
Source : IBRD, (1951), The Economic Development of Ceylon

16
13

W.D. Lakshman summarizes the recommendations of the World Bank mission as follows: “The
recommendations of the WB Mission of 1951, taken as a whole, were intended to promote private capitalism in
the country within the broad economic and social structure which then existed. It was the same type of
dependent capitalism cultivated by British colonialism in Sri Lanka that received the support of the WB
Mission. No change in the structural significance of plantation agriculture which depended on external markets
was envisaged. The largely peasant character of non-export agriculture was to continue. No measures were
recommended to spread the capitalist mode of production into this sector, so that forces of production in it
would develop rapidly. Introduction of industrial capitalism on a wide front was discouraged so that the country
would continue to be dependent on foreign sources for technology and a wide variety of industrial goods.
Foreign capital dominance of the economy would have continued unabated under these recommendations or
would have even become greater. The significance of the building up of a national bourgeoisie for self-reliant
capitalist development was not recognized by the Mission and within the policy framework proposed, the
merchant character of the existing domestic capitalist class would have continued, thereby strengthening the
existing dependent relationships” (Lakshman 1985, 7).
19
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Among other recommendations including those of fiscal consolidation, the issue of
food subsidies was prominent and would have serious consequences on political
developments in Sri Lanka:
Ceylon’s problem of food subsidies is of greatest importance not only because of its
adverse effect on the budget, but also from the general economic point of view. In its
annual report for the year 1950, the Central Bank commented on the problem at
length, concluding that ‘… a widespread system of subsidies has a tendency to hide
real costs, to distort the country’s economy, and sometimes to act as a serious barrier
to efficiency. … Food subsidies are no more than a palliative, concealing the
necessity of adjustment by keeping food prices at an artificially low level.’ …
Therefore the Mission concurs in the view of the Central Bank, that food subsidies
should now be reduced (IBRD 1953, 184 -185).
The World Bank Report legitimized the Central Bank created with the support of
Washington, and had considerable influence with the ruling UNP. Such engagement by
international actors was a significant factor in the formation of the postcolonial state
institutions in Sri Lanka.

‘Hartal of 1953’, ‘Sinhala Only’ and Postcolonial Politics
The economic trajectory and institutions built with the support of powerful Western
actors met with a serious challenge due to global market changes. From 1952 into 1953 with
a fall in exports especially of rubber, Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves were depleted. The
government under considerable financial pressure decided to cut subsidies as recommended
by the World Bank to address the balance of payments crisis.20 The price of rice was raised

20

Lakshman traces the World Bank recommendations in this context as two fold; the gradual closure of a
number of public sector industries initiated during the Second World War and the elimination of the food
subsidies. He claims: “The regime in power acted even more drastically than was recommended by the Mission.
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from 25 cents to 70 cents a measure.21 Furthermore, even the school children’s mid-day meal
was withdrawn (Amarasinghe 1998). This resulted in the largest general strike, ‘Hartal’22 of
August 1953, in Sri Lanka’s history. Militant protests shutdown Colombo and swept the
coastal areas. The Cabinet of Ministers concerned about their security had to meet on a
British warship and the Prime Minister eventually resigned.
The Hartal of 1953 was a landmark event reflecting the emerging contradictions in
postcolonial Sri Lanka. It was an early sign of the deep disenchantment within society. The
national elite’s promise of postcolonial development was failing. The left parties, both the
Trotskyite LSSP and the Soviet-leaning Communist Party, were able to build trade unions in
urban areas and particularly along the Western coastal belt around Colombo. Trade unions
were initially formed among printers, then tram cars and railways, then port worker and
private firms (Jaywardena 1972). However, neither the Sinhala peasantry in the southern
Sinhala hinterland, nor the peasantry in the North and East, populated by Tamils, nor the UpCountry Tamils, the plantation labor bolstered the Hartal. There was already a major gulf
between the politics of the urban left base and the interests of peasantry and the estate
workers who formed the larger part of the population.
The Hartal provided the political impetus for S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP), a party formed after splitting from the UNP and with strong links to
the petty bourgeoisie in the rural South, which saw an opening to mobilize on the Sinhala
population’s disenchantment with the anglicized elite in Colombo. While Bandaranaike was
While the latter proposed a ‘gradual’ withdrawal of consumer subsidies, the government tried to eliminate them
totally in 1953. Since the expenditure on account of these subsidies was a large element in government current
expenditure, their withdrawal resulted in a large increase in government savings, from an average of 13.2 per
cent of government revenue in 1951/2 - 1952/3 to 34.5 per cent in 1953/4 - 1955/6. The grave social hardships
caused by the withdrawal of food subsidies naturally produced a violent social reaction in 1953, later on in 1956
becoming one of the main factors which brought down the existing regime.” (Lakshman 1985, 9)
21
One measure of rice equals 2 pounds or 0.9 kilograms, and 100 cents equal one rupee. In 1950s dollars, where
1 Rupee = US$ 0.21, the price of approximately 0.9 kilograms of rice was raised from US$ 0.05 to US$ 0.15.
22
The hartal is a form of protest, where in addition to strikes by trade unions, all institutions including shops and
transport are shutdown bringing economic activity to a halt. The Sri Lankan left leadership exiled in India after
the British banned them during the Second World War borrowed this concept from the protest culture in India.
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half hearted in his support of the Hartal, he and his SLFP were able to take the wind away
from the left in the ensuing years (Manor 1989).
The Hartal of 1953 was a turning point, which Bandaranaike and his SLFP were able
to capitalize, leading to the eventual defeat of the UNP in 1956. Bandaranaike came to power
with a major Sinhala nationalist campaign for “Sinahala Only” language policies, which
made Sinhala the sole official language, as opposed to the anti-colonial demand of making
both Sinhala and Tamil official languages. Bandaranaike mobilized the Sinhala masses
including the peasantry, first against the English speaking anglicized elite, and eventually
against the Tamil speaking minority communities. Furthermore, Bandaranaike went into a
coalition with small sections of the left. The broader left parties took a principled stand at that
time calling for parity of status for both Tamil and Sinhala and opposed the move towards
“Sinhala Only” (Muthiah and Wanasinghe 2005). Nevertheless, Bandaranaike had initiated a
tradition of coalitions in the parliamentary realm, between the SLFP which had a Sinhala
rural base and the left parties that had an urban working-class base.23
This maneuver by Bandaranaike was significant both politically and economically.24
The politics of majoritarianism with respect to language policy undermined possibilities of a
plural polity resulting in the Tamil population being alienated from the state. Next, the
economic policies were redirected towards land reform and rural development, with the

23

The coalition politics of left parties joining with the SLFP would eventually lead to fall of the left parties, as
they even had to compromise on their principled stand on the “national question” in order to accomdate the
Sinhala majority towards progressive economic policies (Philips 2001).
24
Newton Gunasinghe claims Bandaranaike’s manoeuvre and the important political shift in 1956, set the tragic
path of Sri Lanka’s postcolonial history: “In a social structure which generates an ideology that religion does not
relate to one’s personal beliefs but to one’s family antecedents, S.W.R.D.’s move to become a Buddhist and
what is more, his vocal advocacy of Sinhala-Buddhist interests, testifies to his ability of political maneuver.
S.W.R.D., through these able political tactics, was able to establish his personal hegemony, distancing himself
away from his extended family group, while going against the old-established bourgeois strata, simultaneously
cultivating solid political relations with newly emergent bourgeois and petty bourgeois strata emanating from
diverse social backgrounds. But his ideology of populist Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, while creating the social
base for his assumption of power, also alienated the Tamils in the northern, eastern and central provinces. …
[T]his laid the political foundations for the terrible ethnic conflict, destabilization and violence which we are
obliged to undergo today.” (Perera 1996)

49

initiation of import substitution policies. The shift in 1956, which empowered the Sinhala
rural masses including through access to higher education and jobs in the state sector, also
paved the way for the radicalization of Sinhala youth as the “children of 1956” took forward
the first major youth insurrection fifteen years later; the Janatha Vimukthi Perumuna (JVP)25
insurrection of 1971 was in many ways a backlash from rural Sinhala youth to the failed
promise of 1956.
The Tamil community in turn increasingly felt marginalised, as the Sinhala language
policy reduced the chances for state employment starting in the 1960s. Next, attempts to
curtail the entry of Tamil students into the universities first on an ethnic basis and then on a
district basis, was a form of reverse discrimination that heightened Tamil nationalist feelings
among the lower middle class Tamil youth in Jaffna in particular. There were periodic
pogroms, in 1956 and 1958, as Sinhala mobs felt emboldened to attack Tamils following the
victory of the government promoting “Sinhala Only” policies. There were also physical
attacks against non-violent protests organised by Tamil parliamentarians from the Federal
Party demanding automy in response to the language policy. Such violence greatly increased
the insecurity of the Tamil community.
By the late 1950s, there were four major political actors in the realm of party politics.
The UNP, which was the party of the emergent bourgeoisie controlled by the Colombo elite
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The JVP was a party of Sinhala youth led by its charismatic leader Rohana Wijeveera, who had broken away
from the Communist Party – Peking Wing. The JVP’s ideology combined Sinhala Buddhist nationalism with a
home grown version of Marxism and had as its goal the capture of state power to serve the interests of rural
youth. Its nationalism was consolidated in its idea of opposing Indian expansionism in the region, where it saw
the Up-Country Tamils working in the plantations as the fifth column of such Indian expansionism. The JVP
insurrection was brutally crushed in 1971 with massacre of as many as 10,000 youth. It regrouped in the early
1980s as a political party following the release of its leaders, but attempted a more brutal insurrection in
opposition to the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987. It assumed that it could count on the support of the Sinhala
population rising up against the Indian military presence in the country in the form of the Indian Peace Keeping
Forces implementing the terms of the Accord. However, the JVP was again brutally crushed in the course of two
years when the country saw some of its most brutal massacres and as many as 50,000 people were killed. These
insurrections by rural Sinhala youth crushed by a military mainly coming from the Sinhala community, is often
neglected in the rather ethicized writing on Sri Lanka. The JVP today continues as a small parliamentary party
with a mobilizable social base and has been vocal on issues of democracy and opposition to neoliberal policies.
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and with a base among Sinhala landed classes. The SLFP, which had split from the UNP,
with the same class character but with a stronger base among the petty bourgeoisie
particularly in the non-English speaking Sinhala rural regions. The Left parties, which were
increasingly fragmented, but centered around the Trotskyite LSSP and the Communist Party,
which was first aligned with Moscow and then split with a Peking wing. Finally, the Tamil
parties, which by the late 1950s was dominated by the Federal Party26, whose main demands
were on language policy and autonomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Ceylon
Workers Congress formed in 1950 after changing its name from the Ceylon Indian Congress,
was both a trade union of the estate workers and a political party representing the Up-Country
Tamils (Woodward 1969).
The Left parties gained electoral strength when they went into a coalition with the
SLFP forming the United Front government in 1970. The state socialist experiment in the
1970s characterized by nationalization and land reform failed with external pressures and
balance of payments problems. The Left never recovered after its stint in sharing power with
a coalition government, and has been in steady decline since 1977. Politics in Sri Lanka to
this day continues to be dominated by the UNP and SLFP, the Old Left has been replaced by
the JVP after it entered and gained some presence in parliamentary politics in the 2000s. The
JVP with Sinhala nationalist undertones has emerged as the voice on class issues. Ethnic
minority politics are characterized by the Tamil coalition, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA)
centered on the Federal Party base; various Up-Country Tamil parties after the Ceylon
Workers Congress gained strength in the 1960s has fragmented over the last two decades; and
various Muslim parties including the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, which gained ascendancy
as a powerful party in the 1990s, but fragmented in the following decade.

26

The Muslim community which was mainly Tamil speaking, voted for Muslim leaders who were in the Federal
Party or one of the major national parties. It is in the late 1980s in the context of the ethnic conflict that Muslims
began to assert their independent identity and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress was formed.

51

Import Substitution and the State’s Role in the Economy
While the UNP regime soon after Independence focused on support from the West
and took forward the interests of the emergent bourgeoisie and the large landowners, there
was a significant shift in the governments that emerged after 1956 and continued until 1977.27
The regimes that led these governments depended on expanding the role of the state for their
politics and their consolidation. One characteristic of these regimes was the instrumental use
of state institutions and state power to build a social base and electoral support among various
classes, rather than use of state power to carry forward the sole class interests of the
bourgeoisie. The politics of these regimes were characterized by class compromises as
opposed to outright attacks when it came to the demands and struggles of the lower classes.
In the realm of economic policies, these regimes promoted social welfare policies,
nationalization of some industries and services, and import substitution policies, as opposed
to greater integration with the global market in capital and goods.
The changing relationship between regimes and the state after 1956 had two
characteristics. First, the expanding social base of the state was characterized by further
social services including support and subsidies provided by the state. Second, the state took a
greater role in the economy through initiation of state corporations and greater public sector
employment (Uyangoda 1993). These changes to the state’s role were taken forward with
import substitution policies including the nationalization of a number of industries, services
and the estates.

27

From 1956 to 1959 S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike in coalition with a small section of the Left, particularly, the MEP
led by Philip Gunawardena, was in power. Following Bandaranaike’s assassination, his wife became the Prime
Minister from 1960 to 1965 and again under the United Front coalition with most of the mainstream Left
political parties between 1970 and 1977. Except for the period between 1965 and 1970 when the UNP was in
power, the SLFP regimes in alliance with Left leaned more towards the Soviet Blok as they became active in the
Non-Aligned Movement. With this shift towards the East, aid from the West was reduced to Sri Lanka, and
import substitutions policies came to the fore.
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There were a number of efforts at land reform between the mid-1950s and the mid1970s. The Paddy Lands Act of 1953 claimed to grant security of tenure, however, it was
only initiated in the two districts of Hambantota and Batticaloa with little enforcement, and
was for the most part only a recognition of the problems with land tenure and did not lead to
any substantive changes (Sanderatne 1972, Sanderatne 2004). The Paddy Lands Act of 1958,
on the other hand, was brought about with the keen interest in land reform of leftist leader
Philip Gunawardena, who had joined the SLFP coalition as a Minister of Agriculture. Its
provisions, however, were focused on addressing sharecroppers through regulations to ensure
their security of land tenure and reduce their exploitation. Such security for sharecroppers
were particularly important in the South where absentee landlords living in the towns and in
Colombo exploited the rural population.
In reality, the landowners were able to undermine its workings through evictions,
particularly when tenants attempted to find relief through the Act. Indeed, there was a large
scale attack on the landless peasantry28 by the landed classes after land reform was initiated,
and that between 1958 and 1968 some 35,500 evictions were reported to the government
(Sandaratne 1972, 125).
There was slightly better success by state policies with respect to indebtedness. A
related and important factor was the indebtedness of the tenants who relied among others on
the landlord for credit. In 1957, 54 percent of the rural families were in debt with only 7.8
percent of debt involving institutional sources. However, by 1961/1962 rural debt was
characterized by 34.2 percent to institutional sources, showing a marked reduction of
predatory forms debt as a result of government support including for credit co-operatives
(Sandaratne 1972, 125 - 132).
According to Herring, “empirically the tenure reform model has in the South Asian context proved unable to
accomplish even its limited goals and has indeed often harmed rather than helped the tenants it is meant to
protect.” (Herring 1981, 134)
28
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It was in the 1970s under the United Front government that a more extensive land
reform policy was implemented. The Land Reform Law of 1972 and the Land Reform
(Amendment) Law of 1975 provided for ceilings on agricultural land, alienation of state lands
with a land to the landless approach as opposed to the earlier approach of merely securing the
land tenure of share croppers. Furthermore, there was extensive nationalization of land held
by private corporations including estates (Abeysinghe 1979). The 1972 reforms avoided lands
held by the rural middle classes and temples in Districts such as Kandy, which would have
been welcomed by the Kandyan poor, but were considered politically risky by the Leftleaning government (Moore 2008). Furthermore, the estate lands after nationalization did not
reach the landless in any significant levels.29 However, these reforms along with some major
irrigation projects with colonization of landless peasantry as well as a significant state
supported infrastructure for rural development were major efforts towards reshaping the
political economy of Sri Lanka. Rural development was emphasized with greater support for
co-operatives and agricultural committees as well as state services such as agricultural
extension. The landed classes resisted such land reforms, even as the government struggled
with fiscal pressures, until the coalition government unraveled in 1976.
The economic policies of the import substitution era led to mixed results with some
gains to the rural classes and decreasing inequalities in the country. State promoted industries
included steel, chemicals, cerarmics and eventually the nationalization of tea estates.
Furthermore, agricultural production increased during this period, particularly with much
higher production of rice which was the staple food for Sri Lankan society. Between 1950
and 1982, the level of self-sufficiency in rice went from 25% to 90%, with rice production
growing annually at 4.3% while population grew at 2.2% (Gunatilleke 1993, 8). Such
Moore is critical in evaluating the nationalization of estates: “The estate land reform was conducted in the
name of the peasantry, yet the actual benefits, mainly short-term, took the form of estate jobs for those with the
appropriate political connections. The total amount alienated to villagers was small, and that mainly low-value,
uncultivated land.” (Moore 2008, 81)
29
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agricultural production was increased through the fertilizer subsidy as well as irrigation
support. However, producer prices were kept low and the surplus was transferred to the rest
of the population, particularly in the urban areas.30 Nevertheless, the economic trajectory set
by the United Front Government could not be sustained and was soon reversed by the UNP
government of 1977 that was committed to liberalization of the economy.
The trajectory of economic development had remained more or less consistent
between 1956 and 1977. Politically, the recognition of the importance of rural constituencies
became clear to all parties, and the left parties joined the SLFP at the center, changing the
character of electoral politics which until then was more securely controlled by the elite
mainly in Colombo (Shastri 1983). In the context of import substitution economic policies,
welfare policies were protected and even expanded. However, price fluctuations in the world
market for exports from Sri Lanka and imports into Sri Lanka took their toll on the efforts at
land reforms. The global economic downturn and the oil crisis of the 1970s crippled the stateled economic experiment in the 1970s and ended the import substitution policies31 lasting
close to two decades in Sri Lanka.

Moore’s conclusions are significant: “The net subsidy from the state to paddy producers is: (a) lower than is
widely believed; (b) highly concentrated on a relatively small number of recipients; (c) partly outweighed by the
transfer of income from rice producers to consumers through government policies which depress rice producer
prices: and (d) massively outweighed by a large transfer of resources out of the smallholder sector as a whole,
achieved by the direct and indirect taxation of smallholder producers of export crops, especially coconut
producers. The appropriation of a large surplus from the export crop sector has generally permitted the state to
subsidise both domestic rice producers and food consumers. However, when the interests of local food
producers and consumers have come into direct conflict, the latter have generally prevailed.” (Moore 2008, 86)
31
Godfrey Gunatilleke’s contextualization of import substitution policies particularly with respect to rice and
eventually self sufficienty in rice are important for understanding the policies form the late 1950s into the 1970s.
He claims that “any critique of import substitution policies of the post-independence period would need to take
into account the full complexity of the problems faced by the policymakers… At the time of independence,
import substitution in rice appeared to be an obvious option. The World Bank mission which surveyed the Sri
Lankan economy at the beginning of the 1950s endorsed this. Sri Lanka was importing 75% of its requirement
of rice - the country’s main staple food. There had been a well-developed irrigation infrastructure in the Dry
Zone which could be speedily restored and rehabilitated. New land was available for agricultural settlements.
There was a large landless rural population in the densely populated, land-scarce, Wet Zone available for
transfer to the land-surplus Dry Zone. … Sri Lanka’s performance in the rice sector has been acclaimed as one
of the best in Asia. … The rice program also increased productivity and incomes in the backward peasant sector
and by so doing ensured that Sri Lanka followed a development strategy which was equity-oriented”
(Gunatilleke 1993, 8).
30
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Jayawardena Regime and Liberalization
Following the collapose of Bretton Woods Agreement (Helleiner 1994), the world
economic downturn in the 1970s (Brenner 2006) and the related Sri Lankan economic crisis
of falling terms of trade and a balance of payment crisis led to the Jayawardena regime
coming to power with a landslide victory in the parliamentary election of 1977. Jayawardena
using his five-sixths majority in parliament further consolidated power by bringing in the
executive presidential system, which entrenched power in one individual. Centralized power
was crucial for the economic transformation that he brought about with his open economy
policies to both direct large development projects as well as to crush resistance including
from trade unions. Indeed, both on the political and economic front, the Jayawardena regime
probably brought about the most significant and lasting changes in Sri Lanka’s post-colonial
history.
Jayawardena moved Sri Lanka toward the US policy initiatives and away from nonalignment and pro-Soviet-leaning policies of the previous Government. This shift towards the
US and a major structural adjustment program ensured much larger flows of aid from
Western governments and donors (Bastian 2007). The structural reforms included reducing
exchange rate and price controls, trade liberalization particularly reduction of import tariffs,
facilitating foreign investments and financial deregulation (Weerakoon 2004, 61). To
strengthen its financial position, the Government went into a standby arrangement with the
IMF.
Political scientist Ronald Herring, who worked on the land question in Sri Lanka in
the 1970s and 1980s, provides a perceptive evaluation of the IMF agreement:
International factors in the new strategy thus become critical; external support in
material terms has arguably been a necessary condition for the liberalization
initiatives. The international development community has provided resources to tide
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the regime over the potentially rocky re-adjustment period. The dynamics are
familiar. Following a sharp devaluation of the rupee in November of 1977, the IMF
announced support for ‘the comprehensive program of economic reform ... in support
of which the present stand-by arrangement (of SDR 93 million) has been approved’.
IMF approval is an important signal in international financial and development
communities, and the regime quickly took advantage of its new status (Herring 1987,
328).
With the IMF agreement32 in place, Sri Lanka mobilized considerable donor funds from the
World Bank in particular, and a number of bilateral donors as well. It moved on banking
reform by inviting many foreign banks to open operations in Sri Lanka. It also targeted
investors to expand the tourist sector and the newly formed garment sector.
The Structural Adjustment Program was a mixed bag. The policy package known
locally as the open economic policies included: exchange rate and trade liberalization; a shift
from administered prices to market prices with public corporations33 pushed to become
commercially viable; cuts to budgetary expenditure in food subisidies in place for close to
three decades; and promotion of private enterprises including foreign direct investment
(Lakshman 1985). There was considerable promotion of foreign investment through
incentives; the foreign investment from 1970 to 1977 was a mere Rs. 17 million (US$ 2.6
million)34 but from 1977 to 1984 it was Rs. 5,448 million (US$ 340 million) (Gunatilleke
1993, 34-35).35 However, the Structural Adjustment Program in Sri Lanka was also selective
in the choice and implementation of reforms given the political concerns; therefore
privatization of public sector commercial and industrial undertakings was avoided.
32

The role of IMF approval has proven important to mobilize the flow of global capital in the future as well.
Accorinding to Ronal Herring as late as 1982, public sector industrial corporations included steel, petroleum
products, textiles, fertilisers, tyres, salt, dairy products, distilleries, oils and fats, timber and plywood, paper,
cement and ceramics. They accounted for more than 60% of industrial production (Herring 1987, 330)
34
In June 1974, US$ 1 = Rs. 6.5
35
In June 1980, US$ 1 = Rs. 16
33
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Furthermore, there was a sharp increases in government capital expenditure, particularly on
infrastructural and housing projects, resulting in high budget deficits (Lakshman 1985). In
fact, much of the inflow of foreign capital was absorbed in construction and infrastructure
build out.
International influences and developments led by the United States shaped the open
economy reforms in Sri Lanka. The World Bank supported the Mahaweli Development
project, a massive irrigation and colonisation scheme redirecting the Mahaweli River is the
largest national development project to date. Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were created to
facilitate East Asian capital investment in garment production and were supported with
considerable tax incentives and trade liberalization.
In the context of labor agitations culminating in the general strike of July 1980,
Jayawardena responded by crushing labor through the dismissal of tens of thousands of
workers both in the state and private sectors. While the Government maintained that forty
thousand workers were on strike, trade union estimates vary but claim as many as one
hundred thousand workers were on strike, the majority of them state sector, but also a section
of the private sector unions (Fernando 1983). The Government seemed much better prepared
for the strike, dividing the trade unions on their economic demands, and politically prepared
and decisive in the attack, including through a state of emergency. This concerted attack
significantly weakened the trade union movement into the foreseeable future.
The high economic growth in the first few years after liberalization was mainly due to
the increasing flows of capital from multilateral donors and a massive construction boom in
infrastructure and housing.36 By 1979, with the accelerated construction projects37,

36

According to Ganesan, the construction sector clearly became the lead sector in development during this
period. The accelerated Mahaweli development project and the housing and urban development were both
construction heavy. The third was the Investment Promotion Zone under the Greater Colombo Economic
Commission, which led to the emergence of the garment sector (Ganesan 1982, 2).
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construction grew by 21 percent, while domestic industrial output grew only by 4 percent
(Ganesan, 1982, 6).
One of the most acute analyses of the early years of liberalization came from within
the US Government. A US Foreign Service officer and USAID official based in Sri Lanka at
that time, John Stuart Blackton, analysed the economic process from 1977 to 1983, as one of
initial boom with euphoria followed by worries and reversal, which he claimed is the
conventional path of liberalization.38 While describing the boom and the then slowdown in
the process of liberalization, Blackton nevertheless prescribed further financialisation
including expansion of the banking sector and promotion of the capital markets. In any event,
in his assessment as early as 1983, Blackton was correct about liberalization trajectory:
The consensus of moderate and conservative opinion seems to be that another six
years of liberal economic policies will be sufficient to move the center-point of
Ceylon's politics significantly to the right, and that no future non-Marxist government
would be prepared to abandon a basic commitment to the free market (Blackton,
1983, 750).
Indeed, over three decades later none of the governments were able to shift significantly from
the free market policies.

37

The accelerated Mahaweli development project was to be completed in 6 years from the originally planned 30
years. And the state led 100,000 housing scheme was also to be completed in 6 years (Ganesan 1982, 3).
38
Blakton’s analysis and sequence of steps with liberalisation are fascinating: “(1) Imported goods flood the
markets and the consumers are euphoric while traders grow rich overnight; (2) The new money from trade goes
into real estate and land prices and rents rise dramatically-squeezing some while enriching others; (3) The
banking system expands dramatically, attracting new deposits (usually in foreign exchange at near-Euro market
rates). Depositors are initially euphoric because of the high nominal interest rates; (4) The Consumer Price
Index rises at historically unprecedented rates and euphoria begins to wither among the less favored groups; (5)
Trade and commerce continue to predominate in the private sector and the government begins to worry about
the problems of directing resources to productive investments rather than trade; (6) The banking and trading
constituencies (who are making a killing in commercial transactions) resist pressures to diversify their
investment portfolios towards production, and public criticism of financial intermediaries mounts; and (7)
Government begins to re-examine the social and political cost of liberalization and to consider alterations in
policy to respond to the new distortions.” (Blackton, 1983, 742)
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Blackton also analyzed the implications of the Jayawardena regime’s embrace of the
Singapore model and more generally of the East Asian high growth models. He claimed Sri
Lanka could become a model of high growth, equity and a democratic political system,
refuting criticism that high growth was only possible under authoritarian governments as with
East Asia. This narrative of Blackton’s is prescriptive reflecting US geopolitical interests. By
1983, the Jayawardena regime was anything but liberal. While Jayawardena won his second
term as president, he had manipulated the legislature to maintain his large majority in
legislature thorugh a problematic extension of the term of parliament through a referendum.
Jayawardena was in fact emulating the authoritarian East Asian states. In any event, after the
initial boom with structural adjustment from 1977 to 1983, the Sri Lankan economy began to
stagnate even as political developments destabilized the country.
The other legacy of Jayawardena was the escalation of the armed conflict and the
emergence of a civil war. Soon after Jayawardena’s electoral victory, the riots that occurred
with the complicity of the new government in 1977 were foreboding of what was to come.39
By the late 1970s, Jayawardena was aggressively attempting to crush Tamil militancy.
Jayawardena declared a State of Emergency and brought about the Prevention of Terrorism
Act in 1979. Repression was the response to both Tamil youth unrest and the labor agitations.
Even as the initial spurt of growth propelled by the inflow of capital began to taper, the
largely state-orchestrated pogrom of July 1983 led to the emergence of the civil war.40 The
regional power and pro-Soviet leaning India, frustrated with the shift by Jayawardena
towards the US, began to arm Tamil militants. The Sri Lankan state, thus, hadbecome
embroiled in a protracted armed conflict.

39

The 1977 riots were worst thus far and it was unleashed by mobs close to the new Government.
Over 2,000 people were massacred in the pogrom of July 1983. The Government watched as Colombo burned
for three days and much of the Tamil population in the Southern districts were displaced to the North. Soon after
the pogrom thousands of Tamil youth joined Tamil armed movements with bases in Tamil Nadu in India, and
that in effect started the civil war.
40
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Successive governments during the war continued on the path of economic
liberalization. Premadasa, who succeeded Jayawardena as the UNP president, had to deal
with both the war in the North and the second JVP insurrection by rural Sinhala youth in the
South between 1988 and 1990. The insurgency and a brutal counter insurgency killed tens of
thousands, crippled the economy and weakened the state.
On the economic front the Premadasa regime continued on the liberalization
trajectory. Many scholars on the Sri Lankan economy have argued that the period from 1989
to 1993 under the Premadasa regime represented the second wave of liberalization, which
was characterised by financial, trade, tax and exchange rate liberalization (Dunham and
Kelegama 1995). Next, Chandrika Kumaratunga – the daughter of the founder of SLFP,
Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and later his wife, Srimavo Bandaranaike who had
led the United Front coalition government in the 1970 – was elected president in 1994 on a
peace platform with the support of social movements calling for both an end to the war and a
reversal of liberalization policies that had devastated rural communities since 1977. While
she had ousted the UNP after seventeen years, she was unable to reverse the liberalization
trajectory despite election promises to the contrary. However, she did attempt negotiations
with the LTTE to arrive at a political solution, but the LTTE broke those talks and restarted
the war.
The election of a right wing UNP government in late 2001 led by Ranil
Wickremesinghe, the nephew of J. R. Jayawardena, with the support of the business
community in Colombo did create possibilities of a major for liberalization. The
Wickremesinghe Government attempted to couple the donor-backed internationalised peace
process with ‘Regaining Sri Lanka’, a market-oriented development and reconstruction
program. The economic policy package sought major labor reforms, trade and financial
liberalization, creation of a market in land and privatisation, which if sustained would have
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drastically reshaped the political economy of Sri Lanka. However, the market-oriented UNP
Government was defeated after a short tenure in 2004, in part due to the Southern
constituencies worrying about further cuts to social welfare and in part because of the
perception that the Government was giving into the demands of the LTTE in the
internationalized peace process. Wickremesinghe’s defeat in the parliamentary elections of
2004 to the SLFP coalition led by President Kumaratunga and then the Presidential election
of 2005 to Rajapaksa, and the subsequent return and escalation of war, again decelerated
liberalization of the economy. Therefore, I argue that the first wave of liberalization initiated
in 1977 continued into the following decades, as it did not lead to any significant
transformation of the economy nor change the economic policy trajectory.

The North before the War
An analysis of economic developments during and after the war requires a long durée
perspective. The Jaffna District, while relatively small with just 1,012 km2 continues to house
a majority of the population of the Northern Province. Much like the other coastal towns in
Sri Lanka, Jaffna was transformed by centuries of colonial rule first by the Portuguese, then
the Dutch and finally the British. During the Dutch period in particular, Jaffna became central
to the colonial economy as the place of greatest revenues accruing to the Dutch in Sri Lanka.
Furthermore, Dutch policies in Jaffna monetised the local economy through the export of
cash crops particularly tobacco.
With the shift to British colonial rule in the early 19th century, the Jaffna economy
continued to be commercialised by the tobacco trade, but very differently from the plantation
economy including coffee plantations carried forward by the British in the Central Province
(Arasaratnam 1982). The estates were run by companies with a captive indentured labor,
however, the cash crop economy in Jaffna was led by the small-holdinng peasantry. In
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addition to tobacco, the Jaffna Peninsula was also the centre of agricultural production
particularly in grains and vegetables. Such agricultural production in Jaffna also led to heavy
taxation by the British in Jaffna shaping the small holding land tenure system in Jaffna in the
19th Century (Bastiampillai 2006).
Jaffna also gained from advances in education with schools built during the British
colonial period, particularly starting in the mid-19th century. These schools providing English
education helped produce a small professional middle-class stratum that worked in the
colonial clerical service and as educators in the rest of the country and even in places like
Malaysia during the early twentieth century. Thus a small remittance economy was also
historically true for Jaffna during late colonialism (Paramothayan 1990).
The Tamil elite demanded constitutional power sharing, as their minority status
became increasingly evident in the context of universal suffrage and territorial representation
in the State Councils with the Donoughmore reforms in the early 1930s. This was not the
case under communal representation where the Tamil elite wielded equal power with their
Sinhala counterparts. The Up-Country Tamils were disenfranchised in 1949 with the
complicity of the Tamil political leadership in parliament, particularly G. G. Ponnambalam of
the Tamil Congress. This was one of the precipitating factors in the emergence of the Federal
Party on a Tamil nationalist platform. The Tamil public also began to rally behind the Tamil
nationalist cause with the discriminatory “Sinhala Only” policies in 1956 that affected job
opportunities and access of state services. Anti-Tamil riots in 1956 and 1958 made the Tamil
community insecure. The continuing fear within the Tamil community of violence and
repression of non-violent Tamil political protests led to the further strengthening of Tamil
nationalist politics.
It is the economic policies of these Sinahala nationalist regimes between 1956 and
1977 that also provided state lands for Jaffna Tamils willing to cultivate in the Vanni (the
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region in the mainland south of the Jaffna District with a large land area but low in
population). Economically, the import substitution policies beginning in the late 1950s, and
particularly from 1970 to 1977, supported the cash crop boom in onions, chillies, and
tobacco, which fetched higher prices in the rest of the country (Gunasinghe 1985). There was
also a fisheries boom as seafood was exported with the introduction of trawling and fish
processing facilities in Jaffna (Scholtens 2012). These economic changes benefitted sections
of the Jaffna Tamils, particularly the lower middle classes, with considerable accumulation in
the agriculture and fisheries sectors during this period. Such accumulation was best reflected
by local investment and increased construction, including cement housing and other buildings
for example of co-operatives.
It is this sector of the lower middle-class youth, the children of landed small farmers –
who were increasingly educated but lacked job opportunities despite aspirations towards
clerical and professional jobs – that increasingly came under the influence of Tamil
nationalism (Ragavan 2009, Thiranagama et al. 1990). In the early 1970s, controversial
policies for university admission reducing the high intake of Tamil students from Jaffna were
implemented by the left-leaning government beholden to the rural Sinhala masses. These socalled policies of “standardization” eventually led to district quotas, increasing the university
admissions of educationally backward districts, but were perceived by these lower middleclass Jaffna youth as discriminatory policies against the Tamils. Historically, relative to other
districts university admissions from the Colombo and Jaffna Districts were much higher due
to better facilities in schools in both districts. Therefore, these new university admission
policies had both a rural and ethnic bias. However, while only a very small section of Jaffna
youth entered the universities, the professional or white collar jobs that came with university
admission were central to lower middle class youth aspiration. It is mainly these Tamil youth
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of lower middle-class background who were also the early cadres of Tamil militancy and
built the armed movements leading to the armed conflict (De Silva 1978).
The prosperity from import substitution and cash crop agriculture in Jaffna had a caste
character. The unique characteristic of caste in Jaffna is that the dominant Vellala caste also
forms numerical majority of the population of Jaffna. Furthermore, relatively small land area
resulting in land scarcity in Jaffna coupled with a large population of the dominant land
owning Vellala caste shaped the small holding character of land ownership. Such landed
relations have resulted in labor intensive cultivation of cash crops characterising productive
relations in Jaffna. A large section of the oppressed castes consisted of landless laborers.
Others were involved in services including as barbers, dhobis, manual scavenging and
cleaning and tree climbing.
Here, a broad section of this small-holding Vellala population used both their own
labor and the labor of oppressed castes whom they hired. Indeed, the wealth and
accumulation accruing from cash crop cultivation mainly benefitted the Vellala caste (Lebbe
1979). In this way, the Vellala caste which had been involved in tobacco cultivation for
export to the rest of the country and even South India as early as the late 19th century, made
major gains from the cash crop boom in the 1960s and 1970s (Gunasinghe 1985).
Sections of the fishing community, belonging to the Karaiyar caste also gained from
the fisheries boom that coincided with the cash crop boom in agriculture. Caste relations in
Jaffna, where a Brahmin caste is for the most part non-existent, is characterised by the upper
sections of the Karaiyar fishing caste claiming a position almost equal in status to the
landowning Vellala caste. The Karaiyar caste have some independence from the Vellala caste
as they are restricted to the coastal region and control production in fisheries. This is unlike
the various other service and oppressed castes which are dominated by the landed Vellala
caste.
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The other unique characteristic of Jaffna is the long and vibrant history of cooperatives beginning in the early twentieth century. Colonial policies of promoting cooperatives combined with an educated lower middle class and returning Malayan pensioners
with wealth and time contributed to the growth of co-operatives. By 1970, Jaffna and the
Northern Province also had an extensive co-operative structure. The Northern Division Cooperative Federation had 1259 co-operative societies consisting of Credit and Thrift
Societies, Stores Societies, Hospital Societies, Industrial Societies, Labor Societies, Fishing
Societies, Credit Unions, School Coop Societies etc. The co-operative societies with
hundreds of thousands of members were organised into 42 Secondary Unions (Paramothayan
1990). However, such co-operatives were very much under the control of the dominant
Vellala caste community.
While caste oppression had been severe for centuries, including under colonial rule,
where until the early 19th century oppressed castes were legally categorized as slaves, the
introduction of representative democracy, the social and economic changes in the late
colonial period and the cash crop boom triggered anti-caste agitations. The oppressed castes
consisting of the landless labor and those involved in palmyrah (a palm that grows widely
and naturally in northern Sri Lanka) and coconut work had gained from the educational
advances with an emerging leadership from within the community. The toddy tappers, the
artisans who climb the palm trees to tap the shoots to make a local alcohol, were in the fore
front of the anti-caste struggles along with others in their caste communities who worked as
agricultural labor.
The Communist Party began making inroads into rural Tamil society in the decades
after Independence. While it was initially involved in parliamentary politics contesting also in
from Jaffna, following the Peking wing split in the mid-1960s it became militantly involved
in anti-caste politics. (Senthivel 2009) The Party organised community centres in many
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oppressed caste villages and started agitating for state services for the oppressed castes.
While the strength of the oppressed caste communities varied from village to village, the
leadership provided by the Party was critical to forging an anti-caste movement in Jaffna. The
caste struggles emboldened the oppressed castes with respect to agricultural relations and
gave them confidence to demand access to schools dominated by the Vellala caste. It also
gave them dignity in terms of access to temples and equal seating at tea shops.
The organisation of oppressed castes in community organisations including the
community centres, the work of the left particularly the Communist Party in Jaffna and the
formation of the Palm Development Co-operatives eradicated untouchability and was steadily
weakening caste structure in Jaffna by the 1970s (Lebbe 1979). However, state discrimination
and repression and the riots against the Tamil community mobilized large sections of the
Tamil community under the Tamil nationalist banner. The armed movements led by Tamil
youth began recruiting youth in the villages and took over the community organisations and
redirected them away from their focus on caste politics towards their nationalist project. The
Communist Party lost its social base to these newly emerged armed groups, who through
intimidation and violence ensured the dominance of Tamil nationalist politics to the detriment
of anti-caste politics.

War Economy in the North
During the last two decades of the war, Jaffna was cut off from the national and
interanational market, and the Vanni was pummelled by bombing and displacement.
Economic survival during the war depended on three factors: the accumulation during the
boom in the rural economy prior to the war that the better off spent down; the tremendous
efforts towards subsistence and make-shift economic possibilities; and humanitarian
livelihood support from a range of actors including international donors and the state.
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Accumulation in the rural economy in the two decades prior to the war supported
some measure of resilience in the Tamil community during the war, particularly in the form
of assets including savings in banks and gold jewellery. Many families had gained the
economic means and social connections to send their youth abroad. The mass migration of
youth as refugees to Western countries provided support in the form of remittances. Social
institutions such as co-operatives were able to survive and keep their constituencies mobilised
during the war thanks to their growth and accumulation of resources prior to the war. For
example, the co-operatives had a range of assets from savings in banks to vehicles and
buildings, which were all used to sustain the co-operatives during the war.
State institutions including banks, pension departments and state employee salaries
continued through the war, including in the territory under the control of the rebels, as the
state wanted these institutions to continue even if they were subject to manipulation by the
armed groups. State employees faced the challenge of maintaining the state institutions,
balancing the demands of the Central Government and the increasingly ruthless armed
groups, which led to the intimidation, abduction and murder of a number of prominent
bureaucrats who courageously kept state institutions functioning to serve the local
communities.
Agricultural production continued at a minimal level and was mainly for subsistence
and the local market. The state maintained an economic embargo on fuel and other inputs that
it claimed could be used for the war efforts by the rebels. Therefore, local communities had to
mobilise innovative ways of sustaining day to day economic life. Shortages in food items
were addressed through food substitutes which would not have been possible if not for the
survival mind-set amidst war-time conditions. Substitutes for food during the war drew on
traditional foods that had been replaced by wheat and sugar. For example, yams, kurarrakan
(a local grain) and jaggery (a palm-based sugar) substituted for wheat bread and sugar.
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A range of actors provided support to the war affected population. The state kept the
educational institutions and hospitals functioning. Schools became centres for housing the
displaced during heightened bouts of war and the hospitals were crucial for the increasing
casualties from the war. The donors and the state provided humanitarian support including
food subsidies to the war affected population. NGOs provided a range of support working
with local communities to ensure at least minimal livelihood activities were possible.
Remittances were also important for the war affected population, but limited to the section of
the population that had relatives in the Tamil diaspora. By the end of the war, the Tamil
Diaspora was considered to be almost a million strong, whereas the Tamil population within
the country amounted to about 2.5 million. That is excluding the Muslim and Up-Country
Tamil population, who have their own exclusive ethnic and identarian politics. The Vellala
caste had a much higher proportion of relatives in the diaspora than those of the rural
oppressed castes.
The economically marginal sections sought or gained patronage from the LTTE,
where their youth were recruited, including the forced recruitment of children. The families
whose youth were in the LTTE or whose children died fighting for the LTTE were given
privileges and some support from the LTTE. However, this was limited to the territory
directly under the LTTE, which meant the Vanni from mid-1990 to the end of the war in
2009 with a population of around half a million.
Dependency on state institutions, the donors including NGOs, the Tamil Diaspora and
the LTTE was a defining feature of the Northern war-time economy. The coping mechanisms
during the war were merely efforts towards survival under harsh conditions. The fisher
communities were for the most part barred from going to the sea for fishing, except for small
windows of time and in limited coastal areas. Agricultural communities despite displacement
sought wage work where possible and support of NGOs for survival, but production was
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greatly reduced. In other words, households largely became dependent on external actors that
provided them relief and this dependency undermined and debilitated local social institutions
capable of mobilising communities (JICA 2011, UN 2011).
Some of the social institutions such as trade unions more or less became defunct.
While the North, unlike the commercial and industrial belt around Colombo, never had a
strong tradition of trade unions, it nevertheless had a small trade union presence with the state
owned industries built during the import substitution decades. However, with the war and
displacement, factory production came to a halt disrupting these trade unions. Teachers
unions had a very strong presence in the North, with the Northern Province Teachers
Association formed in 1914. These northern teachers unions were weakened with
displacement and migration of its leadership abroad, and they lost their vibrancy as
independent organising was curtailed during the war. In the post-war years the teachers
unions, bank employees unions and some of the state employee unions have continued as
mere appendages of the stronger federations based in Colombo.
The historically powerful co-operatives survived the war. The consumer co-operatives
were utilised by the state to distribute humanitarian supplies and that ensured their survival.
The producer co-operatives linked to caste-based occupations and as central institutions at the
village level survived the war with considerable strength. This is evident from their continued
mobilisations including the ability to negotiate with the state. I discuss both the history and
the present potential of co-operatives in Chapter 5. The other social institutions such as
schools, temples and community centres were weakened, as in many places they could not
function for years due to displacement. However, given their centrality to village life
including processes of resettlement they are developing in new directions. The relationship of
schools, temples and community centres to caste and the new dynamics of caste relations in
the post-war years are discussed in Chapter 4.
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The war-torn people of the North suffered considerable loss of life and high
casualties, their homes and livelihoods have been devastated and they were subject to
tremendous displacement and migration. After the war, many of the war-torn districts in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces have the highest incidence of poverty, the highest drop out
rates of teenagers from schools, the lowest literacy rates and the highest levels of infant and
maternal mortality rates (UN 2015). Their deprivation during the war is also a story about the
crippling of their social institutions built and nurtured over a hundred years if not longer.

End of the War and Regime Consolidation
In November 2005, Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected president with a broad coalition
consisting of the Sinhala Buddhist right and the left parties.41 However, he had scraped
through to victory only because the LTTE had forced a boycott of the elections in the North
ensuring the defeat of the UNP candidate Ranil Wicramasinghe. This move by the LTTE,
which on a war footing wanted a hard line president to escalate the war, proved to be suicidal.
The blame for the collapse of the peace process fell on the LTTE, as the European Union and
Canada banned the LTTE claiming it was a “terrorist organization” in 2006, which restricted
the financial and political support from the Tamil diaspora to the LTTE. The Rajapaksa
regime with the support of a whole range of international actors, capitalized on the global
“war on terror” push and was ruthless in what proved to be the last phase of the civil war.
The Rajapaksa regime mobilised the South for the war through an extensive process
of militarization. It gave prominence to the military with the President’s brother appointed as
Defence Secretary and greatly increased the defence budget and expanded the size of the
military through recrutment. Large swathes of land in the North and East and areas
41

The left parties never recovered after their coalition government experiment in the 1970s and major defeat by
the UNP. They slipped further into patronage politics in coaltion governments, particularly with return of the
SLFP in the 1994. The rise and decline of the left from the mid-1930s to this day parallels the tragic history of
Sri Lanka from a multi-ethnic and egalitarian society to a polarized country.
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surrounding important facilities were designated as High Security Zones denying access to
civilians. Militarization characterized by the public glorification of the military as war heroes,
greater powers for the military to control civilian institutions and censorship of any criticism
of the military in the press became the norm during the last years of the war. Militarization
included extensive surveillance by the intelligence agencies including by military
intelligence. Such surveillance was even more insidious in character when it targeted the
Tamil community, where former members of Tamil armed groups including the LTTE were
used to surveil and eliminate those believed to be linked to the LTTE, both in the Tamil
regions as well as in Colombo and the South. The press and dissent were disciplined both
through legal sanction as well as extrajudicial physical attacks, abductions and killings of
journalists and Tamil parliamentarians.
Sinhala Buddhist nationalist rhetoric in the press and prominence given to chauvinist
ideologues further mobilized Sinhala society. Sinhala Buddhist nationalist interests were
pacified as President Rajapaksa intervened in proposals towards a constitutional solution by
restricting devolution of power and insisting that the constitution will ensure a unitary
structure of the state as opposed to one with federal features. In effect, the decades of
progress towards a constitutional political solution as government policy were reversed as a
military solution to the ethnic conflict was promoted. On the economic front, the Rajapaksa
regime adopted populist policies to ensure support from the rural South, including investment
in rural roads and electrification, and expansion of public sector employment.
Both the military and the LTTE committed grave human rights abuses against the
citizenry. In the dirty war, the state used torture and disappearances to dismantle the LTTE’s
intelligence and terror networks responsible for assassinations and bombings in Colombo.
The LTTE forcefully recruited thousands of youth and children in preparation for the final
war. The state used massive firepower, bombing and shelling the Vanni region, even as the
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LTTE retreated into a small strip of land on the Mullaitivu coast holding the civilian
population as human shields. The LTTE even fired on fleeing Tamil civilians to hold them
hostage (Hoole 2015). Tens of thousands of civilians died in those cruel final months of the
war. In May 2009, the LTTE was militarilly defeated without the possibility of even a low
intensity insurgency. The LTTE had created a single pyramidal and centralised structure
around its leader Prabhakaran and transformed itself into a conventional army. Thus with the
decimation of the LTTE leadership its revival was not possible (Hoole 2015).
The Rajapaksa regime, euphoric in victory, did not feel compelled to address the
grievances of the minorities. Instead they focussed on the consolidation of their political
power. The Rajapaksa regime, in the process of mobilising Sinhala society for the war had
given centre stage to Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. The military had been given prominence
and carte blanche to carry out the war effort. After the war, strengthening the Sinahala
Buddhist nationalist base and reliance on the military became central to the stability of the
Rajapaksa regime.
The Rajapaksa regime alienated the minorities and caused further suffering for the
Tamil survivors of the war as they were interned in camps for many months and were only
allowed to resettle slowly. While the Tamil survivors of the war were resentful of the LTTE,
particularly the manner in which the LTTE suppressed them during the last phase of the war,
they felt humiliated by the state after the war. They continued to live under a climate of fear
as the military was given full control over their future after the war.
The Rajapaksa regime seemed invincible in national politics. However, Sarath
Fonseka the ambitious former Army Commander, disappointed with the regime that he was
not given more powers, decided to contest the early presidential elections in January 2010.
Rajapaksa’s calculation to callfor presidential elections one and half years early worked in his
favour as he swept the elections. Fonseka was arrested soon after the elections as Rajapaksa

73

further consolidated his hold over the military. Next, the coaltion led by Rajapaksa gained a
two thirds majority in the parliament elections of April 2010. The electoral strategy after the
war had worked and the regime carried forward constitutional reforms to consolidate
tremendous powers under the executive presidency. The 18th Amendment to the Constitution
in September 2010, provided greater powers to the president to make appointments for the
judiciary, police and other independent commissions and repealed the two term limit of the
presidency.
There were a number continuities from the last phase of the war to the post-war years.
First, there was the expanding militarization in the country, particularly the North and East.
The civil administration in the war-torn regions including the Governors of the Provinces and
a number of Government Agents – the chief administrator of a District – were led by military
personnel. The Urban Development Authority and the NGO Secretariat responsible for
regulating NGOs in the country were brought under the Defence Ministry to accelerate urban
development and control the activities of the NGOs. Second, Sinhala Buddhist
majoritarianism was given a prime place nationalist politics with the Rajapaksa regime
instigating and supporting political forces such as Jathika Hela Urumaya and the Bodu Bala
Sena, the former a political party and the latter a right wing social movement, led by virulent
Buddhist clergy and chauvinists. Annual victory parades and war memorials added to such a
militarised Sinhala Buddhist ideological thrust. Third, in the post-war period the Rajapaksa
regime became more and more authoritarian drawing on its new constitutional powers,
militarization and Sinhala Buddhist nationalist mobilizations.
The national question was debated in Sri Lanka during the decades after
Independence and into the war years as a constitutional political solution to the grievances of
minorities. However, Rajapaksa rejected any engagement with this long held consensus in Sri
Lanka by mobilising and championing the majoritarian agenda of the Sinhala Buddhist forces
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that consolidated with the war victory. Instead, Rajapaksa put forward development as the
solution to address the concerns of the minorities as well as the country as a whole.42

Conclusion
Centuries of colonial rule and integration with the global economy continued with
new forms of global political and economic forces into the mid-twentieth century and the
postcolonial era. Global capital flows, international trade for the export oriented economy and
the infrastructure built over the previous centuries were expanded and rebuilt over the last
century. The estates and the urban centres in the country created a contrast to the largely
underdeveloped regions where the small-holding peasantry struggled. The advances and
proliferation of educational institutions, the anti-colonial disourses which took on Sinhala
Buddhist and Tamil nationalist forms, the emergence of trade unions and co-operatives in the
country set Sri Lanka’s politics firmly on a modern path with new challenges for state and
society.
Sri Lanka during the eight decades from the late colonial period into contemporary
times has been transformed by postcolonial capitalist development and modern institutions of
the postcolonial state. The active role of the state led by left-leaning governments with their
import substitution policies and emphasis on rural development and land reform along with
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Such thinking about solving the economic and political problems in Sri Lanka through economic growth had
existed for sometime. Harvard scholar D. R. Snodgrass, a decade before the end of the war claimed Sri Lanka’s
economic development was held back by lack of ideological coherence and the ethnic conflict. He further
claimed that the change of government in 1994 with the continuation of liberalization policies by the new SLFPled government had addressed the first issue, but that the ethnic conflict and the youth insurrections had to be
addressed. He wrote in 1998: “The second major impediment, however – ethnic conflict – has not yet been
overcome. Economic growth is taking place, but the costly war drags on and much more could clearly be done
to accelerate economic progress if the long-sought political solution could finally be found. By the same token,
economic development could help to ameliorate ethnic conflict, as it has in Malaysia. Youth unemployment was
a factor in the emergence of the LTTE, as it was of the JVP. Creation of a million new jobs through outwardlooking economic expansion would go far toward solving Sri Lanka’s political problems as well as its economic
problems.” (Snodgrass 1998, P. 30) Interestingly, the right wing US-leaning UNP Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe during his short stint in power between 2002 and 2004 as well as after regime change in 2015
claimed he was going to create a million jobs through an export-led economy.

75

the free education and universal healthcare policies transformed Sri Lanka into a model
developing country with high human development indicatotrs. However, during the last four
decades, economically and politically, the country deteriorated, with the open economy
reforms leading to increasing inequality and the ethnic conflict crippling sections of society.
The three decades of war were particularly devastating for the mostly rural people in the
north and east, who not only faced the violence of the state but also were mobilised by a
militarised Tamil nationalist movement. In the process, the people caught in the war saw their
social institutions deteriorate and even disintegrate.
Economic realities diverged. Accelerating economic development centred on the
capital Colombo on the one hand and a diabled economy in the war-torn regions on the other
hand, characterized the new Sri Lanka. The process of reconstruction in Jaffna after the war,
including reintegration with the national economy and the social and economic development
of war affected people are the subject of the next chapters.
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CHAPTER 2
The Second Wave of Neoliberalism and Post-War Reconstruction

As with any other society devastated by war, decades of disruption of cycles of
investment and production in the North and East of Sri Lanka curtailed capital accumulation.
Though the state has poured billions of rupees in investment on infrastructure and facilitated
the flow of considerable private finance, these flows have neither stimulated local production
nor mobilised local labor. Indeed, development and the reconstruction of a war-devastated
society raise not only the need for capital but also the particular form of capital in relation to
labor, resources and institutions. Therefore, it is not just the amount of money that has been
put into circulation after the war in the North and East. Rather, it is about how the money has
been used, and how it affects relations between people and their institutions.
I argue in this chapter that the post-war years starting in 2010 have been characterized
by a second wave of of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka. I categorize the period between 1977 and
1983 with the launch of the “open economy” reforms and structural adjustment as the first
wave of neoliberalism. While the civil war between 1983 and 2009 did not disrupt the
neoliberal trajectory of Sri Lanka, it nevertheless curtailed efforts to drastically transform the
economy through accelerated liberalization. This periodization is central to my analysis. I
argue that national authoritarian stability, global conditions conducive for the inflow of
finance capital and accelerated liberalization processes constitute waves of neoliberalism that
set national economies on a transformative path. Furthermore, each neoliberal wave has
particular characteristics including distinct policies; on banking and finance; on urbanization
and infrastructure build-out; privatization and restructuring of state enterprises; trade, exports
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and foreign direct investment; changes to the rural economy; and entitlments and services of
communities and individuals.
In this context, post-war reconstruction starting in 2010 – focused on the rebuilding
large infrastructure, expansion of credit and the promotion of self employment to the
detriment of rebuilding social institutions – are embedded within the national development
trajectory in Sri Lanka. Therefore, I begin this chapter with an analysis of the post-war
economic development in Sri Lanka as a whole followed by a discussion of reconstruction in
Jaffna.

Second Wave of Neoliberalism
At the end of the war, the Sri Lankan economy was facing a balance of payments
crisis with the depletion of foreign reserves and high levels of inflation. In the final months of
the war in 2009, Sri Lanka began negotiating a Standby Arrangement with the IMF. The
Western powers concerned about Sri Lanka’s strong relations with China, Iran and Libya,
and increasingly critical about the humanitarian conduct of the war during the last phase, put
some pressure on the IMF to reconsider if not delay the IMF agreement. However, the IMF
agreement finally went through in July 2009 providing US$ 2.6 billion in loans with
conditions on the Sri Lankan state’s economic policies including reducing the fiscal deficit,43
expanding the tax base, addressing the losses of state enterprises, a flexible exchange rate and
strengthening the banking sector (Skanthakumar, 2009; IMF, 2009).
The IMF agreement was much more than the financial support of US$ 2.6 billion. It
was the first move in a major shift in the political economy of post-war Sri Lanka. The IMF
agreement marked a turning point of support and approval for the Rajapaksa regime’s

43

The IMF called for a reduction of the budget deficit to 5 percent of GDP by 2011, from a target of 7 percent in
2009, but it did not prescribe how that reduction was to be achieved.
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economic policies by global finance capital. Despite the antagonistic moves by Western
states in forums such as the UN, the economic rationale prevailed when it came to the flow of
global finance capital into Sri Lanka, particularly with the guarantee of the IMF agreement.
Next, the economic crisis of 2008 resulted in the flow of capital to the “emerging
markets.” The Rajapaska regime seized this moment, characterising Sri Lanka as a stable,
post-conflict, emerging market on the path to becoming the “Miracle of Asia” (Rajapaksa,
2010). Large flows of global finance capital were facilitated through greater integration with
the global capital markets, both by the state in the form of sovereign bonds as well as banks
that floated corporate bonds. Such global capital was absorbed in various infrastructure and
urban development projects, including in real estate ventures in Colombo, with centralized
and militarized development policies made possible by the new constitutional powers
usurbed by the President after the war.
The end of the war, the emergence of stability characterised by militarised security in
the entire country, a strong authoritarian regime at the helm of state power and global
conditions following the global economic crisis in the West leading to the flow of capital to
emerging markets, created the conditions for a second wave of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka.
This latest phase of global integration and transformation of the political economy of Sri
Lanka is on the order of the changes that came soon after Independence from 1948 to 1953
and then again with the first wave of neoliberalism from 1977 to 1983.
The dominant discourse about the post-war economic transformation of Sri Lanka
disregarded both the history of similar waves of opening of the the Sri Lankan economy
including liberalization as well as the impact of global economic forces. Instead, the post-war
transformation of the economy is articulated as a “transition” from war time stagnation to
high growth with economic development by actors such as the World Bank (Biller & Nabi,
2013). The World Bank claims: “seen through the lens of Malaysia’s successful economic
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transition, Sri Lanka has the basis to reap a peace dividend and move into a higher growth
path that would help it achieve high-middle income status in 15 years” (Biller & Nabi 2013,
102). However, the selective discussion of the Malaysian model does not address the
problems that Malaysia encountered with the East Asian economic crisis and its policies of
control on capital movement. For the World Bank, Sri Lanka emulating the Malaysia model
meant building an export-led economy, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in building
infrastructure and creating business friendly conditions. Furthermore, for some actors close to
the Rajapaksa regime the Malaysian model also meant focusing on economic development as
the solution, rather than addressing the grievances of the minorities through a political
solution.44

44

The following report by the Institute of Policy Studies, the foremost state sponsored economic think tank in
Sri Lanka, reflected the thinking that a change of mindset was possible with the end of the war including the
possibility of pursuing the Malaysian model: “The conflicts in Malaysia were mostly in two periods – 1948 and
1969 – while in Sri Lanka, the conflict lasted from 1983-2009 – nearly three decades. … It is true that the
conflict is sometimes used as a ‘scapegoat’ by those who lament Sri Lanka’s economic ills. Yet, the impact of a
30 year war and the impact of its conclusion on the prospects of the economy cannot be overlooked. … While
East Asian countries were able to use external threats to build the public impetus needed for growth, Sri Lanka
struggled with complex internal divisions caused by the conflict that made it increasingly difficult to get the
public to rally around bold economic reforms.” (Attygalle 2012)
Scholarship on Sri Lanka also tends to compare Sri Lanka’s failures with Malaysia’s success. But in the process
reduced the political resolution in Malaysia into a success, disregarding Malaysia’s legacy of authoritarian and
majoritarian politics. Harvard scholar Donald R. Snodgrass claims: “It is not evident that the ethnic situation in
Sri Lanka should inherently have been more of a threat to economic growth in, say, 1960 than that in Malaysia.
The ethnic Chinese minority in Malaysia was more than twice as large as the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, while
the numerical position of the ethnic majority was far more secure in Sri Lanka, where Sinhalese were seventyfour percent of the population in 1981, than in Malaysia, where the Malays were just over half the population.
Moreover, religious, cultural and linguistic differences between the two largest communities were all sharper in
Malaysia. Yet Malaysia got off with brief episodes of conflict, notably in 1969, adopted a comprehensive
affirmative action policy (the ‘New Economic Policy’ of 1971), and managed to record one of the world’s
highest rates of economic growth in 1970-95, while Sri Lanka was only able to attain modest economic growth
as the political situation deteriorated into civil war.” (Snodgrass 1998, 29)
Malaysian scholar Jomo K. Sundaram has a more sober assessment of Malaysia’s resolution of ethnic tensions.
He claims much of the growth with the New Economic Policy was characterized by the rich getting richer, while
migrant workers were severely exploited. Furthermore, the ethnic issue was only managed through deals to
distribute rents between the ethnic elite and inter-ethnic relations did not substantially improve (Sundaram
2004).
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Facets of Neoliberalism in Contemporary Sri Lanka
I have identified three aspects of neoliberalism45 that are important for analyzing the
political economy of post-war Sri Lanka. First, finance capital and financialisation have
become the engines of economic transformation, where without the continuing inflow of
finance capital and its circulation the economy will be crippled by crisis (Dumenil and Levy
2011, Fine 2013). Large flows of global finance capital as well as integration with the global
capital markets have immensely transformed Sri Lanka’s national finances and its banking
sector. Second, the role of the state has changed to one that reshapes the economy and creates
the conditions, including through its repressive apparatuses, for the accumulation of finance
capital (Harvey 2005). In post-war Sri Lanka, an authoritarian regime controlling a national
security state shapes mega urban and infrastructure development to absorb investments by
finance capital. Third, individuals are atomised and called upon to take economic
responsibility for themselves as entrepreneurs and through self-employment, even as social
institutions are marginalised, where individuals are eventually blamed for the devastation
they face with economic processes and crises. The neoliberal policies targeting individuals
changes the relationship between state and citizen, where the state is less and less responsible
to the citizen (Wacquant 2012).
These three facets of neoliberalism do not exhaust theorisation on neoliberalism. For
example, trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation and funded-NGO schemes are also
45

While there is extensive theorization of neoliberalism in South Asia, the conceptualization and analysis of
neoliberalism here is limited in Sri Lanka. This gap in the use of neoliberalism as an analytical concept is
intriguing. It could be in part related to the displacement of class analysis with the emergence of the ethnic
conflict and the deployment of ethnicity as the central concept in scholarship on Sri Lanka. While political
economic analysis flourished in the 1970s and into the early 1980s, the descent into civil war in the mid-1980s
saw the energies of most scholars turn to analysis of ethnicity. The emphasis of anthropological scholarship as
opposed to political economy in the 1980s to address the emergent problems in the country was a turn away
from class analysis to the analysis of culture (Jeganathan 1998). Over the last few decades, there has been some
analysis of the different phases of liberalisation under successive regimes in Sri Lanka. Such analysis attempted
to understand the impact of policies on specific sectors including agriculture, irrigation, privatisation and trade.
However, there is a dirth of systemic analysis of the social, economic and political changes that came with
liberalisation and the civil war. My own intellectual engagement in Sri Lanka was linked to the displacement of
these forms of analysis in recent decades, particularly political economy and a critique of neoliberalism.
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important facets of neoliberalism. Indeed, after regime change in Sri Lanka in 2015, there is a
much greater emphasis on trade liberalization and restructuring of state enterprises.
Therefore, neoliberal policies in different contexts and at different points in time take
different paths.
The reconstruction of the war-torn regions starting in 2010 were an extension of the
second wave of neoliberalism transforming the country, and were constituted by the
interaction of financialization, the neoliberal state and processes atomizing individuals by
seeking them out as consumers and clients. The interaction at these three realms were shaped
by global forces and national changes, with global financial flows circulating through
national financial institutions were seeking new places for absorbtion of such finance. In this
context, the war-torn regions that were isolated during the war from financial flows and the
market became an open field for a range of new entrants including institutions of finance and
retail trade. Financial instituitons hungry for an untapped population, and euphoric about
Jaffna society as historically a saving population and now with flows of remittances,
aggressively moved to capture the region. However, this financial and market integration was
also a political project, encouraged by the Rajapaksa regime and the international donors and
agencies, who claimed that finance and the market leads to development of the war-torn
regions. 46
In the next two sections, I will discuss financialization followed by the neoliberal
state. I will then discuss reconstruction in Jaffna focused on infrastructure development and
expansion of credit leading to falling incomes and rising indebtedness. I will conclude with a

Wacquant describes the dynamic working of neoliberalism at three levels: “This core consists of an
articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to impose the stamp of the second onto the
third. So all three of these institutions must be brought into our analytic ambit. I diverge from market-centred
conceptions of neoliberalism in that I prioritise (political) means over (economic) ends; but I part with the
governmentality framework in that I prioritise state crafting over technologies and non-state logics, and I focus
on how the state effectively redraws the boundaries and tenor of citizenship through its market-conforming
policies.” (Wacquant 2012, 71)
46
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discussion of the failure of reconstruction, increasing out migration and the policies seeking
to atomize individuals.

Financialization and Global Capital
In analysing the history of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka, there has been some discussion
of trade liberalization, foreign aid, cuts to social welfare, fiscal austerity, the attack on
organised labor and large development projects (Law and Society Trust 2010; Skanthakumar
2013; Bastian 2007). However, there is little analysis of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka focused
on the process of financialization and banking. Neoliberalism at the outset in the 1970s was
centred on the processes of financialization (Dumenil and Levy 2011) and could be
characterized as a class project of finance capital (Harvey 2005). I draw on the broader
concept of financialization47 from the work of Dumenil and Levy, who consider it to be the
expansion of financial institutions and mechanisms and the corresponding increase in assets
and debt. Financialization in contemporary times leads to accumulation with profit-making
through financial mechanisms as opposed to actual production. Furthermore, such
financialization reduces the wealth and incomes of workers, though both processes that
indebt workers and reduce their real wages in order to increase profits.48

Dumenil and Levy analyze financialization as follows: “on the one hand, the expansion of financial
institutions and mechanisms (and the corresponding masses of assets and debt), taking account of innovative
procedures and, on the other hand, the imposition of managerial criteria such as the creation of value for the
shareholder. The comparative size and profit rate of the financial sector is involved. The same is true of the
expansion of the financial component of management within financial institutions and within nonfinancial
corporations, as well as the spectacular rise of the income paid to financial managers. Given the role conferred
on financial interests in contemporary capitalism, the term ‘financialization’ is also used in a broader sense in
the literature, encompassing most of the features of neoliberalism. There is a lot of meaning in the assertion that
neoliberalism is a ‘financialized capitalism,’ sometimes denoted on such grounds as ‘financial or finance
capital(ism).’ But this feature is not really new. The phrase ‘Finance capital’ was coined by Hilferding at the
beginning of the twentieth century. ‘Finance-led capitalism’ would be closer to the perspective here, provided
that a proper definition of ‘Finance’ is given.” (Dumenil and Levy 2011, 35-36)
48
According to Stockhammer, financialization include, “rising indebtedness of households, more volatile
exchange rates and asset prices, short-termism of financial institutions, and shareholder value orientation of nonfinancial businesses.” Furthermore, his discussion of the falling labour share of national income through a
discussion of financialization and its imparct on labour including its bargaining power is important: “First, firms
have gained more options for investing: they can invest in financial assets as well as in real assets and they can
47
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The first wave of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka restructured the banking and financial
sector. According to Karunatilake: “The banking and the financial system between 1979 and
1982, expanded by leaps and bounds and more than 14 leading international banks opened
branches in Sri Lanka. Thus, by 1988, there were 26 commercial banks operating in the
island and the majority were branches of foreign banks.” (Karunatilake 2004) There were
also powerful investment incentives for foreign and domestic capital (Herring 1987). Thus
the post-war process of financialization was built on an earlier period of new financial
structures with banking reform in Sri Lanka.
What is different with the second wave of neoliberalism in Sri Lanka is the role
played by global finance capital and integration with global capital markets. Influenced by
such global finance, the process of financialization was far more extensive transforming Sri
Lanka’s national finances and financial sector as a whole with financial institutions and
products reaching down to the rural economy. In otherwords, there is a structural shift in the
workings of financialization, where global circuits of financial accumulation were able to
reach the rural households through the formal channels of banks and finance companies and
range of new financial mechanisms.
I first discuss changes to financialization at the national level. Then I discuss the
changes to banking, including by comparing the national flow of finances through the
markets compared to the historically high donor assistance in countries like Sri Lanka.
Finally, I look at the mechanisms of financialization that reach the rural economy.

invest at home as well as abroad. They have gained mobility in terms of the geographical location as well as in
terms of the content of investment. Second, it has empowered shareholders relative to workers by putting
additional constraints on firms and the development of a market for corporate control has aligned management’s
interest to that of shareholders.” (Stockhammer 2013, 7)
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Financialisation at the National Level
Fnancialization in Sri Lanka at the national level is acceding to global trends in
financial architectures. The current structure of Sri Lanka’s national finances are
characterized by the increase in shorter term and high interest commercial loans and the
relative decline of longer-term and concessionary loans from multilateral and bilateral
donors. For example, in 2000 almost 100 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt was
concessional loans, but by 2013 that figure had dropped to below 50 percent (Finanance
Ministry Annual Report 2013, 178).
Financialization is also propelled by the increasing market capitalization of the
Colombo Stock Exchange. Furthermore, high levels of euro and dollar bonds are floated by
commercial banks and other companies controlled by the Government. The early evidence of
the dynamics of this process of financialization was the quadrupling of the stock market in
the eighteen months after the war ended in May 2009. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, there is a
tremendous rise in the Colombo Stock Exchange in the two years after the war, but it tapers
off after the initial boom. Furthermore, between 2009 and 2010, Sri Lanka far out performed
the emerging markets and world stockmarket indices.
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Figure 2.1 Comparison of Sri Lanka, Emerging Markets, World Stock Market Indices
Source: Financial Times, Colombo Stock Exchange
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Financiers close to the regime benefited from state finances and other funds
channelled into the stock market to make speculative returns. 49 The Employees’ Provident
Fund (EPF) controlled by the Central Bank, is the largest retirement fund in Sri Lanka with
the net value at the end of the 2013 worth Rs. 1.3 trillion (US$ 10 billion) or close to 14% of
GDP and half the market capitalisation of the Colombo Stock Exchange at that time. See
Figure 2.2 for market capitalization of the stock market as a percentage of GDP. While
historically, the EPF was invested only in government bonds, in recent years as much as 7.5%
(EPF 2013) of this fund is being diverted into the stock market. There have been attempts to
divert much larger percentage of this workers retirement fund even as trade unions accuse the
government of propping up the stock market through risky investments. In the post-war
years, the successive regimes are attempting to create larger private retirement funds as part
of the project to create a large financial market, and investing the existings retirements funds
in the stock market is part of that project.
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Figure 2.2 EPF and Market Capitalisation of CSE (% of GDP)
Source: EPF, Central Bank, Securities Exchange Commission

49

As the post-war euphoria and capital flows into Sri Lanka tapered the Government tried to prop up the stock
market resulting considerable manipulation. In 2011 and 2012, two Securities and Exchange Commission
chairpersons resigned under pressure with financiers resisting market regulation.
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Between 2009 and 2012, most of the major banks in Sri Lanka doubled or tripled
assets by expanding retail business dominated by loans to households.50 Such expansion of
bank assets have been possible through borrowings in the global financial markets. For
example the Bank of Ceylon has floated a total of US$ 1 billion in euro and dollar bonds in
the international capital markets in 201251 and 2013. The National Savings Bank floated a
similar bond of US$ 750 million at an extremely high interest of 8.9% in 2013.52
The National Development Bank (NDB) and Development Finance Corporation of
Ceylon (DFCC), the two development banks in Sri Lanka, were given tax incentives to float
similar bonds worth US$ 250 million each in the Budget for 2013. Their failure to float the
bonds led the Central Bank to call for the merger of the two development banks. While the
Central Bank has not forced the merger of the development banks, since 2014 there is a major
push for financial consolidation with the merger of banks and finance companies. Such
mergers are expected to facilitate greater financialization through increased floating of
international bonds and the inflow of global finance capital to invest in the financial sector in
Sri Lanka.
The floating of dollar-denominated bonds are encouraged by policy makers to bring
foreign exchange necessary for the burgeoning import bill.53 Such a strategy – with high
interest rate loans that could prove costly to the banks – was possible because most of these

50

For example, the largest commercial bank, the Bank of Ceylon, increased loans and advances from Rs. 275
billion to Rs. 715 billion, while deposits only increased from Rs. 408 billion to Rs. 694 billion, between the
years 2009 and 2012 (BOC 2013, 63). Of these loans, 45% to retail customers, 17% to the corporate sector and
38% to state owned enterprises (BOC 2013, 70).
51
Reflecting this strategy of market borrowing by state-owned commercial banks, the BOC’s foreign currency
loans increased by 165% from Rs. 65 billion in 2011 to Rs. 171 billion in 2012 (BOC 2013, 71).
52
The lead managers, Barclays, Citigroup and HSBC and the investors in the bonds were Geographically US
contributed 39%, Europe with 38% and Asia with the remaining 23%. The bond carried an international rating
of BB- (Daily Financial Times, 7 January 2015).
53
The high import bill in Sri Lanka is influenced by global oil prices with Sri Lanka dependendant on its
electricity production through oil. In other years, the import bill has been due to high levels of vehicle imports.
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banks are still majority owned by the state.54 Furthermore, borrowings through such state
controlled commercial banks do not go on the books as state borrowings, in other words, it is
borrowings that do not add to the budget deficit.
In this way, there was a clear strategy of financialization with the flow of foreign
funds. A prominent business news agency reported the following approach of the Central
Bank back in late 2011:
Sri Lanka's non-bank finance companies should borrow abroad to increase resources
they have to lend to the domestic economy, Central Bank Governor Nivard Cabraal
said. ‘We need new money coming into the country if we are going to achieve this
growth that we are targeting,’ Cabraal told a forum of non-bank lenders in Colombo.
‘We cannot do it with only the savings that we have in our own country.’ Cabraal said
the state has borrowed abroad and set a benchmark for private borrowers to go to
international markets (LBO 2011).
Thus global financial flows were encouraged through inter-connected interventions of foreign
borrowing by the state, banks and non-bank financial companies.55
Next, comparing the flow of finances through such financial transactions in the capital
markets to foreign aid points to an increasingly dominant role for the financial sector. The
total disbursement of aid from the multilateral and bilateral donors in 2013, including the
World Bank, ADB, Japan, China and India was Rs. 180 billion (US$ 1.4 billion) with net
flows after repayments amounting to Rs. 68 billion (US$ 520 million).56 Next, Foreign Direct

54

These high interest rates and tremendous accumulation which the Sri Lankan public has to burden is related to
the point above that while the West was against Sri Lanka in Geneva at the UN Human Rights Council, it did
not deter Western financiers from pouring in capital to accumulate high financial profits.
55
National Savings in Sri Lanka have been on the order of 23% to 33% of GDP between 2009 and 2015, so it is
not the lack of savings, but rather the kind of investments in infrastructure and the increasing import bill that led
to calls for increased global financial flows. National investment has ranged between 24% and 39% of GDP,
which in turn increased GDP growth (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 3).
56
According the Finance Ministry: “On a gross basis, total foreign loan proceeds in 2013 amounted to Rs. 179.3
billion which were the disbursements related to project loans received for public investment activities. As the
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Investment continues to be marginal and much of it is channelled into real estate
development, rather than productive investments.57 For example FDI in 2013 was only US$
1.4 billion compared to bonds worth US$ 1 billion floated by the Bank of Ceylon alone
(Finance Ministry Annual Report 2014, 8).
Given that exports are almost half the imports, Sri Lanka would have serious balance
of payment problems if not for the worker remittances. Indeed, it is migrant workers
remittances from the Middle East that have kept the Sri Lanka economy afloat; worker
remittances have steadily increased from less than US$ 2 billion in 2005 to US$ 6.4 billion in
2013 (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 157).

Table 2.1 Soverign Bonds
Date

Amount (US$ Mn)

Interest Rate (%)

Tenure (Years)

Maturity Date

17/10/2007

500

8.250

5

Matured in 2012

22/01/2009

500

7.400

6

Matured in 2015

30/10/2010

1,000

6.250

10

30/10/2020

27/07/2011

1,000

6.250

10

27/07/2021

25/07/2012

1,000

5.875

10

25/07/2022

06/01/2014

1,000

6.000

5

06/01/2019

07/04/2014

500

5.125

5

07/04/2019

03/06/2015

650

6.125

10

03/06/2025

02/11/2015

1,500

6.850

10

03/11/2025

11/07/2016

500

5.750

5.5

11/01/2022

6.825

10

11/07/2026

11/07/2016
1,000
Source: Central Bank

repayments of foreign loans were Rs. 111.4 billion, total foreign financing on a net basis amounted to Rs. 67.9
billion.” (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 178)
57
According to a recent World Bank Report: “FDI remains below 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
five years after the end of armed conflict, relative to much higher levels of FDI in other MICs such as Vietnam
or Cambodia. While FDI can enhance access of producers to global production networks and facilitate the
development of new activities within existing value chains, FDI inflows to Sri Lanka have been largely focused
on infrastructure (inclusive of real estate development), with a relatively small proportion reaching sectors of the
economy that are associated with global networks of production” (World Bank 2015, 4). However, the World
Bank itself had been promoting such infrastructure development and continues with such projects. The World
Bank’s analysis here is premised on the questionable claims that further liberalization will increase FDI flows
that will in turn lead to production of exports. The reality may be that even if such increased FDI flows are
mobilized they may only lead to greater speculative investment in real estate and other assets.
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Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt accumulated over the decades is also changing
drastically. The total foreign debt of the government at the end of 2013 was Rs. 2,960 billion
(US$ 22.8 billion); of which multilateral and bilateral concessional loans were Rs. 1,492
billion (US$ 11.5 billion) and non-concessional loans were Rs. 459 billion (US$ 3.5 billion);
and market borrowing have increased considerably to Rs. 1,007 billion (US$ 7.7 billion)
(Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 206). The latter increased by the issuing of sovereign
bonds is now a third of foreign government financing. As evident form Table 2.1, Sri Lanka
has issued US$ 8.05 billion in sovereign bonds after the war and incurs quite high interest
costs of foreign capital. Furthermore, foreign debt was also accrued through state-held
commercial banks and other state-owned enterprises.

Financialisation at the Rural and Household Level
Financial integration with the global financial markets and changes to national
finances have also extended down to the level of the households including in the villages with
increasing financial products such as pawning, micro credit and lease hire purchasing. In Sri
Lanka, leasing refers to purchase of vehicles as well as household consumer goods, where
following an initial payment of up to 20% of the value of the item, the rest is paid in
instalments. However, if three successive installments are not paid, the leasing company
seizes the item forcefully resulting often in the loss of both the item, the initial down payment
and monthly installments that were already paid, resulting in a massive loss to the
consumer.58
Next, evident from Table 2.2 pawning increased by 53% in 2010 and 60% in 2011
with the increase in the value of global gold prices after the Western economic crisis of 2008.
58

There has been a tremendous increase in leasing business in recent years. For example, the Bank of Ceylon
increased its leasing business by 53% in 2012 from the previous years (BOC 2013, 68). Furthermore, when it
comes to the Non-Bank Financial Institutions as many as much as 50% of their business is in leasing and hire
purchae amounting to Rs. 492 billion in 2015 (Central Bank Annual Report 2015, Table 132).
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Furthermore, in 2011, pawning was 26% of the total loan portfolio of banks. Pawning was
historically provided by informal networks and this level of pawning by banks was
unprecedented. The Bank of Ceylon, which is the largest commercial bank in the country,
had between 2009 and 2011 tripled its pawning loan portfolio (Finance Ministry Annual
Report 2011, 464-465).

Table 2.2 Pawning Data from 2007 to 2011
Name of the Bank

Amount of Loans (Rs. Bn)
2007
2008
2009
2010
Commercial Bank
0.01
1
4
DFCC Vardhana
0.03
0.21
0.34
1
Lankaputra Bank
HNB
17
21
22
28
Peoples Bank
76
96
125
190
Sampath Bank
12
16
25
43
RDB
47
54
58
66
BOC
25
38
55
94
NSB
11
15
25
36
Seylan Bank
2
5
7
18
Total
189
245
318
480
No. of loans provided
5,095,518 5,900,434 6,673,524 7,608,067
Interest rate
19-24%
18-24%
14-23%
10-14%
Average loan size (Rs.)
37,730
42,302
47,682
63,899
Growth rate
30%
30%
53%
Source: Finance Ministry Annual Report 2011, 464-465

2011
24
4
5
36
291
64
76
188
58
31
777
9,027,369
10-14%
86,186
60%

The Bank of Ceylon Annual Report for 2012 states the following about the extensive
expansion of credit through pawning:
The Bank provides a variety of other loan schemes, such as short term “pawning”
loans on personal property, loans for travel expenses, and loans for self-employed
individuals and government workers. As of 31st December 2012, pawning loans &
other loan schemes accounted for 44% of the retail banking loan portfolio of Bank
amounting to LKR 136,962 million [ US$ 1.1 billion]. Pawning loans are short-term
loans that are fully secured by pledged gold coins and jewellery. Pawning loans are
primarily utilised by farmers and individuals in rural areas for agricultural purposes
(BOC 2013).
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The fall in global gold prices and its impact on the banking sector with increasing nonperforming loans, particularly with increased defaults on pawning loans and the depreciation
of gold collateral, shook the banks. 59 However, they seem to have avoided a serious crisis by
2016 due to the diverse character of their assets and continuing expansion of their business
with other services.
In recent years, microfinance loans have also been on the rise. Historically, coopearatives and state insitutions provided such micro loans. However, in recent years there
have been a whole range of actors from NGOs, non-bank financial institutions to subsidiaries
of banks that have got into the microfinance business. Data on the total loan portfolio of
microfinance are not available. However, a survey done by the Central Bank in 2015 claims
50% of those who have taken micro-finance loans pay over 25% interest. Furthemore, close
to 10% of the microfinance loans charge extremely high interest rates on the order over 45%
(Central Bank Annual Report 2015, 250). The government continues to promote
microfinance in its annual budgets and in a move to regulate microfinance institutions has put
forward a new microfinance bill in 2016. However, the microfinance industry and prominent
think tanks oppose powers given to the Central Bank to put a ceiling on interest rates for
microfinance loans.60
In this way, financialisation and greater integration with the global capital markets
have led to higher levels of capital flows. The investment of such capital directed by the state
is transforming the economic landscape through urban and infrastructure development. In the

The following year, the Central Bank Annual Report 2013 had the following to say about pawning: “The
quality of assets in the banking sector deteriorated as indicated by the increase in the NPL ratio from 3.7 per
cent as at end 2012 to 5.6 per cent by end 2013. This was largely the result of weaker loan quality in the
pawning portfolio, and slower loan growth. NPLs increased by Rs. 74 billion [US$ 570 million] during 2013, of
which Rs. 56 billion [US$ 430 million] relates to pawning advances. In comparison, the increase in NPLs
amounted to Rs. 17 billion [US$ 130 million] in 2012.”
60
See, ‘Regulating Financial Services for the Poor in Sri Lanka: A Closer Look at the Long-Awaited
Microfinance Act’, Institute for Policy Studies, 17 October 2016. [Downloaded 20 October 2016:
http://www.ips.lk/talkingeconomics/2016/10/17/regulating-financial-services-for-the-poor-in-sri-lanka-a-closerlook-at-the-long-awaited-microfinance-act/]
59
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countryside, credit has expanded through banks and financial businesses charging high
interest rates on pawning, leasing and microfinance loans.

Urbanization, Infrastructure and the Neoliberal State
Over the last few decades, there has been some analysis of the neoliberal state in Sri
Lanka, including in relation to the global flows of trade and capital. (Dunham & Jayasuriya,
2001; Herring, 1987; Lakshman, 1985). The massive accelerated Mahaweli Development
Scheme, which came with the open economy policies in 1977 discussed in the previous
chapter, at the outset brought attention to the large role of the state in development.
Therefore, unlike the issue of financialisation, the role of the state was critically discussed by
political economists as well as mainstream economists when considering the various phases
of liberalization.
While I claim a second wave of neoliberalism was initiated by the Rajapaksa regime
at the end of of the war, there was a debate in the early post-war years about whether the
Rajapaksa regime can be characterised as neoliberal.61 President Rajapaksa had roped
together a coalition consisting of the Sinhala Buddhist nationalists and the left parties and
made statements that could appeal to and disarm any critique from both ends of the spectrum.
Months before the end of the war, Rajapaksa had the following to say in his Budget Speech:
Neo-liberal globalization process that was followed by our country for over 30 years,
paid economic dividend only to a very small segment of our society. … The need to
develop irrigation, highways, electricity, water supplies and rural development was
also forgotten. In short, rural villages were so neglected and were made distant from
Colombo as though they were no longer a part of Sri Lanka. … we rejected

61

The three Left Ministers in the Rajapaksa Government have also made this claim in the years after the war.
Rajapaksa had also maintained that he would not be an agent of the Western agenda, but that is more to do with
the call for investigation of war crimes taken forward by the US and the UK in the UN Human Rights Council.
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‘Regaining Sri Lanka’ [the economic policy package of the Ranil Wickremesinghe
government of 2002 – 2204] which underestimated local entrepreneurship and viewed
any problem with a blind eye in the guise of globalization and neo-liberalism
(Rajapaksa 2008).
Such populist rhetoric continued as the regime felt compelled to distinguish itself from the far
right and pro-West UNP government that preceded it. However, the regime with support of
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the IMF, took forward many aspects of
‘Regaining Sri Lanka’ policy package of the earlier Wickremesinghe government,
particularly financialization, urbanization and infrastructure development.
The financial support from the World Bank and other donors for the neoliberal state
was premised on particular forms of investment:
The two principal drivers of investment for sustained high economic growth and
productive employment are (a) international competitiveness for export-led growth
and (b) urbanization, which facilitates productive economic activity. These two
drivers of investment and economic growth, in turn, depend crucially on efficient
infrastructure that shortens the international supply chain on the one hand and brings
about agglomeration dividends on the other (Biller and Nabi, 2013, 2).
The building of such large infrastructure and urbanization required global finance capital
channelled through the state. Indeed, close to US$ 10 billion was raised as sovereign bonds
and bonds floated by the state controlled commercial banks between 2009 and 2016, and
much of those finances were used towards such large development projects. That is over and
beyond the capital that came in for infrastructure development from the multilateral donors
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and bilateral donors such as China,
Japan and India.
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In addition to such large levels of finances the state required vast powers for large
development projects. In 2010, the Rajapaksa regime merged the Defence Ministry with the
Urban Development Authority to use the military in accelerated urbanization. The military
became involved in construction, city beautification and slum demolitions. The emphasis on
urbanization was further accentuated by the regime unsuccessfully fielding Milinda
Moragoda62 as the candidate for Mayor in the 2011 Colombo Municipal Council elections.
While the regime could not succeed in capturing the Mayorship in UNP-centered Colombo,
the powers of the Central Government and the military were used to push urbanization of
Colombo at a tremendous pace.
The budgetary capital expenditure is consistenly highest for the Ports and Highways
Ministry in recent years. And road and highway construction came to signify the visible
priorities of the Rajapaksa regime and the role of the state in the economy both in resource
terms and in popular discourse. In the Budget Speech for 2015, President Rajapaksa boasted
that construction was now 10 percent of the GDP and that the sector had a high growth of 17
percent. A major component of construction growth is the building of roads and highways.
While the international and national media focus on Chinese infrastructure investment
in Sri Lanka through their geopolitical lens, the question remains as to why so many of the
other donors including multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank fund such infrastructure projects, particularly when they are unlikely to provide the
necessary returns. The World Bank in a recent report concurs that the highest contributor to

62

Moragoda was a highly influential neoliberal politician, known to be close to Washington including the
Heritage Foundation. Between 2002 and 2004, he held the very high post of Economic Development Minister
under the UNP government, when it attempted accelerated neoliberal policies during its short stint in power
between 2002 and 2004. Moragoda’s cross over to join Rajapaksa and contest the municipal elections was a
clear sign of the emphasis placed on urban development. However, despite the massive neoliberal campaign
vision that spoke of citizens as consumers, Moragoda could not defeat the UNP base in Colombo and lost the
elections.
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GDP growth in Sri Lanka was public investment in infrastructure.63 Indeed, while
acknowledging the nature of such growth,64 it is now calling for a shift in the very policies
that it was promoting not long ago (World Bank 2015, 28-30).
Despite the Rajapaksa regime’s populist rhetoric, its priorities were reflected by the
secular decline in agriculture and fisheries expenditures. As a percentage of government
expenditure, transport and communications, increased from 11.2 to 14.6 percent, while
agriculture65 and fisheries decreased from 2.3 to 1.5 percent between 2008 and 2013 (Finance
Ministery Annual Report 2014). In other words, as a share of government expenditure over
the five-year period, transport and communications increase by 30 percent, while agriculture
and fisheries declined by 35 percent, reflecting the government’s priorities. The two major
toll expressways built during this period are reflective of the social inequalities linked to such
infrastructure, because it is only the middle and upper classes that can afford private vehicles
and moreover travel on such toll expressways. These figures also reflect donor priorities, with
agriculture and fisheries amounting to 0.1 percent and transport and communications
amounting to 44 percent of total donor disbursements in 2015 (Finance Ministry Annual
Report 2015). The World Bank not only rejects investment in agriculture, its analysis is in
favor of trade liberalization in agriculture, claiming that 30% of the labor force only produces

“Private consumption accounted for 67 percent of GDP in 2013, having expanded by 6 percent a year on
average between 2002 and 2013. Private investment, on the other hand, accounted for 23 percent of GDP in
2013, after an average growth of 9 percent a year during the same time period. In addition, public infrastructure
spending grew at an average rate of 18 percent a year between 2002 and 2013, and made up 6 percent of GDP
by 2013. The impulse coming from exports, on the other hand, was very small, with an average growth rate of 4
percent a year, so that the contribution of exports to aggregate demand declined from 35 to 26 percent of GDP
between 2002 and 2013.” (World Bank 2015, 26)
64
“Sri Lanka’s real GDP grew by 43 percent from 2009 to 2014. The top four sectors contributing to 50 percent
of the total growth during the period were all non-tradable sectors: construction, transport, domestic trade and
banking, and insurance and real estate. Reflecting the intensity of a needed post-conflict infrastructure
development thrust, the construction sector alone contributed to 16.8 percent of the total growth while growing
by 109 percent in real terms. The transport sector contributed to 14 percent of the total growth, reflecting
improved transportation infrastructure and increased vehicle registrations. Domestic trade (11.1 percent), import
trade (7.8 percent) and financial services (8.2 percent) were the other main contributors to growth.” (World
Bank 2015, 28)
65
I do not include the fertilizer subisidy, which is a cash transfer to appease the peasantry whose vote is
significant in elections.
63
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10% of GDP (World Bank 2013). However, due to the political sensitivity of agricultural
trade liberalization, the World Bank has not been vocal and there was little pressure on the
government.
I would argue, the World Bank during the tenure of the Rajapaksa regime limited its
policy reform push to financialization with urban and infrastructure development. The World
Bank diagnostic report published in late 2015, came well after regime change in January
2015, and there its message had shifted. With the new Government, the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank66 and the IMF are continuing the agenda of financialization, but
also promoting trade liberalization67 and privatization where possible.
In June 2016, amidst balance of payments problems, the new Government signed an
Extended Fund Facility for US$ 1.5 billion dollar with the IMF68 and augmented by an
addition of US$ 500 million from other donors. That agreement is ambitious calling for
structural reforms that go much further than their advocacy with the Rajapaksa Government.
The second wave of neoliberalism was initiated by the Rajapaksa regime, but that
development trajectory is deepening with the new Government willing to openly take forward
neoliberal reforms.

Reconstruction as Infrastructure Development
It is in the context of such a second wave of neoliberal policies transforming the
political economy of Sri Lanka that reconstruction policies were launched in the war-torn
regions of the North and East. During the final years of the war, the government was of the
view that donor aid for reconstruction may even boost the national economy. However, by
66

The Asian Development Bank has initiated a massive US$ 250 million project to expand the capital markets
in Sri Lanka.
67
The donors are fully behind the the Wickremesinghe government’s push for new free trade and investment
agreements with India, China, Singapore and the US.
68
The IMF Agreements also calls for fiscal consolidaton with a target to bring down the budget deficit to 3.5%
by 2020.
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end of the war, the government’s relationship with Western countries had soured. Therefore,
with only moderate pledges of donor assistance for reconstruction, the Government’s
approach for reconstruction was similar to what it was doing with national development; to
build infrastructure and expand credit.
The Budget Speech given by the Deputy Finance Minister Sarath Amunugama in June
201069, had the following to say about reconstruction of the North and East:
A comprehensive medium- to long‐term reconstruction strategy has been planned to
transform conflict affected areas in order to create decent living conditions. The
construction arrangement of railway lines in the northern sector connecting
Thalaimannar to Medawachchiya and Omanthai to Kankasanthurai and such
arrangement for the construction of national highways such as the A‐9 and the A‐32
have been finalized. Funding arrangements have been secured to implement water
supply, roads, electricity, schools, hospitals, court houses, administrative facilities,
police posts, drinking water, irrigation and livelihood programmes. … The early
completion of these development initiatives will change the landscape providing north
south connectivity and build a strong economic base to exploit agriculture, livestock,
fisheries and tourism based investment opportunities in the north and east
(Amunugama 2010, 71).
Therefore, from the outset, reconstruction was about building infrastructure. Such
infrastructure-centred development was initiated with the re-building of the A-9 Highway
connecting the North to the rest of the country. The A-9, which was repeatedly closed and re-

69

It is normally the President who holds the Finance Minister portfolio that gives the Budget Speech.
Furthermore, in late 2009, the Budget for 2010 was not announced as the Government wanted to hold elections
in January and May 2010 to consolidate its power on the heels of the war victory.
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opened as a humanitarian corridor during the war, became important for connectivity to
markets after the war.70
Reconstruction of infrastructure in the North moved swiftly after the war as by 2012,
the signs of war, the ruins and the warnings of land mines were fading. Electricity was
reaching many villages and by the end of 2012, 72% of houses in the Northern Province had
access to electricity (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 63). According to a Government
official by early 2014, electrification of 85% of the houses in Jaffna was complete.71 Such
electrification also facilitated a market for consumer appliances from refrigerators to
television sets.
The northern railroad, first built over a century ago by the British, was rebuilt by
India. As the train service first reached Killinochi, and months later Pallai and then eventually
Jaffna Town in October 2014, it created much excitement among the local people. A
generation born during the war had not seen trains, and many lined up to watch the arrival of
the trains. Therefore, reconstruction with respect to infrastructure related to transport and
communication could not be faulted.
The many housing schemes, including the fifty thousand Indian housing grant to the
war affected was a massive boost to the war-torn population. However, the faltering incomes
and rising indebtedness, has led to these housing schemes adding to increasing indebtedness,
as owner driven housing costs have been greater than the housing grant.72 When early signs
of such housing grant related debt became evident, the donors and their implementation
agencies the ICRC and UN Habitat claimed it was merely a few bad cases. 73 The officials,

The 2010 Budget Speech emphasized the “opening of the A-9 road, removal of fishing restrictions, opening of
bank branches and unrestricted transportation have expedited business development in the north” (Amunugama
2010).
71
Interview with Government Planning Official, 30 April 2014.
72
‘Web of debt looms for Indian housing scheme beneficiaries’, The Hindu, 18 September 2013
73
The Indian Government had claimed the housing grant was a major effort on their part to address the
aspirations of the war-affected people and did not want to see any negative publicity around the housing debt
70
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donors and even think tanks were cautious about finding fault with the housing grant
schemes.74 Nevertheless, the debate around housing debt became one of the few extensive
debates on post-war indebtedness in the war torn regions.75

Table 2.3 Resources Used in Northern Province Development (2009 - 2013)
Total Amount
(Rs. Mn)
23,933

Item
Welfare of IDPs
Demining of 1,982 Sq. km. Area

12,174

Resettlement of 295,136 Persons

6,096

Infrastructure Development
Roads

221,444
68,000

Transport

30,701

Electricity

14,762

Water Supply & Irrigation

14,103

Health

20,410

Education

19,561

Housing

11,716

Court Houses

1,110

Agriculture and Fisheries
Livelihood Development & Other

17,878
23,203

Total

263,647

Total Amount
(US$ Mn)

184
94
47
1,703
523
236
114
108
157
150
90
9
138
178
2,028

Source: Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013

issue. Eventually, a major conference was organised by the UN Habitat on donor-led housing schemes, but it did
not address the issue. The UN Habitat organised conference sponsored by the European Union, Australian Aid
and the Swiss Development Cooperation titled, ‘Restoring Communities through 'Home-Owner-Driven'
Reconstruction: from post-Emergency to Development’, was held at one of the Five Star hotels in Colombo and
had no panellists from the North even though it was a conference about housing in the North and East. I
attended the conference and when challenged the panellists about the issue of debt, they had no answers. The
conference did not address the crucial question of indebtedness.
74
A Centre for Poverty Analysis Study though weak in its recommendations including calling for greater
financial literacy, nevertheless surveyed the extensive nature of such debt: “A survey of 347 households in
Jaffna, Mullaitivu and Killinochchi, (with 2/3 of households participating in a housing programme) indicated
that average debt among housing beneficiaries were higher than those that have been approved to participate,
but have not begun construction of houses. Half of the sample reported inability to pay back debt; and increased
debt leads households to coping strategies such as reducing food consumption that negatively affects the quality
of life. Findings of this study indicate that participation in an owner-driven housing programme is not the cause
of indebtedness, but is a catalyst that leads to higher levels of borrowing. The lack of sustainable livelihoods
appears to be a strong factor leading households to borrow. Other factors such as the lack of financial literacy
and the increased supply of debt also appear to be linked with indebtedness” (Romeshun et al 2014).
75
The Swiss Development Cooperation following the UN Habitat conference commissioned another study to
address the increasing housing-related debt and the uncompleted houses, but the study was misplaced in its
focus on financial counselling. In response to a follow up study by the Centre for Poverty Analysis on Financial
Counselling sponsored by the Swiss Development Cooperation (Gunaskera et al 2015), I wrote a critical review
in the press on the assumptions and the outcomes of that study (Kadirgamar 2015).
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As evident from Table 2.3, total expenditure on reconstruction of the Northern
Province by the government during the 2009-2013 period amounts to Rs. 264 billion (US$ 2
billion). Furthermore, reflecting the broader neglect of the rural economy in national policy,
expenditure in agriculture and fisheries amounted to just Rs. 18 billion or 6.8% compared to
infrastructure expenditure of Rs. 221 billion or 84% for the reconstruction of the North from
2009 to 2013. Arguably, after a war such infrastructure growth is necessary, but the relative
lack of investment towards the creation of livelihoods and jobs, has led to infrastructure led
jobless growth in the post-war period.

Demographic Changes and Occupations in Jaffna
Table 2.4 illustrates the considerable fall in population in Jaffna from 1981 to 2012
and a significant shift in the gender balance. According to Census and Statistics, between
1981 and 2012, Sri Lanka’s population grew from 14,846,274 to 20,277,597. However, the
population of Jaffna District fell from 734,474 to 583,071. 76 That is an average annual
population decline of 0.74 percent Jaffna District in contrast to 1% growth for SL as a whole.
This drop in population is linked to the mass migration of the Tamil community from Sri
Lanka to form the Tamil diaspora in the West estimated to be 800,000 people and an addition
200,000 people living as refugees in India (ICG 2010). There is also a gendered character to
war-time migration and mortality reflected in the gendered imbalance of the population.

76

The discrepancy in data for 1981 between Table 2.4 and the data from Census and Statistics relates to the redemarcation of Jaffna District.
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Table 2.4 Jaffna District Census of Population (1871 - 2012)
Year

Male

Female

Total

1871

122,500

123,600

246,100

1881

131,500

134,100

265,600

1891

137,600

141,700

279,300

1901

149,200

151,700

300,900

1911

159,700

167,500

327,200

1921

161,600

169,000

330,600

1946

212,200

212,600

424,800

1953

246,400

245,500

491,900

1963

307,900

304,700

612,600

1971

349,900

351,700

701,600

1981

412,700

417,900

830,600

2012

275,500

307,800

583,400

Source: Statistical Hand Book 2013 Jaffna District, Page 58

The occupational pattern of Jaffna District77 at the end of 2014 is given in Table 2.5.
In Jaffna, 51% are in agriculture and fisheries, 11% in construction related fields and 17% are
employed by the state including as bureaucrats, teachers and healthcare workers. The low
level of occupied women, is probably related to the fact that women’s informal labor
including as domestic workers is not accounted for in the data. In many farming and fishing
households, women provide assistance in farming and fishing.

Table 2.5 Occupations in Jaffna District
Occupation
Male Female
Farmers
31,651
3,378
Farm Labor
18,291
6,680
Fishers
17,198
959
Construction (Masons Carpenters)
16,967
23
State Employess (officials, teachers)
15,007 11,467
Others (Private Sector and NGOs)
22,154 10,787
Total Occupied
121,268 33,294
Source: Jaffna District Statistical Handbook 2015

77

Total
35,029
24,971
18,157
16,990
26,474
32,941
154,562

Total (%)
23
16
12
11
17
21
100

The Jaffna District population is 583,882 out of the Northern Province 1,061,315 constituting 55% of the
population. Therefore, Jaffna District is the largest of the five districts in the Northern Province. Source: Census
and Statistics, Housing Census of 2012.
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Recent data from the Jaffna District Secretariat reflects an unemployment crisis. By
the end of 2014, there were 154,562 persons occupied with an additional 32,682 people
looking for work. Of those looking for work, 28,752 or 88% are youth between the age of 16
and 36, and 84% of those youth do not have vocational training or higher education such as in
universities.78 Thus youth unemployment in Jaffna is severe.

Growth Claims and Expansion of Credit
With respect to criticism about the the economic crisis in the North, the Central Bank
Regional Development Department made the following defensive comments about their
efforts in the North: “The Province’s GDP growth rate has also showed a steady acceleration,
starting from 12% in 2009, to 22% in 2010, and to over 25% per annum in 2011 and 2012.”79
This high level of growth is due to the economy grinding to a halt during the war and the
initial boost due to economic activity after the war; the high level of economic growth does
not mean much as the level of Provincial GDP in the North at the end of the war was quite
low.
Next, the Regional Development Department claimed it had disbursed Rs. 13.3 billion
(US$ 100 million) over 11 cultivation seasons to 116,337 farmers in the Northern Province.
This amounts to loans averaging Rs. 114,000 (US$ 880) per farmer. Expansion of credit was
initiated by the state and was a major component of the reconstruction policies.80

Reconstruction Approach of the New Government
The Rajapaksa regime was defeated with the support of the Tamil minority in January
2015 and there was some hope that the new government would be able to address the
78

Data I directly obtained from Jaffna District Secretariat in May 2016.
‘Post-war realities in the Northern Province: CB replies Friday Forum’, Daily Financial Times, 12 June 2014.
80
Furthermore, the Central Bank claimed 37 new bank branches and 22 extension offices were established after
the war in the Northern Province from May 2009 to May 2011. See: Central Bank Press Release 26 May 2011.
79
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challenges of reconstruction. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe announced in his economic
policy statement in November 2015 that he planned to have a major donor conference in
Tokyo to find commitments for the reconstruction of the North and East in June 2016.
Regardless of his ambitions to organize adonor conference like the one at the height of the
peace process with the LTTE in 2003, the donor conference did not materialize. The various
powerful actors including the donors no longer saw Sri Lanka as a crisis prone country. In the
Budgets of 2016 and 2017, there was little allocated for the reconstruction of the North and
East.
Wickremesinghe was not defensive like Rajapaksa: tactically he blamed Rajapaksa
for the post-war woes. In any event, he concedes the economic crisis in the North. In an
interview in December 2016 with The Hindu, Wickremesinghe stated:
The North is going to take a longer time. The war has destroyed the economy. So it
will be a longer period but we have given special concessions for investment in the
North —double the normal concessions we have given the rest of the country,
incentives.81
The vision for reconstruction of the war-torn regions by the Wickremesinghe government is
to promote businesses through tax concessions for investors. While Wickremesinghe awaits
the private sector, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) led Northern Provincial Council awaits
the Tamil diaspora to reconstruct the North. Over seven years after the end of the war, there
is little change in the neoliberal trajectory of reconstruction.

Key Reports on Jaffna and the North
There are a few important reports by the Government, the UN and donors assessing
the post-war challenges in Jaffna and the Northern Province. These documents which came
81

‘We’re all patriots, we’re all nationalists’, The Hindu, 15 December 2016.
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out in 2011 and 2012 were not all accessible to me immediately and I was only able to access
some of them after my field research. The unavailability of these reports in the public domain
have also contributed to the muted response to the problems with reconstruction.
The Government’s reconstruction policies were put forward through its Northern
Spring Development Plan. This development plan unveiled in 2009 had two components a
180 day programme and a five year investment programme (2009-2013). The 180 day
programme emphasised de-mining, resettlement of IDPs, reconstruction of damaged
economic and social infrastructure and livelihood recovery. The five year investment
programme emphasised solutions to displacement, restoring livelihoods, reactivating services
and facilities, rehabilitating infrastructure facilities, developing human capacities, targeting
vulnerable groups and establishing good governance. Some of the key features in the plan
were addressing property rights and generation of livelihoods and employment. Next, it
sought to connect the north and south through mega development projects with special focus
on road development, power and irrigation sectors. Furthermore, the Central Bank launched a
special loan scheme called ‘Awakening North’, with a maximum loan of Rs. 200,000 to be
borrowed at an annual rate of 12% for those households seeking to resume their livelihoods
(JICA 2011).
With increasing concerns about the post-war humanitarian situation and development
needs, the UN, the Government and various international NGOs put forward ‘Joint Plan for
Assistance Northern Province’ in 2011 and 2012. These reports written jointly with the
government were cautious in their tone not to contradict the Government’s optimistic
statements, but nevertheless highlighted some serious concerns. The 2011 Report highlighted
the donor commitments of US$ 2 billion and reconstruction of infrastructure including water,
housing, irrigation, supply of electricity, rehabilitation of roads and railway, health and
education (Joint Plan for Assistance Northern Province 2011, 4). However, the 2012 Report
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was concerned that donors were not allocating funds for continuing needs and had the
following to say about the economic situation referring to a World Food Programme Survey:
While much progress has been made in addressing the immediate resettlement needs
of the returnee and other conflict-affected populations over the last year, critical gaps
still exist and must be addressed simultaneously with efforts in medium- and longterm development. Over 60% of households in the NP [Northern Province] lack any
capacity for securing their agricultural, fisheries and livestock livelihoods, food
security and other basic needs. As a result, many communities remain in a fragile and
precarious socio-economic situation with a growing burden on host communities due
to resource limitations and delaying a return to normality and sustainable
development (Joint Plan for Assistance Northern Province 2012, 23).
The failure of reconstruction affecting an estimated 60% of the population was significant.
However, both these reports as well as the Government’s Northern Spring development
programme were in many ways only needs assessments and lacked deeper analysis and vision
for post-war reconstruction.
In this context, an extensive report was published in November 2011 by the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) titled, ‘The Project for Development Planning for
the Rapid Promotion of Reconstruction and Development in Jaffna District’. This extensive
report drafted with research from March 2010 to November 2011, was led by Mr. Yonesaka
Hiroaki, and involved seventeen other Japanese academics and experts. It only addresses the
Jaffna District, and not the entire Northern Province. The report states in its Preface:
The project formulated the road maps in order to envisage the reconstruction and
development in Jaffna district toward 2020 after the end of the war in 2009. The road
maps consist three sectors of agriculture, fisheries and community development which
are assumed as the main pillars for recovering Jaffna economy.
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The JICA Report argues for an extensive rural development programme and in its discussion
of community development places emphasis on co-operatives. 82 However, as discussed
above, the Government’s economic policies over the last few decades continued to reduce
investment in the rural economy and that economic vision has undermined reconstruction of
the North. To sum up, these key reports suggest that the crisis facing the war-torn North and
the problems with the path of reconstruction were apparent to many of the international actors
working in Sri Lanka. However, neither the government nor the major international actors
and donors seemed to have the political will to address the crisis.

Local Officials on Reconstruction
Within the state structure, there are clear differences between the centralised marketoriented policies advocated by high level officials in Colombo and the views of local state
officials in the North. A number of interviews with local officials reflected the conundrum
they are caught in. On the one hand, they are conscious of the economic crisis in the North,
particularly the falling incomes, lack of job opportunities and the rising indebtedness. On the
other hand, they continue to think within the framework of existing policies of further
expansion of credit and the greater integration with the market.
In 2012, just three years after the end of the war, they were still involved in a process
of ensuring fallow lands were cultivated and they expressed some hope of recovery in the
rural economy.83 One of the most contested political issues in the North relates to land,
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While I only gained access to this report towards the latter stages of writing my dissertation, my own research
for my dissertation and participation in another fisheries research project, have led me to as similar conclusion
that the three sectors that require focus for sustainable reconstruction are agriculture, fisheries and co-operatives.
My knowledge of fisheries come from a five year long University of Amsterdam led research project on
fisheries conflicts titled REINCORPFISH (Re-Incorporating the Excluded: Providing Space for Small Scale
Fishers for Sustainable Development of Fisheries of South Africa and South Asia). This project opened not just
engagement on the Palk Bay fisheries conflict but larger issues of fisheries development in Sri Lanka and I
found it a greatly rewarding experience. It also complemented my understanding of the rural economy in
northern Sri Lanka where close to 20% of the population depend on fisheries.
83
Interview with Agriculture official on 2 October 2012.
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particularly with military grabs of private lands and the problematic use of state lands. The
processes of ensuring fallow paddy lands – particularly, those left behind by migrants – are
cultivated and land registration more broadly were also central issues in 2012.84 Thus there
was some initial sensitivity about my research given the politicisation of the land issue.
By 2014, the crisis of the local economy had become very clear to local officials and
they were despondent. While Tamil politicians continued to focus only on the land issues
relating to military occupation, the local bureaucrats were conscious of the widespread
economic crisis affecting the rural population.
Official reports claim agricultural production in the Northern Province has increased
considerably in the post-war years.85 Similarly, a local agriculture official claimed most of
Jaffna peninsula’s paddy lands are under production. However, he said that in the islands off
the Jaffna peninsula that were subject to extensive displacement during the war, the lands
remain fallow due to lack of labor.86
The same official also noted how farmers in the North and Sri Lanka generally cannot
compete with agricultural produce from India, where the scale of production is much larger
and labor is much cheaper. He said that “one of the problems, is the lack of coordination
between the Ministry of Trade determining imports and the Ministry of Agriculture
[monitoring production]. Imports at the wrong time disrupt farmers harvest prices.”87 Like
this Agriculture official, many of the local officials I interviewed are from Jaffna and have
been working in Jaffna for many years and are frustrated by the crisis in the Jaffna economy.
Their responses to the current predicament in the Jaffna District and the Northern Province
84

Interview with Land official on 8 October 2012
“The new and abandoned lands are being increasingly cultivated in the conflict affected districts and about
120,921 ha [hectacres] of land have been brought under cultivation of paddy and other highlands crops during
last three years.” (Finance Ministry Annual Report 2013, 62)
86
Interview with Agriculture Department official 19 May 2014.
87
Interview with Agriculture Department official 19 May 2014. In 2015, I myself heard from a parliamentarian
that the Finance Minister wanted to unload two containers of agricultural produce despite a government decision
to the contrary due to the harvest. The traders are a strong lobby and this comment by the official may also have
to do not just with lack of coordination but also corruption relating to the profits of traders.
85
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are shaped by their inability to challenge the state’s policy direction as they assume the
market oriented policies are a given and thus incapable of offering alternatives.
The falling agricultural incomes were argued by another official in the Provincial
Agriculture Ministry to be a consequence of the lack of proper marketing arrangements and
the need for diversification of crops.88 She argued that the Jaffna farmers should consider
moving to the Vanni where land is available; she also believed that the younger generation
“are lazy and unwilling to work.” She further claimed that the large and expensive harvest
machines used for paddy harvesting in the Vanni were necessary given the unreliability of
labor.
Other officials also discussed the consequences of addressing labor problems with
capital inputs, including through the major increase in the purchase of tractors and harvest
machines. One official explained these phenomena as a result of everyone in Jaffna wanting
to become a “mudalali” (a capitalist or manager) by owning a tractor, one can become a
“tractor mudalali” even though there was no room for profits.89 However, government
officials are not disinterested observers given that families of such officials in Jaffna are
involved in cash crop cultivation employing wage labor.90
In the context of falling agricultural and fisheries-related incomes, there has been
some discussion in Jaffna on the need for industries providing regular monthly incomes.
Interviews with District level planning officials91 and officials responsible for industries
agreed on the need for small industries.92 They were, however, frustrated by the lack of
private investments flowing into the North. Their assessment is that investments from the
88

Interview with Provincial Agriculture official 13 May 2014.
Interview with Agriculture Department official 19 May 2014
There was a tinge of contempt in the tone of the official for the rural folk who want to own a tractors.
90
Such comments about the laziness of rural youth and day wage labour is common among middle class people
in Jaffna. They often say there is plenty of work available but youth are unwilling to work. The workers in my
view are more strategic in what work they accept knowing that day wage labour is irregular. This kind of
rhetoric and resistance is not unique to Jaffna, see (Scott 2008) and (Guha 1987).
91
Interview with Planning official 30 April 2014
92
Interview with Industries official 12 May 2014 and Board of Investments official on 2 May 2014.
89
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Tamil diaspora will not be forthcoming.93 The planning official explained her Department’s
skills training program, and then went on to say, these were just “time pass” for the youth. 94
The frustration expressed by these officials with the lack of effective local entrepreneurs and
private investment to stimulate local employment and growth, and their condemnation of the
youth as lazy, may in part be linked to the difficulties of addressing and conceptualising the
failure of reconstruction policies.95 It may also reflect the officials’ class position
condemning rural folk.

Unfolding Crisis: Falling Incomes and Rising Debt
While the economic crisis in the war-torn region of falling incomes and increasing
debt is clear from interviews with officials in Jaffna and reports on resettlement,
macroeconomic data does not fully capture the economic crisis in the north. Data on the north
and east have been wanting for decades and the census carried out every decade in Sri Lanka,
was carried only out in the entire Northern Province in 2012 after a lapse of three decades.
The Household Income and Expenditure Survey conducted by the Census and
Statistics Department is a 12 month long survey done every three years and is an important
survey to analyse the economic inequalities and uneven development. While this survey was
initiated in 1990/1991 taking place every five years and following 2005/2006 every three
years, it was only carried out in the entire Northern Province96 in 2012-2013 and was
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Other than two tourist hotels in Jaffna there had been no significant investment by the diaspora in Jaffna as of
May 2014. Interview with Board of Investments official on 2 May 2014.
94
Interview with Planning official 30 April 2014
95
It is difficult for me to pin down the reason. The absence of ideas for alternative policies at the district and
provincial level, including broader reflection about the local predicament, could reflect the hegemony of the
centralised state. Discussions with an older generation of government officials showed this was not always the
case, as they had advocated for various economic initiatives during their time in office. The current impasse
with little local initiative by the local bureaucracy could be both a consequence of the war-time impact on the
bureaucracy which focused on humanitarian and logistical concerns of survival of the community and the
centralised and authoritarian dominance of neoliberal state.
96
Data for 2009/2010 is only available for some districts of the North, and that too is unreliable due to the mass
displacements from those districts.
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published in March 2015. As Table 2.6 illustrates, the Northern and Eastern Provinces have
the lowest levels of median incomes in the country. I focus on the median income rather than
mean income, as it is more reflective of the state of incomes of the bottom 50% of the
population. The only district where the median income is close to and below some of the wartorn northern and eastern Districts is in southern district of Moneragala.97

Table 2.6 Mean and Median Incomes in Select Provinces and Districts
Sector/ Province/ District

Mean (Rs.)

Median (Rs.)

2012/13

2009/10*

2012/13

2009/10*

Sri Lanka
Urban

45,878
69,880

36,451
47,783

30,814
42,267

23,746
31,000

Rural

41,478

35,228

29,376

23,126

Estate

30,220

24,162

24,087

17,366

34,286

23,712

23,571

16,710

Jaffna

34,788

18,917

23,446

14,815

Mannar

28,535

-

24,200

-

Vavuniya

43,965

39,640

30,967

29,370

Mullaitivu

23,687

-

17,714

-

Kilinochchi

30,643

-

20,614

-

30,676
25,483

23,922
22,844

22,710
20,359

18,030
16,129

Ampara

32,537

24,721

23,429

19,082

Trincomalee

34,577

24,291

24,436

19,154

Western Province
Colombo

64,152
77,723

47,118
51,070

42,100
50,071

30,600
34,186

Uva Province

35,638

28,717

24,228

19,761

Moneragala

34,804

22,161

20,686

17,226

Northern Province

Eastern Province
Batticaloa

*Data for not all districts are available

Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey – 2012/2013 Final Results August 2014

While incomes are low in the North, due to the slow recovery of the economy, a more
worrying development is the gap between income and expenditure in the North, which is one
symptom of rising indebtedness. The only provinces other than the north and the east where
median expenditure exceeds median income are the Western and Central Provinces. This is
97

Moneragala is a mainly agricultural district in the South, which is commonly known in Sri Lanka to have a
high incidence of poverty.
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also the case with the urban and estate sectors. See Table 2.7 for comparison of selective
districts and sectors on the levels of median expenditure exceeding median income.

Table 2.7 Percentage Increase of Expenditure over Incomes
Sector/Province /
District
Sri Lanka
Urban

Median Expenditure
(Rs.)
2012/13
2009/10*
30,701
24,509
43,825
34,039

Median Income
(Rs.)
2012/13 2009/10*
30,814
23,746
42,267
31,000

Expenditure over Income
(%)
2012/13
2009/10*
0%
3%
4%
10%

Rural

29,010

23,600

29,376

23,126

-1%

2%

Estate

25,580

20,490

24,087

17,366

6%

18%

Western
Colombo

44,318
49,229

32,500
36,597

42,100
50,071

30,600
34,186

5%
-2%

6%
7%

Gampaha

43,057

31,825

38,807

29,821

11%

7%

Kalutara

39,036

28,361

36,512

27,511

7%

3%

Central
Kandy

29,513
31,120

22,741
23,770

28,900
30,371

21,410
22,450

2%
2%

6%
6%

Matale

27,342

20,400

26,441

18,606

3%

10%

Nuwara Eliya

28,327

22,245

28,152

21,431

1%

4%

Northern
Jaffna

26,414
28,209

22,171
21,059

23,571
23,446

16,710
14,815

12%
20%

33%
42%

Mannar

22,563

-

24,200

-

-7%

-

Vavuniya

33,503

28,757

30,967

29,370

8%

-2%

Mullaitivu

17,352

-

17,714

-

-2%

-

Kilinochi

24,052

-

20,614

-

17%

-

Eastern
Batticaloa

25,936
23,959

22,040
20,536

22,710
20,359

18,030
16,129

14%
18%

22%
27%

Ampara

26,757

22,686

23,429

19,082

14%

19%

Trincomalee

26,777

23,169

24,436

19,154

10%

21%

*Data for not all districts are available
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Survey – 2012/2013 Final Results August 2014

As evident from the HIES survey, there are clear issues for the bottom half of the
population with respect to the gap between expenditure and income resulting in indebtedness.
It is in the war-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces that in the 2012/2013 survey we see
that median expenditure over income is on the order of 12% and 14%. This is only in one
year, and such debt is accumulated every year compounding the levels of debt. Data is
available for 2009/2010 for the Jafffna District and the Eastern Province, where the median
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expenditure exceeds median income in Jaffna District and the war-torn Eastern Province by
42% and 22% respectively. 98
The above analysis of debt is limited by the data as the HIES survey on monthly
income and expenditure flows will not capture household assets and debt as stock. Nor does
the HIES survey provide data to analyse the dynamics of debt. The dynamics of debts are
such that interest payments for the larger stock of debt, including for larger purchases and
investments in vehicles and houses, are covered by new debt thus effectively rolling over
debt until there is a crisis.
The dire economic situation in the North was beginning to unfold close to three years
after the war, with an emerging crisis in the food security situation and increasing
indebtedness. A report99 based on a survey on food security provided some insights into rural
debt:
The proportion of households with debt is high across all districts and population
groups. The highest was in Jaffna district, with 75 percent of the households having
debt. At least on average 70 percent of the households in Northern Province have debt
compared to 63 percent of households in the Eastern Province. The median debt
holding per household is estimated at LKR 50,000 or an average of LKR 116,380. Of
the households with debt, the major source of credit was banks, followed by friends
and relatives then traditional credit arrangements (WFP 2012, 36).
By early 2012 the report found that some households particularly in Jaffna and the Vanni
required ten months of their current income to settle their debts and most others required at
98

Data is not available for some districts in the Northern Province during the survey. However, the data may not
be accurate due to the war-time conditions. Furthermore, the severe differences in incomes and expenditure
during the 2009/2010 period may also reflect the disruption of livelihoods due to displacement.
99
This extensive surevey of 3,800 households was conducted by the Ministry of Economic Development, the
Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute and the United Nations World Food Programme
in March-April 2012. Unfortunately, the Report based on that survey titled, ‘Food Security in the Northern and
Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka: A Comprehensive Food Security Assessment Report Sri Lanka 2012’ did not
get the necessary attention.
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least six months of their current monthly income. Furthermore, the Report went onto state
that, “high indebtedness and food security are negatively related, with households that are
highly indebted tending to be food secure.” In other words, the Report through it survey
showed that people who took loans were able to spend more on food.100 Furthermore, “debt
was also used for household construction and livelihood inputs” (WFP 2012, 38).
Thus by early 2012 debt had become widespread for food consumption to home
construction. What this report does not capture is the large section of the population in the
North indebted through lease hire purchasing, because of the focus of the report on food
security. Therefore, this report does not capture all the dynamics of rural debt including the
full impact of the expansion of credit. Nevertheless, its focus on food security does provide
some insights about the state of livelihoods in the rural sectors:
Across livelihood groups, the most food insecure households were those relying on
gifts and donations, but are only about two percent of the households. This is followed
by unskilled laborers depending on both agriculture and non-agriculture wage that are
the majority at least 28 percent of the households. The third most food insecure
livelihood groups are farmers and fishermen. Those dependent on casual labor
become vulnerable as casual labor tend to be seasonal and with households reporting
that labor was not available during the main rainy season – November to January.
Furthermore, reports from the field indicated that women are usually paid half the
men’s wage rate of Rs 600 to 1000 per labor day as in April 2012 (Food Security in
the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, 41).
A follow up limited survey in parts of Mullaitivu and Vavuniya South in the Northern
Province by the World Food Programme in August 2013, not made public, but the results

100

This point is counter intuitive, that is at least during the short-term it is only those who took loans could
spend on food.

114

which I am in possession of paint an even bleaker picture.101 This survey shows that jewellery
assets had depleted by 50% between the previous survey in March 2012 to the later survey in
August 2013.102 For rural households in Sri Lanka, jewellery is the main form of liquid asset
passed over generations and are used to tide over household emergencies and seasonal
agricultural failures. In some of the war-torn northern districts, jewellery assets which had
even survived the war were wiped out in the post-war years. While historically, jewellery was
pawned during the emergencies, the jewellery is recovered within a few years if not months
and are maintained as insurance against future emergencies. The severity of the post-war
crisis of indebtedness is reflected in such wealth being consumed or leveraged to augment
further debts.
The situation had deteriorated much further by early 2014 in the context of a drought.
Another food security assessment claimed: “A series of consecutive natural disasters is
undermining household resilience especially in the rural areas of North Sri Lanka.”103 Indeed,
natural disasters mount on the failure of reconstruction, resulting in the downward spiral of a
post-war economic crisis.

Failure of Reconstruction and the Production of Neoliberal Individuals
There have been a few initiatives towards regular employment through investment in
industries with the support of international donors. There is the MAS Holdings garment
factory in Killinochi opened in 2013 that employs close to two thousand young women.
There is also a Hydramani garment factory in Mullaitivu opened in 2015 employing a few
101

I was able to access this data through a donor agency official who interviewed me on reconstruction. I had
heard about this survey and I wanted to see it published, however, the WFP was reluctant to publish the data.
102
The survey through stratified random sampling interviewed 300 households in 4 Divisional Secretary areas.
The government did not give permission to conduct the survey in all 12 districts due to the Provincial elections
the following month. While the WFP informally stated they did not wish to release the data due to the survey
being incomplete, I believe they did not want any negative publicity around the serious economic crisis in the
war-torn regions. Documented in World Food Programme, ‘Food Security, Nutrition Situation’, August 2013.
103
Drought Sri Lanka April 2014, Report by the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of
Disaster Management of the Government of Sri Lanka and the World Food Programme.
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hundred women. In Killinochi, the military initiated farms employ over a thousand
individuals and pay them regular monthly salaries. While there was criticism of such military
enterprises by Tamil politicians, the people desperate for jobs continue to work in those
farms. The Atchuvely Industrial Zone in Jaffna was re-opened in September 2014, however,
despite considerable efforts by officials, only six businesses have agreed to put small plants
thus far.104 Indeed, in the context of failing livelihoods in the rural economy, there is great
demand for such jobs in industries that provide regular monthly incomes.
Many of these private sector initiatives are by firms from outside the North and
capital subsidised by donors, particularly USAID.105 The garment companies in particular are
owned by Sri Lankan multinational comapanies based out of Colombo, and one concern is
that the capital accumulated by such external actors may not be reinvested in the North and
are likely to repatriate elsewhere. Furthermore, for those companies that were initiated with a
major subsidy from USAID, they may pull out after a few years. In any event, such ad hoc
donor led initiatives for job creation hardly address the large demand for employment with
regular incomes.
The bulk of the capital flowing into the North for reconstruction has been absorbed in
infrastructure which does not seem to engage local resources nor labor. Many road and
construction contractors from Colombo who successfully bidded for reconstruction projects

104

The Atchuvely Industrial Zone before the war in the 1970s had employed some 3000 people in small
industries. The 65 acre zone has now been developed in a limited way with 25 acres divided into a number of
plots. However, by May 2014 there were commitments for only 7 projects in the Zone. These projects include
Fiber Glass, Light Engineering, Hose Pipes, Nylon Twine, Food Processing and Waste Paper Recycling. Each
investment is on the scale of Rs. 15 million. Couple of them have an additional investment of Rs. 15 million
from USAID; particularly the Light Engineering and Waste Paper Recycling Plant. Land is given on a 30 year
lease, with infrastructure such as water, power, land development and roads provided. Interview with Industries
Development Board official 12 May 2014.
105
Interview with Industries Development Board official 12 May 2014 and Board of Investments official on 2
May 2014.
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brought labor from the South. The Indian construction of the railroad to North after the war
mostly did not provide much demand for local labor.106

Donor and Government Housing Grants and Local Incomes
The donor and government housing schemes as well as housing construction in
general after the war creates considerable demand for labor. For each house that is built about
25% of the cost is direct labor of masons and masonary assistants. With close to 100,000
houses built in the North through donor and government grants after the war from 2009 to
2016, it translates into considerable wages. Furthemore, construction of private houses often
with remittances and other construction initiatives from government facilities to temples after
the war greatly increased the demand for local masons and construction related labor.
Each house can contribute the equivalent of one household’s income for one year,
with 25% of the cost of the house being paid as direct wages. So for example, the largest
housing project initiated after the war, the Indian housing scheme, provided a grant of Rs.
550,000 (US$ 4,200), but in reality many estimates point to owners spending a total of about
Rs. 800,000 (US$ 6,200). Therefore, Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540) in direct wages almost
equivalent to the median household income per year in Jaffna as per the HIES data above
results from each house. Therefore, 100,000 houses just from the various donor and
government housing grants built over a period of 8 years from 2009 to 2016 translates to
incomes for 12,500 households per year.
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I was unable to find independent data on the total number of those employed in this massive project to
rebuild the railroad, amounting to US$ 800 million. The Indian High Commission claims 500,000 man days of
labour will be provided in the region. That amounts to approximately 500 jobs for the four years that it took to
build the railway. However, during my field research and conversations with local officials, I did not hear of any
local person employed in the project. So the question remains as to whether even those few jobs were
subcontracted to southern contractors.
See: Northern Railway Project: Scope of Project.
[Downloaded on 25 November 2016:
http://www.hcicolombo.org/pdf/Project_Sheet_NORTHERN_RAILWAY_PROJECT.pdf]
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In January 2016, the Resettlement Minister decided to award the building of 65,000
houses in the war-torn districts to Arcelor Mittal, a multinational company that builds
prefabricated steel houses, for a total cost of US$ 1 billion over a period of five years. This
massive award to a multinational for steel houses that many in Sri Lanka considered to be
unsuitable for local conditions and relatively very expensive, led to a major debate. I was also
part of this debate in the media and eventually some of us formed an adhoc committee to
draft an alternative proposal to build owner and community driven cement houses with
architects from Moratuwa University, those with experience in donor-led housing schemes
and activists.
The extensive proposal had many sections, but I was interested in the financing of the
project and the livelihoods linked to the project. The Arcelor Mittal houses cost Rs. 2,200,000
(US$ 16,900) each, where as even the government was supporting an owner driven cement
housing scheme for 10,000 houses in 2016 at Rs. 800,000 (US$ 6,200) each. The government
would have incurred a major foreign loan of US$ 1 billion to be paid over ten years with an
HSBC financing option that came with the Arcelor Mittal project, where as the adhoc
committee drafting the alternative proposal was able to get a commitment from the local
National Development Bank, to float a rupee bond to finance houses at almost half the cost.
The proposal illustrated that the government need not incur a foreign loan, the cause of
periodic balance of payment problems in Sri Lanka, and 102,000 cement houses can be built
for same cost of the 65,000 prefabricated houses. Finally, and most importantly, prefabricated
houses do not contribute to local incomes, cement houses as per government housing grant of
Rs. 800,000 (US$ 6,200) would have contributed Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540) in direct wages,
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which amounts to approximately the income of one person per year. There are additional
economic benefits of stimulating local industries in roofing and other house fittings.107
These efforts to grant the largest post-war development project for the North and East
to a multi-national corporation and the foreign financing loan through HSBC reflects another
level of global financial maneuvering to the detriment of labor and production in the war-torn
North and East. The provision of post-war housing itself is only seen as a consumer good
granted to a household. The steel prefabricated house is unsuitable for the recipient, the
participation of the home owner in the building process is denied and the larger contribution
to the community in the form of employment is not considered. This is another scale of
producing neoliberal individuals who are only expected to consume and the project if it goes
ahead will be another major mark in the continuing failure of reconstruction.

Out Migration for Foreign Employment
In this context, one of the main avenues for regular incomes now is foreign
employment through migration, which allows for monthly remittances. There is a steady
increase in the out flow of migrant labor to the Middle East from Jaffna in recent years. The
data for Jaffna District in Figure 2.3 reflects the departures for foreign employment only and
is not the total number of those employed overseas. The data may not be accurate as some
individuals leave without informing officials and there is no tracking of those who return
from employment overseas.
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At the time of revising my dissertation, in December 2016, almost a year since the government decided to
finance 65,000 houses, the debate is continuing in parliament and in the media, even as the Resettlment Minister
with the backing of the Prime Minister insists on the Arcelor Mittal project. There are allegations of corruption
with a notorious local agent for Arcelor Mittal, who had been arrested for previous frauds and known to be a
contributor to the ruling political party. The debate on this project including aspects of the alternative proposal
have been regularly documented by a prominent Sunday Times journalist (Wijesdasa 2016).
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Figure 2.3 Departures for Foreign Employment from Jaffna District
Source: Economic and Social Statistics 2015, Central Bank

The data for Jaffna is revealing of the economic pressures, where between 2012 when
the crisis in the rural economy became apparent as per many of the reports mentioned above
and 2014 there is a major increase. In terms of male migrant workers in 2012 and 2014, there
were 3,621 and 7,817 departures respectively, amounting to a 115% increase. The data for
2015 is provisional and the drop could also be related to the general fall in demand for
migrant workers in the Middle East. The total number of those employed overseas108 is likely
to be much higher as many of them work for two to three years before returning for a break.
Some of them, then choose to again migrate abroad for employment depending on their
household’s financial situation. Unlike in other districts, where Sinhala and Muslim women
do migrate on a large scale abroad, women from Jaffna do not migrate abroad for
employment in large numbers. Finally, in the districts devastated by the last phase of the war,
Killinochi and Mullaitivu, which are also the poorest districts as evident from the HIES data
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The data on total estimated number of those employed from Sri Lanka is only available for 2010, amounting
to 1,932,245. In that year, it is estimated that 23.8% of the labour force is employed overseas. The total
departures from Sri Lanka in 2014 was 300,703.
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above, only a few hundred men manage to go abroad for employment.109 Thus there is also a
class character to those who can access means and ways of going abroad for employment.
The departure of male migrant workers from Jaffna as a percentage of population
compared to the rest of the country is not significantly different, with 1.25% and 0.9% for
Jaffna and the national average respectively.110 Therefore, one conclusion could be that such
out migration from Jaffna is becoming similar to the situation in the rest of the country and
could taper off in a few years. However, the dynamics of the increasing out migration
discussed above and the jump from 2012 to 2014, could point to structural shift in the
economy with dependence on migrant remittances.
Employment in the Middle East has few protections in the form of labor rights and
workers are subject to harsh working conditions. In addition, such out migration creates
problems within households due to the long absence of spouses adding to the debilitated
famlial ties after the war. The large number of youth willing to work under such conditions is
also a strong refutation of the rhetoric of “lazy youth” deployed by middle class Jaffna
society including officials mentioned above.

Return to Rural Livelihoods and Self Employment
Reconstruction was initiated with the idea of returning the war-torn rural population
to their original livelihoods consisting mainly of cash crop agriculture and fisheries in the
Jaffna District. Those livelihoods it was assumed could be resumed with loans from banks,
including subsidized loans backed by the Central Bank. Those who could not get involved in
agriculture and fisheries were given self employment loans by the banks at market rates. Such
109

Only 458 men sought foreign employment from these two districts in 2014.
According to the ILO in 2013, some of the highest levels of out-migration of male and female workers from
South and South East Asia in the Middle East comes from Sri Lanka (247,356), Nepal (284,392) and Philippines
(791,765). These statistics of the departure of workers as a percentage of population is Sri Lanka (1.2%), Nepal
(1.02%) and Philippines (0.8%). Thus regionally Sri Lanka has the highest levels of out-migration of workers to
the Middle East (ILO 2015, 7).
110
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self employment for men might involve putting up a shop, driving a three wheeler for a fare,
or owning a small truck to transport goods. For women, such self employment meant raising
livestock, taking sewing orders after purchasing a sewing machine or some other cottage
production such as weaving baskets.
The state’s reconstruction vision then only considered the individual and their
capacity to make living with initial capital. The question did not arise that a people devastated
by war, production that had ground to a halt, and a market for local services that was
marginal could be an impediment to the return and revival of the local economy. There were
the added pressures of mass produced goods suddenly flooding the war-torn regions after a
lapse of few decades. The result was that many of these self employment loans failed. Either
investments in shops, vehicles and livestock failed or people used those loans for day to day
consumption including food.
When such self-employment and loans failed, the people were blamed instead of the
market and the reconstruction vision. Dr. Muttukrishna Sarvananthan one of the few
economists working in Jaffna had the following to say about debt and the market:
‘I’m not surprised about this because for a long time they lived in a closed economy,’
said Muttukrishna Sarvananthan, economist and founder of the Point Pedro Institute
of Development. ‘They had nothing to borrow and did basic, subsistence farming. So
there was pent up demand. All of a sudden, everything opened up and the North
became, more or less, like any other part of the country. People are tempted for
things.’…Dr. Sarvananthan believes that that the market will correct itself after a
period of pain that might involve some suicides and even institutional collapses.
‘People will realise that they cannot go on like this,’ he said. (Wijedasa 2014)
Sarvananthan at the time of the interview in 2014 at least realized the severity of the debt
problem due to his strong connection to Jaffna, whereas, many of the economists and policy
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makers in Colombo did not even recognize the problem. However, Sarvananthan like most
neoclassical economists blamed the situation on the people and the legacy of the import
substitution era and the war.
Reconstruction and the sustainable livelihoods of the war-torn people are in this way
reduced to individual responsibility. In other words, people should become thrifty, hard
working and entrepreunerial. If they have access to capital, and they are unable to make a
linving it is their fault.
Reconstruction policies of this neoliberal vision then are about individuals finding the
capital through the financial system or helping them activate the use of their own assets such
as the pawning and sale of gold jewellery as well as mortgaging and sale of land.111 Indeed,
there are now moves to create a market in land as per the economic policy statement of Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe in November 2015 and the Budgets for 2016 and 2017. They want
to convert permit land given to people on government lease for a few decades into free
holding land that can be mortgaged or sold. The World Bank112 for close to two decades has
been calling for such market-led reforms113 in Sri Lanka, which is tied to its vision of
urbanization with small holding farmers selling their plots and moving to the cities, where by
small-holding agricultural land is consolidated under larger agribusinesses.114
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The neoliberal ideologue Hernando de Soto calls land that can not be sold dead capital (de Soto 2001).
The World Bank argues such permit land “restrictions on mortgaging preclude its use as collateral to access
the credit households could use to finance both income-enhancing farm and non-farm investments. For those
wanting to remain in agriculture, the small landholdings, the lack of secure tenure rights, and the legal
restrictions on acquiring or leasing in land reduce incentives for productivity-enhancing investments. Those
interested in shifting out of agriculture into non-farm activities, or merely moving to another location would
have to leave without compensation for their land. In addition to fostering a large cadre of part-time farmers,
these legislative provisions limit the ability of the land market to allocate land to its best use.” (World Bank
2003, 38)
113
See discussion of market led agricultural reform. (Lahiff et al 2007)
114
Ha-joon Chang has the following to say about agencies such as the World Bank and their policies that it
“believes that land markets should be deregulated so that entry into and exit from agriculture becomes easier.
However, deregulated land markets almost always lead to re-concentration of land ownership, nullifying the
result of the land reform. Sooner or later, such holdings will be hit by a shock and the owners will have to sell
out to survive. Large farmers (be they commercial farms or traditional landlords) who can more easily survive
those shocks then can buy up these fragmented farms, further expanding. For example, in Chile, close to 50
112
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In this way, the second wave of neoliberalism increasingly focuses on the individual
making him or her responsible for their economic lives. The production of such neoliberal
individuals is linked to financialization, as it is only those who are claimed to possess access
to finance that can also be asked to take responsibility. Finally, the role of the neoliberal state
is facilitation of access to the market and finance for the individual, as it increasingly
withdraws from the social welfare services it provided during an earlier era. The state,
however, is very much active in disciplining those “irresponsible” individuals and
suppressing any collective protests (Wacquant 2012).

Conclusion
The relative surplus population exists in all kinds of forms. Every worker belongs to it
during the time when he is only partially employed or wholly unemployed. Leaving
aside the large-scale and periodically recurring forms that the changing phases of the
industrial cycle impresses on it, so that it sometimes appears acute, in times of crisis,
and sometimes chronic, in times when business is slack, we can identify three forms
which it always possesses: the floating, the latent, and the stagnant (Marx 1992, 794).

The war-torn people for two and a half decades were caught in the war, displaced
multiple times, and were forced to wait for the war to end in order to resume production. In
the post-war years, this long suffering population has been further ravaged by a second wave
of neoliberalism, characterised by financialised indebtedness and condemned to become
neoliberal individuals attempting to find self-employment in a war devastated wasteland. The
situation of this population, draws parallels with Marx’s description of a relative surplus

percent of the beneficiaries of the pre-Pinochet land reform had sold out by the mid-1980s, especially in the face
of diminishing state support in credit, extension, and other inputs.” (Chang 2009, 487)

124

population. While global finance capital has indebted and uprooted most of them, only some
are absorbed by global demand for labor, in this case, migrant labor to the Middle East.
What will become of the subaltern sections of this population, those who are socially
excluded, and do not have the wherewithal to find employment in the Middle East? Will the
demand for labor in the Middle East increase to a point where employment agents will come
in search for them? Or will a crisis in the Middle East send back those who have recently
migrated increasing the size of those excluded from capital? Will the process of social
exclusion with dispossession by the second wave of neoliberalism remain a wasteland for the
longue durée, as Sanyal has argued about the informal sector in rural India abandoned by the
state and capital? (Sanyal 2014) In otherwords, would a section of the war-torn population of
Jaffna become in a stagnant pauperized population?
The challenges that have emerged with reconstruction in Sri Lanka may in part be a
result of the particular form of capital mobilised for such reconstruction and the manner in
which it changed social relations including processes that atomize individuals. However,
policy makers assumed that integration with the national market and the flow of finances
through the expansion of credit would lead to a “transition”. While the concept “transition”
(Sanyal 2014) has a long history both in Marxist and liberal discourse, it gains a particularly
powerful deployment with respect to war-torn societies. The idea of transition implies a
definite process of normalisation. Transition demarcates a particular temporal relationship
between the period of war and post-war and assumes inevitable progressive change. It also
emphasises an economic break between the time of war and the period after the war and deemphasises the continuities. Thus any socio-economic deterioration after the war is
considered part of the cost and process of normalisation, at the end of which a better future
awaits the population. My analysis of post-war Jaffna, question the certainty of the discourse
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of “transition”. Indeed, the politics of “transition” becomes the justification for forms of
dispossession and social exclusion.
While these changes have been happening in the rest of the country over a few
decades, the dynamics are different during a short period, as with the war torn regions during
the post-war years. Furthermore, arguments about the necessary social costs of “transition”
are perhaps easier to push against a war-torn population when they are attempting to recover
from devastation by war under conditions of continuing militarization and widespread
climate of fear. It may also be a consequence of the time needed for movements of resistance
to emerge, including new forms of politics by the socially excluded. At the level of analysis,
the changes to social relations including the production of neoliberal individuals,
indebtedness by financialization and dispossession by the neoliberal state during the short
post-war period, may reveal the dynamics of social processes that may be harder to capture
and analyse over the longue durée.115
The failure of reconstruction and dispossessed individuals condemned to indebtedness
in the war-torn regions are shaped by the second wave of neoliberalism transforming Sri
Lanka. This second wave of neoliberalism is constituted by extensive processes: (1)
financialization with global capital flows, changes to national finances and the financial
sector and financial mechanisms reaching down to the rural level in the form of increased
pawning, leasing, micro credit and bank loans; (2) a neoliberal state promoting private
business as well as urban and infrastructure development; and (3) attempts to discipline and
produce neoliberal individuals who have to fend for themselves even as they are immersed in
debt. In this way, the second wave of neoliberalism was a departure from the earlier period of
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In a talk I gave to the Social Science Study Circle in Jaffna in July 2014 on the Economic Causes of Social
Deterioration in Jaffna, I mentioned Margaret Thatcher’s famous statement, “There is no such thing as society.”
And I was surprised at the way in which it resonated with the local activists. The changes in Jaffna over the last
few years seem to be racing along towards a neoliberal attack on the very idea of society.
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liberalization in the levels of financialization and the attendant indebtedness and the social
inequalities that were reinforced by the new infrastructure.
While the Rajapaksa regime initiated this second wave of neoliberalism with what
were opportune conditions with the end of the war coinciding with the flow of global
finances to the emerging market countries due to the Great Recession of 2008, the new
government after regime change in January 2015 continues and expands these neoliberal
policies. While an IMF agreement initiated this wave of neoliberalism in 2009, a new IMF
agreement in June 2016 under the new Wickremesinghe government is giving fuel to expand
that wave as neoliberal policies are broadened to include trade liberalization, privatization
and the creation of a financial center in Colombo. The Rajapaksa regime spoke of a
repressive Malaysian model, but the Wickremesinghe regime speaks of a Singapore model
with an even greater emphasis on the market.
With neoliberal policies and discourse seeming to be ubiquitous, the question arises
about the particular characteristics of what I have called the second wave of neoliberalism.
There are a few significant aspects to the working of neoliberalism during the post-war
moment in Sri Lanka. First, the depth of financialization, where global finance passes through
formal banking and financial institutions down to the rural level. In other words, it is not just
the deployment of any one financial instrument at the rural level, such as micro finance
schemes, but rather a structural change in the financial system where global finance circulates
through the formal banking system down to the rural level through multiple financial
products. Second, the emphasis on self-employment, including attempts to create livelihoods,
through the expansion of credit with a variety of financialized products. The consequence of
such policies have led to individuals and households having to shoulder greater
responsibilities and risks, and eventually high levels of indebtedness and inability to sustain
their way of life. Third, the new circuit of accumulation, where financialized debts lead to
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rural dispossession resulting in out migration to pay for such debts that in turn provides for
the accumulation of global finance capital. In the next, chapter I illustrate the workings of the
second wave of neoliberalism through a field study of one village.
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CHAPTER 3
Financialisation and Rural Debt in Pathemany
Map 3.1
Jaffna Peninsula and the Vanni

Source: Google Maps

Some of the central challenges of post-war reconstruction in Sri Lanka relate to rural
incomes and rural debt. I examine the state of rural incomes and rural debt in Jaffna through a
field study in one village, Pathemany, a village near the small town of Atchuvely in Jaffna. I
chose this village, because it was the only case study in northern Sri Lanka, in an extensive
research project on agrarian change conducted by the Social Scientist Association. This
multi-site research project was conducted between 1980 and 1982 just before the war, and
provides a good baseline of social relations in rural Jaffna (Abeysekera 1985). My field study
three decades later in the same village, after a long war and bouts of displacement, sought to
investigate the changes to rural incomes. In the course of the field study, I discovered that
rural debt had become the major issue in Jaffna.

129

When I began my field research in late 2012, three years after the end of the war,
many of the roads and highways had been rebuilt. The ruins that had remained during the war
years that were visible when I had visited Jaffna in 2002 and 2004, and for that matter soon
after the war in late 2009 and 2010, were increasingly receding from sight as one travelled on
one of the main roads crossing the Jaffna peninsula, the Pointpedro road. Pathemany village
begins just a kilometre north of Atchuvely town, which is located mid-way between Jaffna
town on the South West corner of the Jaffna peninsula and Pointpedro town on the North East
corner of Jaffna Peninsula. There is regular bus service between Atchuvely and both towns
on the newly carpeted Pointpedro road connecting a string of villages and small towns.
Atchuvely town has its own hospital, schools, market, a number of banks and finance
companies, co-operative societies and tea shops. In this way, Atchuvely town is centrally
located for a number of villages in the vicinity.
Map 3.2
Atchuvely Town

Source: Google Maps
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Field research in the years after the war was constrained by many challenges,
particularly the continuing militarisation of northern Sri Lanka and widespread climate of
fear. Most villagers, particularly during the tenure of the Rajapaksa regime, were reluctant to
be recorded and avoided surveys unless it was by government officials or someone they
knew. In this context, I found that people in the oppressed caste quarter of Pathemany village,
called Bharathy Veethy, were more willing to speak about their predicament. The oppressed
caste in Pathemany mainly belonged to the toddy tapping (tree climbers who tap the sap of
palm trees) caste, but they mostly work as agricultural wage labor in contemporary times. I
had established a good relationship with one of the local leaders of this oppressed caste
community in Bharathy Veethy, Mr. Chandrabose, and coincidentally found a research
assistant from the same community, both of which facilitated my field study including access
to oppressed caste households.
Pathemany, Grama Niladari (GN) division (the smallest unit with government
officials at the village level) J281 is one of 31 GN divisions in located in the Kopay
Divisional Secretariat. The Kopay Divisional Secretariat is part of the red soil agricultural
belt, and is one of 15 Divisional Secretariats in the Jaffna District. Pathemany, covers a land
aread of 2.75 square kms and in 2012 had a population of 696 households (2,258 people) with
an estimated 400 households in the oppressed caste quarter of Bharathy Veethy with the rest
mainly belonging to the dominant Vellala caste.116 However, among the Vellala caste an
estimated one hundred households are displaced people renting houses and land from Palaly.
Some of these Palaly Vellala households have agricultural land elsewhere including in the
Vanni.
116

Data obtained from Grama Niladhari (Village Official) of Pathemany on 3 December 2012.
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Methods Description
My research assistant Akalya, the only if not one of the few university graduates from
Bharathy Veethy, and I attempted to reach as many of the households as possible in
Pathemany village through convenience and snowball sampling. We began with the contacts
of Akalya and Mr. Chandrabose and through those contacts, we reached their families and
friends. We also attempted to reach as many other households as possible by randomly
knocking on doors in Pathemany. However, it was much harder to find agreeable respondents
through such random visits.
We first carried out a questionnaire starting in March 2013 in the various parts of
Pathemany village, but it was those in Bharathy Veethy that mostly agreed to participate in
the questionnaire. The questionnaire was also combined with open-ended interviews where
possible, which helped identify participants for longer detailed interviews for questions
relating to the history of the village, caste relations and the role of social institutions. These
short interviews and conversations, gave me a broader understanding of rural life in
Pathemany, and when agreeable led to longer interviews later.
The initial questionnaire was framed in a broad manner with some open ended
questions consisting of the twelve sections as follows:
1. Identity including religion, temple and membership in community centres
2. Educational level of family members
3. Housing including war-time damage, ownership or rental, housing assistance
4. Economic status of household including assets and home garden
5. Livestock reared by the household
6. Agricultural land, share cropping and wage labor
7. Agricultural support from government, co-operatives and private business
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8. Jobs of household members, migration, incomes and remittances
9. Inter-generational relationship to Pathemany village and migration
10. Agricultural crops reared and time spent in agriculture
11. Agricultural equipment and machinery including ownership and rental
12. Women’s labor in the household and wage labor
We attempted the questionnaire on 107 households and 68 agreed. Therefore, 9.8% of the
696 households in Pathemany participated in the questionnaire. The exercise of the
questionnaire and the related conversations were valuable for me in familiarizing myself with
not only Pathemany village, but the broader concerns of rural social life in Jaffna. Therefore,
the questionnaire was mainly of qualitative value.
The questionnaire and the interviews provided some important insights for the
construction of the survey to gain quantitative data. Questions emerged about rural
provisioning, rural debt and migrant remittances from the Middle East as opposed to
remittances from permanent migrants to the Western countries. Such questions were
addressed in the survey and data was collected to understand the dynamics of incomes and
debt in Pathemany village.
I also realized from the questionnaire that it was going to be difficult for me to gain a
detailed breakdown of household expenditure in the surevy with the resources available to
me. Most rural households did not keep such accounts or think in terms of monthly and
weekly expenditures. Therefore, I decided to focus on their monthly expenditure on firewood
bought once or twice a month and education expenditure paid once a month.
The questionnaire and the related interviews also reinforced the point made to me by
many including the village leader that it would be difficult to ask direct questions about caste
identity. I continued my research on caste through subtle means, such as detailed interviews
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relating to social institutions including temples, schools, co-operatives and community
centres. Analysis of caste relations in Pathemany are addressed in Chapter 4.
We also organised a focused group discussion at the Bharathy Veethy community
center.117 The discussion with seven men including the community center leaders was
insightful on the dynamics of debt. We found that people were more willing to talk about
debt in a group discussion rather than in individual interviews.
We carried out a survey starting in November 2013 approaching 136 households and
102 households agreed to participate. The survey was only carried out in the Bharathy Veethy
oppressed caste quarter, and the survey recorded 25% of the estimated 400 households in
Bharathy Veethy. Again it was administered as a convenience and snowball survey. The
survey consisted of 34 questions under the following categories:
1. Monthly household expenditure (food, education, firewood)
2. Monthly household incomes (income from agriculture, income from other jobs)
3. Loans incurred (agriculture, self-employment, leasing, pawning, social
institutions, informally from individuals, for housing)
4. Land ownership (own home, own farm, share cropping)
5. Remittances (diaspora in the West, migrant workers in the Middle East)
Therefore, the survey following the questionnaire was geared towards understanding the
impact of monetization, credit, rural provisioning and remittances.
My experience with the survey is that there is likely to be considerable error for the
reason that the villagers make broad approximations of monetary amounts on a monthly
basis. It was also very difficult to get historical information from them for example of
incomes and expenditures more than a year ago. Furthermore, they were also guarded in the
information they provided. Finally, I found that with the survey and the interview, the
117

This discussion was held on an evening after the members returned from work on 16 May 2013.
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villagers responded to my questions with the most recent developments in mind. Therefore, a
drought year would mean they are very pessimistic during the interview about the future of
agriculture, eventhough in reality they will cultivate the next year if they have the
wherewithal.
The value of the survey for me was to get an on the ground sense of data to be able to
compare it with the robust HIES survey carried during the period of my field study and
identify broader patterns of rural economic life in the oppressed caste quarter of Bharathy
Veethy. While my initital questions were about rural incomes, in the course of my field
research I became more interested in the post-war dynamics of debt linked to new forms of
financialization at the rural level. Therefore, the construction of the survey and the analysis of
my findings reflect that focus on indebtedness and contemporary forms of dispossession and
accumulation.
Map 3.3
Bharathy Veethy

Source: Google Maps
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Rural Incomes, Land and Capital
The Jaffna economy is characterised by failure of incomes to match the rising cost of
living as illustrated from data in the previous Chapter. How does one account for the falling
incomes relative to household expenditure after the war? This problem can be analysed from
three angles: first, the challenges faced in agricultural production and incomes following
integration into the national and global market after the war; second, the impact of systemic
changes to the rural economy after the war in the form of monetisation of the economy, the
shift in rural provisioning, and changes in consumption; and third, the expansion of credit that
allowed for much higher expenditure than incomes.

Land and Landlessness in Jaffna
The size of plots cultivated by farmers, has historically been small in Jaffna.
According to the Agricultural Census of 2002/2003 in Jaffna there are no plots over 20 acres.
There are 25,303 plots, between 0.25 and 20 acres cultivating a total extent of 31,895 acres.
That is an average plot of 1.26 acres lower than the national average of 2 acre plots for those
holding lands between 0.25 and 20 acres. The farmers with plots between 0.25 and 20 acres
could be categorized as the small holding peasantry. Therefore, there are no large farmers in
the Jaffna District and the small holding peasantry also have smaller plots than in the rest of
the country. Next, there are 66,526 plots that are less than a quarter of an acre cultivating a
total extent of 9,941 acres in Jaffna. Many of these small plots are possibly home gardens.
Since this data is from the Agricultural Census of 2002 and the Agricultural Census of
2013/2014 is yet to be published, it is difficult to analyze the land pressure and the number of
farm households and farm workers and their acces to land.118
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According to the Department of Agrarian Development, in 2012 there were 63,280 farm families, 33,888
farm laborers and 230 registered farmer organizations in Jaffna (Jaffna District Statistical Handbook 2013, 78).
This number had declined by 2014 to 54,417 farm families, 22,418 farm laborers and 230 registered farmer
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Pathemany is located in the Kopay Division in the Jaffna District. In this Division, out
of 22,064 households 2,682 households are absolutely landless, which is about 12percent of
the population.119 In the Jaffna District as a whole, out of 186,681 households 14,001
households amounting to 7.5% are absolutely landless.120 Such landlessness means they do
not even own one-eighth of an acre of rural land or one-twentieth of an acre of urban land
that would have qualified them for the government and donor housing grants for the war
affected. It is mainly the oppressed caste community of landless wage labor who also lack
such housing land. Indeed, many of these landless households are looking to purchase even a
small plot to qualify for a housing grant.
In this context, agricultural land is an important asset in the Jaffna District, and
agricultural plots are very small. However, given that my survey was mainly carried out in
the oppressed caste quarter, there is only a limited number of agricultural plots and they are
smaller in size than those owned by the upper caste landowners. Agricultural plots for cash
crops in Jaffna are referred to in multiples of 1,000 crops by the farmers. The local measure
of land in Jaffn is called a lacham. 121 The measures of land used by farmers can be
summarized as follows:
1,000 crops = 3.5 lachams of land
1 acre of highland = 16 lachams
organizations in Jaffna (Jaffna District Statistical Handbook 2015, 72) This decline in two years of 8,863 or 15%
of farm families and 11,470 or 34% of farm laborers is quite significant if the published data is accurate.
However, it would be prudent to wait until the Agriculture Census of 2013/2014 is published to verify this data
as well as analyze the cause for such a major change in agriculture.
119
Data obtained from Jaffna District Secretariat in May 2016.
120
Data obtained from Jaffna District Secretariat in May 2016.
121
Different parts of Sri Lanka have historically had different measures for land. Jaffna has both capacity
(volume of seed) measures and surface measures.
In terms of capacity measures: the amount seed that can be used to sow and area.
For paddy land: the land area necessary to sow 12 measures paddy = 1 lacham
For high land: the land area necessary to sow 12 measures kurrakan grain = 1 lacham
In terms of surface measures: the smallest measure is a kuli, whichi is the squared area of a side with 12 foot
pole called a kole.
For paddy land: 12 kulis = 1 lacham and 24 lacham = 1 acre
For high land (for non paddy cultivation) 18 kulis = 1 lacham and 16 lacham = 1 acre
I draw this from the paper by D. B. Ellepola. (Ellepola 1936)
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Highland refers to land not used for paddy cultivation and is land used for cash crop
cultivation and home gardens.
1 acre of paddy land = 24 lachams
1 hectare = 2.47 acres
Therefore, in one acre of land and one hectare of land, 4,500 crops and 11,300 crops,
respectively are cultivated.

Incomes from Agriculture
Jaffna is historically known for the cultivation of cash crops and particularly red
onions. Nesamma, a fifty-two-year-old farmer whom I interviewed, had six lachams of dowry
land, but the soil in that land was unsuitable for cultivation and therefore she was cultivating
just 1,000 crops or about quarter of an acre of onions on a relative’s land. 122 She like many
others had lost their crops the previous year due to floods and did not take an agricultural
loan for the 2013/2014 Maha season.123 Since she was cultivating her relative’s land, she did
not have to pay the Rs. 3,000 (US$ 23) per season (for six months) for share cropping.
She puts in her labor and her family labor into agriculture. She estimates her costs for
fuel for pumping water, fertilizers, pesticides and some labor costs for harvesting could cost
her about Rs. 30,000 (US$ 230). Because her crops failed the previous year, she bought seed
onion at a very high price of Rs. 7,000 (US$ 54) to Rs. 8,000 (US$ 62) per anthar (50 kgs)
and she bought 4 anthar. So, her seed cost was approximately Rs. 30,000 (US$ 230).
Therefore, the total input cost for her was Rs. 60,000 (US$ 460) excluding her labor. She
estimates, depending on the harvest it could yield 15 to 25 anthar. Therefore, depending on

122

Interview with Nesamma (pseudonym) on 4 March 2014.
In Sri Lanka, the Maha season refers to the rainy season from November to March that coincides with the
north east monsoon, where agricultural production is highest. The Yala season is mainly tank or well irrigated
season from May to August and not all farmers farm during this season of smaller production with the need for
much higher levels of irrigation.
123
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the yield and price of onions at harvest, she might sell her harvest for Rs. 60,000 (US$ 460)
to Rs. 150,000 (US$ 1,150). Therefore, her take home from the season she said could be at
the value of cash inputs or a profit of Rs. 90,000 (US$ 690). If she has a good harvest, given
that she has only sown 1,000 crops, she gets about Rs. 15,000 (US$ 115) in monthly income
over six months.
In most cases farmers would cultivate 2,000 or 4,000 crops (half acre or one acre),
and they would also cultivate multiple seasons. However, most households I interviewed
were unable to pay back the agricultural loans they had taken the previous year. They claimed
it was due to the failed crops the previous year.

Table 3.1 Red Onion Cultivation in Jaffna District
Season
Yala 2013
Maha 2012/13
Maha 2011/12

Yeild
Farmgate
Unit Cost Net Return
(kg./hectare) (Price Rs./kg.) (Rs./kg.)* (Rs./hectare)*
12,874
119
31
1,131,597
14,532
54
31
333,206
13,151
51
33
239,431

*excludes own labour
Source: Central Bank, Economic and Social Statistics Report 2016, Table 5.8

Central Bank data has only been published thus far for a select few seasons on
farmgate prices, unit prices and net returns for red onions in the Jaffna District coinciding
with the time of my field research. Table 3.1 illustrates how farm gate prices vary. The Yala
season in Jaffna which is irrigated mainly through ground water from wells clearly fetches
much higher prices. However, the two difficult Maha seasons with crop failures at the end of
2012 and 2011 the farmers only got a net return of Rs. 333,000 (US$ 2,540) and Rs. 239,000
(US$ 1,840) per hectare or Rs. 30,000 (US$ 230) and Rs. 22,000 (US$ 160) per 1,000 crops
respectively. 124 With agricultural incomes in those seasons for 1,000 crops cultivated

124

One hectare is equivalent to approximately 11,000 crops.
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approximating to just one month or one and a half months of montly expenditure, the farmers
were devastated and therefore could not pay back their loans.
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Figure 3.1 Average Producer Prices and Retail Prices for Red Onions (Rs. per kg)
Source: Central Bank, Economic and Social Statistics Report 2016

The fall in in agricultural incomes seen in Table 3.1 was partly due to unfortunate
weather conditions, and it is reflected in the massive increase in the average producer price of
onions in Figure 3.1. However, Figure 3.1 also illustrates a structural problem, where
producer prices with respect to red onions are far below retail prices, on the order of 60% of
retail prices. Furthermore, retail prices for red onions in the North are 20% lower than the
national average. In this context, many farmers mentioned that in the past before the war, the
co-operatives used to ship the onions to the market in Colombo and fetch them a good price.
Therefore, the falling incomes of agricultural production has many causes from unfortunate
weather conditions to the structure of integration with the market.

140

42%

45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

38%

9%

9%

2%
<5,000

5,000 - 9,999

10,000 - 14,999

15,00 - 19,999

20,000 - 24,999

Figure 3.2 Monthly Incomes from Agriculture* (Rs.)
*45 of 102 respondents recorded incomes from agriculture

In this contex, the low levels of agricultural incomes in Bharathy Veethy are evident
from Figure 3.2 based on data from my survey conducted in late 2013. The cause for such
low agricultural incomes could be partly influenced by the failed crops discussed above and
the resulting low incomes. Furthermore, their low level of land ownership leads farmers to
combine cultivation of their own land with share cropping where possible and wage labor.

Land Ownership and Rent
Most farmers in Bharathy Veethy cultivate 1,000 to 4,000 crops that is farming only a
quarter to one acre of land. As evident from Figure 3.3, only a minority of people in
oppressed caste quarter where the survey was conducted owned land to cultivate agriculture.
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Figure 3.3 Agricultural Land Area* (crops)
*33 of 102 respondents own agricultural land
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Of those who don’t own land only a few households manage to participate in sharecropping
or renting land for agriculture as evident from Figure 3.4.
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000 - 5,000

Figure 3.4 Cultivating Share Cropping and Rental Land* (crops)
*9 of 102 respondents share crop or rent land for cultivation

Rent for land is quite low costing just Rs. 3,000 (US$ 23) for quarter acre of land per
season. The Vellala landowning caste avoid giving their lands for share cropping by the
oppressed caste, and prefer to rent it to the Vellala caste.125 Therefore, there is only a small
number of share cropping or rental plots cultivated by the oppressed caste residents of
Bharathy Veethy, despite the lack of land owned by the oppressed castes as evident from
Figure 3.3.
Land rent which had become monetised with the cash crop boom in the 1970s
continues in the same form. However, as Gunasinghe describes it, during times of
accumulation and growth, rent was high:
On the one hand, the rent of land from the mid-70s to1980 increased 2 to 3 times. On
the other hand, a new system of rent came into operation which in actual fact
increased the ground rent still further. The new system of rent known as ‘otti’ requires
the renter to deposit a substantial amount of money with the land owner; the interest
emanating from this amount forms the ground rent. When the contract comes to an

125

This came up in a number of interviews in Bharathy Veethy and Pathemany in the course of the questionaire.
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end the land owner is obliged to return the entire amount to the renter. … The new
system of renting also drives the cultivators with no savings out of the cultivation
process (Gunasinghe 1985, 213).
Both systems of rent, paying just the rent or the deposit accruing interest, exist today in both
Pathemany and in Jaffna. However, land rent relative to income is quite low after the war.
The process of driving out cultivators with low savings, described by Gunasinghe a few
decades back, does not apply now due to the tremendous expansion of credit.
During the time of my field research, land rent is only a fraction of the total
production costs of a farmer in Pathemany, where for one thousand crops land rent is Rs.
3,000 (US$ 23) for a season, where as production costs for onions discussed above can be at
least Rs. 30,000 (US$ 230) and if seed costs are added to it, production costs could be as
much as Rs. 60,000 (US$ 460).
Land rent per acre in Pathemany was Rs. 12,000 (US$ 92) per season in 2013.
However, the New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme initiated before liberalization in the
1970s, where farmers are eligible for subsidized loans from commercial banks, provides Rs
95,000 (US$ 730) for the cultivation of an acre of onion for one season. The interest rate
charged is 8 percent, which is much less than the market rate of 14 percent. Thus rent costs
are not an impediment for cultivation. Therefore, if land is available for cultivation, such that
the upper castes are willing to provide their land for cultivation, an oppressed caste farmer
could readily finance the rent through an agricultural loan. Therefore, in contemporary Jaffna
caste-based landed relations, credit from banks and profits from production are the
determining factors of cash crop agriculture and not land rents.
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Labor Costs and Capital Investment
There is a shortage of labor within the Vellala caste community, as a large sector of
them had migrated abroad with the war. Therefore, the Vellala landowners can no longer rely
on exchange of labor through networks involving Vellala youth. Furthermore, oppressed
caste wage labor can no longer be coerced into working for lower wages, as caste oppression
no longer works through coercion and overt violence. In this context, farmers including
bureaucrats who form the dominant sections of society, as discussed in Chapter 2, complain
of the rise in monetized wage labor after the war and condemn wage labor as lazy.
Male wage labor per day costs Rs. 1,000 (US$ 7.70) plus lunch and tea. Women’s
agricultural labor can be between Rs. 600 (US$ 4.62) to Rs. 800 (US$ 6.15) plus lunch and
tea. However, demand for agricultural wage labor is irregular and average monthly real
incomes of wage laboring households are low. Furthermore, with the monetisation of the
rural economy farmers in Pathemany find it more efficient to provide short-term contracts for
the labor process. Therefore, when it comes to labor relating to cash crop cultivation such as
seeding, building water channels and harvesting, it is networks of groups of workers from
neighboring Puttur village that are employed on short-term contracts spanning a day to a few
days.
The oppressed castes in Puttur village do not own any agricultural land and due to the
historical severity of caste oppression in that village do not have the possibility of cash crop
cultivation. Therefore, the men and women from Puttur are completely dependent on wage
labor. They are involved in breaking stones and clearing plots or they work on contract in
farms during the agricultural seasons.126 In this context, it is financially prudent for the

126

I visited Puttur village a few times in preparation for a conference paper on caste in August and September
2016. Their village set up, very small plots of residential land and village geography of isolation was very
different from Bharathy Veethy.
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farmers to employ these teams from Puttur, and the workers from Puttur are also willing to
work for less.
Caste relations are not as coercive or obligatory as they were before the war.
Historically, an oppressed caste person worked on the land of the same upper caste person.
During the cash crop boom of the 1970s they did demand higher wages, but the oppressive
caste based productive relations continued. However, with the war, displacement and the
mass migration of the upper caste landowners, familial ties and productive relations linking
upper caste landowner to oppressed caste wage laborers were disrupted. Furthermore, wage
laborers demand higher cash wages with the rising cost of living and the monetization of the
economy.
In this context, the landowners now prefer to substitute labor with machinery and
other contractual agreements to groups of workers. The landowning farmers do not have cash
flow problems due to the post-war expansion of credit and there is abundant access to capital
to invest in such labor substituting equipment. In this context, with falling incomes in Jaffna
as evident from the data discussed in Chapter 2, the accumulation is only for the foreign
producers of agricultural machinery and the banking and financial sector which has facilitated
the purchase of such equipment on credit, particularly through lease hire purchasing.

Household Expenditure and Rural Provisioning
In Bharathy Veethy, in many interviews with rural households, including with
landless wage laborers, it was claimed that for a household of four to six persons, monthly
expenditure to sustain the household is Rs. 20,000 (US$ 154). It is women who are mainly
responsible for provisioning for the home and they claim to spend close to Rs. 1,000 (US$
7.70) at the market. Furthermore, they claim they do not go to the market everyday because
of the costs, and only go every other day. Therefore, they estimate food costs at Rs. 15,000
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(US$ 115) per month and non-food expenses at Rs. 5,000 (US$ 38) per month. In this
context, male wage labor of Rs. 1,000 (US$ 7.70) per day is not high, particularly given that
wage labor is irregular. Furthermore, wages for female day wage labor is only Rs. 600 (US$
4.60). While I did not have the capacity to do a detailed survey on household expenditure, I
can draw the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) of 2012/2013 carried out at
the same time. The HIES data on household expenditure is far more rigorous and complete
and puts my findings in perspective. The median monthly expenditure per household in
Jaffna District is Rs. 28,209. (HIES 2013, 19) However, Bharathy Veethy falls into the
bottom 25% of Sri Lanka’s expenditure. As Table 3.2 illustrates, the median household
expenditure for the third decile group is Rs. 20,454.

Table 3.2 Monthly Food and Non-Food Household Expenditure Decile Group
Decile
Group

Household
expenditure range

Median
Mean
Mean food
household
household
expenditure
expenditure expenditure
(Rs.)
(Rs.)
(Rs.)
All
30,701
41,444
15,651
1
Less than 13,837
10,795
10,238
6,531
2
13,837 - 18,498
16,328
16,254
9,815
3
18,499 - 22,461
20,454
20,474
11,693
4
22,462 - 26,354
24,408
24,397
13,438
5
26,355 - 30,701
28,479
28,514
14,643
6
30,702 - 36,011
33,237
33,259
16,267
7
36,012 - 43,248
39,268
39,412
17,764
8
43,249 - 53,321
47,547
47,816
19,490
9
53,322 - 74,933
61,585
62,654
21,521
10
More than 74,933
100,777
131,471
25,357
Source: Household Incomes and Expenditure Survey 2013, 35

Mean nonfood
expenditure
(Rs.)
25,793
3,708
6,439
8,782
10,959
13,871
16,992
21,647
28,326
41,133
106,114

Mean
household
income (Rs.)
45,878
14,111
21,322
24,819
28,965
35,274
38,473
49,070
51,365
66,186
129,239

While Sri Lanka has had a history of free education policies since the 1940s, and even
provides free school uniforms and textbooks along with a mid-day meal, in reality household
educational expenses have been increasing. These expenses are due to the hidden fees by
schools and after school tuition programs. Parents believe such after school tuition is
necessary for their children to get ahead in competitive national exams. As Figure 3.5 shows
about 66 of the 102 of respondent households in Bharathy Veethy have school going children
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and they incur education related expenses.127 Furthermore, as Figure 3.5 shows expenditure
on education for households with school going children are significant, with 60% of them
spending between Rs 1,000 (US$ 7.70) and Rs 4,000 (US$ 31) per month and 8% spending
over Rs. 4,000 (US$ 31) per month.
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Figure 3.5 Expenditure – Education Costs* (Rs.)
*66 of 102 respondants have school going children

The increasing monetisation of rural economic life in Bharathy Veethy is evident
from my survey findings for the costs of firewood used as fuel for cooking. If the household
does not have medium sized plots of housing land as is the case in the oppressed caste
quarters of the village, where most houses are on very small plots on the order of 1.5 lachams
(close to one-tenth of an acre), almost all firewood128 must be bought. Furthermore, adding to
the financial burden on such oppressed caste households, without the possibilities of foraging
for firewood, the cost of firewood for cooking alone can be close to Rs. 2,000 (US$ 15) per
month as evident from Figure 3.6. I chose to look at the cost of firewood to understand the
changing dynamics of rural provisioning with the monetisation of the rural economy in
127

According to the HIES Survey for 2012/2013 average household expenditure on education is Rs. 1,448 (US$
11.10), and since this includes a number of families that do not have children going through education, the
number is possibly higher. However, since Bharathy Veethy is in the bottom 3 deciles, the average household
expenditure on education for the third decile is only Rs. 407 (US$ 3.20). These figures reflect a much higher
monetised cost for education in Bharathy Veethy.
128
According to the HIES Survey for 2012/2013 79% and 57% of rural households in Sri Lanka and the Jaffna
District respectively, collect firewood as opposed to purchase firewood. Again the monetised cost of firewood in
Bharathy Veethy is quite high.
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Jaffna. Indeed, Rs. 2,000 (US$ 15) for monthly expenditure in firewood and fuel is a
significant portion of the non-food expenditure.
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Figure 3.6 Expenditure on Fuel and Firewood (Rs.)

From the HIES data, the bottom three deciles monthly expenditure ranges from Rs.
6,531 (US$ 50) to Rs. 11, 693 (US$ 90) for mean food expenditure and Rs. 3,708 (US$ 29) to
Rs 8,782 (US$ 68) for mean non-food expenditure. Therefore, the approximate averages of
Rs. 2,000 (US$ 15) for education and for firewood each per month evident from my survey,
is a significant share of the non-food costs for the Bharathy Veethy population.
Unlike the Vanni (mainland region south of Jaffna peninsula), where land alienation
schemes129 have provided most families with half an acre of land in recent years and much
larger plots in the past that allows for some level of subsistence including the possibility of a
home garden, in Jaffna small plots and landlessness creates further economic pressures. The
comparison with the Vanni is relevant because many of the housholds in Pathemany were
displaced to the Vanni during the war, and managed to survive the years of war through
subsistence agriculture and rural provisioning from home gardens.

129

The state provides permit lands which are on lease for a few decades but are eventually free holding title is
given to the person.
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In the post-war context in Jaffna, landlessness and small plots of residential land
constrain rural peoples’ possibilities for survival through rural provisioning and are trapped in
a monetized economy. Therefore, land is important for rural provisioning of food from home
gardens including livestock and for firewood as much as it is for agricultural production,
particularly for the bottom sections of income earners.

Expansion of Credit and Rural Debt
Banks and finance companies have been greatly expanding credit in Pathemany, as is
the case throughout Jaffna, in the post-war years. Such credit takes the form of various bank
loans, pawning, leasing and microfinance schemes.

Agricultural Loans
Pathemany, like many other villages in the country, continues to benefit from the
agriculture loans with the Central Bank backed New Comprehensive Rural Credit Scheme
initiated in the 1970s. The loan amounts are determined by the Central Bank based on the
crop cultivated per acre of land, for example onion – Rs. 95,000 (US$ 730) and chilli – Rs.
65,000 (US$ 500), and provided at subisidized interest rates. Figure 3.7 shows the
agricultural loans taken by those surveyed. Since the survey was conducted in the majority
landless and wage laboring households in the oppressed caste quarter of Bharathy Veethy, the
number of agricultural loans taken were 40 of the 102 households surveyed.130
The Central Bank backed agricultural loans are administered by the commercial
banks. Therefore, in every town linked to villages, a large number of banks work with village
farmers’ organisations to determine who should receive such loans, and such loans are to be

130

This approximates well with the fact that 33 households claimed they had agricultural and and 9 households
claimed they were involved in share cropping. Therefore
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paid back at harvest. In recent years, farmers have been unfortunate with harvests failing due
to untimely rains, crop diseases and drought. At the time of my field research in late 2013 to
early 2014, many of the families had not paid back the loans from the previous year. This is
also another reason for the lower level of agricultural loans taken in Bharathy Veethy during
the time of my survey.
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Figure 3.7 Agriculture Loans (Rs.)

Self-Employment Loans
After the war in May 2009, private commercial banks were tasked with providing
loans to initiate livelihoods; the loans were used by farmers to begin farming to fisher-folk
resuming fisheries. These loans were on the order of Rs. 50,000 (US 380) to Rs. 200,000
(US$ 1,540) at a subsidized interest rate of 8% and part of the ‘Northern Spring’
reconstruction programme discussed in Chapter 2. Once the bank branches were established,
the banks began providing so-called self-employment loans at market rates on their own
initiative in 2011. As evident from Figure 3.8, close to 60% of the households surveyed had
taken self-employment loans. If Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.7 are compared, it becomes clear that
there was far more credit expanded through the self-empolyment loans than through the
agricultural loans. It is however, difficult to distinguish between the subsidized Northern
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Spring loans and the market rate self-employment loans, as most villagers spoke of them
inter-changeably.
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Figure 3.8 Self-employment Loans (Rs.)

One of the community center leaders in Bharathy Veethy explained the proliferation
of self employment loans.131 He said the Bank of Ceylon manager came to their community
center in early 2012 and offered to provide self employment loans to the community. He
believes a total of Rs. 10 million (US$ 77,000), with each loan to an individual amounting to
Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770) and to be repaid through monthly instalment payment in either two or
three years, were distributed as self employment loans starting in early 2012. The villagers
only knew and mentioned the monthly installment payments of Rs. 3,600 (US$ 28) a month
for 3 years and Rs. 5,000 (US$ 38) for two years. I was able to calculate that the interest rate
in this case is 14%. The loan merely required two guarantors and no collateral. Furthermore,
in many cases loans were given to each member of a household, and thus in a few cases four
members of a household incurred a total debt of Rs. 400,000 (US$ 3,100). The loans were
meant to initiate small businesses such as starting a shop or used to raise cattle, and those

131

Focused group discussion with Bharathy Veethy community center on 16 May 2013.
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seeking loans had to state the purpose, but the community center leaders told me the people
who took the loans had no plans or ideas of how to generate incomes from those loans and
merely consumed the loans. Some people used it to pay for house building or to pay other
loans. A year later many people were defaulting on their loans and the bank manager began
deducting payments from the guarantors’ savings creating a tense situation.

Debt tied to Housing Schemes
Another major problem tied to the reconstruction efforts is the indebtedness tied to the
housing schemes.132 During the latter phase of the war and after the war, many donors
including the World Bank and the Swiss Development Cooperation gave grants to households
to rebuild houses destroyed by the war. India’s major contribution to post-war reconstruction
was 50,000 houses to the war affected, each worth a grant of Rs. 550,000 (US$ 4,230). These
owner-driven housing construction grants were administered in installments after each major
step of building of the house. By 2013, the cost of building a house with the specifications of
the donors cost between Rs. 800,000 (US$ 6,150) and Rs. 1 million (US$ 7,690). As Figure
3.9 shows, 26.5% of those surveyed had received housing grants by the end of 2013. As
discussed above, the absolutely landless, who do not own an eighth of an acre of rural
residential land, do not qualify for the housing grants. Most of the housing grant recipients
incurred expenses far in excess of the grant to build their house. The additional expense of
building the house was met through debt. Such housing debt came from variety of loans from
self employment loans to pawning.

132

I along with a few activists raised the housing debt issue as it became clear to me during my field research. A
focused group discussion with Bharathy Veethy Community Center called Ilankathir Sana Samuha Nilayam
about community issues led to a discussion on housing related debt on 16 May 2013. Meera Srinivasan the
correspondent for The Hindu was one of the first journalists to raise the housing debt issue. See Srinivasan
2013.
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Figure 3.9 Housing Costs above Grant for House* (Rs.)
*27 of 102 respondents received housing grants

The implication of post-war housing grants and their related debt for the rural
economy in Bharathy Veethy and Jaffna more broadly is that while a house in the form of a
major asset had been added to the household, the household also incurs large debts from the
financial sector, which have to be paid with interest. The debt and debt related payments in
time shapes and directs rural economic life, including the level and form of incomes that are
necessary to sustain household finances. The high level of out migration for work in the
Middle East discussed above in Chapter 2 is possibly linked to the repayment of such debts,
including housing construction related debts.

Pawning, Leasing and Informal loans
With the boom in global gold prices between 2009 and 2012, many banks got into the
pawning business in a major way and even extended their hours of operation so that wage
laborers could come to the banks after work. For most rural households in Sri Lanka, gold
jewellery continues to be their main liquid asset. Rural households in the North had managed
to preserve some amount of gold jewellery despite the war. Historically, pawning of gold was
the fall back mechanism for rural household financing and provisioning during familial and
agricultural emergencies.
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Figure 3.10 Value of Pawned Jewellery (Rs.)
Amount pawned by 102 respondents

In the post-war years, households pawned their gold not only due to crisis caused by
crop failures but also to pay the installments on other loans. As Figure 3.10 illustrates about
85% of the surveyed households had pawned their jewellery. The scale of the pawned loans
for 80% of the population on the range of one month (Rs 20,000 or US$ 154) to more than
ten months (Rs. 200,000 or US$ 1,540) of average monthly incomes in Bharathy Veethy is
going to be very difficult for them to recover.
In Bharathy Veethy, only 12.5% of the respondents in the survey had bought a vehicle
or consumer item such as a refrigerator on leasing. This might be in part because of the low
levels of savings and the larger cash flows necessary to purchase a vehicle.133 While both
banks and leasing companies were involved in such leasing sales, the leasing companies were
considered to be much more aggressive in seizing products where installements had not been
133

For example, a two wheeler tractor costs Rs. 350,000 (US$ 2,700), but to buy it on leasing one has to make a
down payment of Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770). The rest of the Rs. 250,000 (US$ 1,900) has to be paid in monthly
installments over three years. The few people who did purchase tractors and three wheelers in Bharathy Veethy,
would typically get a self employment loan for Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770) and use it toward the down payment.
However, they have to pay monthly installment payments on the self employment loan and the leasing contract
for the total amount in the case of a two-wheel tractor of Rs. 350,000 (US$ 2,700) that is a Rs. 12,500 (US$ 96)
amounting to close to 60% of the average monthly income in Bharathy Veethy.
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paid. The leasing companies are ruthless, they forcefully seize the product, where by the
customer loses his down payment and the value they have paid in installments until the time
of the company seizing their product. These problems with leasing were explained to me
during the discussion at the community center.134 At the time of my field research, leasing
was not prevalent in Bharathy Veethy, where it was widely discussed as a social curse. The
few cases of default had made it clear that individuals lose much of their assets and end up
with considerable debt.
Historically, in Jaffna most people took loans from money lenders and relatives.
However, as Figure 3.11 illustrates only 21% of households surveyed took informal loans
from local money lenders and relatives. As the various levels of loans illustrate, much of the
debt is in the form of loans to banks and financial institutions. However, the fewer informal
loans from money lenders charged a much higher interest rate.

90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

78.4%

1.0%
Not taken

<49,999

4.9%
50,000 99,999

7.8%

2.9%

2.0%

0.0%

2.9%

100,000 - 150,000 - 200,000 - 300,000 - >400,000
149,999 199,999 299,999 399,999

Figure 3.11 Informal Loans from Money Lenders and Relatives (Rs.)
In Bharathy Veethy and in Jaffna more broadly, a new form of debt called “meter
vatti” (metered interest, colloquically meaning it increases like an electric meter) from money
lenders are given at 5% interest per day. Such extremely high interest loans are taken by
individuals when they have serious cash flow problems including when they have to meet
134

Focused group discussion with Bharathy Veethy Community Center on 16 May 2013.
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installment payments to banks and finance companies.135 Some individuals take loans from
banks to lend to others in the village at higher interest rates.136 Therefore, the tremendous
expansion of credit has also created worrying and new forms of debt culture.
Table 3.3 Types of Loans Taken
Types of Loans

Percentage

Agriculture, Self Employment and Pawning

25%

Agriculture and Self Emploment

26%

Agriculture and Pawning

34%

Self Employment and Pawning

55%

Neither Agriculture nor Self Employment

28%

Neither Agriculture, Self Empl nor Pawning

10%

Table 3.3 illustrates how many households in Bharathy Veethy have taken multiple
loans, particularly a combination of agriculture, self-employment and pawning loans.
Furthemore, only 10% of the households have not taken any three of these loans. Therefore,
there is considerable access to credit from the formal financial sector to the households in
Bharathy Veethy. In figure 3.12, I compare the levels of agricultural and self employment
loans. Clearly, there is a shift towards the recently launched self employment loans reflecting
the new expansion of credit by the banks.

135
136

Focused group discussion with Bharathy Veethy Community Center on 16 May 2013.
Focused group discussion with Bharathy Veethy Community Center on 16 May 2013.
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Figure 3.12 Comparison of Agricultural and Self-Employment Loans*
* Out of 102 respondents 39% took Agricultural loans and 60% took Self-employment Loans

Out Migration and Remittances
The faltering incomes have led a section of wage labor to seek employment in
construction. As Figure 3.13 shows 11% of those surveyed are involved in mason and
carpentry work137, however, a significant section of wage labor shifts to construction when
work is available. Such pluriactiviy characterized by occupational multiplicity is common.138
However, employment in construction is linked to the one-time post-war construction boom;
particularly, the various housing schemes discussed above which were a major stimulus for
labor in the form of mason work in almost every village. By mid-2014, when my field

137

While carpenters should be classified as middle castes rather than oppressed castes, due to the proximity of
the carpenter caste ward to the oppressed caste ward, and with some connections in that ward, we were also able
to interview and also conducted the survey in the carpentry caste ward.
138
The complexity of such pluriactivity is not captured by the survey as I only became aware of the level of
switching of labor and the self perception of households and their work in the course of my fieldwork. For
example, there is greater social standing and pride attached to cultivating their own land as opposed to share
cropping, and in turn share cropping as opposed to wage labor. Therefore, in the survey and even in interviews,
villagers sometimes hide the fact that they are doing wage work.
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research was coming to an end, there were increasing concerns about the decreasing demand
for construction oriented mason and wage labor.139
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Others

Figure 3.13 Types of Employment

The monthly incomes of those involved in wage labor are given in Figure 3.14. The
low levels of incomes, where 58% of them earn less than Rs. 15,000 (US$ 115) per month
and 42% earn less than Rs. 10,000 (US$ 77) per month, allows them to spend what the
bottom two and bottom one deciles respectively of national expenditures as compared to the
HIES data in Table 3.2. This is a worrying reflection of the crisis of rural incomes in
Bharathy Veethy. Such a hopeless condition leads to high levels of indebtedness and where
possible out migration in search of incomes.

139

Nesamma explained she was providing some wage work in her fram to one of the village youth rather than
wage workers from Puttur. She explained that this youth like many others could not find construction related
wage work as in past years. Interview with Nesamma on 4 March 2014.
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Figure 3.14 Monthly Incomes of Wage Laborers* (Rs.)
*Monthly wage distribution of 24 respondents involved in wage labor

While there is much discussion in the mainstream media about the considerable
remittances coming from immigrants to Western countries,140 the flow of such remittances
from the diaspora to places like Bharathy Veethy is not significant, at least since the end of
the war. Once permanent migrants marry and have children or after they help their immediate
family members to migrate, remittances tend to decrease. In fact, such remittances from the
Tamil diaspora tend to be for major events such as weddings rather than on a regular monthly
basis. As Figure 3.15 shows only about 12% of the households surveyed get remittances from
the permanent migrants to the West who form the large Tamil diaspora.

140

There is no data breaking down the historical flow of remittances, and it is particularly lacking in the North
due to the war. Migrant remittances in the South emerged in the 1980s and there again the data is not
disaggregated and it is only useful for analyzing its impact on foreign exchange earnings for the Government.
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Figure 3.15 Monthly Remittances from Western Countries (Rs.)

The more significant flow of remittances after the war is migrant labor to the Middle
East, where regular monthly remittances are possible. As Figure 3.16 illustrates 25% of those
surveyed have sent youth to work in the Middle East who provide regular remittances.
Indebted households often depend on such remittances from young men involved in migrant
work to meet household expenditure and debt payments.
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Figure 3.16 Monthly Remittances from Migrant Labor to Middle-East (Rs.)
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In Figure 3.17, I provide the distribution of various forms of rural incomes. While
there is some error in the classification of these incomes as some of those receiving
agricultural incomes are involved in wage labor and other incomes. Nevertheless, the
comparison illustrates the continuing importance of agricultural incomes and the generally
low level of wage labor incomes.
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Figure 3.17 Distributions of Incomes in Bharathy Veethy*
*Out of 102 respondents, 45 have agricultural incomes, 24 have wage labor incomes, 31 have other incomes, 25
receive Middle East Remittances and 12 receive Western Remittances

Response to the New Debt Culture
Rural indebtedness in Pathemany was discussed in a number of interviews. I first
provide the perspective of the bank manager from a state bank in Atchuvely providing loans
in Pathemany. Next, I provide the perspective of the village leader for Pathemany on
indebtedness. I follow that with a discussion of the perspectives that emerged from interviews
with farmers who had taken loans and the views that emerged during the discussion at the
community center.
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Loans from a Bank Manager’s Perspective
In May 2013, I interviewed a Bank Manager141 in Atchuvely town. He was the
manager of a Bank responsible for the highest level of loans given in Pathemany village.
There are a number of banks and finance companies situated in Atchuvely town and serve
many of the neighboring villages; Pathemany, Valalai, Thambalai, Kathiripai, Iddaikadu,
Thenmolai, Thopu, Avarangal West and Sirripuddity.
The Manager described the agricultural loans as those based on the New
Comprehensive Rural Credit System (NCRCS) developed in 1974. Agriculture loans used to
be for a length of 180 days, but he said two years ago it was changed to 274 days (9 months).
Furthermore, the Central Bank decides on the loan amount per acre depending on the kind of
crop cultivated. For example, for onions, it used to be Rs. 50,000 [US$ 385] per acre but with
the 2010/2011 season it was increased to Rs. 95,000 [US$ 730]. If a farmer takes a loan of
Rs. 190,000 (US$ 1,460) then it is given in two stages first Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770) and then
rest of the Rs. 90,000 (US$ 690) after two weeks. Such loans are given for both the Maha,
monsoon rain-fed seaon and Yala, well irrigated season. At the time of the interview, the
market rate for loans from the Bank was 14% but the Central Bank gives a guarantee and
subsidy on agricultural loans of 6%, so the farmers effectively pay an interest rate of 8%.
The Manager explained that his Bank began actively giving loans, after the
interruption of the war, during the later phase of the war starting in 2007. In 2011 and 2012,
approximately 3,600 agricultural loans were given each year by the Atchuvely bank during
the two seasons. For example, Maha 2011-2012, a total of 2,325 agricultural loans were given
and in Yala 2012, a total of 1,817 agricultural loans were given. For Pathemany village, for

141

The Bank Manager and the Bank are not named here. I interviewed the Bank Manager on 23 May 2013, who
by then was frustrated with the increasing number of non-performing loans, and wanted to vent his frustrations
though he refused to speak on record.
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the Maha and Yala seasons about 150 loans were given on the scale of Rs. 100,000 (US$
770) to Rs. 150,000 (US$ 1,150) each.
The Bank Manager then explained the various other loans provided by his Bank. He
mentioned how Self-employment loans were initiated in 2011 with interest rates of 11% for a
maximum amount of Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770). In the Atchuvely bank branch they had given
out 450 Self-employment loans in 2012. Furthermore, Self-employment Horticulture loans
were also started in 2011 with interest rate of 14% for a maximum amount of Rs. 500,000
(US$ 3,850). Again he claimed his bank branch had given about 1,000 Self-employment
Horticulture loans in 2012.142
He also mentioned the Northern Spring loans that were granted soon after the war on
the scaled of Rs. 50,000 (US$ 385) to Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540) per family at subsidized
interest rates.143 Then a new Central Bank loan for villagers called the Poverty Alleviation
and Micro Project loan, with interest rate of 12%, and on the scale of Rs. 50,000 (US$ 385) to
Rs 100,000 (US$ 770); the Bank had given 750 loans in Atchuvely of which 150 loans were
given in Pathemany village. He also mentioned a new loan that had been initiated in 2012 for
Rehabilitation with the coordination of the Central Bank and the District Secretariat.
The Bank Manager, who was increasingly in a confrontational situation with the
villagers who were defaulting on the loans, claimed the bank had been generous in helping
the people but the people were ungrateful. Furthermore, he claimed it had been the Bank’s
policy to expand credit to assist the people after the war. Therefore, in October 2009, the

142

These horticulture loans were not given in Bharathy Veethy as they probably could not show the levels of
lands and collateral necessary for those loans.
143
The initial Northern Spring loans were at subsidized rates, but were implemented by commercial banks as
opposed to the state insitutions. Within a few years the banks used their newly opened branch offices to provide
a range loans at much higher interest rates.
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Chairman of the Bank himself visited the Atchuvely branch, and formally distributed loans
for villagers purchasing tractors on leasing.144
He said one of the reasons for the major increase in indebtedness was that the Credit
Information Bureau of Sri Lanka (CRIB) system only came into use in Atchuvely in 2012
and therefore, until that system was in place there were no mechanisms for banks to cross
check if other banks had given loans to the same clients. Therefore, the banks restricted
lending after 2012 as they became aware of same people taking multiple loans from different
banks.
The Bank Manager mentioned the increasing number of micro-credit schemes that
were entering his region by micro-finance companies, which were charging 29% annual
interest rates to be paid in weekly installments. By 2016, that is almost three years after I had
interviewed the Bank Manager, micro-credit schemes and leasing that had become a serious
problem of predatory lending, piling further debt on on loans owed to banks. The Jaffna
District Women’s Federation took a decision in July 2016 to addres both as their main
concerns. Microfinance and leasing companies lend to anyone without collateral, and then
use thugs who are abusive to recover loans mainly given to women.
The Bank Manager raised fears of a banking crisis in his region unless the villagers
started paying these loans. He suddenly wanted to conclude the interview as he said he was
going with the police to a village after a complaint he had made about the threatening
behaviour of a defaulting client. The interview with the Bank Manager provided a clear

144

The down payment value had decreased down to 5% or even 0% and it can also be manipulated through the
valuation of the product. With increasing competeting such changes became common in Jaffna in subsequent
years by other leasing providers particularly leasing companies. The leased products are the property of the bank
until full payment, and following a down payment of up to 20% of the value of product, a monthly installment
of the product has to be paid at 12% interest rate and for a period of 2 to 5 years depending on the product. The
interest rates could vary increasing up to 20% depending on the leasing provider. None of the interviewees in
Pathemany or those whom I have spoken to in other villages knew the interest rates they were paying on leased
goods and they only made the decision based on the monthly intallment payment and length of years.
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picture of how a proliferation of loan products and expansion of credit was by 2013 proving
to be a major problem for the banks themselves.
The Bank branch had been providing as many as a fifth to a third of some its loans in
2012 to Pathemany village, the rest going to neighboring villages. Therefore, in 2012, I
would estimate that this bank branch alone had given 150 each of the following loans
agricultural loans averaging Rs. 150,000, (US$ 1,150) self employment loans averaging Rs.
100,000 (US$ 769) and Poverty Alleviation and Microproject loans averaging Rs. 75,000
(US$ 577). Therefore, the estimated total credit expanded in Pathemany village thorugh one
bank by these three forms of loans could be Rs. 50 million (US$ 380,000).145 Therefore, for
the 696 households in Pathemany, this is an average increase in their debts of Rs. 70,000
(US$ 539) in one year from just one bank, which is 3.5 months of the average income of a
household in Bharathy Veethy. It is such sudden increase of the expansion of credit in one
year in post-war rural Jaffna that creates new dynamics of rural indebtedness.

Bharathy Veethy Village Leader on Indebtedness
In May 2014, I interviewed Mr. Chandrabose, the oppressed caste leader in Bharathy
Veethy, who described the naiveté and desperation of his people by narrating the ways in
which the debt problem proliferated:
The debt problem was started by the banks. The people were living within their
means. But then the banks came and gave loans freely and the people took loans. And
today they are in debt and they don’t have their vehicles. They gave vehicles on
leasing and people took these leased vehicles, and it was profitable for the leasing
companies. The people would have paid ten months in instalments and then they
145

Note that this estimate only includes three types of loans from one bank, with the self-employment loans and
micro project loans being the new kinds of loans. There could have been other loans such as the larger
horticulture loans given to residents of Pathemany. Also, this expansion of credit is for all of Pathemany not just
Bharathy Veethy where I conducted my survey.
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would lose their vehicles. Without the people knowing, the people’s entire wealth has
been taken. The banks have taken and the leasing companies have taken what little the
people had.
What Mr. Chandrabose, himself a farmer with one acre of land, describes is a commonly
heard explanation of banking and debt in Jaffna. As he was talking, his wife interjected:
“Leasing and loans have brought our people to this state.”
What is significant here is the insidious character of lease hire purchasing of vehicles,
where a large down payment is made often by taking a bank loan and then monthly
instalment payments are made from their incomes or by pawning their jewellery. However, in
many cases payments cannot be sustained and then the vehicle, with value paid up to an
equivalent of a couple years of income is seized. The owner having lost the vehicle is still
stuck with the bank loan and may have depleted his assets such as gold jewellery.
In mid-2014, Chandrabose described how such indebtedness was also affecting loans
that farmers were traditionally able to pay back:
The farmers have taken loans and for two years they have not been able to pay, and
banks are not able to get it back. It may take 5 or 6 years, and that is if there is an
agricultural boom like old times [referring to the cash crop boom of the1970s], it is
then that banks will be able to get their money back. It is starting in 2012 that for the
first time this kind of debt crisis has come about.
Thus with increasing indebtedness and the falling incomes from agriculture, even the
historically feasible agricultural loans are now in trouble. Indeed, debt is contagious, as one
loan is taken to pay another loan. Furthermore, with higher interest payments on high levels
of a combination of loans, rural incomes are unable to pay back even low interest agricultural
loans.
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Banks with a view towards expanding their asset base got into new loans particularly
in the North after the war. These so-called self-employment loans were justified as a form of
employment creation.
In the old days, they used to give loans, but they were limited and for a particular
purpose. And we returned the loans at harvest time. Now they give self-employment
loans, which can be as much as Rs. 2 lakhs [Rs. 200,000 or US$ 1,540]. You can give
such loans to a company. But what business do I have taking that kind of money?
They take the loan and then they buy vehicles. In the Atchuvely banks, many of those
who took loans used it to buy motorcycles.
Mr. Chandrabose sees the problem as one resulting from credit expansion providing loans to
individuals without consideration of how those loans will be used. Indeed, he explains how
this has led to naïve consumption in the form of villagers purchasing motorcycles.
Mr. Chandrabose articulates this problem as one of about insidious accumulation:
“This is all about exploiting people. Look at the high interest people are paying on debts.”
For such exploitation by the banks, his solution depends on measures by the state: “Only if
the government forgives this debt, like small children we can grow again. Otherwise, we will
remain as infants, and continue to pay the interest on the debts.” This point about debt
forgiveness is hardly discussed in policy circles, but the incomes of the villagers and their
level of indebtedness implies the need for such debt forgiveness. The only other avenue of
addressing such high indebtedness has been out migration and remittances to pay back at
least part of the debts.

167

Peoples’ perception of debt in Bharathy Veethy
I interviewed Sakuntala, a 57-year-old farmer146, who said she had taken an
agricultural loan for Rs. 150,000 (US$ 1,150) in 2012 that she had not been able to pay back
due to the crop failures that year. In the meantime, one of her sons has taken a self
employment loan for Rs. 100,000 (US$ 769) and she had pawned her jewelerry to complete a
house she had started with the World Bank housing grant of Rs. 325,000 (US$ 2,500). The
completion of the house had required an additional Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540). Sakuntala, has
six children with two of them married and the other four living with her and her husband, is
in a better financial state than most others in Bharathy Veethy. Eventhough her houshold’s
total debt is Rs. 350,000 (US$ 2,690), two of her children living with her have regular
monthly incomes, one works as a toddy tavern co-operative employee and another works as a
nurse.
Income from pluriactivity is necessary for farmers’ survival. In fact, during the war in
the late 1990s, Sakuntala’s family was able to purchase a total of 7 lachams of land (close to
half an acre) because her husband who is now retired was a co-operative employee. It is the
combination of his regular monthly income and the household’s farm incomes that allowed
them to acquire some land. Sakuntala, because of the regular incomes of her children spoke
with some confidence and said, she “will never allow her sons to go work in the Middle
East.” That is not the case with most households in Bharathy Veethy, where falling and
irregular incomes and high levels of indebtedness provides few choices other than
remittances through migrant work.
The discussion at the community centre in Bharathy Veethy, made it clear to me that
rural people understand the dynamics of bank loans. They believed it was targets given to the
bank managers that had led them to approach the Community Centre to facilitate the
146

Sakuntala is not her real name, and I interviewed her on 4 March 2014.
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disbursement of loans. They think that possibly 50% of the households of Bharathy Veethy
have taken self employment loans by the time of the discussion in May 2013. They were up
to date with new kinds of loans such as the one introduced by the Hatton National Bank
(HNB) to complete houses, where the deeds of the houses have to be given as collateral.
Indeed, as evident from that discussion in Bhararthy Veethy and with most villages I visited,
village people were mostly aware of the various kinds of loans available, levels of loans and
the monthly installments.
What also emerged from the discussion at the community centre was a sense of
desperation and the inability to emerge out of such a new debt culture. They mentioned how
the banks were becoming increasingly harsh, not allowing clients to withdraw their pawned
jewellery until they had paid intallments on other loans. They also mentioned the desperate
situation of some individuals, who have gone into hiding unable to deal with the harassment
of the bank managers and police that came looking for them to recover debts.

Conclusion
My research in Pathemany was an attempt to understand the transformation of the
rural economy by liberalization policies and civil war that came after the cash crop boom in
rural Jaffna between the 1960s and 1970s. My field research reveals how post-war
reconstruction policies and reintegration with the liberalized national economy have resulted
in falling incomes, rising indebtedness and out migration in Jaffna. While my findings are
particular to the oppressed caste quarter of one cash crop agricultural village in the Jaffna
peninsula, I draw conclusions about contemporary characteristics of rural social and
economic dynamics and new forms of dispossession and accumulation.
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Rural Provisioning and Pluriactivity
There is continuing decrease in agricultural land in Jaffna District as such land is
converted to other purposes including as residential land. There is also a continuing decline in
the number of farm households and farm laborers. However, conclusive data on the changing
pattern of land use147 as well as farming households and farm labor in Jaffna will be not clear
until the extensive Agricultural Census for 2013/2014 is published. Comparing the data from
this recent Agricultural Census with those from for 2002 and 1981, will allow for analysis of
the level of decline of agricultural holdings.
Those involved in small holding cash crop agriculture, whether it be on their own
land, rented land or working as landless wage labor, are facing falling household incomes
relative to household expenditure. In this context, the landless who are dependent on wage
labor are worst affected due to irregular work. Those wage workers who do not have a small
plot of land with their home cannot provision basic needs through a home garden and
livestock. Furthermore, the landless households incur significant additional costs, particularly
firewood for cooking, which households with a quarter acre of land need not incur as
firewood can be foraged.
In my field research an important point that emerged about the viability of rural
agricultural production and accumulation is the diversification and receipt of multiple forms
of incomes within households that is characteristic of pluriactivity of rural households in Sri
Lanka and many other countries.148 During the war, it is those oppressed caste households
with the steady monthly income of at least one member of the household as a government or
147

According to data obtained from official sources that requested anonymity, following a series of release of
military held land in the Jaffna District, as of October 2016, military held land is about 5,000 acres. Much of this
military held land is in the Valikamam North Division, one of the fifteen Divisions of Jaffna District,
surrounding the Palaly airport along the northern coast of Jaffna peninsula. Therefore, in this Division, where
40% of the land is held by the military, it could be a cause of land pressure, but in the other Divisions of Jaffna
and the Jaffna District as a whole that can not be the cause.
148
The Sri Lankan Integrated Survey (SLIS) (1999-2000) had revealed that non-farm activities contributed 56%
of the total rural household income whereas the contribution of crop cultivation, livestock and casual agriculture
wage labour was only 23% (De Silva and Kodithuwakku 2010, 86).
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co-operative employee that managed to purchase land and increase their agricultural
production. Such diversification has become even more important for rural survival with the
monetised economy and declining possibilities of rural provisioning in the post-war context.
Increasingly, diversification has become a necessary condition of agricultural production;
agriculture is only viable for those who have an alternate source of income and therefore not
dependent on agriculture for the day to day expenditure of the household.
While such pluriactivity with the new rurality is characterstic of many other
agricultural societies, there are now few possibilities for such alternative livelihoods and
incomes in Jaffna. Many oppressed caste residents of Pathemany village, who were
historically involved in agricultural wage work, are now involved in mason and construction
work, with reconstruction efforts including state and donor supported housing grants.
However, such construction efforts are a onetime opportunity with post-war reconstruction.
Therefore, while there is a demand for sustained incomes from alternative forms of local
employment including in industries, reconstruction policies have not generated such jobs and
incomes.

Debt and Dispossession
There has been increased levels of indebtedness in the context of falling incomes and
expansion of credit through new financial products. Such rural debts in Pathemany and Jaffna
have been mainly through the formal sector including banks, finance companies and
microfinance institutions. This is different from other countries in South Asia as well as
historically in Sri Lanka, where rural debts were to the informal money lenders. However, the
levels of such formal debts are also difficult to identify, as they are cascaded through
different financial products and mechanisms of various durations from bank loans, pawning,
leased goods on instalment payments and microfinance loans.
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The inability of farmers during my field research period to pay back the agricultural
loans was due to crop failures. However, with generally high indebtedness following other
forms of credit, they may not be able to take the agricultural loans even if conditions for
agricultural production improve. In other words, the dynamics of debt creation including
defaulting on agricultural loans, increased debt through self employment loans and the
depletion of gold assets losing their emergency reserves may determine their future
possibilities for recovering agricultural incomes.
Banks expanded into pawning business because of the rise in global gold prices. In
fact, after the fall in global gold prices, the scale of pawning led to a worrying increase in
non-performing loans for the banks as discussed in Chapter 2. Subsidiaries of banks and a
range of finance companies also came into the rural economy providing micro-finance loans
and lease hire purchasing of a range of items that have dispossessed a war-torn population.
The significant point here is that indebtedness in the war affected regions would not have
been possible on this scale, if not for the process of displacement, uprooting from the local
economy and then integration into the economy under conditions of financialization. In
Bharathy Veethy, most families including landless laborers are indebted on the order of Rs.
200,000 (US$ 1,500) to Rs. 400,000 (US$ 3,000) per household by the end of 2013. That was
the perception of indebtedness in the village during my discussion at the community center
and in numerous interviews with villagers, and the data from my survey on the various forms
of debt falls in that range. That is debt on the scale of ten to twenty times their monthly
expenditure.
The larger process of indebtedness was fuelled by the expansion of credit in the
formal banking sector, and any solution requires addressing the loans by this formal sector.
Such formal sector debt is very different from debt in many parts of rural India. In India, rural
debt is mainly to local money lenders. The point is that most agencies and analysts tend to
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ignore increasing levels of indebtedness in the formal sector, as such debt is considered to be
legitimate. In this context, there is a need to recognize the predatory nature of the financial
system, including the formal sector of banks and finance companies and their working at the
rural level. Given the strength of the financial lobby and the refusal of state actors to
recognize the severity of the rural debt crisis, the situation is unlikely to change without a
major political mobilization.
The high level of indebtedness including the depletion of a major portion of rural
people’s liquid assets in the form of gold jewellery and their inability to locally provision
their livelihoods can be characterised as dispossession. Gold accumulated by rural households
over generations can not be recovered in a few years and perhaps even decades. David
Harvey claims, the credit system, finance capital and debt are central features of
dispossession with contemporary capitalism.149 It is such indebtedness that has emerged with
the tremendous expansion of credit and processes of financialization linked to global systems
of finance capital including the predatory forms of credit leading to new forms of
dispossession and accumulation. Such processes are particularly pernicious in places such as
Jaffna mired in war during the decades of neoliberal globalization, where the population had
not experienced and was not aware of the workings of such financial processes and the
dynamics debt and dispossession.

According to Harvey: “The credit system and finance capital have, as Lenin, Hilferding and Luxemburg all
remarked, been major levers of predation, fraud and thievery. Stock promotions, ponzi schemes, structured asset
destruction through inflation, asset stripping through mergers and acquisitions, the promotion of levels of debt
encumbrancy that reduce whole populations, even in the advanced capitalist countries, to debt peonage, to say
nothing of corporate fraud, dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock
and corporate collapses) by credit and stock manipulations – all of these are central features of what
contemporary capitalism is about. … But above all we have to look at the speculative raiding carried out by
hedge funds and other major institutions of finance capital as the cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession
in recent times.” (Harvey 2004, 75)
149
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Loans Targeting Individuals
A major shift in recent years is that loans are directly negotiated between the
individual and the financial institution. This is unlike the agriculture loans involving farmers’
organisations. Thus in Bharathy Veethy, many individuals have got self-employment loans
up to Rs. 100,000 (US$ 770) to Rs. 200,000 (US$ 1,540) to start up shops and to buy three
wheelers. The loans do not require collateral, but only two guarantors, most of whom are
themselves recipients of loans. These loans from banks are leveraged for leased hire
purchasing of three wheelers (used as a taxi in South Asia) and tractors either from leasing
companies or the banks themselves in the form of a credit line.
There has been no analysis about the demand for so many shops, three-wheelers and
tractors in the same village. Furthermore, many such loans are used for purposes other than
self-employment such as for consumption and festivities or to repay other debts. And this
approach of targeting individuals with predatory loans without engaging village organisations
makes individuals vulnerable both in the process of taking loans, where the conditions of the
loans may not be clear to them and then to face the intimidating collectors, when loans cannot
be repaid. Such targeting of individuals for loans and allowing them to fend for themselves as
opposed to negotiating defaulters concerns in a collective manner through farmers’
organisations and co-operatives is a major shift in the administering of loans in the post-war
period. The war-torn population not used to such financialization in recent decades found this
new loan culture to be devastating.

Outmigration
While monetisation of labor including in agriculture has a long history, the
contemporary forms of dispossession and financialized debt have led to a form of outmigration that is new to Pathemany. The war led to tremendous displacement and
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considerable permanent migration to the West, however, the recent form of outmigration is of
a temporary nature to sustain livelihoods and address indebtedness.
In Pathemany, there is a long history of proletarianised wage labor. In the post-war
years, such proletarianised labor switches between wage labor in agriculture, to labor in
construction characteristic of pluriactivity in rural economies. However, the pressures for out
migration to find work in Middle East are of a different order. I can not conclude from my
field research about the causal link between indebtedness and out migration. The dynamics of
out migration have a different temporality, with outmigration increasing after a few years of
declining rural incomes, and my field research was taking place around the time that
indebtedness had become a crisis in Bharathy Veethy. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, in
the two years since my field research, in 2014, there is a tremendous increase in the out
migration of labor in Jaffna District. Furthermore, what is also clear is that a substantial
proportion of remittances will end up becoming debt payments. The scale of incomes sought
reflect the debt dynamics, as alternative local incomes including in construction and even
other industries in southern Sri Lanka would not suffice to meet the high levels of
indebtedness.
An important question is whether there is some difference in the income levels within
the oppressed caste quarter of Bharathy Veethy itself in who can migrate and who can not
migrate due to the lack of social networks and the initial capital often about Rs. 150,000 (US$
1,150) needed for migrant labor to the Middle East. With the increasing expansion of credit
available to all households and increasing networks of migrant labor, the conditions are there
for almost all sections of the population to migrate.150 Capital in the process of accumulation
through dispossession does not seem to discriminate on the basis of caste or class. However,
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During visits on fisheries related research to the oppressed caste village of Maruthapuram in the Karainagar
Island in Jaffna District, I found that villagers on an even larger scale were seeking migrant work in the Middle
East.
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the levels of exploitation may have a caste character, with the levels of remittances varying
depending on skill level, education and social networks.

The New Circuit of Neoliberal Accumulation
The banks and finance companies are themselves increasingly indebted through the
sale of euro and dollar bonds in the global capital markets, as discussed in Chapter 2. I argue,
a new circuit of neoliberal accumulation through dispossession in the countryside is
emerging. It works through indebtedness in the countryside leading to out migration to the
Middle East where labor is exploited but provides remittances back to the village, some
portion of those remittances are in turn sent as debt payments through domestic banks to the
accumulation of global finance capital.
This new circuit of accumulation for global finance capital is not in the realm of
production but rather through a process of accumulation through dispossession (Harvey
2005). That circuit involves the double exploitation of workers from the war devastated
regions. These workers migrate to the Middle East where they are first exploited and then the
second part of the exploitation involves their remittances being siphoned off thorugh debt
payments for the accumulation of global finance capital. It should be noted that there are
contingencies relevant for this circuit of accumulation. First, this circuit is dependent on the
oil rents and stability in the Middle East. Second, if a barrier to migrant labor to the Middle
East emerges for any reason, for example a war in the Middle East or sustained collapse of oil
prices, it can lead to the disruption of this circuit of accumulation.
The most worrying next stage of dispossession could be if the rural households are
pushed to meet debts, by selling their small plots of land and even houses, which are their
most important asset accumulated over generations. Indeed, the new wave of debts seem to
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be linked to such mortgaging of housing land for loans from banks.151 Thus falling incomes
and increasing indebtedness are important conditions for post-war dispossession with myriad
forms of social consequences including forms of social exclusion discussed in the next
chapter.
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The discussion at the community center brought up such a new loan for completion of houses through
mortgaging the houses. In May 2016, an official from the local government in Atchuvely mentioned to me the
increasing number of loans taken by mortgaging houses for various reasons. The local government official
became aware of this trend as many individuals approached them for documents relating to landownership to be
taken to banks for loans.
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CHAPTER 4
The Silence on Persistent Caste Relations in Jaffna
Map 4.1
Atchuvely, Pathemany and Neighboring Villages

Source: Northern Provincial Council

At a commemoration at the Jaffna Public Library152 of the launch of the anti-caste
struggles in October 1966, C. K. Senthivel, described the militant thousands that marched
from Chunnakam town and ended in a major rally in Jaffna town. Senthivel some five
decades earlier was the leader of the youth wing of the Communist Party. The struggles that
were launched during the late 1960s were central to ending “untouchability” in public spaces,
the practices of forced segregation and exclusion that were humiliating to the oppressed caste
152

The event was organized by the New Democratic Marxist Leninist Party at the Jaffna Public Library on 27 th
October 2015.
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people. Public spaces such as temples, access to schools for oppressed caste children and
equal seating in tea shops that had barred oppressed caste communities were opened to them
through those struggles.
Almost, fifty years later, as Senthivel remembered the onset of those anti-caste
struggles and the youth who died fighting caste oppression, the audience at the
commemoration meeting barely stood at fifty individuals. Caste continues as an oppressive
social institution in Jaffna, but consciousness and discussions about caste oppression have
receded. If the library event was an attempt to break out of the silence of discussing caste
oppression including its history, the inability to mobilise an adequate audience suggests that
caste oppression continues, if in silence.
What are the historical dynamics that have shaped caste relations in the post-war
years? The three decades of war were characterised by massive displacement. Such
displacement necessarily meant being uprooted from the historically strong landed social
relations in Jaffna. Indeed, one important consequence of displacement was the weakening of
caste relations as people were uprooted from their spatial and productive relations tied to
land. However, it should be noted that caste relations continued in many forms during
displacement, particularly between the displaced people and the host communities.
Furthermore, there was a caste and class character to the displaced, where the oppressed
castes and lower classes were more likely to remain displaced for longer periods of time
(Thanges 2008). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), neither reinforced nor
attempted to dissolve caste relations, rather, it contained the overt materialisation of social
contradictions within the Tamil community with its singular militarised nationalist goal for a
separate state (IIDS 2008). Therefore, the LTTE suppressed any struggles and even
discussion of caste, as part of a strategy of silencing dissent and any independent
mobilisations within Tamil society.
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In this chapter, after providing the historical context of caste relations in Jaffna, I
draw on my field research in Pathemany to analyze caste relations through social institutions,
particularly religious and educational institutions central to rural social life, and the everyday
struggles people face in the countryside. I then analyze how post-war resettlement and
reconstruction, after the Tamil nationalist mobilisations, civil war and displacement, are now
shaping caste structure in Jaffna. Furthermore, I address the silence on caste relations and the
possibilities of direct violence both of oppression and resistance, particularly after regime
change in January 2015, democratization and the increasing space for protests and
mobilisations.

Contextualising Caste in South Asia and Jaffna
The literature and work on caste in South Asia is extensive constituted by various
theoretical trajectories. Furthermore, historical developments particularly in the post-colonial
era have engendered various debates, state policies and new forms of struggles around caste.
Desai and Dubey have framed the theoretical trajectories on caste relations into four
categories (Desai and Dubey 2012). First, the work of Max Weber and Louis Dumont, and
the emphasis on theories of status including a focus on the concepts of purity and pollution.
Second, theories of social transformation, drawing on the work of Indian anthropologists and
sociologists, particularly M. A. Srinivas and André Beteille, who analysed the changes to
caste based occupations and the impact of urbanisation. Third, postcolonial theories of social
construction including the work of Nicholas Dirks, which emphasizes the importance of
colonial power and orientalist discourses in solidifying caste orders. Fourth, theories of
exclusion and exploitation, which is also my orientation, and I draw on the work Gail
Omvedt and Anand Teltumbde (Omvedt 1991, Teltumde 2010).
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The vast corpus of work on caste in India, has also been shaped by major historical
and political developments. The emergence of caste based parties has had a significant impact
on Indian politics and democracy. The Mandal Commission Report of 1982, calling for
reservations (affirmative action) along caste lines and its implementation starting in the 1980s
have shaped debates on caste and placed much importance on state policies in determining
social mobility and addressing caste discrimination. Over the last few decades, Dalit politics
has led to tremendous struggles as well as writing on caste in India. Such Dalit politics draws
on the works of the earlier writers on caste such as Phule and Ambedkar.153 Finally, caste
atrocities and anti-caste struggles in India have led to extensive debates and research in India.
The central question then in India as in South Asia is the persistence of caste. How is
it that despite modern postcolonial states, capitalist economic transformation and vibrant
debates and struggles against caste oppression, that caste relations persist? I find the research
in the State of Tamil Nadu in India to be relevant here. A century of successive research
studies in the village of Iruvelpattu between 1916 and 2008, point to both political economic
changes due to increasing states services and migrant labor, but also the persistence of landed
caste relations (Harriss et al 2010). This study is particularly important for my work, as I also
ground my research on a village trying to understand broader dynamics of the political
economy of caste in a region.
Such extensive work on caste and major caste related political upheavals in India have
hardly influenced analysis and politics of caste in Jaffna. While historically, Jaffna and the
Tamil community in Sri Lanka were greatly shaped by developments in India, the militarised
nationalist politics during the civil war and the physical isolation shielded Jaffna society from

Gail Omvedt’s work has created considerable interest in the writings of Phule the 19 th century anti-caste
activist in Maharashtra. There is a corpus of literature on Ambedkar, who had many phases from his early
debates with Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, to his role in drafting the Indian Constitution and finally
calling for mass conversion to Buddhism and coining the term Dalit.
153
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the flow and reflection on caste politics in India. Western scholarship on Sri Lanka also
focused on ethnicity and neglected analysis of caste relations.
Scholarship on caste in Sri Lanka, examined caste in both the Sinhala and Tamil
communities, with each region having its own characteristics. There was vibrant work on
land, kinship and caste in the Sinhala community (Leach 1961, Tambiah 1965). The work on
caste in the Sinhala community addressed questions such as the rise of Karava (coastal and
fisheries castes) challenging the dominance of the Goigama (the Kandyan landed castes),
through an analysis of economic changes and political representation (Roberts 1982). Caste
in eastern Sri Lanka, a multi-ethnic region of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese has its own
specific characteristics of land ownership (McGilvray 1982). One of the few recent works
trying to contextualise caste in Sri Lanka, looks at caste in the Sinhala, Up-Country and
Tamil communities and claims caste continues to be severe and rigid in the Jaffna Tamil
community (Silva 2009).
Historically, before the civil war, the anthropological and sociological scholarship on
caste in Jaffna focused on the centrality of caste for village structure and religious practices.
Furthermore, the discussion of caste in a number of works on Jaffna, took off as their starting
point comparisons of caste structure and village life in South Asia (Banks 1960, Leach 1960).
Many of these works were also concerned with an analysis of religion and rituals, including
questions about the individual’s relationship to society as they also related to caste
(Pfaffenberger 1982, Perinbanayagam 1965, Suseendirarajah 1978). Thus the earlier
anthropological and sociological work on caste in Jaffna was limited to theories of status
particularly in village life. I find the historical works (Arasaratnam 1981, Bastiampillai 1988)
and the more recent political writings on caste in Tamil (Senthivel 2009, Senthivel 2014) to
be more relevant for a political economy of caste relations in Jaffna.
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Contemporary analysis of caste structure in post-war Jaffna, has to take as it starting
point factors outside village life, including the war, the massive displacement and return, the
integration with the market after the war and the character of reconstruction policies. Have
such macro changes affected caste structure and caste relations resulting in new forms of
social exclusion and oppression? Thus my concerns are not so much about village structure,
but rather with the dynamics of caste in the context of greater movement out of villages and
migration. However, in Jaffna, unlike in India, there has been no caste census and caste does
not even exist in any contemporary official records.

Use of Caste Names in Jaffna
Given the relative silence of discussion on caste in Jaffna in recent decades and the
related taboo of naming caste identities, which were part of the structure of domination, both
in my research and my writing I am confronted with ethical, political and pragmatic
considerations of discussing caste. The caste names themselves in Jaffna are derogatory and
would rightly lead to a strong reaction from those communities. In India, with the anti-caste
movement, the so-called untouchable castes took on a “Dalit” identity. In other words, they
referred to themselves as Dalits, drawing on the identity constructed by Ambedkar. Some
progressives in Jaffna have considered using the term Dalits, but that has not gained much
tractionin Jaffna.
Most progressive activists in Jaffna draw from the struggles in the 1960s and use the
term “oddukappatta makkal” (“oppressed people”). I borrow that terminology and refer to the
castes that faced severe oppression of untouchability in the past and continue to face new
forms oppression, by using the term “oppressed castes”.154 These castes were involved in

Some others use the term “depressed caste” instead of oppressed caste, and Kuganathan has traced the use of
these various terms (Kuganathan 2014).
154

183

occupations such as field labor, toddy tapping, washing clothes, shaving and cutting hair, and
scavenging and cleaning waste. Such work was categorised by the upper castes as “impure”,
and relationship with the oppressed castes was enforced through “untouchability”. However,
untouchability took a blow with the anti-caste struggles in the 1960s, and is not practiced
openly in Sri Lanka. I refer to the upper caste, the oppressors, the landed farmers, by their
caste name “Vellala” and as “Vellalar” when referring to groups of people belonging to the
Vellala caste. There are also a number of middle castes, which were service castes to the
Vellala caste, such as the “Thatcher” (carpenters) and “Koviar” (cooks). The Karaiyar (fisher
castes), though subordinate to the Vellalar in the local caste hierarchy, have a degree of
economic independence, as they are not bound to the Vellalar though productive relations
constituted by land.

History of Caste and Colonialism in Jaffna
Some of the historical works on the colonial period provides some insights about the
social and economic workings of caste in Jaffna. Four hundred years of colonial rule
contributed to the dominance and consolidation of the Vellala caste in the Jaffna. The
Portuguese, the Dutch and eventually the British in different ways engaged the Vellalar in the
process of colonial rule (Arasaratnam 1981, Bastiampillai 1988).
In the 16th century and into Portuguese period of the early 17th century, Jaffna had
become a commercial hub drawing on trade developed in the previous period of Tamil kings.
Such commercial activity was characterised by the export of tobacco grown in Jaffna along
with the export of elephants to the Moghul Empire and other kingdoms in India. By the
Dutch period starting in the late 17th Century there was an expanding Indian Ocean trade
which made Jaffna a strategic outpost (Arasaratnam 1981).
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When the colonial powers arrived, the Vellalar were at the apex of the social
structure. The colonial powers governed through a fine balance of working with the Vellalar
while also making sure the Vellalar did not gain too much power. The Portuguese (1619 1658) contribution to social change included the introduction of Christianity. They rewarded
the Karaiyar (fisher) caste as they accepted Christianity. However, they also had to work with
the Vellalar, who maintained control over the villages and administered the regional offices
for revenue collection. When the Dutch took over, there was a rebellion by the two coastal
castes close to the Portuguese, the Karaiyar and the Madapalli, and they were crushed by the
Dutch. Therefore, the Dutch favoured the Vellalar in administrative positions during their
century and a half of rule, greatly strengthening the position of the Vellalar (Arasaratnam
1981, 383).
The colonial processes of extraction utilised the caste system. For example, there was
a massive boom in the tobacco exports from Jaffna, as early as the 17th and 18th Centuries
under Dutch colonialism. The Dutch ensured the forced migration of oppressed caste people
from India to Jaffna, under the then existing system of slavery, and augmented the labor
necessary for such tobacco production. The caste system in Jaffna became rigid during this
period when the Vellalar augmented their power through production for colonial trade
(Pfaffenberger 1990).
The Dutch also strengthened the caste system through the codification of
Thesawalamai, the customary law in Jaffna. In 1707, the Dutch commissioned a group of
Jaffna Mudaliyars (local administrators who also served as magistrates) to codify these laws
(Tambiah 1952). The codification came with some transformation of property and laws on
caste relations. The Dutch through the codification of customary law and the expansion of the
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export economy clarified caste demarcations, but they also provided oppressed castes the
possibility of escaping bondage by working for the colonial state.155
With the shift to British colonial rule in the early 19th century, the Jaffna economy
continued to be commercialised and depended during the next one and a half century on the
demand and price for tobacco trade. In 1921, there were 25,000 laborers employed in tobacco
farms and another 10,000 employed in administration and other white collar jobs such as
teaching of the total population in Jaffna of close to 300,000 (Arasaratnam 1982, 36-40).
Under British colonialism as early 1842, the turn to wage labor was noticeable: “forms of
payments varied from full cash payment to cash plus one meal, cash plus two meals, full
payment in paddy, paddy plus food.” However, comparing cash wages to food prices in the
18th century, Arasaratnam argues: “these agricultural laborers lived at or near starvation
levels, a feature compounded by the seasonal nature of the demand for labor” (Arasaratnam,
1982, 30-31). Thus, while the increase in the wage form might be construed as an advance
toward a capitalist economy, the over-riding penury spread misery rather than progress
throughout Jaffna and the South.
In the early 19th century, American missionaries negotiated with the British to initiate
educational institutions. Education in American mission schools became a major asset to
middle class Jaffna society. Indeed, Jaffna became a centre to recruit clerks for the British
civil service. By the early twentieth century, Jaffna Tamils had created a strong remittance
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The caste relations that were consolidated during the Dutch period, particularly the relations between the
Vellalar and the oppressed castes had a lasting impact. The renowned historian of the Dutch period,
Arasaratnam has the following to say: “Many of those who are classified as slaves appear to have been in a state
of bonded serfdom than slavery. Some of these must have been depressed castes that originated from South
India together with their masters of the higher castes and continued this bond in Jaffna. But over the years a
number of these appear to have liberated themselves, though they may have continued to live on the land of
their masters and performed some services. When Thesavalamai was codified, the rights of slaves were carefully
written in, despite opposition from the Mudaliyars. There were many who were listed as state slaves who were
obliged to work for the state. After some years, the Dutch gave them a monthly wage, from the savings of which
they were able to buy their freedom.” (Arasaratnam 1982, 18)

186

economy with migrant clerks to South East Asia under the British Empire. However, neither
the missions nor the schools challenged the caste system.
Historian Bertram Bastiampillai describes the challenge to British administrators and
American missionaries, both with respect to policy on caste and related problems in
education:
The Tamil people in the north were so steeped in caste prejudice, the British
administrators and even missionaries were apprehensive that impetuous or precipitate
action in regard to caste practices could provoke unrest among the Tamils. … As a
result, administrators as well as missionaries treated each caste problem specifically
instead of prescribing general principles of universal action to deal with the social
scourge of caste. … So strong were caste prejudices among Tamils of the North that
bringing together children of different castes within a school or persons of diverse
caste within a church was in itself a social revolution, that could well have triggered
off deleterious consequences to the progress of education or religion. Even teachers
had to be selected from those of the higher castes, if children were to be attracted to
the Christian mission schools (Bastiampillai 1988, 57-58).
As late as the 1930s in Jaffna, caste oppression in education manifested itself in at least three
ways. First, some castes were forbidden entry into a number of schools. Second, non-Vellala
children had to sit on lower chairs or on the ground. Third, the Vellalar did not allow Vellala
and non-Vellala children to eat together (Russell 1982). When caste exclusion in education
was challenged it led to the outbreak of caste violence and even strikes.156 In this way, caste
oppression by the Vellalar continued in the late colonial period, despite counter-policies by

The colonial government’s policy of equality of opportunity in education in the 1920s and attempts to
implement inter-dining in schools in the 1930s, led to the outbreak of caste violence. Furthermore, Vellala
children boycotted schools in protest. Such conflicts spread to other spheres. The Vellala bus drivers went on
strike when oppressed castes demanded they be allowed to sit on seats in buses rather than on the floor of the
bus (Russell 1982, 11-12).
156
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the colonial government, mainly through segregation and exclusion of oppressed castes in
public spaces.

Emergence of Anti-Caste Politics and its Silencing: Crucial Decades of 1960s and 1970s
Caste politics in Jaffna was influenced by political and social developments in India.
Gandhi’s campaign against untouchability during the 1920s deeply affected Jaffna’s
politicised youth. The Jaffna Youth Congress, one of the first nationalist movements in Sri
Lanka to call for full independence, facilitated Gandhi’s visit to Sri Lanka in 1927 and took
up issues such as inter-caste dining and called for an end to untouchability (Kadirgamar
1980). Influenced by the work of the Jaffna Youth Congress, an organisation by the
oppressed caste community in Jaffna was formed in 1927 under the name of the Oppressed
Tamils Workers Union (Oddukkapatta Tamil Ooliyar Sangam) (Senthivel 2009). It demanded
greater representation and protection of oppressed castes, at a time when the Donoughmore
Commission came to address constitutional reform considered universal suffrage. However,
the politically active Tamil Vellalar elite, opposed universal suffrage to safeguard their
dominance (Russell 1982, 16). The Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 transformed electoral
politics, with Sri Lanka becoming the first country in Asia to gain universal suffrage.
The Jaffna Youth Congress boycotted the first State Council elections with universal
suffrage in 1932, as it called for full independence from Britain. In subsequent elections the
conservative Tamil elite entered electoral politics and gained ascendancy. This move by the
Jaffna Youth Congress to boycott electoral politics in retrospect was a major blow to
progressive politics, as Tamil politics came under the hegemony of the conservative Tamil
elite who supported forms of caste oppression. However, many from the Jaffna Youth
Congress joined the left political parties in the 1940s and 1950s. The Minority Tamils
Mahasabha (Forum) an all island forum of oppressed caste activists was formed in 1942
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(Senthivel 2009). The 1930s and 1940s proved to be a time when the conservative Tamil
elite, under the leadership of G. G. Ponnambalam, consolidated their position within the state
structures and electoral politics. The formation of the right wing Tamil Congress in 1944,
which dominated Tamil politics over the next decade, consolidated the Vellala caste’s
influence on electoral politics and the postcolonial state.
By the early 1950s, the Tamil Congress was challenged by Tamil political forces both
within and outside it, questioning the Tamil Congress’ complicity with the Sinhala elite in the
disenfranchisement of the estate workers in the central highlands, Tamils of Indian origin
brought by the British as indentured labor in the 19th Century. The Federal Party which split
from the Tamil Congress, took up the mantle of Tamil nationalism and called for greater
autonomy for the Tamil regions. Left politics within the Tamil community, built on the
legacy of the Jaffna Youth Congress and in alliance with the Minority Tamils Mahasabha,
challenged Tamil nationalist politics. The left parties with their parties headed in Colombo
had a national orientation prioritising caste and class issues as opposed to the Jaffna-centred
parochialism of the Tamil nationalist parties. The Communist Party led anti-caste agitations
with campaigns for access to public spaces, including temples, tea shops and public wells.
There was a historical shift in anti-caste politics in Jaffna, with the Communist Party
taking the decision to launch struggles against untouchability in October 1966. (Senthivel
2009) The launch of this major struggle by the Communist Party drew on the previous
decades of isolated struggles for equal access to public spaces, culminating in a focus on
temple entry and equal seating in tea shops, which symbolised public spaces that undermined
the dignity of the oppressed castes. The Communist Party had gained confidence by the
militant support it gained in the years before it launched the campaign and went along with
the pulse of the oppressed caste people who were keen on the temple entry movement. While
there were pitched battles in many villages, the most prominent struggle was for the entry
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into the Mavattapuram temple (located in the north west of Jaffna peninsula) in 1968 by the
oppressed caste communities consisting of the toddy tapping and landless wage laboring
castes (Pfaffenberger 1990). This struggle gained much attention, as several people died in
the struggle and reflected the ultra-conservatism in Jaffna society with respect to caste
relations. While the Social Disabilities Act of 1957 had outlawed such segregation by caste, it
was never implemented by the authorities in Jaffna. In fact, the Vellalar in many Jaffna
villages attempted to crush anti-caste sentiments with violence. The police force for the most
part backed the Vellalar (Senthivel 2009).
The leading Tamil nationalist party in the 1960s was the Federal Party, with a Vellalar
base, and it was in a quandary as caste divisions made it difficult to unite the Tamil
community under its fold. Even as there were major caste struggles in rural Jaffna in the early
1970s, Tamil nationalism was also on the rise following majoritarian policies of the state. The
Tamil nationalist call for federal autonomy in the regions where Tamils were a majority,
particularly the Northern and Eastern Provinces, gained a considerable hearing within the
Tamil constituencies. The politics in Jaffna continued to shift with escalation of the ethnic
conflict. While incidents of caste violence continued in the 1980s, the priorities of the leftists
in Jaffna shifted to addressing state repression. Writings and mobilisation against caste
oppression receded into the background as mass violence and the ethnic conflict became the
central contradiction facing Tamil society.
Eventually, the LTTE consolidated power with the protracted civil war. Tamil armed
movements, particularly the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front, which
attempted to raise caste issues within its nationalist struggle, was decimated by the LTTE in
the late 1980s. The LTTE had the support of the Jaffna Vellalar in these attacks on the
EPRLF, which was labelled “Eelathu Pallar” (Eelam stands for the Tamil nation, but Pallar is
a derogatory caste name for one of the historically untouchable castes). The LTTE in its quest
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to become the sole representative of the Tamil community silenced dissent including through
assassinations of politically independent Tamils; in that process discussions on caste were
also silenced.157

Previous Research on Caste in Pathemany
Newton Gunasinghe and his team analysed caste relations in Jaffna, particularly
Pathemany, through their field research on the potential for accumulation in different agrarian
systems in Sri Lanka. They describe the caste structure in Pathemany from the early 1960s to
the time of their field research in the early 1980s. They specified a few economic categories
relating to the castes in Pathemany village. Those at the bottom of the pyramid were rural
workers and the landless consisting of oppressed caste people. Then there were the peasants
who own small plots of land, and were involved as rural workers along with cultivating their
land, and they belonged to both the oppressed castes and the middle castes. Next, there were
the middle peasants mainly from the Vellala caste who derived a sufficient income from the
land and did not have to work as rural workers. Finally, they claim there were also a thin
stratum of Vellala rich peasants, who used capital and labor intensive methods of cultivation.
These rich peasants produced mainly for the market to accumulate capital and often had a
permanent group of rural workers attached to their land.
Thus in the 1960s and the 1970s caste structure was related to land ownership, not
only for the oppressed castes and the Vellala upper caste, but also the middle castes, such as
the Koviar caste who were the service castes of the Vellalar. Levels of landownership also
related to whether rural wage work was necessary to sustain livelihoods or whether
cultivation of land owned was sufficient.
157

A full discussion of the political changes that shaped Tamil politics and the fascist political culture of the
LTTE are outside the purview of this dissertation. The works of the University Teachers for Human Rights
(Jaffna) remain the important archive for understanding the trajectory of Tamil politics and its disastrous
trajectory. See Thiranagama 1990, Hoole 2001 and many related reports by UTHR(J).
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Thirty years later, when I went to Pathemany, the following changes were observed
few years after the war compared to the caste structure elaborated in Gunasinghe’s study few
years before the war. First, the service castes consisting of the Koviar, Madaththavar and
Thanathar castes had become difficult to identify in the village, as they no longer had
separate caste quarters. These service castes historically worked inside the Vellalar homes
and temples, as opposed to the oppressed castes historically considered untouchable and not
allowed inside upper-caste homes and temples. In the decades before the war, these service
castes were also primarily involved in agriculture even as they performed some of the social
practices ascribed to them in the Vellala homes and temples, particularly for marriage,
funerals and temple festivals. These service castes had either migrated or been assimilated
into the Vellala caste through marriage.158 Second, The Vellala caste originating from
Pathemany had greatly diminished due to migration to the Western countries forming the
large Tamil diaspora. Third, Vellala households displaced from Palali, the region north of
Pathemany near the airport that had been taken over by the military and designated as a high
security zone in the 1990s, were now renting houses in Pathemany from Vellalar who had
migrated to Western countries. These Palali Vellalar, historically a wealthy community, also
were involved in agriculture both in the paddy lands they owned in the Vanni region south of
Jaffna peninsula and in lands rented from the Pathemany Vellalar. These changes to the
origin of the Vellalar households in Pathemany also weakened the caste relations relating to
agriculture as in addition to the war and displacement, the Palali Vellalar do not have the
power and authority of caste relations relating to local social institutions such as temples.
Fourth, the Thatchar, the carpenter caste ward had remained intact: while sections of their
community had also migrated to Western countries, those who remained continued to work

158

This point was made to me in an interview by a Vellala man in Pathemany on 12 May 2014. I was not able to
verify what happened to the middle castes, as I did not do extensive research in that part of Pathemany.
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mainly as carpenters. The oppressed caste community consisting of wage laborers and toddy
tappers had grown proportionately in the village population as a much smaller ratio of them
migrated to the West. Some people belonging to the oppressed caste community, described
by Gunasinghe as landless rural workers above, had managed to purchase small plots of land
and were involved in farming in addition to working as wage labor.
I was able to observe changes to the social structure recorded by Gunasinghe,
including the divisions of castes and their land ownership. However, Gunasinghe’s study
continues to be important to understand caste structure in Pathemany village for the reason
that it is difficult to discuss caste identities openly in post-war Jaffna. It is very difficult to ask
people about their caste identity, including to do a survey on caste in contemporary Jaffna, as
open discussion of caste is taboo or may result in an aggressive reaction from oppressed caste
people. Table 4.1 reproduces the population data from Gunasinghe’s work in the early 1980s:

Table 4.1 Population Growth in Pathemany
Year
1921

Population
1,314

1931

1,258

1953

1,935

1963

2,457

1971

2,558

1981

2,647

2012
2,258
Source: (Gunasinghe 1985, 208)

What is significant here is the drop in population from 1981 to 2012, from 2,657 people to
2,258, which is a drop of 15 percent. If Pathemany had grown with the national average it
would be 55 percent larger than its current population totalling close to 3,500 people. Such a
drop in population is characteristic of Jaffna with migration159 and the expansion of the Tamil

159

Mortality due to war is not significant. The estimated size of the Diaspora is one million, where as those who
died during the war vary from 100,000 to 150,000. As many as 40,000 to 100,000 of that were in the last phase
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Diaspora, and a large proportion of that migration was by the Vellalar. Therefore, the ratio of
oppressed caste people to Vellalar had drastically increased, and this in turn has also changed
the ratio of rural workers to middle and rich peasants.
According to the Grama Niladari, the village official, in Pathemany160, there are close
to one hundred families of displaced Palali Vellalar. Furthermore, the village official claimed
there has been the out migration of a section of the original population of Pathemany to the
Vanni after 2010, amounting close to 25 families. These are families that had been displaced
to the Vanni, went through the ordeal of the last phase of the war, returned to Pathemany
after the war, and yet again moved to the Vanni due to the difficulties of economic survival
and finding livelihoods in Jaffna. In any event, the total number of families residing in
Pathemany in 2012 was 696 families, compared to 478 families in 1981.161 The increase in
the number of families after the war despite the fall in population is the smaller family sizes
with demographic changes over those three decades.
What is of great value from Gunasinghe’s research in 1981 is the breakdown of castes
and their land ownership. Given the taboo of asking peoples about caste in contemporary
Jaffna, it is very difficult to create Table 4.2 for Pathemany in contemporary times.

of the war in the Vanni in 2009, and the Jaffna population was not as affected by such deaths, except for those
who were displaced to the Vanni during the war. While in Districts like Mullaitivu mortalities due to the war
and tsunami of 2014 are factors influencing population, in Jaffna I believe it is migration that is the main factor.
One of the reasons it is difficult to account for the war dead and the disappeared is also the large numbers of
migration which are not documented as people left in various forms including as undocumented boat people.
160
Interview with Grama Niladhari (Village Official) of Pathemany on 3 December 2012.
161
Jaffna District Handbook 2013, District Secretariat Jaffna.
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Table 4.2 Pathemany Distribution of Cultivated Land by Castes in 1981

69

Total
Number of
Families
125

Total
Families
Percentage
26%

Average
per family
(Lachams)
5.3

16

35

7%

5.3

120

36

137

29%

0.9

27

3

35

7%

0.8

Madaththavar

260

35

48

10%

5.4

Koviar

171

25

42

9%

4.1

Thanathar

111

17

24

5%

4.6

Carpenters

3

1

19

4%

0.2

27

3

13

3%

2.1

1,569
205
478
Source: (Gunasinghe 1985, 209)

100%

3.3

Total Land
(Lachams)

Families
Holding Land

Vellala (Hindu)

666

Vellala (Christian)

184

Nalavar (Hindu)

Caste

Nalavar (Christian)

Others
Total

The castes documented by Gunasinghe in the table are not openly uttered in Jaffna.
There were references to “our community” (Samuham) which implies our caste, but few
people openly spell out the names of theirs and others “community”. It was understood and
known locally. During my field research, most people would ask me and my research
assistant, where I was from, to locate our caste. The place and name of the Hindu temple a
person worships at is another marker of caste. Remarkably, conversion to Christianity does
not allow one to escape caste. My family is of Protestant Christian origin and my research
assistant is of Roman Catholic origin, but caste would be subtly identified in that case
through the location of our house and hence the village quarter. In Pathemany, there have
been conflicts between the two Roman Catholic parishes of Vellalar and oppressed caste
communities, with Vellala caste community excluding the oppressed caste people from their
Church. In other words, while caste may have originated and consolidated with the
development of religious practices, it is also about social relations including landed
productive relations. Therefore, a person cannot escape caste relations by religious
conversion alone, rather, that person would have to leave Tamil society itself.
For the most part, vocalising caste identities is taboo and could only be understood
from body language, the tone of the voice when discussing other castes and other hints such
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as description of their dress and behaviour. The Vellala caste people’s contempt for the
oppressed caste community, comes out in the manner in which they talk about the low
intelligence of oppressed caste children and the unacceptability of their dress. In the past, an
individual’s name itself would have given away their caste, but with recent generations that is
rarely the case. Furthermore, caste identities are not explicated, in public or to outsiders,
except when there is a conflict or a confrontation. Otherwise, a Vellala person will just say
“they” and it would be understood as referring to the oppressed caste community.
In the post-war context, caste dynamics have changed from occupations that
historically characterised caste structure to forms of social exclusion. The main caste
contradiction is one between the dominant and middle castes versus the oppressed castes. I
summarize the table above from Gunasinghe into the following comparison of the dominant
and middle castes with the oppressed castes, particularly in relation to land ownership as it
existed in 1981. While there has been a major demographic change with the dominant and
middle castes migrating abroad in much larger numbers, the disparity in land ownership
remains.

Table 4.3 Pathemany Dominant/Middle vs Oppressed Castes Land Ownership in 1981
Caste
Dominant and Middle
Castes
Oppressed Castes
includes Wage Labour
Total

Total
Land
(Lachams)

Families
Holding
Land

Total
Number of
Families

Total
Families
(%)

1,422

166

306

64%

91%

4.6

147

39

172

36%

9%

0.9

100%

3.3

1,569
205
478
100%
Source: Analysis of Data (Gunasinghe 1985, 209)

Land
Owned
(%)

Average
per family
(Lachams)

The significant point from the Table 4.3 is that less than 10% of the agricultural land
was owned by the oppressed caste community before the war. As discussed in Chapter 3 from
my own survey, little had changed in the ownership of land by the oppressed caste
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community three decades later. Ownership of land continues to be an important marker of
caste identity and shapes caste relations.

Local Leaders Views on Social Structure
Mr. K. Chandrabose, was an elected member of the local government, the Pradesha
Sabha as it is known in Sri Lanka. He belonged to the EPDP (Eelam Peoples Democratic
Party)162, which was at that time in the government coalition. The EPDP is an offshoot of the
Tamil militant movement the EPRLF. During the war, the EPDP also functioned as an armed
group aligned with the military in the war against the LTTE. In the Tamil political spectrum,
the EPDP is a relatively small political party with an oppressed caste base, whereas the Tamil
National Alliance, a coalition formed by the Federal Party, is the most popular Tamil political
party committed to Tamil nationalism.
Mr. Chandrabose is a member of the Central Committee of the EPDP. He also held
many positions within the village, including secretary of the Farmers Organisation, leader of
the Rural Development Organisation, secretary of the Senior Citizens organization, advisor to
the community centre and leader of the Coconut Development Board. He also used to be a
secretary of his temple. Given all his official positions, he is perhaps the most influential
individual in the village, particularly in Bharathy Veethy the oppressed caste ward of
Pathemany.163
Mr. Chandrabose’s porch with a small low table where the newspaper was placed
along with a few chairs, is a place where many would visit to talk to him about a variety of
issues relating to the local government, the farmers organisation, the community and his

162

The EPDP came out of dissident Tamil militants and joined the Government in the war against the LTTE, it
gains importance as a political party with an oppressed caste base.
163
The Grama Niladari (GN), the village official responsible for Government services, while he will not speak
of caste identities, told me the population of Bharathy Veethy was approximately 400 families.
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extended family. I also benefited from many conversations on his porch during my two years
of field research in Pathemany.
Early on during my field research in October 2012, after I had met Mr. Chandrabose
on two occasions, he decided to invite Mr. Sivalingam to speak to me about the history of
Pathemany. Mr. Sivalingam is one of the most senior village residents, and belongs to the
Vellala caste. The long interview with the two of them eventually turned into a fascinating
discussion about caste and politics.

On Incomes and Landholdings
This is how they described the social structure of Pathemany. According to them, out
of the 600 families now in Pathemany, about 20% of the families have large plots on the scale
of 50 lachams164 (3 acres). Then 50% of the families have lands on the scale of 3 lachams
(0.2 acres), 5 lachams (0.3 acres), 10 lachams (0.6 acres), and up to 20 lachams (1.2 acres).
Thirty percent of the families don’t have any agricultural land. About 300 people have gone
abroad during the war, but perhaps only 5% of those may have sold their land, including for
money to go abroad. Land fragmentation due to increasing population has reduced the land
available for agriculture. In comparison to land tenure half a century earlier, housing land has
increased and garden land has decreased, even though most people are still dependent on land
for incomes. About half the population of Pathemany are dependent on kuli (wage labor)
work, because farmers cannot survive on farm incomes alone. They claim a kuli worker’s life
is very difficult due to the lack of regular work, due to rain, crop failures and other
disruptions.
Mr. Sivalingam, who was displaced for two decades, claims people survived the war
and continue to sustain themselves with the support of remittances from relatives. In southern
164

16 lachams equals 1 acre of highland.
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Pathemany, in the upper caste ward, most people have relatives in the diaspora and Mr.
Sivalingam believed half of their income comes from remittances.165 However, Mr.
Chandrabose mentioned that only about one in five families of northern Pathemany, which is
the Bharathy Veethy, the oppressed caste quarter, receive remittances.166

On Displacement
They narrated the many bouts of war related displacement that affected Pathemany.
The first bout of major displacement was during the Sri Lankan Army’s major offensive,
called Operation Liberation, against Tamil militants in early 1987. Most people were
displaced to villages a few kilometre away. However, this bout of displacement soon ended
with arrival of the Indian Peace Keeping Forces in late 1987 and they were able resume
agriculture during the following years. Then again starting in 1991, there were bouts of
displacement culminating in the entire population being displaced to Thenmaraatchy
(southern Jaffna) during the forced exodus of 1995. The LTTE enforced this exodus by
demanding the entire population to leave Jaffna in the face of a military offensive. About 400
out of the 600 families present in Pathemany were displaced to the Vanni (the region south of
the Jaffna Peninsula on the mainland) controlled by the LTTE, and continued to live there for
many years. Those who were displaced became heavily dependent on state and donor
humanitarian supplies, remittances from relatives abroad, and support and work from
relatives and friends.
In 1995, Mr. Sivalingam was also displaced to the Vanni and only returned after the
end of the war. Mr. Chandrabose, however, returned to Pathemany within a year after the

165

As discussed in Chapter 3, such remittances from the Diaspora have been declining in recent years. Also,
such remittances are increasingly more for weddings, temple festivals and other such important events and not
regular monthly remittances for livelihoods.
166
My survey data in Chapter 3 on the remittances in the Bharathy Veethy area broadly agrees with Mr.
Chandrabose’s estimate.
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1995 mass displacement. Such varying lengths of displacement are characteristic of many
parts of Jaffna. Those who feared the Sri Lankan military, or those who had stronger
allegiance to the LTTE, remained longer in the Vanni. Those who did not have relatives in
the Vanni and lacked access to remittances and savings, returned to their villages and live
under military occupation. There were a variety of reasons and calculations that went into
determining if one decided to return quickly to their village or spend years displaced in
another region.
After such displacement, a small number of households returned to agriculture in
1997, but with scant success. There were attempts to revive agriculture during the Norwegian
sponsored ceasefire period between 2002 and 2004. However, with the resumption of war in
2006 and the closing of the main A-9 Highway to the South, agricultural produce had to be
transported by ship out of the Jaffna peninsula. The lack of transport facilities and cost of
trasportation reduced demand for agricultural production. It was only after the war in 2010
that the displaced population to the Vanni returned and full-scale agriculture resumed.

On Caste and Politics
The discussion turned to the history of uneven development in Pathemany.
Accumulation during British rule enabled the upper caste to build large houses. They also
mentioned the social differences, including the prevalence of poverty in northern Pathemany
(the oppressed caste quarter). Mr. Sivalingam claimed the community living in the vicinity of
the Wairavar Kovil (Temple)167, had developed from being landless to becoming capable of
buying land and building houses due to the cash crop boom in the 1970s. Mr. Sivalingam’s
comment here was perhaps meant to placate Mr. Chandrabose, by saying your people have
also advanced.
167

The reference to the temple, was his way of pointing to the oppressed caste community.
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Then Mr. Sivalingam acknowledged: “The caste mind-set has not changed”. Mr.
Chandrabose responded: “but there have been changes, we are able to eat together.” Now, it
was Mr. Chandrabose who was making a concession saying the oppressive situation had
changed. Then Mr. Sivalingam said: “The Pillaiyar Kovil (Temple)168 area people have also
advanced. Anyway, we don’t speak about caste. Yesterday also someone told me not to speak
about caste. But I can tell you about the areas, which are surrounding each temple.” Mr.
Sivalingam’s comment that “we don’t speak about caste” and “someone told me not to speak
about caste” is the clearest articulation of the taboo of talking about caste in Jaffna society.
Mr. Sivalingam given his age and stature in Pathemany society is able to verbalise how this
taboo works in practice.
Mr. Chandrabose was uncomfortable about the direction of the conversation. While
he had agreed to discuss the history of Pathemany by inviting Mr. Sivalingam, he was not
ready to have a deeper discussion about caste. He intervened by belittling the caste problem:
“Now there are no problems going to temples, any person can go to any temple. Marriage can
become a problem, but other problems are not there.”169

A Vellala Leader on Caste and Politics
Then Mr. Chandrabose stepped outside his gate to speak to someone, and Mr.
Sivalingam went into a fascinating monologue, emboldened by the absence of the oppressed
caste leader who had invited him. Mr. Sivalingam’s views and comments were a turning
point in my research on caste.
In each place there are different communities. I live in the central area of
Pathemany. I belong to the Vellala community. The people who now live in Wairava
168

The temple in the Vellala caste quarter.
In this early interview, and with Mr. Sivalingam present, whom Mr. Chandrabose had invited, there was
considerable discomfort in discussing caste. Mr. Chandrabose’s strong views on caste oppression became
evident in subsequent conversations and the interview recorded below.
169
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Kovil (oppressed caste temple) had bought our lands in the 1970s, as our people sold
their lands and went abroad. In my community also there is poverty, as some of them
became poor over the generations. About one hundred families have become poor due
to displacement.
Before 1960, there were a lot of caste problems. Then the Communists and the
Federal Party took up activities including by giving jobs to lower caste people, and
the Federal Party started taking action in 1957 to get rid of caste. I was a member of
the Village Council in 1963. I am a Vellalan, and there was another Vellanan from
Valali, and together we brought a resolution that if there is discrimination in tea shops
and in workshops, we [in the Village Council] would take away their licences. So, in
tea shops and eating places, people could sit equally, drink equally and eat equally
without any difference. Before that they were given tea in a Mukkuperni (a special
cup for oppressed castes) at tea shops. There were communists like him
(Chandrabose) and they used to do demonstrations against us, the upper castes, with
slogans questioning the Tamil community and Tamil politics. We were progressives,
so we supported them, but we were afraid that the other Vellalar would attack us.
In 1963, the Federal Party did a Pathai Yatharai (a campaigning journey)
where we went to different houses and ate together. Since, I was in the Federal Party,
I also followed that. After that some people went back to the old ways, I did not. If
people are kind, I don’t show any difference. There were early on difficulties in
entering temples, but in 1957, Nallur Kanthasamy Kovil (the largest temple in
Northern Province located in Jaffna town) opened up. Kopai Vanniyasingham, a
leader of the Federal Party was active on caste issues in Jaffna. Kailaspillaiyar Kovil,
Vannarpillai Sivan Kovil, Sattanar Kovil (there are villages in Jaffna peninsula) and

202

all these temples were opened up170. Also, tea shops including the Malayan tea
shop171 were opened up. And thus all tea shops all over Jaffna became equal.
Most temples, except may be a few small temples in villages, became equal. If
you take our region, Atchuvely people can go to any temple, same in Avarangal, but
not in Puttur (neighboring villages to Pathemany, Puttur village is known for severe
caste oppression). In our village also people can go and worship, but in some temples
when people (oppressed caste people) go in, they will show they are unhappy. There
is a Kali temple here, and there they will be really worried. You can’t go into temples
in Idaikkadu (a neighboring village where caste oppression is strong).
The anti-caste mobilisations in the 1960s focused on equal access to public spaces. The
Communist Party gave leadership to these struggles mobilising oppressed caste youth to fight
against discrimination in public spaces. The upper caste controlled Tamil nationalist Federal
Party, to which Sivalingam belonged, wanted to represent the entire Tamil population, but its
upper caste character made it difficult to address the caste conflicts that were bursting out
into the open in many villages like Pathemany.
Sivalingam said it is mostly the oppressed caste community that does not have land.
However, there are people in his community who also don’t have land. He believes there
might be about 200 families from the Vellalar community with the rest having migrated
abroad. Out of those who are left, he claims about ten families have no land even to build a
house. They don’t qualify for the Indian housing scheme because they have no land to build
houses. He said: “they are not my relatives, but they are Vellalar. There are divisions within
the Vellalar.”

170

Significantly, he did not mention the Mavattapuram Kovil, where the major temple entry struggle took place.
It was owned by Malayali people from the Indian state of Kerala. I learned later that the Malayali owned tea
shops were the first to open up, also because some of the owners were linked to the Communist Party.
171
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Sivalingam’s reference to the few landless families in his Vellala community, was to
counter the perception that Vellalar are the landed oppressors in the countryside. Then
Sivalingam gave his analysis of politics, which flowed well after his interjection about caste.
Indeed, for Tamil nationalists like Sivalingam, caste oppression was not the main issue, rather
its importance or the need to silence it stemmed from the way in which it complicated party
politics.
Mr. Sivalingam narrated how initially it was the Tamil Congress and the Federal Party
that were present in politics, but then he said the Communists and Minority Tamils
Mahasabha took up the concerns of oppressed castes. He qualified that statement by talking
about the oppressed caste persons in the Federal Party including the Deputy Mayor for Jaffna
Town. He further stated that by the 1960s, there were four political parties in Pathemany.
Tamil Congress, Federal Party, Communist Party and LSSP (Trotskyite Party).
With this broad canvass of party politics in Jaffna, he discussed the history of village
level politics despite the presence of the two Tamil nationalist and two leftist parties.
But in the Village Council at that time, people were elected on the basis of caste, and
how much work they did for the people, not on the basis of political parties. When I
stood for elections, certain sections of each caste supported me, other sections
supported the Tamil Congress candidate, who also happened to be my relative. They
tried to defeat me, but they couldn’t. People liked the House (the symbol on the ballot
paper and for campaigning) of the Federal Party too much. They were crazy about the
House.
The interesting observation here is that both Tamil nationalist parties in the 1960s, the
Federal Party and the Tamil Congress, were controlled by the Vellala caste. Even at the
village level, the two opposing candidates were not only from the Vellala community, but as
Mr. Sivalingam explains were in fact relatives. The Left parties attempted to break the
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hegemony of Vellala-led Tamil nationalist parties with anti-caste mobilisations. But given
that the upper caste candidates could gain the allegiance of different sections of the oppressed
castes, it was very difficult to put forward an oppressed caste candidate–a situation
compounded by the fact that the Vellalar were the numerical majority before the war.
Then Mr. Sivalingam went on to discuss current politics, and claimed how the people
are interested more in rights than development. And what he meant by rights are about Tamil
nationalists demands of autonomy. He went onto say, they will ask for material assistance
from the EPDP, Mr. Chandrabose’s party, but they will in the elections vote for the House,
the Federal Party’s ballot symbol used by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).
As evident from the discussion above, even for experienced local leaders with party
experience, as with Mr. Sivalingam and Mr. Chandrabose, talking openly about caste was
difficult, and they particularly avoid it in the presence of each other. Perhaps they worry
about social repercussions. Their conversation of caste was cautious and fractured. Younger
men and women in Jaffna are even more careful, and avoid talking about caste all together.

Caste and Social Institutions
The hegemony of the Vellala caste affects the schools, temples, and the Sana Samuha
Nilayam (Community Centres with Reading Rooms). In the following sections, I address the
workings of caste structure at present in the village schools and temples. I do not have a
separate section on the Sana Samuha Nilayam in part because their role is not as prominent in
the post-war context and in part because I understood their historical significance fairly late
in my field research. There is very little written about the social history of this important
social institution, and I hope to work on the Sana Samuha Nilayam in the future.
The Sana Samuha Nilayam are located in each caste ward and often next to a temple,
and reproduce the caste dynamic in village social life. Many of these Sana Samuha Nilayam
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host pre-schools, thus pre-school children end up interacting with only those of their own
caste. They also organise a host of community activities such as sports events, dramas and
cultural festivals. On a daily basis, men congregate there to read the newspapers. Some Sana
Samuha Nilayam organise tailoring centres and other community activities for women.
In the past, Sana Samuha Nilayam organised anti-caste struggles as explained in some
of the interviews below. The running of these community centers requires local funds
collected in the community. In the post-war years, with low levels of contributions in the
oppressed caste quarter, the community centers are no longer the vibrant institutions they
were before the war. In affluent parts of Jaffna, and in the upper caste quarters, well off
individuals including from the Tamil diaspora, support the Sana Samuha Nilayam and make
contributions, so that newspapers and other reading material are available. In the oppressed
caste quarters, with increasing emphasis placed on individual responsibility by state policies
and NGO schemes as opposed to greater involvement of the community in the process of
resettlement and reconstruction, and without the galvanising power of anti-caste
mobilisations, the Sana Samuha Nilayam have not recovered after the war. However, the
institutional memory of the work done by Sana Samuha Nilayam in the past remains, and it
may be too early to write them off.

Caste, Education and Social Exclusion
An oppressed caste farmer and toddy tapper cooperative leader in a village adjoining
Pathemany, insightfully commented on education in a passing conversation.172 He claimed
the upper castes would not allow the oppressed castes to advance in education, and would
actively oppose oppressed caste educators gaining positions of power in the school system.

172

Conversation with a farmer and toddy tapper cooperative leader in Atchuvely during a field visit on 7
February 2014.
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Education, he said, was central to the emancipation of the oppressed castes, and control of
education was central to upper caste domination. His comments were perhaps prompted by
the recent news of a number of qualified oppressed caste candidates denied school principal
appointments in Jaffna. Furthermore, social progress through education is the approach
advocated by many in the oppressed caste community, including those leaders who were at
the forefront of the anti-caste struggles in the 1960s and 1970s.
Sri Lanka has benefited from free education policies starting in the 1940s. While there
were many Christian and Catholic private schools into the early postcolonial years, left
leaning Governments took over most of them in the 1960s. Some of these private Christian
schools became assisted schools, with the teachers’ salaries being paid by the Government,
where in turn the schools had to ensure free education. However, in reality many of these
former private schools continued to charge exorbitant entrance fees. Officially, there are only
two fully private schools in the Northern Province, Jaffna College and Uduvil Girls’ College,
which are supported by a trust fund of the American missionaries. While free education
policies in Sri Lanka have continued for seven decades and contributed to the high literacy
rates and Human Development Indicators, there continues to be a class and caste character to
schools.
Caste exclusion in education in Jaffna begins even prior to school entry, in preschools run by caste-linked community centres discussed above. Such exclusion continues in
schooling, with the better off upper and middle caste children commuting from the village to
schools located in towns, with only the oppressed caste children of landless wage labor
attending the village schools. In Jaffna, due to the proximity of villages to towns, for example
Pathemany village is only one to four kilometres from Atchuvely town, Vellala children are
dropped and picked up from the town schools by their fathers and uncles on their
motorcycles. As the children get older they bicycle the few kilometres to the schools in the
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town. Even though the town schools are also funded by the government with the system of
free public education, in reality admission to these schools requires a large entrance fee called
the “donation”. The low income households that cannot afford the “donation” send their
children to the village schools.
Along with this form of exclusion in urban and rural schools, a caste divide exists in
rural schools with Vellala teachers and oppressed caste students. While the social
transformation with free education in the past had made some space for teachers from lower
caste communities, the persistence of caste relations is reflected in a large majority of
teachers and principals belonging to upper castes. For example, when I visited the Ratneswari
School, the only school in Pathemany village in 2012, all the teachers except one and the
principal were upper caste, even though all the children were oppressed castes. Teachers’
expectations for students are low, and students themselves rarely finish high school as they
drop out and go into wage labor in their teens.

Ratneswari School in Pathemany
The Ratneswari School in Pathemany village was formed in 1932 by a prominent
individual in the village who wanted to promote Tamil and Hinduism. It was part of a trend
of schools started by the local movements for the revival of indigenous language and religion
in the late colonial period in Sri Lanka. It was initially a school that only went up to Grade 5,
but now it goes up to Grade 9. In 2012, the school had only 72 students, but had eight
teachers and the principal. School records show that in 1975, there were as many as 340
students. The school provides a glass of milk at 10am and then lunch as part of the mid-day
school meal.
The decrease in the Ratneswari school student population is because most children
from the village attend schools in Atchuvely town. The boys go to Atchuvely Central and
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girls go to St. Theresa’s, which are schools initiated by the Catholic Church in the past. While
these schools are now supported by the government under the free education system, they
nevertheless charge exorbitant entrance fees that in the process exclude the children of the
landless laboring classes.
I first met the principal of Ratneswari School, located at the centre of Pathemany
village, Mr. Suppiah Mohanarajan soon after I had initiated my field research in late 2012.173
He had been the principal of the school from 2007. He is from the southern part of Jaffna
peninsula, and had been posted as a teacher in other districts, but his wife is from Atchuvely
so he had developed a strong connection to this area. The villagers and community leaders
spoke quite highly of his commitment to the students and his efforts to develop the school.
Mr. Mohanarajan himself came from one of the oppressed caste communities, and his ties to
the community were strong because of his marriage to someone from the region and more
importantly his caste affiliation. The villagers were unhappy about the principal before him,
who was a Vellala man, and it was during the tenure of the earlier principal they felt that the
school had started to deteriorate. With more and more students moving to the urban schools,
Mr. Mohanarajan was worried that if the student body at the Ratneswari School dropped
below 50 students, with more of its oppressed caste students moving to urban schools, the
government might close the school.
I had visited the school a few times during my field research and towards the end of
my research, I interviewed the principal, Mr. Mohanarajan.174 He addressed the problems of
rural education:
The social inequalities after the war is an important reason [for the low enrolment in
the school]. In fact, I would say that is the main reason for the low student body.
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Interview with Suppiah Mohanarajan, 22 November 2012.
Interview on 7 February 2014, with Suppiah Mohanarajan.
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There are mainly two communities (castes) who are present in this area, one being the
community on the Atchuvely side (Vellalar) and the other on the Bharathy Veethy
(oppressed caste ward). In earlier times, it was the Atchuvely side people that were
active in this school including its administration. Initially, the children from Bharathy
Veethy side were not accepted into this school. Eventually, with social changes (with
the caste struggles and greater integration in the 1970s) the children from that
community were allowed into this school. But even then, there were restrictions like
not allowing those children to draw water from the well. Those children
(BharathyVeethy) had to sit on the floor and study [while the Atchuvely side children
were given desks]. With time the conditions changed. In fact, there used to be a
school exclusively for them (Bharathy Veethy) called the Sri Vibathy Vithiyalayam.
But that school was closed with displacement, and after the displacement the
community (Bharathy Veethy) started sending all their children here [to Ratneswari
School]. Then these people (Vellalar) said, we can’t send our children to this school.
They pulled out their (Vellalar) children little by little and now there are no children
from that community (Vellalar).
In this way, the Vellala children had moved to the schools in Atchuvely town, leaving only
the oppressed caste children from Bharathy Veethy quarter of Pathemany to attend the
Ratneswari School.
Principal Mohanarajan was surprisingly open in talking to me about the caste
dynamics in the village. However, even then he did not vocalise caste group names, choosing
instead to refer to the village quarters as the Bharathy Veethy and Atchuvely sides.
Nevertheless, he clearly focused on the issue of caste as central to the social make-up of the
school, and how the caste character of the schools changed with the war. Principal
Mohanarajan spoke about the high level of school drop outs in his school:
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The children from this community (oppressed caste) are stuck in poverty. Parents
have also not studied, and they don’t understand the importance of education. Parents
don’t send their children to school, and so we have to inform the government officials
and go with them and try to bring the children to school. And even in that community
(oppressed caste), when the parents have some interest in education, they take their
children toward the schools in the town. Those who have advanced a little
economically send their children to the urban schools. It is those children who are at
the very bottom that come here. This school is only up to Grade 9, and with that they
say, that is enough education, and don’t send their children to the next school to
continue their education. So most children, go for work after Grade 9, either for kuli
(wage labor) or mason work.
With war and displacement, education was disrupted for many of the parents and the current
generation of students. In a research effort on rural education, I visited eleven rural schools
between 2012 and 2013, and the teachers and principals of those schools confirmed the
impact of such disruption with the war on schooling.175 The UN’s humanitarian news agency
reported that school drop outs are highest among the war-affected population in the Northern
Province and concurred that children in their early teens drop out of school to take up odd
jobs (IRIN 2014). An education officer also told me that many of the Jaffna schools did not
have special catch up programs for children who had returned from the Vanni after the last
pahse of the war.176
Mr. Mohanarajan went on to discuss the social problems and the economic situation
of parents which affects the educational mind-set of the community:
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The outcome of that research was published in the following book chapter: Kadirgamar, A. (2015).
Neoliberal state, rural dispossession and struggles for education. pp 135 – 147. In Kumar, R. (Ed.)
Neoliberalism, Critical Pedagogy and Education. New York: Routledge.
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Interview with Zonal Education officer on 5 November 2012.
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The parents of these children have little education and here they are mainly involved
in kuli work. And then heavy drinking is a problem, much of their earnings goes into
drinking. Then fighting. If every night there is a fight at home between the husband
and wife, how will the children study? The parents are not interested in educating
their children. They only want them to earn. So now, everyone wants to send their
children abroad. That is mainly to the Middle East to earn. They don’t consider what
their children will do after working in the Middle East for a few years, they are only
interested in earning money now. Now debts are also high, loans to banks are high, so
they want their children to earn.
The widespread indebtedness and out migration to the Middle East discussed in Chapter 3, is
thus affecting the commitment to educational advancement of the oppressed caste
communities.
The Principal then went on to discuss the problematic character of the bureaucracy in
its engagement with rural schools. Good teachers are rarely sent to such schools with
transfers of such teachers blocked through political interference. The Principal was also
troubled by the role of teachers. He mentioned the problems of parent teacher relations in the
context of caste relations and the caste mind-set of teachers.
As for teachers, the old teachers are still around and so educational methods are not
changing. The young teachers coming out of the College of Education are well
trained. The university graduates who are not trained in education are also poor
teachers. And Jaffna University graduates are particularly poor teachers. I also
graduated from Jaffna University, so I know the low level of education there.
The teachers don’t take interest in the students in rural schools like ours. They don’t
teach properly. They know the parents can’t challenge them, because they lack
education. Teachers are caste conscious. I know some teachers did not go to the
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funeral of their student’s parent because the child was from the oppressed caste. There
are also caste differences between teachers.
Parents of two school children my research assistant and I spoke to complained of the low
quality of teachers at the Ratneswari School. They were particularly critical of one lady
teacher who was abusive towards the children and felt it was her caste outlook. But the
parents were not keen to take any action.177 Parents of two girls, of oppressed caste origin,
who attend the urban school said they don’t send their children to Rarneswari School as the
teaching is of low quality, though they struggle to pay for the various education related
expenses in the urban school and after school tuition.178
Finally, Mr. Mohanarajan discussed significant caste discrimination in the
administration of schools:
Caste continues to be major issue. My colleague and I went for an interview for
principal position at the Senguttuvan School [closer to Jaffna Town and known as an
upper caste stronghold]. My colleague, who is currently a principal in the school in
Puttur (village close to Pathemany), which is mainly an oppressed caste school, was
clearly the most qualified. But there was pressure from the Old Students Association
not to accept him, because he was from the oppressed caste. Even the Northern
Provincial Council became involved in this issue, and decided to block his
appointment.
The comments of Principal Mohanarajan may not be echoed by other principals in Jaffna,
because it is his commitment to addressing the caste exclusion that made him so vocal.
However, during visits to other schools in Jaffna, I was able to observe a similar dynamics of
rural schools with exclusively oppressed caste children. Furthermore, there has been a series
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Interview with parents of Ratneswari School parents on 11 June 2013 and 8 July 2013.
Interview with parents of two girls at St. Theresa School on 22 June 2013.
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of cases, where oppressed caste teachers and village officials are being denied positions as
heads of schools or as officials of upper caste villages.179 These discriminatory acts by the
bureaucracy are reflective of the persistence of caste.
In an earlier era, oppressed caste children may have been denied entry to a school or if
admitted, segregated and humiliated by being asked to sit on the floor while upper caste
children sat on chairs with desks. However, the contemporary form of caste exclusion in
education is through economic inequalities; the oppressed castes being stuck in the village
school and the upper castes moving their children to urban schools.

Social Investment in Temples
Temples have been absorbing much of the local investment since the end of the war.
In most towns and villages in Jaffna, the Hindu temple steeples are being rebuilt and in much
larger sizes. Historically, castes have had their local temples and the massive displacements
caused by the war weakened the connections between caste communities and their temples.
After the war, villages have established a subtle segregation of temples. Temples have
become symbols of caste pride and investment. The oppressed castes that struggled to gain
entry into the upper caste temples few decades ago are now focused on building their own
temples, reinforcing the exclusionary character of caste temples. Furthermore, the oppressed
caste temples have also become sanskritised emulating the rituals and practices of the upper
castes (Muttulingam 2016). In Pathemany, I interviewed the leaders of both the wealthiest
temple in the Vellala caste ward and the relatively small temple in the oppressed caste ward.

179

Many of these cases of discrimination only emerge word of mouth and have not been documented. In most
cases the Education Ministry mediates and finds a transfer for the principal in question. But such cases were
discussed in a series of discussions on education in Jaffna from October to December 2015 as part of the
Anandarajan Memorial Education Seminar Series at St. John’s College, Jaffna.
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Pillaiyar Kovil in the Upper Caste Ward
Mr. Karalasingam is 49 years old and has two sons aged 28 years and 23 years of age.
He and his forbearers have been the presidents of the Pillaiyar Kovil. His son is on the board
of the Ganesha Sana Samuha Nilayam (community center). He explained his role and history
of the temple:
As a president, I am like the head of the family, like in the country there is a
president. We decide on the temple matters, and there is no such thing as a committee.
In our ancestry, I am the 7th descendant in charge of this temple. Since 1822 it has
been under our family. I have been in charge of it since my father died 11 years ago. I
have one older brother, but he has gone to Canada. … Our ancestral relatives
converted to Christianity, so when they converted they gave the temple to our family.
The land was their land, those Christians converts, but now the land is temple owned
land. My house land is my father’s brother’s land, and I married my father’s sister’s
daughter’s daughter, and so that is how the housing land continues to be transferred
among us.
Mr. Karalsingam described the generational transfer of temples through the eldest son.
However, such temple ownership is a major source of pride and the rest of the family is also
active in the management of the temple. The extended family’s wealth is preserved through
cross cousin marriage as in his case. It is common for a man to marry his father’s sister’s or
mother’s brother’s daughter. In this way, a strong bond is created with the temple, even as
houses and agricultural land remain within the extended family, with property passed down
through the daughters as dowry.
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Mr. Karalasingam then explained the temple finances including the regular monthly
expenses of the temple including payment for the temple priest180 called the Aiyar:
From the donation box we pay the electricity bill, if it is not enough we ourselves pay
it. … There are ten days in the Thiruvila (yearly temple festival). We do the first day
of the Thiruvila, the male siblings of our family get to do the first Thiruvula. For the
Aiyar (Priest), we pay Rs. 15,000 (US$ 115). So, if you multiply that by twelve for
one year and divide by those who take each Thiruvila, so by ten, then it is Rs. 18,000
(USD$ 138) from each [family that runs a day of the festival], and I pay the Aiyar
every month.
He then gave the detailed accounts of the costs for the ten-day temple festival every year. To
finance the day of the temple festival organized by his family, he said his brother usually
sends Rs. 100,000 (US$ 769) to 150,000 (US$ 1,150) and his cousin sends another Rs.
50,000 (US$ 385). The ten-day temple festival, according to his estimates, cost a total of Rs.
1.5 million (US$ 11,500) to 2 million (US$ 15,400), a large sum of money as much as the
annual income of five to ten households in rural Jaffna.
Every twelve years, the temples go through a process of rebuilding and cleansing, the
expenses of which are even larger. The temple was not damaged much by the war and in
1998, his father did the Kumbavisaham [consecration and refurbishment of the temple done
every twelve years]. Then again in 2012, he did it with the cleansing ceremony costing a total
of Rs. 1.5 million (US$ 11,500). The ten members who run the Thiruvila also rebuilt the
temple with five new structures for a total cost of Rs. 4.5 million (US$ 34,600). In this way,
he had an intricate knowledge of temple finances.

Karalasingam’s contempt for Aiyar (priests) was evident in his tone. He was implying that they are there to
take money. This is also characteristic of caste relations in Jaffna where the Brahmin castes have little power
and they are basically the paid employees of the Vellalar. This is very different from many parts of India, where
power resides with Brahmins, who are responsible for the religious rites and also hegemonic in the social,
economic and political realms.
180
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Mr. Karalasingam’s own financial situation is quite dire, and after speaking about the
temple finances he spoke about his own financial situation in the same vein. He farmed when
he was a student, and then again only during the last four years. He became a shop owner
when he was 22, but it resulted eventually in major financial losses. Currently he cultivates
7,000 crops in about 2 acres of land, which is a significant farm size in Pathemany. His sons
help in the farm, but his older son is continuing his studies, and the younger son wants to go
to Canada to join Mr. Karalasingam’s brother. He hires kuli labor for certain kinds of work,
such as cutting the water channels. He also pays for watering, though he said it is expensive.
Due to previous losses, he wants to now put in as much family labor as possible.
Mr. Karalasingam was displaced twice in 1987 and then in 1995. And during the
period of displacement he used to transport firewood on his bicycle for a little money. During
his business days he had taken loans from a range of people including banks. He claims he
never took loans for more than 3% per month from the money lenders, which is still 36% per
year. Debts had accumulated from the failed business and he is now indebted for Rs. 1.5
million (US$ 11,500). Mr. Karalasingam’s pride, and his family’s position in the community,
as with the position of the temple including their caste in the village, requires tremendous
expenditure in temples, even though he is deeply in debt.

Wairava Kovil in the Oppressed Caste Ward
I was fortunate to meet the chairman of the Wairava Kovil, Mr. Tharmaratnam, who
was an acquaintance of my research assistant’s parents. Given the introduction by people
known to him, I was hoping he would speak more candidly about caste.
In the Wairava Kovil, the temple committee consists of ten members. While the Aiyar
does his services for free, the monthly expenditure for the various pusai (a regular ritual of
worship at the temple) comes to about Rs. 2,800 (US$ 22). There are about 350 families who
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worship at this temple, and they are mainly families doing kuli work. Running the temple is
costly: each year the Thiruvula (annual temple festival) cost is Rs. 70,000 (US$ 538), so a
group of people, usually about 15 people in the group bear that cost.
The year I interviewed Mr. Tharmaratnam in 2013, the temple committee and temple
members had done a Kumbavihasam (refurbishing of the temple), and it cost Rs. 1.2 million
(US$ 9,230), because it required 15 priests, and the cost of the priests itself cost Rs. 850,000
(US$ 6,530). Out of that Rs. 1.2 million (US$ 9,230), Mr. Tharmaratnam estimated about
200,000 (US$ 1,540) came from the diaspora. People may send on the scale of Rs. 10,000
(US$ 77) to Rs. 50,000 (US$ 385) from abroad.
Mr. Tharmaratnam believes this temple is over a hundred years old. They have a Sana
Samuha Nilayam (community center) which was rebuilt after the displacement with the
support of an NGO. When I asked him repeatedly about the caste issues in the village or in
relation to the temples, he was firm in his reply: “Until 1965181 there were problems, but
after that caste problems are not there. With economic progress all those problems are now
gone.”
I mentioned to him that I felt Jaffna society has three strong social institutions,
specifically the temples, the schools and the Sana Samuha Nilayam (community centres), and
asked him about his impression of these institutions in relation to his community. And that is
when he made some interesting comments:
For our growth, the Sana Samuha Nilayam is the most important. Next in importance
for our growth are the schools. The reason I can talk to you with confidence is
because of the Sana Samuha Nilayam. The founder of our Sana Samuha Nilayam,
Ponnuthurai, knew each and every family here. He was a communist. He was the one
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In his mind 1965 was synonymous with the major anti-caste struggles, including temple entry struggles in the
1960s.
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who built our Sana Samuha Nilayam to this state [of a strong institution]. He was a
CTB driver [Ceylon Transport Board bus driver], and he was from another village and
he married here and came and lived here and developed our village. Then there was
another man called Kathirkaman. Both of them were communists. They opened their
houses to everyone, and whether or not they had food to eat, [they sacrificed their
own well-being and] they cared about the village. They were concerned about the
interests of the people and what kind of work could be done for the people. They both
worked hard. Ponnuthurai died about 3 months ago and Kathirkaman died twenty
years ago.182
Mr. Tharmaratnam went on to explain the engagement of those communist leaders at the
village level:
They would work on all problems. If a road had to be repaired, they would work on it
[by agitating and placing demands], and then get the authorities to fix it. But most
importantly, they created awareness. People like me are able to talk like this because
of them. I did not have the background to study much. It is to the Sana Samuha
Nilayam that we went often and watched and learned. They would call us to speak in
public, to read in public and trained us like that. I worship them like gods, because
they are the ones who have given me the confidence to talk. In those days,
Ponnuthurai brought all the Ministers here, Peter Kenuemen, N. M. Perera, Colvin R
de Silva, [national leaders of the Communist and Trotskyite parties, who were
ministers in the United Front Government in the 1970s]. They all came to our reading
room (part of the Sana Samuha Nilayam).
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It is very difficult to get exact dates in interviews, unless one pursued and got death certificates, in rural
Jaffna when people say twenty years ago, it may be fifteen or twenty five years ago.
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Mr. Tharmaratnam was visibly emotional as he spoke about his mentors. He was proud that
the famous leftist leaders from Colombo visited his Sana Samuha Nilayam. However, Mr.
Tharmaratnam himself did not identify himself as a communist. Furthermore, it is the social
consciousness they raised rather than the struggles that were important to him. As he talked
about such public education and awareness, the temple of which he is the chairman, and
which gains more attention now in the village, receded into the background. What had
become clear from our conversation was that the Sana Samuha Nilayam was a space that both
perpetuated caste difference and supported struggles against caste oppression.
Towards the end of the interview, my research assistant asked him about an incident
at a neighboring village, Avarangal, where youth had bashed up a hall few weeks earlier. He
again became defensive and said it was not in his village and that he did not know what had
happened. Then he said, that he had heard that some people from Europe related to the hall
had written something disparaging of the oppressed castes in Puttur on the internet, and so
oppressed caste youth from Puttur had attacked the place. Similar to his reluctance to speak
about anti-caste struggles, Mr. Tharmaratnam dismissed this as an isolated incident of
violence.

Rethinking Caste in a Time of Crisis
In May 2014, as I was wrapping up my field research, I interviewed Mr. Chandrabose
again. By then, he had become familiar and comfortable with me. My research assistant and I
had also co-authored a long piece in a Tamil magazine on toddy tapping and palm
development co-operatives, which I had shared with him, so he knew our political
perspective.183 I wanted to ask him about caste oppression in particular. But our interview
Francisglaim, A. and Kadirgamar, A. (2013) ‘Seeval Tholil, Kooturavu Sangankalin Vettrihalum
Savalhalum: Vadamahana Sabhaiyin Kavanathirkku’ [The Development and Challenges of Toddy Tapping and
Co-operatives: For the Attention of the Northern Provincial Council]. Samakalam, October 1-15, 2013.
183
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touched on many matters including toddy tapping and the role of the Palm Development Cooperative; some of those comments I will return to in Chapter 5. I discuss Mr. Chandrabose’s
interview at length, as he was so central to my research in Pathemany, and has greatly
influenced my thinking on caste politics. I began by asking him about his upbringing and his
entry into political work:
I was born here [in Pathemany] and have lived here. My father was a farmer.
After finishing my education up to HSC184, I was employed in the Palm Development
Co-operative from 1972 to 2008. From my school days we interacted with the
communist party and were active in their work. … I contested elections for the first
time in 1971, as an Independent candidate against the Federal Party candidate, and I
lost by a few votes.
I was active in the anti-caste struggles through the initiatives of the
Communist Party. Those were days of big struggles. We went and fasted and
protested in front of the Mavattapuram Kandaswamy Kovil (temple famous for
keeping oppressed castes out) and they used water pumps to flood water on us and
chase us. There was a Communist leader called Nagaratnam from Chunnakam and it
was through his connection that we went for the struggle. And then there was also
violence and one of my friends was injured.
In our village here, we could not go to the Pillaiyar Kovil. And when we told
them we wanted to visit the temple, they fenced it with barbed wire to keep us out. It
became a big problem, we tried to break in and they called the police.
Mr. Chandrabose’s personal life history is very much linked to caste struggles. His links to
the Communist Party in his youth, his participation in the anti-caste struggles and then
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Mr. Chandrabose belongs to one of the early generations who benefitted from free education policies and the
rural economic boom, which led to some level of education and social mobility into the lower middle classes
among the oppressed. It is his generation that also produced a number of oppressed caste writers.
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working for the Palm Development Co-operative organising the toddy tappers, which was
itself a creation of those struggles and the Left Parties in power in the 1970s, all related in
different ways to struggles against caste oppression.
Mr. Chandrabose was active in one of the most renowned anti-caste struggles in
Jaffna, the Mavattapuram temple entry movement which drew youth from many parts of the
peninsula, but he was also part of temple entry struggles in his village including the large
Pillaiyar temple mentioned above. Chandrabose’s anecdotal comments bring to life the
largeness of caste struggles in the 1960s and 1970s.
Then I asked him about land and landed relations and their relationship to caste
relations in Pathemany:
The other house of our family which is towards the front part of the village, used to
belong to them (Vellalar), and then my father managed to buy that land. You see, we
were like their slaves, so we could only live in the back or where they wanted us to
live. Some of these landlords owned the land, where our people had to live on the
landlord’s land and work for him, so they never had their own land. Slowly, the
oppressed community on that land started to study or went abroad, and are now
slowly buying land. The caste and land issue is much worse in Puttur [neighboring
village]. When I was young we could not even go close to their schools. When we
were thirsty, we could not draw water from their wells. We could only get water if
they gave it to us.
Mr. Chandrabose is describing the productive and spatial relations of caste. The oppressed
castes were denied agricultural land and were forced to depend on the Vellalar for their
employment. They were denied water, with the Vellalar claiming that if the oppressed castes
draw water from the wells, they will pollute the wells. Furthermore, they were pushed to the
back of the village and were not given the visibility of living near the main road or the centre
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of the village. His reference to Puttur, reflects the continuing strength of the Vellalar even in
contemporary times in this village known for its severity of caste oppression. Because of a
much larger Vellalar population in Puttur, the Vellalar were much stronger and more
oppressive.
Take the Ratneswari School, we could not go there. Now it is our children who are
only studying there. In the 1970s after the caste struggles, our children could finally
go there. The Puttur Somaskanda School, opened up to our people [his community,
the oppressed caste community] much later. Our people can’t go there as teachers.
Once there is economic progress, caste oppression will slowly disappear. Now our
people go as wage labor to his house. They should go for work, but they should keep
it a clear transaction. They should receive his wage and go home, and not interact
further.
Throughout the interview, even though I asked him about Pathemany, he referred to the
neighboring villages not only for comparisons but also to articulate the relations they had
with other villages. It was a reminder that villages are not enclosed, that there was
considerable influence, movement and solidarity between villages and other regions of
Jaffna.
His reference to education above is about the hard fought victory for the oppressed
caste children to enter the Ratneswari School in Pathemany. However, now that the upper
castes have abandoned the school, education has become segregated once again, and the
quality of the educational process for lower caste children had significantly declined. The
school in Puttur, while it provided entry to oppressed caste children much later, and is a better
performing school as the upper castes have not abandoned it, nevertheless excludes teachers
from the oppressed caste community.
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Mr. Chandrabose believes caste oppression is entangled with landed relations, and it
is work on land that leads to oppressive forms of social relations with the upper castes. His
solution is to strictly keep it as a wage labor transaction and nothing more than that. He links
wage labor to economic progress, and what he believes will lead to the decline of caste
oppression. As the discussion shifted to the possibilities of caste emancipation, he made a
strong connection between caste and dowry:
No one can end caste and dowry in our society. The Tigers also thought about ending
it but they couldn’t. Even the Tigers were caste conscious. They would say there is no
caste but they gave importance to their caste people. Caste and dowry domination will
not end. Male domination is decreasing but dowry domination won’t. Now look at her
[points to my research assistant]: she has studied, so now the man is going to ask for
an even higher dowry. If a woman has not studied, he will ask for 10 lakhs [Rs. 1
million, US$ 7,690], but for a woman who has studied, he will ask 30 lakhs [Rs. 3
million, US$ 23,000]. Because a woman who has studied would also need a man who
is better off. (laughs) The girl who has studied will ask for an appropriate husband and
he will ask 50 lakhs [Rs. 5 million, US$ 38,500] in dowry. Now people like her won’t
have time to earn her dowry, by the time she finished studying it will be time to get
married. A woman studying is a big problem… (laughs)… I am speaking from
experience. My friend had educated four of his daughters and now he is worried.
What is he going to do? If you come to our house, all these worried fathers will be
here late in the evenings talking to me.
Mr. Chandrabose’s wife interjects: “Now there is importance for money and caste, nothing
else.”
For Mr. Chandrabose and his wife, as for so many of their relatives those are perhaps
the two most troubling issues on a daily basis. Their caste identity is a constant reminder of

224

their position in society, and it has not changed even after the war. And the difficulties of
finding marriages for their daughters and relatives continues because of the lack of dowry in
the form of property, particularly land.
Caste relations are also tied to land, particularly the possibilities of ownership of land.
Mr. Chandrabose continued:
It is with the caste struggle that land ownership also slowly started to change.
In Puttur, because the upper castes are strong, there was no change, people can’t even
talk about land. In our area, caste was not as strong, because there was some balance
in our population. In the past [before the war], they were 60% and we were 40%, but
in Puttur, they are 90% and our people only 10%. Here, because of the struggles,
social consciousness also increased. In the Atchuvely area [which includes Pathemany
village], our community was stronger and the domination was not as strong. In places
like Changanai and Kodikammam, caste domination was much stronger.
Now their [Vellala] population has greatly decreased, they only have
economic strength [in Pathemany]. So, they [Vellalar] can’t face too many caste
problems now [challenges by oppressed caste people]. That is why I say, it is when
we go to their house that we become weak. We can’t demand to go and eat in their
house; we can only demand equality in public places. Now their population has
decreased, as many of them have gone abroad. And many in their community here [in
Pathemany], are displaced people from Palaly.
This is a perceptive analysis recognising the weakness of the Vellalar in relation to the
demographic and spatial changes, and he understands how caste relations are strongly linked
to a history of oppressed caste people working on the land of the Vellalar. He realises that the
Vellalar continue to have wealth but that does not translate into productive relations locally,
which is how caste relations are strengthened. Furthermore, he recognises that many of the
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Vellalar in Pathemany in recent years are from Palaly, and they are not of local origin, so that
also weakens Vellalar power in Pathemany. Finally, Mr. Chandrabose draws on his
experience of anti-caste struggle in the 1960s and states anti-caste struggles can only take
place with respect to public spaces. That is if they enter a Vellalar house or a farm to work,
then at that point itself the demand for equality is lost.
Then Mr. Candrabose went on to talk about the history of labor relations and
exploitation:
In those days, out of our people, half of them were tapping and the other half went for
kuli work. Now only 5% or less of our people may be involved in tapping. … In those
days if a mudalali [overseer], took kuli workers for mason work, and if the worker is
to be paid Rs. 500, he would take Rs. 100 from that. So if he took five workers, and
he is to be paid Rs. 1,000, he takes home Rs. 1,500 and the workers only take Rs. 400
each. That kind of exploitation used to exist. Now, that kind of exploitation is
decreasing. In those days, in each village there were only two or three mudalali
[overseer] like that. Now, there are many more and people cannot be cheated. Now if
five people go together for agricultural work and to cut water channels and they get
Rs. 3,000, they have to divide it equally among them. Now people are much more
conscious; before, people will take what they are given.
Those going to kuli work, even if they get paid Rs. 1,000 (US$ 7.70) that is
not enough to support his family of five. He would have drunk for Rs. 400, so he
gives his wife Rs. 600 which is not enough. And kuli work is irregular: once the rainy
season comes for the three months, you just stay at home. Those who are dependent
on kuli work and agriculture cannot depend on that work. They may get 10 or 15 days
of work. If it rains for two weeks, then there is no work. So, tapping or industrial jobs
are much more regular. For those involved in industrial jobs they have continuous 30
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days of work. The Atchuvely Industrial Zone: if it starts to work properly, we will get
work. People from our region will get the jobs. In the 1970s, it was working well and
before it became much bigger the war disrupted it. At that time, we did not have any
political connections so our people were not working there as much.
Mr. Chandrabose in the above passage is discussing the changing consciousness among the
oppressed caste community about wage labor and access to jobs. With the rural economy
becoming more and more monetised, the wage laborers are also much more conscious of the
wages paid to them and what might be skimmed by the overseers or those who employ them.
In Jaffna, the demand for higher day wages is often translated as the arrogance and
laziness of wage labor by the middle classes and the professionals including the bureaucrats.
In fact, the higher wages demanded by wage labor is considered to be a problem of labor
shortages rather than the increasing consciousness of wage workers about the wages due to
them. This consciousness of labor factors in the irregularity of wage labor that is only
available when those who employ them want it, and it is not needed during the rainy season.
The Atchuvely Industrial Zone, lies a few kilometres from Pathemany, and Mr.
Chandrabose believed that he could use his political connections to get such jobs for his
community. Mr. Chandrabose claims the way out of caste oppression is to avoid dependence
on incomes from working on the land of the Vellalar. Furthermore, he also believes that
toddy tapping and industrial jobs are desirable as they not only create jobs independent of the
Vellalar, they ensure regular incomes and makes the oppressed castes self-reliant.185
Mr. Chandrabose also discussed the way out for the oppressed castes, including the
kind of social consciousness that was necessary to challenge the power of the Vellalar.
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Contratry to this perspective, there has been considerable work done in India, particularly in the context of
the modes of production debate on how capitalism and industrial exploitation can work in tandem with caste
relations, rather than get rid of caste oppression. See for example the early work of Dipesh Chakrabarty on the
working class in West Bengal. (Chakrabarty 2000)
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Now if caste is to change, there needs to be a mind-set change. What do we do? Do
we start a movement for this now? Look what happened in Mullivaikal [Where tens of
thousands died in the last phase of the war]? Do we get destroyed through another
struggle? People’s minds have to change. It’s much less in schools, it’s not in temples,
but it’s in their minds.
In Jaffna, and the post-war North and East, any reference to struggle is overshadowed by the
history of the armed conflict and its disastrous consequences. Therefore, it also shuts down
the possibility of discussing struggles as a way of resolving the social problems. This might
also be related to the visible and massive military presence and the widespread surveillance,
which confronts the idea of any notion of independent organising.
Mr. Chandrabose then touched on the politically sensitive issues militarization and the
presence of a mostly Sinhala police force after the war:
If a man from our community runs off with their [Vellalar] woman, they can’t do
anything. Because the Sinhala police is here. … If it was the Tamil police, they would
ask the man and woman to separate. We don’t need Tamils rights, first we need the
rights for our community and we need to end caste oppression.
Mr. Chandrabose’s comments about the police speak to the devolution debate in Sri Lanka
and the demand for police powers to the Provincial Council. Since the 1980s a constitutional
political solution to the ethnic conflict demanded considerable autonomy to the Northern and
Eastern Provinces. The Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13th Amendment to the Constitution
instituted the Provincial Councils with various powers. However, police powers were not
devolved to the Provinces during the war. And in the post-war context, one of the Tamil
nationalist demands is to devolve police powers to the Provinces, so that a Provincial Police
Force consisting mainly of Tamil police officers could be responsible for security. In this
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context, Mr. Chandrabose is questioning the possible caste mind-set of such a Tamil police
force and making a connection between caste and devolved state power.
Mr. Chandrabose mentioned historical parallels of how it is in the interests of the
oppressed castes to make alliances with outside actors given the Vellalar moves to deprive as
well as socially and economically exclude the oppressed caste communities. He said
American missionaries were more inclusive than Vellalar officials, and he justified the
conversion to Christianity in the past to get jobs from the missionaries. This repudiation of
Hinduism as a way of caste oppression is not new. The Indian anti-caste leader Ambedkar
called for conversion to Buddhism.
The solution that Mr. Chandrabose proposes is that of the social consciousness and
economic autonomy for the oppressed castes.
If there is economic advancement caste issues will decrease. If the upper castes
dominate politics, caste problem will not decrease. … We have to realize that he
depends on our labor for his production. If our people don’t go to labor, will he be
able to plant his crops? No, he can’t. But our people have to become conscious of
that, but our people think he is giving us work. Until our community gains
consciousness he will remain the mudalali [overseer], and our people won’t become
mudalalis [overseers].
These political views of Mr. Chandrabose come out of decades of experience first as an anticaste activist and then as a local political leader of a party. His language is one that speaks to
his community. As with his comments about his people become mudalalis [overseers] or
getting jobs, they are not necessarily about emancipation, but rather in some minimal way
meeting the economic power of the Vellalar. The EPDP, his party also does not aspire
towards social transformation, rather it is merely attempting to build a social base through
patronage. Those are also the limitations of anti-caste politics in contemporary times.
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In day to day interactions, Mr. Chandrabose is always matter of fact, he does not talk
too much, as he is always running around with one errand or another assisting people. His
speech is also not very clear as he mumbles. But as the interview progressed on that day, and
he began talking more and more about caste, his articulation was powerful. His interview that
day also reflected the moment. By 2014, the post-war economic crisis was all too clear and
his community was in a dire situation. There is a sense of desperation in his words about the
economic future and the political possibilities.

Women, Land and Caste
I now turn to Suganthy (pseudonym), whom my research assistant had met with and
was impressed by her courage.186 Most single women refused requests for interviews when
my research assistant approached them. My research assistant, herself not much younger than
most of these women, explained to me that they did not want their stories to come out into the
public, and feared the interview will bring further social stigma and shame. We wanted to
talk to such women, because of the high number of single mothers with dependents and the
economic difficulties such women faced.
Suganthy is a thirty year old mother of two children, though with her thin frame, she
could have passed for an eighteen year old. She was separated from her husband and lived in
a small temporary house, a shack made of a combination of mud walls and tin sheets, on the
land of her husband’s aunt who was sympathetic to her plight. She lives deep into the
oppressed caste ward in Pathemany.
Suganthy, a daughter of a mason, grew up in another village. In her late teens she
eloped with a relative, a man slightly older than her and came to live in Pathemany. Eloping
with her husband meant her relationship with her own family had severed and she could not
186

Interviewed on 14 May 2014.
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expect any support from them. A few years into her marriage, she started going for kuli work
to strengthen their household finances and also because her husband had a few unmarried
sisters and he had to get them married. It is the duty of the male sibling to find the dowry to
make sure his sisters are married off. She said, how initially going to kuli work was difficult,
but then she got used to such work. She described her working day:
I wake up at 5:00 or 5:30 am and finish all the housework by 7:30 or 8 am. I give my
children their breakfast and also get their lunch ready and then I go to work. It is
mostly work of weeding and harvesting, depending on crops like beet roots, onions
and chilies. Morning wages are Rs. 300 (US$ 2.30) and afternoon another Rs. 300
(US$ 2.30), to total Rs. 600 (US$ 4.60). It used to be a total of Rs. 300 (US$ 2.30)
and then Rs 500 (US$ 3.85), [but] as prices increased wages were increased. People
come in search of kuli workers, and they tell us, how many people they need, and we
go as a group. Then when I come home, I cook dinner. We get breakfast at work and
if we stay there for onion digging work, we get lunch. We also get tea in the late
morning and again in the afternoon. … It is mostly women who are married and older
than me that go for kuli work. They won’t send young unmarried daughters for such
work.
While she lived with her husband, he did not like her to go for kuli work in the Vellala ward,
but after they separated and as kuli work reduced in the oppressed caste ward among the few
landowning farmers, she now mainly goes for work in the Vellala ward. The gardens of
people she works on are some who have their own land, and others are those who have rented
lands for farming. Suganthy’s expenses are less than most families, because she has only
small children:
I have small children, so the food cost is less, so it costs about Rs. 350 (US$ 2.70) to
Rs. 400 (US$ 3.00) a day. My husband has to pay alimony of Rs. 7,500 (US$ 58) [per
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month]. He mostly pays it. Last month I would have only worked ten days. I get the
support of my aunt to look after my children, when I work, which is a big help.
Like many people in the oppressed caste ward of Pathemany, housing land is important for
her. She mentioned her earnings and efforts to buy land:
I have two lachams of land in Changanai. But I don’t go there as wages for kuli work
are low there. I have taken a self-employment loan for 1 lakh (Rs 100,000, US$ 769)
and I have put it aside to buy a piece of land here. But that will cost about Rs. 3 or 3.5
lakhs (Rs. 300,000 or 350,000, US$ 2,300 or 2,700). I am trying to save some more to
buy that land. I also have to keep paying the interest from the loan.
Suganthy’s family having severed relations after she eloped, have re-established relations and
given her some land. However, the two lachams of land from her family is not suitably placed
to access even a meagre livelihood. She wants to stabilise her life by gaining housing land in
her vicinity.
Suganthy like most rural women in Jaffna has taken loans and also participates in a
community savings scheme called seetu. In Jaffna, seetu is a system of pooled savings where
each month a small amount is added by all members of the group, and when an individual
needs a lump sum they can take it but continue paying the monthly payment.
She talked about the other women who work with her and her interaction at the courts
when she first got her alimony:
The other women who come to work with me are married. They have young
daughters who are unmarried, so they need money. … When my husband first left me,
it took time before the court case and he had to start paying alimony. At the courts,
there are so many women like me. When I first went, I went there crying, and then
saw so many women like me. They are also going for work, some for kuli work,
others work in shops. We all talk about our difficulties and then leave.
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Around the time I was interviewing her, many people in Pathemany were starting to talk
about the Atchuvely Industrial Zone, and I asked her if she is also thinking of such work
given the decreasing amount of kuli work. She was indifferent. She said if the work they
provide is flexible and allows her to take care of her children by getting home on time, then
she could take such work. Industrial work, will provide regular incomes without having to
work on Vellalar land. However, for single mothers like Suganthy even such work will have
its challenges given her dependants.
Almost two years after I had interviewed Suganthy in early 2016, I heard from my
contacts in Pathemany that Suganthy had purchased a small plot of land. However, that plot
of land was in the Vellala quarter, bordering the oppressed caste quarter. In recent years, the
Vellalar do sell their land to oppressed caste individuals, particularly in the context of the
mass migration by the Vellalar. In the past, there would have been far more pressure on any
Vellalar person who considered selling the land to an oppressed caste person, including the
threat of ostracism.
In any event, such caste prejudice continues, and in the case of Suganthy, her
neighbors have written a petition to the Electricity Board claiming her plot of land should not
qualify for an electricity connection because it is not on the land register connecting with an
official address for the lane. She has to get the bureaucracy to sort her papers and depending
on the local officer, who is likely to be a Vellala person, this process may take months if not
years. In the past, the Vellala community may have used violence to chase away those
oppressed caste individuals who move into their caste quarter, but in contemporary times
subtle forms of pressures, including petitions to officials perpetuate social exclusion.
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Caste Oppression, Resistance and Violence
In Jaffna, older oppressed caste men involved in anti-caste struggles in the 1960s and
early 1970s, either avoid speaking about those struggles or spoke of them as belonging to a
distant past with little relevance now.187 Perhaps after the armed struggle, the many
massacres and the heavy presence of the military and police in the region, they can’t imagine
the space for any struggle. Furthermore, their caste struggles are now considered irrelevant
and insignificant in the public sphere, given the tremendous destruction the Tamil society had
experienced with the war.
In Jaffna, I have heard of a few incidents of spontaneous acts of violence by
oppressed caste individuals against upper caste individuals, and they have not led to the same
repercussions against the oppressed caste community as it would have happened before the
war. Indeed, before the war, an act of violence and even an insult by an oppressed caste
individual against a Vellala individual would have led to major retribution against the
concerned oppressed caste village by Vellala backed thugs.
In this context, a recent caste problem in northern Jaffna, in October 2016 gains
significance. It was triggered by the Vellalar community in Punallaikatuvan village trying to
re-establish a cemetery right in the middle of a neighboring oppressed caste villaged called
Thidatpulam. The developments with this caste conflict may reflect the changing dynamics of
caste relations after regime change in January 2015, and the attendant changes to social
mobilisations.
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In September 2016, with the support of the New Democratic Marxist Leninist Party, the offshoot of the
Communist Party in the 1970s, I visited the villages of Nitchamam, Kanpolai and Puttur. The field visits were in
preparation for a presentation on contemporary caste issues for a conference organised by the Mass Movement
for Social Justice in Jaffna. These three villages were the sites of major caste struggles in the 1960s and 1970s,
and the oppressed caste community had made major gains through those struggles including access to land
(Senthivel 2009). Even those aligned with this party could not find people to talk about those caste struggles,
and were hardly encouraging of the visits, as they felt the people in the village did not want to revisit that
history.
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I first heard about caste in Punallaikatuwan when I interviewed Ragavan188, one of the
founding members of the LTTE, who left the organisation after ten years and became a strong
critic of its politics. In that lengthy interview, at the height of the last phase of the war in
2009, Ragavan began with one of his earliest memories of his village Punallaikatuvan.
There was a man called Thuraisingam, an upper caste man and a Chandiyan (a local
village thug), my mother told me that he murdered a man long ago. He also owned
land and the Dalits (oppressed caste people) were the service caste and they would
work for him. At that time, I was about six or seven years old, in the early 1960s, and
one day, there was some problem with the Dalits, possibly because they didn’t want to
work as he hadn’t paid them properly. The outcome was that the entire Dalit
community was chased away from my village. … And it took them a long time before
they could come back and resettle.189
A few years after the incident mentioned by Ragavan, the Central Government in 1969
created a housing settlement of 40 landless oppressed caste families from a neighboring
village called Evinay onto state land adjacent to the cementry used by the Vellalar in
Punnalaikattuwan. The oppressed caste people of this new village, Thidatpulam, continued to
work as waged labor and share crop on the large lands owned by the Vellalar from
Punnalaikattuwan. In 1982, there was another caste problem, culminating in thugs from
Punnalaikattuwan murdering two youth from Thidatpulam, leaving a deep scar and fear
among its residents to this day.
The cemetery was not used during the war, and with the population of Thidatpulam
having increased to 180 families, about nine families had encroached and built houses on the
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His movement name in the LTTE.
Ragavan (2009) ‘Interview with Ragavan on Tamil Militancy (Early Years)’. Kafila, 16 February 2006.
[Downloaded 27 November 2016: https://kafila.online/2009/02/16/interview-with-ragavan-on-tamil-militancypart-i/] Ragavan who is also active with some progressive Tamil diaspora forums uses the term “Dalit” that has
been borrowed by some progressive diaspora writers who follow developments in India.
189
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cemetery land. After the war, the Vellalar have resumed the use of the cemetery, creating
tensions as the cemetery and the burning pyres pollutes the neighborhood. A confrontation
ensued, and the Vellalar brought about 30 thugs, who camped out in the cemetery and built a
high wall around the cemetery blocking the main entrance to a few of the houses. One night,
the Sana Samuha Nilayam (Community Center) of Thidatpulam was also defiled by smearing
engine oil presumably by those Vellalar-backed thugs. While the residents of Thidatpulam
found it difficult to unite their village against the Vellalar as many of them either work as
wage labor or sharecrop on the lands owned by the Vellalar, the attack on their Sana Samuha
Nilayam created a sense of urgency and united them. The residents of Thidatpulam have
appealed to various state officials and the police, but action is not forthcoming.
In discussions with the Mass Movement for Social Justice, the oppressed caste
villagers said they believe the police have been bribed and the state officials are partial
considering they mostly belong to the Vellala caste. While there is palpable fear relating to
the 1982 killings as consequences in the past for confronting the Vellalar, the villagers are
defiant and believe they have the support of neighboring oppressed caste villages. They said,
they told the Vellala thugs, if you kill one of us, we will kill one of you.
The caste conflict in Thidatpulam is reflective of the changing dynamics of caste
relations in post-war Jaffna, with possibly the the reemergence of overt and violent caste
conflicts. However, this is the first major caste confrontation of this nature that I have heard
of in recent years and it is too early to say, whether regime change, the loosening of military
repression and the increasing space for protests, signals a shift in caste confrontations.
In general, the space for organised violence and resistance has been muted in the postwar years. Resistance with force, which is what my interlocutors consider to be “struggle”, is
much more difficult after the war, with the large military camps, extensive surveillance and
widespread police presence. However, the state structures at the district and local levels are
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represented by Tamil officials, who are mainly of Vellala caste. They perpetuate caste
discrimination through their administrative interventions, but not through overt violence. For
example, oppressed caste quarters are rarely provided rural roads, access to water and street
lighting.190 Therefore, even if the oppressed caste communities may now have the courage to
challenge physical threats from the Vellalar landowners, they lack the wherewithal to
confront the Vellalar officials dominating state structures.

Towards an Analysis of the Contemporary Dynamics of Caste Relations
Analysing caste relations in contemporary Jaffna is difficult due to the public silence
on caste during the war and continuing into the post-war era. The current silence is a
consequence of the near absence of an oppressed caste movement. Furthermore, there is
suppression of anti-caste discourse with Tamil nationalist discourse dominating the public
sphere. Indeed, Tamil nationalists argue that the priority is to achieve self-determination for
the Tamil nation first and then address the internal contradictions such as caste. Many upper
caste academics in Jaffna deny the existence of caste oppression in contemporary Jaffna, and
claim that discussing caste in public, including its history would bring back caste and divide
Tamil society.191 In this context, the oppressed castes are also responding to caste exclusion
through a strategy of non-confrontation and educational progress.
Historically, landed relations were central to caste structure in Jaffna, and the return to
land after the war, and changes to land as a productive asset are shaping contemporary caste
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I have noticed this in many villages. But I have a clear understanding of the workings of the state machinery
from the problems faced by Maruthapuram village, in Karainagar in Jaffna, where I was part of a fisheries
research project. It was only after the war that they were able to even get road connectivity to their village, and
water service and street lighting are still denied to them among a host of grievances relating to state services.
The villagers of Maruthapuram have also protested in front of the Divisional Secretariat, the bureaucratic center
in their region, but progress on issues such as state services in water, housing and street lighting move at an
extremely slow pace compared to other villages.
191
Both during initial meetings with academics at Jaffna University in the sociology and geography
departments, and in public forums involving retired academics, they discouraged me from pursuing research on
caste and dismissed the importance of caste relations in contemporary Jaffna society.
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relations. The spatial politics of caste relate to the location of houses, of temples and of
schools and their proximity to caste wards in the village. Furthermore, caste is reproduced
through social exclusion in schools, job opportunities and the caste demographics of
migration and the related remittance economy.

Caste in Social Institutions
I argue that even if landed productive relations are not strengthened, the caste
structure is not weakening. Rather, the very political economic processes that have been
weakening landed relations are resulting in new forms of social exclusion leading to the
consolidation of caste relations. Such strengthening of caste is tied to the workings of the
social institutions.
Temples continue to be important institutions for the persistence of caste. And their
spatial location in each caste ward and the membership that sustains them is significant for
caste relations. Much of the social investment in the post-war context has been in temples,
and considerable amount of that capital comes from the Diaspora, creating a link between
migration, remittances and the consolidation of caste in Jaffna. Migrant remittances are tied
to forms of pride in the family and caste, and investment in temples has become the
expression of social power. Indeed, belonging to a caste group and a temple, draw on the
spatial differences that characterised social power in the pre-war decades. Furthermore, while
there were major battles for temple entry in the 1960s confronting such social power, there
are few such confrontations in contemporary times; oppressed caste people are now less and
less interested in making their presence felt in upper caste temples. The social dynamic now
is of each caste group investing in its own temple and each caste community worshiping in
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their temples192 and reproducing caste differences projected as community differences in each
locality, rather than confronting such differences as forms of caste oppression.
In addition to temples, other social institutions such as schools and Sana Samuha
Nilyam (community centers) are institutions that affect people’s everyday social life. Given
that oppressed caste communities have the right to attend schools or teach in schools, there
are subtle forms of exclusion where the Vellala caste avoids schools with oppressed caste
children, by enrolling their children in urban schools. Furthermore, the Sana Samuha
Nilayam by their proximity and linkage to the temples are inherently caste institutions, which
through the pre-schools they run begin social exclusion by caste when children first enter
public spaces.
Such social exclusion is further reinforced in marriage. Inter-caste marriage can lead
to the concerned individuals, particularly of the upper caste being disowned, and not
receiving the property normally passed down to the next generation. Marriage and dowry are
important for property relations, and impinge on household assets, which provide
disincentives for inter-caste marriage. In any event, the imposition of arranged marriage is
very strong. Even in the cases where youth find their own partners, such partners are also
chosen to avoid the repercussions of inter-caste marriage. The continuing importance of
dowry property in the marriage institution ensures segregation through caste based marriage.

Caste in Spatial Relations of Employment and Social Access
Land ownership gains a spatial significance with the location of houses within the
caste geography of villages. Where do you live, in which part of the village? Which temple or
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One argument that is put forward is that the war-time trauma is leading people to invest in and become
involved in temples. Furthermore, that is the reason for the oppressed caste communities getting involved in
their temples. The analysis of psycho-social concerns while they may contribute to this dynamic, is beyond the
scope of my research.
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Sana Samuha Nilayam do you go to? These are crucial questions for the recognition of caste
position. And through such recognition, caste plays its role in access to education and jobs.
The web of community activities, the recognition of peoples’ caste locations and
kinship ties extend beyond the village, and the caste structure then reproduces itself in
employment and education. There have been a number of controversial rejections of
oppressed caste principal and teacher appointments in upper caste dominated schools;
protests and petitions against such appointments of principals and teachers are mobilised by
upper caste village bodies and old student associations. Therefore, in educational
appointments in particular, there are increasing cases of caste exclusion.
Industrial work is considered to be one possibility of exiting the caste relations tied to
land. There was much expectation of jobs for example with the Atchuvely Industrial Zone,
which can provide regular incomes and better wages. However, such industrial jobs may not
be able to completely escape caste relations as they are still embedded within Tamil society,
where owners, managers and engineers are likely to be Vellalar. Moreover, there is a
gendered dimension to the accessibility of such industrial work. Indeed, social reproduction is
contingent on a number of factors including spatial and temporal issues. The location of
work, the hours of work and the priority of taking care of dependents will be an economic
calculation for women who choose wage labor and domestic work in Vellala farms and
homes. The larger economic pressures on war affected women as they attempt to survive the
various challenges of caring for dependents while eking out a livelihood may draw them
deeper into caste relations.
State institutions which not only provide jobs but also a range of state services are
disproportionately populated by the Vellalar. And caste prejudice reflects neglect in the
delivery of state services to oppressed caste wards. The Muslim community which is outside
caste relations also complains of such discrimination by Tamil bureaucrats in Jaffna
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following their return after the war; that is two decades after their eviction by the LTTE in
1990.193

Dispossession, Social Exclusion and the State
The entire population of Jaffna is affected by the post war onslaught of the market and
financialisation resulting in widespread indebtedness and dispossession. However, the
dynamics of dispossession are such that the more socially vulnerable, the oppressed caste
communities in the case of Jaffna, are the heaviest hit as they lack significant remittances
from the Tamil diaspora in the Western countries. Here, oppressed caste women, and
particularly if they are single women with dependents, carry a major social burden, and the
process of dispossession can be devastating.
The subtle character of caste oppression in contemporary Jaffna is one reason why the
process of consolidation of caste relations is not as evident. Caste relations in Jaffna are not
characterised by atrocities as is the case in many parts of India (Teltumde 2010). Rather,
caste exclusion in Jaffna is perpetuated by stealth. Furthermore, repression by the security
apparatus including the army and police also have a caste character, to the extent that an
upper caste individual is more likely to access officials and lawyers, and is less likely in the
post-war context to be physically attacked by local gangs believed to be controlled by
military intelligence. Caste struggles, if they emerge again in the future, will have to
challenge the workings of state power in support of caste structure, particularly thorugh the
workings of the Vellalar dominated bureaucracy in the Tamil regions. If the powers of the
Government in Colombo are curtailed through further devolution, the devolved powers are
likely to strengthen the Vellalar dominated administration in the Northern Province.

193

I have been involved in organizing a number of meetings on Tamil-Muslim relations in Jaffna town, and
Muslims have mentioned such discrimination as the cause of lack of access to the housing schemes and
infrastructural neglect of the Muslim quarters in Jaffna town.
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The role of the state and its policies with respect to caste exclusion in the future are
likely to be significant. Indeed, from the Social Disabilities Act of 1957 condemning caste to
the support given to the co-operatives in the 1970s were enabling developments to confront
caste exclusion. Next, the forms of politics that emerge in response to the processes of
dispossession and social exclusion will be significant. Would a new political actor emerge
with an emancipatory vision for the oppressed castes much like the role played by the
Communist Party in the 1960s? Or would it be the continuation of patronage oriented parties
like the EPDP which have managed to capture the social base of oppressed castes? How will
any new political formation challenge the politics of the TNA dominating Tamil politics? The
TNA is not only narrowly nationalist, but also caste conscious, but the question is whether
the oppressed caste communities can mobilise their large voter base to change the nationalist
political trajectory.
The demographic changes with migration to form the large Tamil diaspora have
possibly brought the numerical strength of the oppressed castes on par with the Vellalar in
many regions, and political mobilisation and the revival of an anti-caste movement can
drastically shape politics in Jaffna. However, that would also require the Tamil population
and the oppressed caste communities coming to terms with the disastrous armed conflict and
the legacy of the Tamil Tigers. It is through an ideological critique of the Tamil nationalism
that has dominated the political imagination in Jaffna and the North that the space can be
created for a progressive anti-caste politics.
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CHAPTER 5
Cooperatives and Alternative Visions of Reconstruction

In the growth of co-operation in Ceylon, Jaffna can justly be proud of blazing many a
trail. The first Co-operative Central Bank was set up in Jaffna: so was the first Cooperative Hospital at Moolai – perhaps the first of its kind in the world. The first
successful Co-operative Marketing Society in Ceylon was the Jaffna – Malayalam
Co-operative Sales Society Ltd. The first Co-operative Union for Agricultural
producers was the one in the Northern Division. The first Harbour Services Union and
the first District Fisheries Union were also later set up in Jaffna. Amongst these
numerous ‘firsts’ an outstanding success was the creation of the Northern Division
Co-operative Federation (the first regional Union) which was registered in 1937. It
covered the Northern and Eastern Provinces (Kurukulasuriya, 1971, 78-79).

Hence the Ten Hour Bill was not only a great practical success; it was the victory of a
principle; it was the first time that in broad daylight the political economy of the
middle class succumbed to the political economy of the working class. But there was
in store a still greater victory for the political economy of labor over the political
economy of property. We speak of the cooperative movement, especially the
cooperative factories raised by the unassisted efforts of a few bold ‘hands’. The value
of these great social experiments cannot be overrated. – Karl Marx, Inaugural
Address of the Working Men’s Association (Marx 2010, 79)
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Introduction
If the war-torn northern economy is in crisis, what can be recovered from its past to
reconstruct a future for its people? In this Chapter, I address the rise and decline of the cooperatives. The history of the co-operative movement in Jaffna and Sri Lanka more broadly
reaches back to the early twentieth century. The British colonial government initiated and
then nurtured co-operatives as part of its agricultural policy and then for distribution of
essential items during the Second World War. By Independence in 1948, co-operatives had
become widespread and gained an important place in the economy. In the late 1950s and into
the 1970s, left-leaning governments committed to import substitution strengthened cooperatives to boost rural development.
The history of co-operatives in Jaffna finds its place in my research for a number
reasons. First, co-operative development was tied to the advances in both formal and informal
education in Jaffna. The second connection is between co-operatives and credit, with the cooperative movement itself initiated through credit co-operatives by the British. The third
connection is with caste, with the leadership coming from Vellala upper caste communities.
However, with the emergence of producer co-operatives, particularly those formed for casterelated occupations such as fisheries and toddy tapping, co-operatives also became
institutions for advancing the interests of certain middle and oppressed castes.
In analysing the co-operative movement, I address their deterioration with the war, the
pressures they are now facing with market oriented reconstruction policies and the continuing
obstacles placed by Tamil nationalist politics indifferent to their rejuvenation. While I realize
that co-operatives cannot solve the economic crisis in the war-torn North, I articulate the
importance of co-operatives in constructing an alternative development vision and plan. I
further analyse the tension between state support for the revitalisation of co-operatives in a
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post-war society and the historically problematic relationship between the state and cooperatives.
I begin this chapter with a discussion of the history of national level policies on the
development of co-operatives in Sri Lanka and then move to a discussion of the emergence of
a powerful co-operative movement in Jaffna and more broadly the north. I then discuss the
contemporary workings of the fisher and palm development co-operatives, two of the most
vibrant producer co-operatives in Jaffna to this day. Following a discussion of the broader
contemporary challenges for co-operatives in Jaffna, I address the contradictions of state
support for co-operatives through a discussion of Marx’s interventions on co-operatives. My
discussion of co-operatives will argue that the legacy, institutional memory and wide
presensence of co-operatives to this day in Jaffna provide ideas and possibilities for an
alternative vision of reconstruction.

The Growth of Co-operatives in Sri Lanka, 1911 - 1977
By the late nineteenth century, indebtedness and defaults on taxes by farmers in Sri
Lanka had led to calls on the colonial government to address the agricultural crisis. These
pressures and subsequent interventions by the Governor, Sir Henry Blake, led to the
formation of the Ceylon Agricultural Society in October 1904, with the Governor as
President and a Board nominated by the Governor (Paramothayan 1990, 50). While this
institution was created with a view to enhance paddy cultivation and increase productivity as
well as to address indebtedness, further agitations called for the implementation of cooperative credit banks along the model instituted in India in 1904.
The new Governor, Sir Henry MacCallum appointed a Committee of Investigation
called the Agricultural Banks Committee in 1909. On the basis of its recommendations, The
Ceylon Co-operative Credit Societies Ordinance No. 7 was passed in the Legislative Council
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in 1911 (Paramothayan 1990, 50-52). These credit societies became critical to address rural
indebtedness and to strengthen farmers; while borrowings were necessary for farmers the
interest rates were much lower than charged by the rural traders ensuring the farmers could
repay their loans and not fall into permanent indebtedness.
The rapid increase in the scale of co-operatives in the entire island, however, only
came with the major push by the colonial government in 1942. The British centralised
distribution of essential items and rationed goods in Ceylon, due to the Second World War
shortages, particularly as the war with Japan escalated in South East Asia. This war-time
colonial policy led to the tremendous increase in the formation of consumer co-operative
societies and their membership in the country.

Co-operatives at Independence
Soon after Independence, the Reserve Bank of India sent one of its Chief Officers in
October 1948 to gain insights by studying the co-operative movement in Sri Lanka (Reserve
Bank of India 1948). That study, titled, ‘Co-operation in Ceylon’ is an important historical
record of the state of co-operatives in Sri Lanka at Independence.
The co-operative movement which had a membership of just 7 percent of the
population in 1942 had reached two-thirds of the population by 1947. In 1946-1947, there
were 6,521 co-operative societies with 1.1 million members and a working capital of Rs 33.2
million (Reserve Bank of India 1948, 11). The population of Sri Lanka at that time was 6.8
million and in 1946-1947 the government current expenditure and capital expenditure were
Rs 448.3 million and Rs 57.3 million respectively (World Bank 1953, 193-196). Thus the
working capital of the co-operative movement was equivalent to 7% and to 58% of the
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colonial government’s current and capital expenditure respectively during the final years
under British colonialism.194
Reviewing the tremendous increase in co-operatives in the 1940s, the Reserve Bank
of India claimed every village in Ceylon had a co-operative and that it was now a “live
issue”, though co-operation in the country was mainly with consumer co-operatives (Reserve
Bank of India 1948, 11). This positive assessment was due to the creation of a system of
rationing and distribution of essential items, particularly with the expansion of consumer cooperatives. The question inevitably arises whether the colonial expansion of co-operatives for
war-time distributional purposes could be sustained after the war in post-colonial Sri Lanka.
The World Bank Mission in the early 1950s also evaluated the state of co-operatives.
It emphasized the expansion of agriculture and stressed the importance of co-operatives for
that task:
Ceylon is fortunate in possessing a well-developed and vigorous cooperative
movement. It furnishes leadership and guidance in the solution of many agrarian
problems, such as effective utilization of existing resources and the introduction of
improved methods of cultivation. Cooperatives provide a large share of agricultural
credit on reasonable terms. They also perform an important educative role, both in
training of local leaders and in quickening the awareness of the peasant... (World
Bank 1953, 58)
The World Bank considered the co-operatives to be organising institutions for agricultural
expansion, which it recommended for the dry zone with irrigation and colonization schemes.
The World Bank also discussed the issue of exploitation of rural producers such as
small cultivators and fishermen by village traders and money lenders. It went on to

194

The co-operatives running costs are compared with government expenditure as GDP figure are not readily
available; even in the early 1950s the GDP figures are not reliable (World Bank 1953).
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recommend the doubling of the number of credit, marketing and producer co-operatives to
address such exploitation. It also discussed the possibilities of co-operatives providing longterm loans of up to 30 years to relieve those farmers who are tremendously indebted to
money lenders.
The co-operative credit societies had doubled in membership in the 11 years before
the World Bank mission. The World Bank recorded that the co-operatives advanced loans to
members on reasonable terms between 6% and 9% per annum, with limits to individual
members of around Rs. 200-300. Furthermore, most loans were “productive” and used for
cultivation with only less than 4% of “unproductive” loans used for ceremonies and
repayment of old debts (World Bank 1953, 199). In this way, the co-operatives were
considered indispensable institutions for the rural economy soon after Independence.

Postcolonial Expansion of Co-operatives
The left leaning regime of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike came to power in 1956 supported
by a strong rural power base, and it initiated another phase of co-operative expansion. The
Minister of Agriculture and Food, Philip Gunawardena, promoted a stronger role for the state
utilising co-operatives in the rural economy. Gunawardena believed co-operatives had both a
faulty ideology and a faulty structure, of serving the interests of selected groups of people
with a multiplicity of single-purpose societies in a village (Royal Commission 1969). His
concerns according to a policy directive to the Co-operative Department in the late 1950s was
that in less developed countries co-operatives are active partners of the state in national
development, however, in the process parochial interests of various groups are advanced
(Royal Commission 1969). Therefore in the late 1950s, Gunawardena put forward a program
of rural development through Multi-Purpose Co-operative Societies (MPCS) to assist the
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state’s economic development agenda. In particular, he envisaged a rural development plan
with an ambitious programme of developing entire villages.
The MPCS was conceived as a society which carried on consumer services as well as
agricultural credit, supply of marketing and, wherever possible labor contracts for the
execution of village works. By the end of 1960 there were 4,741 multipurpose cooperative societies. … The Minister who introduced the multipurpose co-operative
societies gave the multipurpose unions a monopoly in the wholesale distribution of
rice, flour and sugar. … It was intended that the unions would be able to make a
substantial profit on the monopoly trade and thereby augment their capital. This
actually happened for a while but the margins allowed on the monopoly commodities
were gradually reduced by the Government (Royal Commission 1969, 34 - 36).
In this way, Gunawardena’s vision had a lasting impact of centralising the co-operatives and
creating further dependence on the state. This role for the state in co-operation were further
consolidated during the tenure of the left-leaning governments between 1960 – 1965 and then
again 1970 – 1977.
The consolidation of co-operative banking had a major impact on the co-operative
movement as a whole. Gunawardena’s proposal in the late 1950s for a centralised cooperative development bank with state support was realised with the formation of the
People’s Bank in 1961. The People’s Bank amalgamated the capital in various rural cooperative banks. While the People’s Bank was to benefit co-operatives through co-operative
representation on the board, in reality, it took on the characteristics of a state-owned
commercial bank. The older Bank of Ceylon was also nationalised around the same time, and
the People’s Bank was seen by its General Manager in the 1960s as a rival to the Bank of
Ceylon in commercial banking (de Livera 2000).
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In retrospect, state led centralisation of co-operative banking undermined the cooperative movement. The centralised operations of the People’s Bank did provide financial
support for the co-operatives through its rural branch offices, its vast network of agents and
its New Agricultural Credit Scheme for rural development. However, when the left was
defeated in 1977, one of the first attacks on egalitarian social institutions was against cooperative banking. The mandate of the People’s Bank was changed, removing the
relationship to the co-operatives, and it became pure and simple a state owned commercial
bank.
Next, consumer co-operatives became increasingly dependent on the state,
particularly with the distribution of rations and subsidies to the public through MPCS and
other co-operative stores. While co-operatives are enhanced through state subsidies and
banking support, the left-leaning governments went much further in centralising and
strengthening the hold of the state over the co-operatives. The left governments at that time
assumed they were on the path to socialism and created a long-term plan of rural
development.
In India, it was rent-seeking within the co-operative movement that led to its
decline.195 Whereas in in Sri Lanka, when a pro-business right wing Government came to
power in the late 1970s, it was the earlier centralisation and state control that enabled the
usurping of co-operative resources as with the capital of the co-operative banks and the
undermining of consumer co-operatives through the sudden withdrawal of state support. The
Sri Lankan case raises important questions about the trade-offs between the advantages of

According to Singh: “In India, traditional cooperatives were mostly registered under the respective State
Cooperative Societies Acts. But due to political interference, corruption, elite capture, and similar issues, the
cooperatives soon lost their vibrancy and became known for their poor efficiency and loss-making ways. Now,
government support to these cooperatives is declining, though gradually and selectively. At the same time, they
face higher competition due to privatisation and liberalisation policies. The new environment, however,
provides new opportunities for cooperatives due to state withdrawal and deregulation.” (Singh 2008)
195
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economies of scale that come with state led federation of co-operatives and the disadvantages
of the membership losing control of the co-operatives.

Historical Vitality of Co-operatives in Jaffna
It is the business of the International Working Men’s Association to combine and
generalize the spontaneous movements of the working classes, but not dictate or
impose any doctrinary system whatever. The Congress should, therefore, proclaim no
special system of cooperation, but limit itself to the enunciation of a few general
principles. …
We recommend to all cooperative societies to convert one part of their joint income
into a fund for propagating their principles by example as well as by precept, in other
words, by promoting the establishment of new cooperative fabrics, as well as by
teaching and preaching. – Karl Marx, Instructions for the Delegates of the Geneva
Congress in 1867 (Marx 2000, 90)
While the co-operative movement in Sri Lanka was considered extensive and strong,
the reach, breadth and strength of co-operatives in Jaffna was of another order. It is in Jaffna
that producer co-operatives with their deeper organisational structure and symbiotic
relationship with credit, marketing and consumer co-operatives thrived. In this section, I
explore the rich history of co-operation created by a particular set of factors, both the social
history of Jaffna and its social and economic links with other parts of the world.
In 1926, when a separate Co-operative Department was formed taking away cooperatives from the Agricultural Department, the Registrar of Co-operatives in Jaffna took up
a strategy of recruiting local leaders for federated co-operative structures and encouraging
these wealthier individuals, some of them former state officials to put their own capital into
the co-operatives credit societies (Paramothayan 1990, 61-63). In the 1930s, a range of
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marketing and producer co-operatives emerged with the proliferation of the co-operative
concept with the new co-operative leadership encouraging different workers to form cooperatives. It was this experimentation with and the emergence of innovative producer cooperatives that instilled a deeper co-operative culture.
The vibrancy of educational institutions in Jaffna and the highly literate culture
contributed to co-operation. In particular, the presence of teachers and principals as well as
retired public servants including those who had returned from working in Malaysia provided
a pool of willing co-operative leaders in Jaffna.196 The particular characteristics of the Jaffna
economy discussed in Chapter 2 also contributed to co-operation; high population density
with small holding agriculture and high levels of literacy was conducive for co-operative
organising.
One of the most interesting co-operative initiatives was the marketing of tobacco in
the subcontinent. The Jaffna Malayalam Tobacco Co-operative Sales Society was initiated in
1934. It functioned by notifying its members of the current market prices for the different
grades of tobacco, classifying the tobacco and paying the cultivators an average of 60 percent
of the market price as an advance. On completion of all export and sales transactions the
members were paid the balance due to them. This society was not only the first of its kind in
Sri Lanka exporting to another country, it illustrated the vast potential for co-operation in the
Northern Province, especially in the area of member-education and participation. The growth
of its membership and capital over the first fifteen years of operation was a major boost to not
only the tobacco growers but also the co-operative movement as a whole (Paramothayan
1990, 140).
196

According to Paramothayan, this tradition of co-operation beginning in the 1920s continued into the 1970s:
“An examination of two large and well respected Multi-Purpose Cooperative Societies in Jaffna (Alaveddy
MPCS and Chavakacheri MPCS) showed that between 1971 and 1978 teachers constituted 39 percent and 41
percent respectively of all members of the Executive Committee. … On the whole the majority of committee
members of cooperative societies or unions were teachers, the rest being composed largely of lawyers,
government officials, Malayan pensioners and a good many farmers.” (Paramothayan 1990, 100)
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Such an initiative in tobacco was paralleled in many other sectors. Along with the
Jaffna-Malayalam Tobacco Co-operative Sales Society, the most successful were Moolai Cooperative Hospital Society (1936), the Northern Province Fishermen’s Cooperative Union
(1959) and the Jaffna District Cooperative Harbour Services Union (1963) (Paramothayan
1990, 163). By 1970, the Co-operative structure in the North consisted of a total of 1,301
cooperative societies of which 1,259 primary societies and 42 secondary societies, under the
aegis of Northern Division Co-operative Federation (Paramothayan 1990, 143).
The Moolai Co-operative Hospital Society, despite great setbacks during the war,
including displacement and massive damage to its physical infrastructure, continues on a
smaller scale in the post-war years. It has about thirty five staff, mainly nurses with one
medical officer each on rotation during the three shifts. It serves the somewhat isolated
population in the north-west region of the Jaffna peninsula. Its main income earner now is an
elders’ home it runs, and it is struggling to rebuild after the losses and disruption during the
war.197
The important role of fisher co-operatives in leading the fishing community in the
post-war years will be discussed at length in the next section. Here it suffices to contextualize
the fisher co-operatives with the history of co-operatives in Jaffna. The Northern Province
Fishermen’s Cooperative Societies Union, the first of its kind in Sri Lanka was registered in
1959 for the purpose of facilitating the supply of fishing gear to its member societies. In
addition, it helped member societies by making advance payments on the produce sent to it
and facilitated sea food exports (Paramothayan 1990, 164).
The success of such co-operation also had a caste dimension. In the case of
agricultural co-operatives, it is the Vellala castes that gained from savings resulting from co197

I visited the Moolai Co-operative Hospital in June 2015, and it is a moving site of vast infrastructure much of
it in ruins with effects of war including shelling clearly visible. The visitors’ book preserved by its
administrative staff despite years of displacement reflects the appreciation it had during the decades of its
success. Visitors from places such as the Soviet Union and Japan had visited is back in the 1950 and 1960s.
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operative marketing. Given the numerical majority of the dominant Vellala caste in Jaffna
combined with small holding agriculture, a broad section of the population benefitted, and
not just a small elite. However, with caste exclusion in the countryside, a section of society
was completely left out of the gains from such agricultural co-operation. During my field
research in Pathemany, I found that that there was no functioning agricultural co-operative
after the war. This is also for the most part true of agricultural co-operatives more broadly in
Jaffna and that is why I am unable to write on the current state of agricultural co-operatives.
In this context, the emergence of the Palm Development Co-operatives provided a
major advance to the oppressed castes involved in toddy tapping. And the story of the toddy
tappers co-operatives emerging in the early 1970s is important not only as a unique
experiment in co-operation, but also to understand the consolidation of changes to caste
structure in Jaffna following the anti-caste struggles of the 1960s. Hence, the contemporary
concerns of the Palm Development Co-operative is discussed at length in a section below.
This rich history of co-operatives in Jaffna and their different path from co-operation
in the rest of the country requires some discussion. At the national level, particularly in the
early post-colonial decades it was state intervention and aid that promoted federated cooperatives such as the MPCS. However, in Jaffna, institutions of co-operative expansion
including of federations, marketing and banking had evolved in the early 1930s into the
1950s, and had gained a level of autonomy from the state. Such co-operatives in Jaffna
precedes the evolution of the now famous Mondragon Co-operative Corporation in Spain,
which was initiated in the mid-1950s and grew tremendously in the following decades
(Errasti et al 2003). Mondragon prioritised the four co-operatives functions of production,
distribution/marketing/retail, banking, and training along with research. By the 1940s, the
federation of co-operatives in Jaffna had all of these functions except the emphasis on
research and technology. Given that Mondragon has survived and even expanded despite
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neoliberal globalisation, the question arises whether the co-operative movement in Jaffna
could also have innovated and thrived, even amidst the open economy reforms starting in the
late 1970s, if not for the devastating civil war.

Fisher Co-operatives
Close to 20 percent of the entire Northern Province population depend on fishing for
their livelihood; this includes communities from all three religions, Hindus who form the bulk
of the northern populations, Christians concentrated in the coastal regions and Muslims,
particularly in the Mannar District. Historically, the development of fisher co-operatives
came with the food production drive during the Second World War. By 1945 there were
thirty fisher co-operative societies in the country (Kurukulasuriya 1975, 117). This interest in
developing fisheries and co-operatives continued in the 1950s, particularly with the support
of the Canadian government.
There were different models of fisher co-operatives that were attempted. One was fish
production co-operatives where the boats were owned by the co-operatives. The other was
credit and marketing co-operative societies, where the societies supplied credit and assisted
with sales and marketing. The latter, seems to have been a more successful model by the
1960s (Royal Commission 1970). In the North today, the main function of the co-operatives
continues to be that of facilitating credit and support for sales and marketing.
The efforts at promoting co-operative societies and the policies of promoting fisheries
through mechanisation and exports enhanced fisheries organisations in the North. In
September 1959, the Northern Province Fishermen’s Co-operative Societies Union was
registered, which by 1969 had 56 member societies (Kurukulasuriya 1975, 207). By the early
1960s, the Jaffna Fishermen’s Co-operative Societies Union is reported to have had a
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profitable export business mainly of bêche-de-mer (sea cucumber), conch-shells and shark
fins, contributing to the foreign exchange earnings of the country (Paramothayan 1990, 164).
Mechanisation of fisheries, including the introduction of trawling, and export of
fisheries led to considerable accumulation by the fishing community. Such accumulation also
contributed to the strengthening of the co-operatives in the 1970s into the 1980s (Bavinck
1984). By 1985, with the escalation of the armed conflict, the seas also became a site of
conflict between the various Tamil armed groups and the Sri Lankan Navy. The fishing
community caught in the crossfire suffered major losses, both loss of lives and assets.
Furthermore, the coastal communities suffered from multiple bouts of displacement. Even
when there wasn’t heavy fighting, due to the fear of infiltration, the Navy put heavy
restrictions on the hours and locations of fishing. Thus from 1985 until 2010, going to sea
itself was a dangerous and arduous task for the fishing community.

Contemporary Challenges and Fisher Co-operative Structure
After the war, the fishing community in the North is facing the major challenge of
Indian trawlers198 poaching in their waters. The trawlers from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu
are much more powerful and practice environmentally damaging bottom trawling. For the
small scale fishermen on the Northern coast, the trawlers did considerable damage by also
cutting their nets which were one of their significant assets totalling as much as a year’s
worth of income (Scholtens et al 2012).
The northern fisher-folk have mobilised their communities in powerful ways to
address these war-time and post-war challenges. Such mobilization was possible mainly due
to the co-operative infrastructure built over the decades prior to the war. The fishing

198

On the three days of the week, Mondays, Wednesdays and Saturdays, that over one thousand Indian trawlers
cross into the northern Sri Lankan waters the northern fishermen do not venture out to sea worrying that the
trawlers may destroy their nets which can be over a year’s worth of income of an average fisherman.
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community in the north is one of the few communities that has been able to dialogue with the
fishing community in the south to raise their concerns with the state. The fisheries cooperative leaders have also participated in talks and negotiations with the Indian trawler
fishermen, not to mention the organized capture of dozens of Indian trawlers poaching in
their waters in two major incidents in 2011 (Scholtens et al 2012).
The northern fishing community, though it has received little support from the Tamil
political leadership, is arguably the most organized community. Every fishing village has a
co-operative society called a sangam. Then a group of villages in a region form a small
cluster of co-operatives societies called a samasam. Finally, the clusters at the Jaffna District,
form a co-operatives federation called the samellanam. In this way, the entire fishing
community is democratically organised.
The strength of the co-operative is the society (sangam) at the village level, which
depends on the co-operative’s organizational capacity and leadership as well as the total fish
catch in that village. For example, in most co-operatives, about 5% of the total sales
auctioned by the co-operative market goes to the co-operative society to pay for its
employees and services. Therefore, if the overall catch or the prices are low, then the cooperative will also find it hard-going.
There are 207 fisheries co-operative societies in the Northern Province, and they are
all federated at the district level. Out of the Northern Province population of 1.1 million
people an estimated 200,000 people depend on fisheries for their livelihood, with close to
50,000 active fishermen, most of whom are members of fisheries co-operative societies.

Political Challenges facing Fisher Co-operatives
The fishing community, mainly due to its organisational capacity through its cooperatives, was able to change the politics of the Palk Bay fishing conflict. The political
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difficulties they faced were complicated; Colombo did not want to antagonize New Delhi on
an issue that was seen to only affect the northern mainly Tamil fisher-folk; and the Tamil
National Alliance (TNA), the dominant Tamil party, did not want to antagonize Tamil Nadu
and New Delhi whose pressure on Colombo towards a political settlement was their primary
concern. Therefore, in the case of the fisher co-operatives, their work has been as much about
shaping politics as about addressing the day to day economic concerns.
The fisher co-operatives have also had to face the challenges of politicization and
patronage politics by the various ministers in successive governments. Given that the fishing
community is seen as an electoral base, some Ministers and politicians attempt to capture that
base by politicizing the co-operatives. However, to date, the fishing community for the most
part has maintained its independence; changing the co-operative leadership, particularly when
they are perceived to be aligning with political interests rather than addressing the concerns
of the community.

Sustainability of Fishing and Fisheries Co-operatives
The more worrying concern is the continuing fall in fisheries incomes particularly
between 2012 and 2015 due to poaching by Indian trawlers. Co-operative revenues, which
are a share of fisheries incomes, have also been falling, whereby making it difficult to employ
co-operative employees such as accountants, clerks and managers necessary to run the cooperative structure. Unless there is a resolution to the devastating Palk Bay fishing conflict
with Indian trawlers, both fisheries in Jaffna and its co-operatives may continue to
deteriorate.
The Fisheries Ministry is now exploring the possibility of a robust fisheries
development plan for the North including the building of a harbour for deep sea multiday
fishing vessels similar to those in southern Sri Lanka. If the fisher co-operatives can survive
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their current economic woes, some of them may grow considerably if they are given the
opportunities for deep sea fishing; considerable employment in fish processing may also
emerge. The prospects of the fishing community and their co-operatives in the North seem
contingent on a number of external factors at the moment; including the future of the Indian
trawling conflict and the proposed fisheries development plans of the government.

Palm Development Co-operatives
In many villages in the North, a common sight in the early mornings or the late
afternoons is a bare bodied toddy tapper with his sarong tied up to his thighs riding his
bicycle to different parts of the village. He usually carries his equipment including a big
knife, a basket and large plastic containers filled with toddy199, and is either climbing the tall
palm trees or transporting the toddy to the taverns. Until my field research I did not know that
these simple looking men were part of an elaborate co-operative structure making collective
decisions about the price of toddy and the number of bottles of toddy to be tapped and sold in
the district, and that they controlled three distilleries for the production of arrack. It is when I
started interviewing them, both the tappers at the village level and their leaders and cooperative employees at their co-operative unions and federation that I realized that their
dignity and confidence had greatly benefited from the existence of the Palm Development
Co-operatives.
The toddy tapping community belonging to the oppressed castes and exploited and
excluded for centuries, made some major gains in the 1970s through the formation of their
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Toddy is tapped from both Palmyrah and Coconut tree shoots, and is drunk on the same day without
processing; due to fermentation it cannot be drunk after about eight hours at which point it needs to be distilled
into arrack. Toddy has an alcohol content of 4.5% to 6% and is mainly drunk by the farming communities in the
villages after the work in the fields in the morning and then again in the evening. Palmyrah trees are unique to
northern Sri Lanka, and they grow abundantly with little care. Therefore, Palmyrah toddy is the more common
form of toddy which is tapped from January to June. The taverns provide coconut toddy as well as bottled
Palmyrah toddy in the off season from July to December.

259

co-operative. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is only in the 1960s that anti-caste struggles
around temple entry had created both a level of social mobilization and consciousness around
the concerns of the oppressed castes. The left played a significant role in those anti-caste
struggles in the North, and it is no coincidence that the left coalition government coming to
power in 1970 contributed to the formation of the Palm Development Co-operatives. While
co-operatives were in general promoted by the left-leaning governments from the late 1950s
as discussed above, the formation of the Palm Development Co-operative in 1972 was a
unique intervention by the leftist Finance Minister at that time N.M. Perera.
The parliamentary act which created the Palm Development Co-operative provided
for a monopoly on toddy production and sales. Mr. Chandrabose, one of the village leaders
and himself a former Palm Development Co-operative employee, saw the changes to the sale
of toddy to be crucial: “With the Palm Development Co-operative, the social practice of the
tappers having to beg the upper castes to buy their toddy changed to one where everyone had
to come to the tavern and drink orderly was a major change.”200
The toddy tappers in rural Jaffna are organised around a tavern. In each village with a
tavern, there are usually around ten to twenty tappers who supply toddy to the tavern. Each
tavern is assigned a co-operative employee, who is also from the same caste community, and
whose duties are to run the tavern. A cluster of taverns are managed by a Palm Development
Co-operative Union, which has an office run by a General Manager, an accountant and other
office staff, who are co-operative employees responsible for that region.201
A typical tapper depending on his capacity, leases a number of trees often on Vellala
land, and pays about Rs. 500 (US$ 3.85) per tree for the six month period. Toddy tapping
requires climbing the tall Coconut or Palmyrah trees and is physically exhausting and
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Inteview with Kathirgaman Chandrabose, 14 May 2014.
Interview with Selvarasa, General Manager, Atchuvely Palm Development Co-operative Union, 17 June
2013.
201
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dangerous work; falling from a tree can be fatal or cripple one for life. While many tappers
continue tapping into their 50s and even 60s, they begin to slow down after the age of 40,
either reducing the number of trees or only climbing shorter trees. On a typical day, a tapper
begins early in the morning around 6am and climbs the trees and empties the the pot tied to
the shoots oozing sap. Before 11am, he has to deliver the toddy thus collected to the tavern.
The tavern is usually open from 11am to 2pm, as many of the local farmers come to drink
toddy before their lunch. Then again the tapper has to tap the trees starting again around 3pm
and deliver the toddy by 6pm, so that the tavern is again open from 6pm to 8pm.202
The toddy tavern near Pathemany village for example has ten tappers attached to it.
The average sales in the tavern in an evening is about 150 bottles, each bottle costing Rs. 75
(US$ 0.58). There would be anywhere from 50 to 75 men who come to drink at the tavern.
The taverns that had been mere shacks in the past are being modernized in recent years, as the
co-operative is trying to keep its clientele from increased competition by modern bars serving
beer and liquor. The modern taverns now consist of a cement structures with tables, chairs
and ceiling fans. And on any day around noon or at sun down, farming men come on their
bicycles to drink for a couple hours and socialize before they stagger back to their homes.203
Toddy has light alcohol content of about 4.5 to 6 percent, and needs to be drunk on
the same day before it ferments further. If the toddy is not drunk at the tavern, then the left
over toddy from the taverns are collected and sent to the distillery run by a cluster of Palm
Development Co-operative Unions. There are three such distilleries in Jaffna, and that is
where arrack, much higher in alcohol content of about 32 percent, is distilled and bottled.
Excess toddy that is not expected to be sold is also bottled and stored for the off seasons
when toddy is not produced.
202

Interview with Selvarasa, General Manager, Atchuvely Palm Development Co-operative Union, 17 June
2013.
203
Visits to taverns on 17 June 2013 and 1 September 2013. Interview with tavern tender Karuna on 17 June
2013.
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The Palm Development Co-operatives have a Federation at the Jaffna District level.
The members of the Federation meet every month to decide on the price of toddy and other
issues relating to operation of co-operatives. In addition to the production of toddy and
arrack, the co-operatives are also involved in the production of other Palmyrah products such
as Palmyrah jaggery (a sugar), Pathaneer (a non-alcoholic nutritious drink) and other sweets
through small industries. The Palm Development Co-operatives have also created a
compulsory saving and pension scheme for the tappers. They also provide accident insurance,
other loan services and even pre-schools to the community.
Mr. Chandrabose who eventually became a political leader in Pathemany village,
started working for the Palm Development Co-operatives soon after they were established in
1972. He claims the toddy tappers earned much better than the co-operative employees,
particularly after the distilleries were built to transform toddy into arrack:
There are people during that period, who earned well as tappers, built houses and
educated their children and moved up because of the good incomes. When I worked
in the Palaly branch there was a man who did not know how to sign his name, and I
used to sign his name for him. He did so well that his two sons studied and became
doctors.
Despite toddy tapping being affected by displacement with the war, many of the tappers
continued to work in their new locations and managed their livelihood. During war-time the
Palm Development Co-operatives functioned quite well with high incomes as there was no
import of liquor.
Mr. Chandrabose pointed out a generational change, which is resulting in the
reduction of the number of toddy tappers:
The younger generation does not like tapping because of the social stigma. I know a
man here who earned well and sent his sons abroad. Now his sons call him and tell
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him not to tap. May be only a fifth of the number of people who used to tap are now
tapping in our area. There are young people, children of tappers, who are not doing
anything, they have no work and are refusing to tap. Or they go for kuli (day wage)
work which is very irregular.
If toddy tapping will be abandoned as Mr. Chandrabose fears, it is going to impact the social
and economic life of the community as a whole. In reality, given the lack of other
opportunities in Jaffna for this community and the low incomes and irregular work available
in agriculture, the continuation of tapping may depend to a large extent on the incomes that
can be accrued.
The post-war change in attitudes towards tapping is not only social but also affected
by economic factors. With road connectivity to Jaffna after the war, and integration with the
market, the toddy tappers are facing falling demand for their produce. The expansion of the
market for beer and arrack from the South of the country is drastically reducing the demand
for local toddy and arrack. Not only is marketing of beer attracting the youth in particular, the
opening of bars and liquor shops in many part of Jaffna, and the easy availability of beer and
liquor from the South have created a tremendous challenge to the sale of local toddy and
arrack. The arrack produced in Jaffna is also of a lower quality due to the lack of investment
in new distilleries over the decades.204 Indeed, with diminished production and little capital
accumulation, a range of small industries in the North including distilleries are outdated and
find it hard to compete with products from the South and the global market.
In Jaffna District in 2015, about 9 million bottles of toddy were produced of which
about 6 million bottles were consumed in toddy taverns. The rest of the toddy is either bottled
or distilled into arrack. However, not all such bottled alcohol finds a market. The tax structure

204

I noticed that the equipment at the Varani Distillary in southern Jaffna is very outdated, with the boiler still
using a wood stove. Visit to Varani Distillary and discussion with engineer, Senthan on 9 September 2013.
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of the Government increasingly depends on excise tax on alcohol. The varying levels of tax
on toddy, arrack and beer may determine the consumption of local toddy and arrack. 205
Despite these changes and limitations, Mr. Chandrabose believes there is an
unrealised political potential with the co-operatives:
Politically, also such organizing by the co-operatives has potential. For example, here
in the Kopay Division we [oppressed caste community] are a majority, if there was
social unity we can put forward and win with a parliamentary candidate. The
consciousness in our community is not there. At least we [his party the EPDP] do
some work. Look, at what the Provincial Council has done, nothing, but no one will
ask them any questions. They will come and say we are Tamils, we are going to fight
for our Tamil rights. Then they will say you are Tamils and you should vote for the
Tamil Arasu Katchy (Federal Party), and people will vote for them. (He laughs).
This relationship between mainstream politics and co-operatives, particularly as a space to
organize on class and caste lines is a complicated and difficult endeavour. The lack of
consciousness in the community that Mr. Chandrabose discusses also relates to the power of
Tamil nationalist ideology and discourse that he is critiquing.
The Palm Development Co-operatives have contributed greatly to the community’s
dignity and economic empowerment, but their political emancipation is a more complicated
question. It was the political struggles of the oppressed caste communities in the 1960s that
led to the formation of their co-operative. However, the ensuing decades of war, the rise of
Tamil nationalist ideology silencing debates on caste oppression and the weakening of social
movements with militarization, have politically weakened the interests of this community and
their struggles for emancipation from caste oppression.
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Discussion with General Manager of Palm Development Co-operative Federation on 21 March 2016.
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The Life of a Toddy Tapper
I was fortunate to meet one of the oldest practicing toddy tappers in Pathemany. Mr.
Tharma Balasingham, 67 years. He was continuing to tap when I met him, and he was willing
to explain the process of tapping and allow me to follow him while he worked. Mr.
Balasingham had lived through the various changes that had shaped the toddy tappers over
the past five decades and he narrated to me this history through his own experience.206
I started toddy tapping when I was 18 years old with a cousin of mine. Then I got
married and started moving from place to place. I stopped tapping when I was 24
years old. Because I got into farming, which had increased and I found that it was
hard to do both. When we took land for share cropping, we also had to irrigate the
lands of the land owners, so that [the additional work for the land owners] took a lot
of time [making it difficult to continue with toddy tapping].
He went on to explain the system that existed before the Palm Development Co-operatives.
That system was called “maraweri”, which involved getting official licence to tap, but
tapping remained under the control of the Vellala land owners who owned the trees, and
could demand that the tappers sell them the toddy at a cheaper price. In other words,
“maraweri” amounted to a form of share cropping but with toddy tapping. As discussed
above, it was only with the Palm Development Co-operatives that the tapping community
was given a monopoly on the sale of toddy through their co-operative unions and in the
process took away the possibility of exploitation by the land owning Vellala castes.
According to Mr. Balasingham the “maraweri” system was corrupt and exploitative.
When I was 18 years old the co-operatives didn’t exist and so we had to sell it
ourselves. This was “maraweri”, about five of us would get together and go inform
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I interviewed him at length on 31 August 2013 and 1 September 2013 and followed him from morning to
evening, as he went about his work and he took the time to explain the process of tapping and slowly opened up
about his past as well.
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the local official that we are going to tap so many trees, and so we get the licence and
we pay the commission for the permit. In those days, we would pay the big official
there a bribe of Rs. 100. Do you think all this works normally? (He laughs.) Even
though we have the permit, a couple fellows [state officials who issue licences] will
come, they will ask for two or four bottles of toddy. We give it to them, you can’t
challenge them. Those were days when we sold toddy for first 10 cents, then 15 cents
and then 25 cents. Those were such days. If I tap for a mudalali (a boss) in those days,
I was paid 10 cents per bottle. I did that, I would tap 90 bottles a day.
Mr. Balasingham like many others in Jaffna was displaced during the war for years, but was
fortunate to find a community that accepted him and was able to tap for them during his years
of displacement.
In 1991 all of us including the land owners were displaced due to the war. And I lived
in the Vanni, in Mannar, until 2001. We lived in a village deep inside the Vanni in the
jungles, where we had to walk twelve miles from the road, in a village with sixty
families. Those families were so united, if one person gets a headache, all sixty
families will feel the headache. I can never forget that community, how they helped
me. They are people who had come from plantations in the Up-Country, they told me
they had come in the 1950s. So, I did toddy tapping for them there in the Vanni, when
I was displaced.
In this way, Mr. Balasingham had worked as a toddy tapper under different contexts, first
under a system that was more or less share cropping toddy for the upper caste landowners,
then for the palm co-operatives, then through the informal exchange of labor during his years
of displacement during the war under conditions of a subsistence rural economy and then
finally again after the war for the co-operatives.
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What is remarkable about toddy tapping are the varying forms of the relations of
production that it could be adopted to, particularly in the context of war and displacement.
While this may also be true for other forms of rural production such as agricultural crop
cultivation and fisheries, it is significantly different from manufacturing and industrial
production that were for the most part disrupted during the war. Amidst the precarious
conditions of war-time and post-war rural production, including with the possibilities of
exploitative productive relations, the co-operatives are important for reintegrating labor into
more egalitarian forms of production.
Mr. Balasingham’s work in the post-war years consisted of toddy tapping
supplemented by agriculture. It is work that required considerable discipline.
These days, I also do a little bit of agriculture, just about 1500 plants (quarter
of an acre). And I tap ten trees. I wake up at 4am every morning, and because my wife
is sickly, I sweep the house, boil the water and then wake up my wife. I then go and
tap the trees, which I will get done by 9:30 am. It will take until, 10:30 am if I have to
also hit the shoots, which has to be done at a certain pace. You can’t do it too hard or
quickly, as it will ruin the shoots. Hitting the shoots is to make sure the sap will keep
coming. In the evenings, I will go and tap at 4:30 pm and I would have handed over
the toddy at the tavern by 6:30pm, because we don’t do other work on the trees. After
that I will look at the farm, bring the cow in and tie it and then come home.
In the mornings, from the ten trees I tap, I get about 15 bottles of toddy, and in
the evenings, only about 10 bottles of toddy. People look down on us, and they say
tapping is easy work. But they don’t realise how dangerous it is. We have to climb the
trees, and then sometimes when we get up there, we realise that the pot which collects
the toddy has a hole because the crows have pecked on it, and then we get nothing.
We have to think about all these challenges.
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Since I am old now, I only climb short [4 to 7 meter high] coconut trees. I
climb them after having tied coconut husks on the tree so it is not as dangerous.
Before, I also used to climb the tall trees, and then you would have seen that my arms
and calves were bruised from hugging the trees when I climb. The marks and the
bruises on my body used to be so visible. People could look at my arms and legs and
right away know that I am a tree climber.
I then asked about his current economic situation including questions about indebtedness, and
he responded that incomes were low and the cost of living was high. But he also spoke of the
services provided to them by the co-operatives:
This year is economically difficult. The onion plants failed me because of crop
disease. And I only started tapping more intensively the last few months. So, my
incomes are just enough to meet the expenses. I don’t take loans. We don’t need that
headache. We are eating and living. They [the leasing companies that sell all kinds of
goods from television sets, furniture to motorcycles on monthly instalment payments]
will show us desires and get us caught in loans. Look at it, every house is in debt,
every house has a motorcycle.
While indebtedness is widespread in the Jaffna, the toddy tapping community in Bharathy
Veethy was the least indebted. The structure and the services provided by the Palm
Development Co-operatives is the reason for the reduced levels of indebtedness of the toddy
tapping community.
With the co-operatives, when we end our tapping life, we write to the Federation and
they have records of our savings. For a person who has tapped through his life, he
probably has savings of Rs. 10 lakhs or Rs. 15 lakhs (Rs. 1 million or Rs. 1.5 million,
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US$ 7,700 or US$ 11,500) to his name.207 There are so many advantages with the cooperatives. They will subtract money for accident insurance, for compulsory savings,
and another savings scheme. The compulsory saving is for retirement. The other
savings are returned to us every three months [which can be used for family and
festive expenses]. And we also get a pension.
Therefore, the reason for the low levels of indebtedness of the toddy tappers has to do with
the savings and credit schemes run by the co-operative. Unlike the banks, the co-operative
restricts, monitors and links the loans of the toddy tappers to their savings so they do not
reach levels of debt that are unsustainable.
Despite Mr. Balasingham’s loyalty to the co-operatives and his pride in his work, he
nevertheless was sceptical about the next generation continuing toddy tapping.
After my generation, the next generation won’t be toddy tapping. Even I don’t
encourage youth to tap. They should get educated and find better jobs. The times have
changed.
This generational view may be linked to his sense of the fast changing world around him and
the increasing emphasis placed on educational mobility of the toddy tapping community even
by the co-operatives, which often have programs to celebrate the educational success of their
youth.
During the interview, my research assistant and I pressed him on the anti-caste
struggles of the past and his involvement in them. He eventually spoke with reluctance about
those times:
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This level of retirement funds would be enough for a person to build a small house or to buy half an acre of
land in rural Jaffna. Alternatively a fixed deposit in a bank will allow them to barely pay for their daily expenses
through the monthly interest. For example, through the senior citizens savings scheme the Government provides
a subsidized 15% interest on deposits up to Rs. 1 million, which amounts to Rs. 12,500 a month interest on a Rs.
1 million deposit.
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We were involved in all the anti-caste fights. About twelve of us youth would
go and stand at the junction and stop the van [with Vellala passengers], and get the
driver and cleaner out and beat them up and tie them up and send the passengers on
another bus. We had many fights like that and only after [fights] that they started to
respect us. We went and broke the Mukkuperni (cup given to oppressed caste people
at tea shops) at the Atchuveli tea shops. We did everything, I won’t hide it, and we did
show gangsterism. We threw shit at shops. We broke windows. We would fight all
night. Now the police will try to come immediately, but then the police had to come
from Kangesanthurai. [So they could not suppress the violent struggle.]
The Pillaiyar temple, they locked it up, because they didn’t want our people to
go inside, and we broke the door open. It was Atchuvely North [one of the
neighboring villages] people who started the struggle, but it is our youth who gave
them support. At that time there were Russia Communists and Chinese Communists
here, so we were influenced by all of them and we were militant. There were two
factions within us, Ponnuthurai was Russia Communist, Kathirkaman was Chinese
Communist and I was with the Chinese Communists.
Mr. Balasingham is explaining the role of the various leftist parties in the anti-caste struggles.
The Communist Party had been split between the Moscow and Peking wings in the 1960s.
The split came right down to the village level. As with others of his generation, many of them
were mobilised and politically educated by the Communist cadres.
In those days there were educated people. Today’s youth have studied but
have nothing in their heads. We used to work hard. In just one night, we built our
reading room. We cut the wood, weaved the coconut leaves and built it. Think how
much the boys worked in just one night. We would work so hard, we would climb the
trees like birds and cut the coconut leaves. Now we can only dream of doing things
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like that. We used to go to the volleyball tournaments and it is both our groups that
would win. Look now, what our youth are worth? Even the dogs won’t look at them.
Now they just wear shirts and look at girls; that is all there is to them. I feel like
killing them. I don’t go where the youth stand around. I can’t stand them.”
Not only is there a major generational gap between the life of Mr. Balasingham and the youth
today. The political memory of that generation of toddy tappers is also fading.
Mr. Balasingham’s generation were at the centre of the struggle for their community’s
dignity by fighting exclusion in public spaces such as temples and tea shops. Those struggles
for dignity and the social consciousness and organizing that it created eventually contributed
to the formation of the Palm Development Co-operatives. Yet the legacy of their struggles
have been overshadowed by the far more brutal and devastating war which consumed almost
the entire population with displacement, death and destruction. Recovering the struggles and
politics of those times some four or five decades ago has become even hard for the very
generation that ensured the social empowerment of their community.

Challenges Facing Co-operatives in Jaffna Today
Historically, in the Jaffna District, there was a range of co-operatives involved in
various trades and different economic functions such as credit, production and marketing.
However, the war and displacement have led to the decline of co-operatives and in many
cases their dissolution. Co-operatives from boat transport to a vibrant network of carpentry
unions no longer exist. As far as institutional memory and membership, however, the cooperatives continue to have a widespread presence. There are close to 1000 and 2000
registered co-operative societies, with total membership of 260,000 and 409,000 members, in
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the Jaffna District and Northern Province respectively.208 The challenge is to mobilise and
activate the members; and even if a fraction of those members become active out of the total
population of 630,000 and 1,100,000 in the Jaffna District and Northern Province
respectively, they will have a major impact.
At the monthly meetings at the Co-operative Council of Jaffna District,209 the
umbrella body of all the co-operatives, the representatives of the following co-operatives are
usually present:
1. Palm Development Co-operative
2. Fisher Co-operative
3. Multipurpose Co-operative Societies (MPCS) (mandated to co-operate various forms
of producer and consumer societies)
4. Livestock Co-operative
5. Lorry Co-operative (private transport truck societies)
6. Textile Co-operative (handloom weaving)
7. Rural Bank Co-operative
8. Thrift and Credit Co-operative
The Co-operative Council is housed in the massive Veerasingham Hall, named after V.
Veerasingham, a former principal of a school, the first president of the co-operative
federation in Jaffna, and considered the father of co-operatives in Jaffna. Veerasingham’s
popularity culminated in his election to parliament in 1956, where he continued his advocacy
for co-operatives. The Veerasingham Hall, the largest auditorium in the Northern Province
where major public events take place, is a testament to the vibrancy of co-operatives in a
bygone era, as it was built entirely with co-operative funds. The Co-operative Council used to
208

Data provided by the Jaffna Co-operative Council May 2014.
I have attended two of the Co-operative Council Meetings in February 2015 and January 2016. I also
attended the annual Co-operatives Day celebration in December 2014 and I witnessed over the a thousand
people attending the event.
209
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run a co-operative school and training centre in Jaffna before the war, but both were
destroyed during the war. At present, the Co-operative Council mainly meets its expenses
through income from renting out the Veerasingham Hall and running a printing press.
The most extensive structure of co-operatives in Jaffna to this day consists of the
MPCS, with 19 of them in each of the divisions of the Jaffna District. The MPCS as local
federated structures manage the consumer co-operative stores and depending on the region
organize agricultural co-operatives, rice mills, bakeries and other small industries including
food and fruit processing plants. While some of the producer co-operatives under the MPCS
are profitable and producing for the local market using local resources and labor, the
consumer co-operatives, particularly co-operative stores are struggling to survive due to
competition from the retail market.

Problems facing contemporary co-operatives in Jaffna
One of the central challenges facing co-operatives in the post-war years is the lack of
capital: both capital investment and working capital to increase production. Many of the
producer co-operatives that have potential to grow also face cash flow problems, having
depleted their savings and lost assets during the war. Furthermore, banks are unwilling or
charge high interest rates on loans making it difficult for producer co-operatives to increase
their production and take new orders from clients.
Such problems are compounded by the role of the state and the bureaucracy. The cooperatives are over-regulated by the Provincial Government. The co-operative laws drafted in
the 1970s continue and even the bylaws have not changed. Thus co-operatives are weighed
down by the Provincial Co-operative Minister and the Commissioner, who often deny the cooperatives the autonomy to take up new initiatives or insist on programs that do not benefit
the co-operatives. The co-operatives are sometimes demanded to carry out awareness
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programs by the Minister using the co-operatives own funds, eventhough such programs are
unlikely to produce results.210 Given that the co-operatives lack political strength and
militancy after the war, the co-operatives are easily intimidated by the bureaucracy who
threaten them with blocking approvals for routine functions. Furthermore, the marketoriented policy vision of the Central Government also constrains much needed material
support and resources from the state towards rebuilding the co-operatives. There have been
no major projects to revitalise the co-operatives through allocations in the government
budgets. Without policies towards capital investment to upgrade co-operative production
facilities, they cannot compete with more capital intensive production from the rest of the
country and the global market.
The co-operatives constantly face the danger of attack by capital on their assets and
resources. While the Co-opertives need capital and credit, they can also be dispossessed by
finance capital. There are pressures on co-operatives to sell or rent their assets in the form of
prime real estate to private companies. Next, excessive liscences and concessions to large
fishing companies for lucrative export oriented fisheries can quickly undermine the future of
fisher co-operatives and the livelihoods of their membership.
The post-war challenges facing the Palm Development Co-operatives are reflective of
the new political and economic environment that cripples co-operatives more generally.
While it was the monopoly provided by the state in the production, distribution and
distillation of toddy that accounted for the co-operatives’ take off few decades ago, the
situation has changed now with competition in the market from new products such as beer
and arrack distilled in the South. The Palm Development Co-operatives are also weighed
down by new taxes on bottling plants and distilleries, where they are forced to pay a higher
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Communication with co-operative employee in January 2016. I am aware of a few initiatives including a
seminar with a visiting co-operative expert from India that was cancelled by the Minister only so he could assert
his power.
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tax due to relatively smaller economies of scale compared to private plants in the south of the
country.
Next, the co-operatives have lost much of their vibrant middle class leadership, as the
middle classes have overwhelmingly migrated with the war to join the diaspora in Western
countries. The political culture of violence and overt intimidation during the war has resulted
in potential leaders avoiding public roles. In this way, strong links between educationists and
the co-operative leadership have been severed. With the class character of the co-operative
leadership changing, the social and informal linkages with the bureaucracy have weakened.
Therefore, in addition to the material setbacks including the destruction and drain of
accumulated capital, social networks that sustained co-operatives in an earlier era hardly exist
now. The larger question is whether the vibrant contribution of co-operatives to the northern
economy in the past can be recovered in post-war era.

Argentinian co-operatives after the crisis, investment and research
The worker co-operatives in Argentina after the severe economic crisis in 2000 is of
relevance to the situation of co-operatives in Jaffna. In Argentina, with the tremendous
disruption of the economy, worker co-operatives have taken over factories with the support of
the municipal governments (Dobrusin 2013). A similar program of local government support
to co-operatives in Jaffna and the North could go a long way in revitalising the local
economy. In Argentina, one of the significant challenges of workers taking over bankrupt
factories was the need for technological upgrade of backward machinery and equipment
(Dobrusin 2013). One of the central needs of producer co-operatives in Jaffna are also such
capital investment including in technologies that can enhance production.
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Research to develop new products with the local resources remains a challenge for
rural co-operative production in Jaffna. The Palmyrah Research Institute (PRI)211 in Jaffna
developed with a grant from the Government of India in 2012 is the only technological
research institute in the North. Palmyrah palms being one of the most important natural
resources in the North, research and extension from PRI is contributing to upgrading the
products of the Palm Development Co-operatives. However, there is both the need for greater
investment in PRI and research capacity for various other forms of rural production. One of
the reasons for Mondragon’s success in Spain is their strong research capacity to adapt to the
changes in the market (Errasti 2003). Similarly, the once successful and extensive structure of
co-operatives in Jaffna requires adaptation to the global consumer market, which has
drastically changed over the last few decades when production and innovation in Jaffna was
paralysed by the war. Such capital investment, technological advancement of local
production and research development in Jaffna will require support from the state.

Marx and the Political Economy of Co-operatives
The co-operatives in post-war Jaffna are in a conundrum. On the one hand, they
require a different path of social and economic revitalisation from the neoliberal trajectory of
promoting private businesses, markets and financialization. On the other hand, the coopertives require support from the donor agencies and the state that are taking forward such a
neoliberal transformation. In this section, I analyse this contemporary problem of state
support in the neoliberal age by revisiting Marx’s engagement with co-operatives.
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I have visited PRI on a number of occasions starting in August 2015, and looked at their laboratories and
have had discussions with their manager, extension officer and researchers. Contrary to the perception in Jaffna
that the PRI had not produced meaningful research, I am of the view that it has been doing important work in
identifying the nutritional content and refining methods of palmyrah products. Revamping PRI could greatly
contribute towards innovative methods and expansion of rural production in Jaffna and the Northern Province.
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Marx found the historical emergence of producer co-operatives as a major advance for
working class politics, particularly after the many political setbacks following the defeats of
the uprisings in 1848. Furthermore, producer co-operatives were also theoretically important
signifying the emancipatory possibilities of transcending capitalist productive relations. Marx
considered the trade union movement’s advances in gaining legal recognition of the ten hour
working day and the emergence of producer co-operatives as great victories for the working
class movement by the early 1860s.
Marx in his Inaugural Address of the First International in 1864 as evident from the
epigraph greatly commended the initiation of producer co-operatives. Subsequently in 1867,
Marx’s Instructions for the Delegates of the Geneva Congress engaged co-operatives in a
programmatic manner. Marx rejected any formulaic creation of co-operatives and believed
their strength was the spontaneous efforts of workers to co-operate and change productive
relations. Marx articulated the significance of the co-operative as one based on class struggle:
We acknowledge the cooperative movement as one of the transforming forces of the
present society based upon class antagonism. Its great merit is to practically show,
that the present pauperizing and despotic system of the subordination of labor to
capital can be superseded by the republican and beneficent system of the association
of free and equal producers (Marx 2000, 90).
However, such co-operation had to emphasize producers and production as central to
capitalism and hence the transformation of capitalism itself.
We recommend to the working men to embark in cooperative production rather than
in cooperative stores. The latter touch but the surface of the present economical
system, the former attacks its groundwork (Marx 2000, 90).
As evident from my own research, it is again the producer co-operatives that engage in
resistance to many forms of oppression. Significantly, it is also the producer co-operatives
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that have survived the war and the attendant destruction. The consumer co-operatives, on the
other hand, have declined with the withdrawal of support from the state and the expansion of
the market. The producer co-operatives in the context of Jaffna also gain significance for
their ability to empower oppressed caste communities such as the toddy tappers. Thus
producer co-operatives challenge productive relations not only as class relations but also as
caste relations.
My engagement with the post-war challenges facing co-operatives and their
relationship to working class politics should be contextualised in relation to the political
economy of Jaffna. Trade unions in Jaffna were historically weak due to the small industrial
production base and the independent organizing of workers has centred on co-operatives. The
centrality of fisheries and agriculture to the Jaffna economy have also added to this emphasis
on co-operatives over that of trade unions. The trade unions’ disintegration in Jaffna was
linked to the destruction of the small industrial production base during the war. Furthermore,
nationalist militarisation and repression of the left by armed actors including the LTTE,
undermined what trade union base that existed including for example the teachers unions.
It is in the context of such repression of independent organizing during the war years
and the immediate post-war years that the survival of the co-operatives and their continuing
extensive structures are of importance. However, the political limitations of co-operatives –
including the lack of militancy and protests – and their calls for state support despite over
regulation by the state, raises questions about their political possibilities. On the other hand,
the weakening of co-operatives was due to tremendous loss of assets and the crippling of
their leadership due to the war and migration, and as with most social institutions in post-war
Jaffna, co-operatives find reconstruction difficult without external support.
Next, productive relations in Jaffna are not only shaped by class relations but also
caste structure further complicating the political economic questions about the workings and
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progressive potential of co-operatives in Jaffna. From the discussion above, it should be clear
that the contradiction between oppressed castes involved in toddy production and the upper
castes land owners who oppress them was over-determined by a left leaning government,
which gave the toddy tappers the monopoly on the production and sale of toddy. Such state
aid, in this case by the state centred in Colombo and acting as an external actor, was able to
strengthen the oppressed caste workers by working as a countervailing force against the
Tamil elite in Jaffna.
The history of co-operatives in Sri Lanka discussed above, including the efforts of left
leaning governments to promote them at the national level and the eventual attack on the cooperatives including by the usurpation of their finances held in co-operative banks towards
commercial ends raises serious questions about the state and its relationship to co-operatives.
While Marx commends the efforts towards co-operation, he was wary of the attack that
eventually ensues:
To save the industrious masses, cooperative labor ought to be developed to national
dimensions, and, consequently, to be fostered by national means. Yet the lords of land
and the lords of capital will always use political privileges for the defence and
perpetuation of their economical monopolies (Marx 2000, 80).
In Sri Lanka, liberalization starting in 1977 led to such attacks by economic monopolies on
the co-operatives.
This is where Marx’s warning about the limitations of the co-operative movement in
relation to capitalist society and state power is important.
Restricted, however, to the dwarfish forms into which individual wage slaves can
elaborate it by their private efforts, the cooperative system will never transform
capitalistic society. To convert social production into one large and harmonious
system of free and cooperative labor, general social changes are wanted, changes of
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the general conditions of society, never to be realized save by the transfer of the
organized forces of society, viz., the state power, from capitalists and landlords to the
producers themselves (Marx 2000, 90).
Thus for Marx and his revolutionary politics, the co-operatives can never transform the
capitalist system, because it does not lead to the transfer of state power.
A number of years later, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme drafted in 1875,
Marx went further in critiquing state aid for co-operatives.
That the workers desire to establish the conditions for co-operative production on a
social scale, and first of all on a national scale in their own country, only means that
they are working to revolutionise the present conditions of production, and it has
nothing in common with the foundation of co-operative societies with state aid. But as
far as the present co-operative societies are concerned, they are value only in so far as
they are the independent creations of the workers and not protégés either of the
government or of the bourgeois (Marx 1875, 536).
This strong critique of co-operatives by Marx and a shift from the more generous account of
the co-operatives in the Inaugural Address of the International Working Men’s Association,
according to Karl Korsch, relates to particular politics of that historical moment. 212 By 1875,
Marx was struggling against the reformist tendencies in the international communist
movement.
The problem with the war-torn society such as in Jaffna is that production itself had
been disrupted with the war, and strategies for organising production requires the aid of the
state. In the case of the Sri Lanka as a whole, it is the change in economic policies of the state
from import substitution to “open economy” in 1977 that led to the decline of the co-
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See: Karl Korsch, Introduction to the Critique of the Gotha Programme, 1922.
Downloaded from: https://www.marxists.org/archive/korsch/1922/gotha.htm
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operatives, in the case of Jaffna, it was also other exogenous political factors including the
tremendous disruption that came with the war that devastated the co-operatives. The fisher
co-operatives and the northern fishing community continue to be undermined by the external
attack by Indian trawlers poaching in the northern Sri Lankan waters.
Given the political devastation with the war and the tremendous setbacks to working
class politics including the elimination of the left and trade union base, co-operative forms of
organising become important for rejuvenating radical democratic politics. Indeed, revival of a
vibrant co-operative movement will not only have implications for working class politics as
spaces of organising but also strengthen anti-caste politics through the strengthening of cooperation in caste-based occupations and communities.
Marx’s challenge remains, and co-operatives decades down the line may fall apart if
sustained with state aid. However, the urgencies of addressing the continuing post-war
economic crisis may require drawing on the strong co-operative tradition in Jaffna and
coupling it with support from the state towards reconstruction of this war-torn society. In the
post-war years, such revitalisation of co-operatives will be a platform to reverse the failed
reconstruction policies that atomise workers and put them at the mercy of the market, private
businesses, self-employment schemes and financialized indebtedness. Just as Marx in 1864,
after the long defeat of the working class with the failed revolutions of 1848, was inspired by
the efforts of co-operation, Jaffna in its post-war context may also draw from the potential of
co-operatives, but it may require the support of the state in the form of investment,
regulations and protections from the continuing deterioration of the rural economy and the
attack of finance capital.
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Conclusion: The Co-operative Alternative
In this concluding section, I articulate the possibilities and advantages of co-operation
to rejuvenate the war-torn economy and consider an alternative vision of reconstruction. First,
reconstruction requires leadership and vision, including confidence of rebuilding a war-torn
society. The legacy and institutional memory of the vibrant history of co-operation in Jaffna
is a powerful social asset to organise and reintegrate a war torn society. Toddy tappers,
fishermen and farmers require social and institutional supports to strengthen their productive
activities after a war. The co-operatives are effective institutions for providing such support
including meaningful credit where necessary, without pushing workers into the debt trap as
with banks and financial institutions.
Next, co-operatives are capable of pooling labor resources and facilitating the
participation of fractured communities towards production. One of the central challenges of
reconstruction in the war-torn North is to rejuvenate production and employment, and create
a virtuous cycle with the re-investment of accumulation from such production in the local and
still rural economy. Here, the advantage of co-operative production and accumulation is that
any profits accruing to the co-operatives will be either shared by the broad membership or reinvested in the local economy. This is not the case with the Colombo-based companies and
multi-national corporations, whose profits are siphoned out to Colombo and other capitals.
In the current context, co-operatives in Jaffna can draw from ideas about new
generation co-operatives and producer companies that are attempting to address the
challenges of markets in India (Singh 2008). Given the constraints facing co-operatives in
Jaffna of raising capital and marketing arrangements for their produce on the one hand and
over regulation and interference by local officials on the other hand, new generation of cooperatives such as the producer companies in India that are set up with producers in control
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of the companies and one member one vote for major decisions, are new ideas that cooperatives in Jaffna should explore.
While the reconstruction of the war-torn economy can draw from the revitalisation of
co-operatives, the realization of such a vision is dependent on political conditions including
state policies and the Tamil political leadership. Tamil politics has focused on trying to
achieve devolved powers through a constitutional political solution. Ironically, the cooperatives are a devolved subject, which means the powers of regulating and developing the
co-operatives reside with the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) led by the Tamil nationalist
leadership. However, the TNA has done little during its three years leading the NPC, starting
in September 2013 to address the concerns of the co-operatives. The economic policy
trajectory of the Central Government focused on promoting private business and disregarding
co-operatives and the rural sectors is also a major obstacle. The prospects of both the
Northern Provincial Council awakening from its indifference to economic issues and the
Central Government making a drastic change in policies of reconstruction are rather bleak.
In this context, co-operatives in post-war Jaffna can draw on the politics of cooperatives in post-conflict and neoliberal Nicaragua after the Sandinistas lost power in
1990.213 The co-operatives in Nicaragua adopted multiple strategies of economic and political
proportions, both organizing horizontally for broader militant struggles to guard the land of
agricultural co-operatives as well as second and third tier structures to provide services
including credit and sustain primary co-operative societies. Given the strong neoliberal
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The survival of co-operatives in Nicaragua after an initial phase of tremendous state support followed by the
attack of a neoliberal regime is something to consider: “The analysis of post-conflict reconciliation and
development in Nicaragua shows that ‘peace’ in the context of neoliberalization came at the cost of a deep
socioeconomic crisis, manifested in large-scale unemployment, dispossession, and the renewal and dispersion of
armed conflict. … As regards cooperatives, they were subject to numerous pressures and constraints which
provoked a contradictory response. On the one hand, many were disabled and disbanded; on the other, both
producers and workers engaged in various forms of collective action and social innovation, involving
associative and enterprise practices, not only as a coping strategy but as a route to economic and political
empowerment. The upshot of these developments was that the cooperative sector acted as a partial brake on
neoliberal restructuring” (Utting et al. 2014).
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policies in Sri Lanka and the lack of concern on the part of Tamil nationalist politics, cooperatives in Jaffna and the Northern Province more broadly may also have to adopt such
strategies. They will have to activate their broad base into militant struggles against the new
forms of market-led and financialized dispossession and indebtedness, by using the newly
opened democratic space after regime change. They should also insist on and seek to create a
market for locally produced goods for their survival. The survival of the co-operatives and
addressing the failure of reconstruction seven years after the war is increasingly now a
political question requiring social and political movements.
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CONCLUSION

The changes in Sri Lanka, between 2008 and 2016 have been extraordinary. In mid2008, it was hardly imaginable that the long and protracted war in Sri Lanka would come to
an end in the near future. By late 2008, the LTTE, once considered one of the most ruthless
and invincible armed movements in the world, was on the retreat, holding the civilian
population as human shields even as the Sri Lankan Security Forces mercilessly bombed and
shelled the rebel territory with tremendous fire power. The catastrophic end to the civil war
came in May 2009, with tens of thousands of civilians killed and the leadership of the LTTE
decimated.
The end of the war raised the humanitarian predicament of the devastated population
as well as longer-tem concerns of resettlement of the displaced people and reconstruction of
the war-torn regions. It was also a major shift in politics for a country and its people
priortising security and survival amidst decades of protracted war. In this context, the
euphoric regime in power focused on its own political consolidation with a major economic
development push and continued militarization.
From May 2009, I visited the war-torn regions frequently, and then moved back in
May 2012 to Jaffna for my field work. These were years when the authoritarian Rajapaksa
regime seemed invincible and people in the North in particular were under constant
surveillance, where public meetings could not be held without permission from the military
and people even feared to speak in small groups. In September 2013, under considerable
international pressure, elections for the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) were held after a
twenty-five year hiatus. The NPC led by the Tamil nationalists lacks a vision for
reconstruction and has done little to strengthen Tamil society.
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Soon after the completion of my field work, in a major political shift in January 2015,
the Rajapaksa regime was thrown out of power by a coalition of forces including the Tamil
and Muslim constituencies. Regime change offered hopes of a constitutional solution to the
grievances of minorities, new initiatives towards post-war reconciliation and a fresh approach
to reconstruction and development. A year and a half after regime change, while the
democratic space opened up for discussions and protests, there is little change in the approach
to and conditions of the economic crisis facing the war-torn people.
I provide this brief sketch of major developments to point to the tremendous political
upheavals in Sri Lanka, and particularly the North, with the end of the war and the post-war
years. I am conscious of this period as a time compressed with various social, economic and
political imperatives that inevitably shape my scholarly study. Many countries after
protracted armed conflicts, situations on the scale of uprisings and revolutions or return to
civilian rule after decades of military dictatorships, go through such periods of turmoil
creating unique challenges for political economic analysis.
While analysing political economic developments during such a period is inevitably a
difficult endeavour, in the course of these years, I have also found that working under such
conditions provides new insights. In other words, the workings of some social and economic
processes are revealed during such periods of flux, which may be hidden or not as apparent
during analysis of the long durée. Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte is
characteristic of such analysis; where Marx is able to capture a variety of social dynamics
including those of regime consolidation, the various factions within classes and how
economic structures built over time interact with political and economic processes in a time
of change (Cowling and Martin 2002).
While the social devastation that is prevalent during the time of war is readily
understood, the times of change following the protracted war, can also cause tremendous
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suffering during a short period of time. However, exploitation and dispossession with
problematic policies of resettlement and market integration are hidden when such a period is
conceptualised as a time of “transition”. While the discourse of transition is prescriptive in
pushing for a market oriented economy, it is promoted as descriptive concept.214 In this
conclusion I want to raise some questions about the power of a concept such as transition, its
relationship to concepts such as accumulation, dispossession and social exclusion in analysis
of “post-conflict” societies.
The other set of challenges of analysis relate to the spatial changes during the decades
of war and the post-war years. The tremendous bouts of displacement, the formation of a
diaspora, the resettlement after the war, the temporary migration of labor to the Middle East
and the flows of funds such as remittances have created new dynamics in society. During the
decades of war, Jaffna and the war-torn regions were isolated from the “open economy”
policies and integration with the global economy transforming the rest of Sri Lanka. The
rapid re-integration with the market in the post-war years and increasing flows of people,
goods and capital in and out of the war-torn North have also contributed to the above
mentioned new forms of accumulation, dispossession and social exclusion.
In this context, a silence prevails about the failure of reconstruction. This silence in
scholarly work, in policy discourse and in the mainstream media about the economic crisis
and widespread indebtedness in the war-torn regions is in stark contrast to the international
attention on the challenges of a constitutional solution, transitional justice and war-time
accountability in Sri Lanka. Indeed, contemporary international discourses relating to postconflict societies ignore concerns relating for example to rural dispossession. The clamour of
Tamil nationalist demands for international intervention, including to address war crimes,
Nicolas Guilhot’s genealogy of the concept of transition is instructive. He claims that in various intellectual
traditions and research programmes, transition has emerged as either a social ontology or a social technology.
He further claims the “former is usually associated with macro-sociological paradigms, while the latter tends to
codify and rationalize political practices.” (Guilhot 2002)
214
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suppresses discussion of the travails of the war-torn people. The vision and policies on
reconstruction, first under the authoritarian Rajapaksa regime and then under a liberal
democratic regime, as challenges of building infrastructure and expanding credit effectively
silences the concerns of the rural population even as they are increasingly trapped into cycles
of debt and dispossession.
The caste structure is the principal historical source of social exclusion in Jaffna
society. War-time dispossession and its aftermath have created new and more subtle forms of
caste exclusion. The subtle segregation in schools and the large invesments in caste-based
temples provide an institutional base for strengthening caste relations. The organisational
weakness of oppressed caste community centers and the absence of an anti-caste movement
have muted the social and political voice necessary for resistance against caste oppression in
the countryside. Tamil nationalist discourse continues to silence discussion of caste even as
the Tamil bureaucracy through its day to day workings contributes to caste exclusion.
Finally, such temporal and spatial changes and the overwhelming silence on the
economic crisis and persistence of caste relations, create major intellectual challenges for
thinking about alternatives. I critique the failure of reconstruction in post-war Jaffna by
contrasting those policies with the historical workings of the co-operatives and the alternative
vision they embody. What are the possibilities of such alternatives and how do they relate to
neoliberal globalisation with deepening financialisation? How do different paths of
reconstruction interact with caste relations and its subtle changes, and what are the impacts of
migration, remittances and economic changes removed from landed productive relations on
caste oppression? How do institutions such as co-operatives, which attempt to reduce the
dispossession inherent to the expansion of the market, function after decades of disruption
and under the now prevalent market-oriented policies? In this context, the historical moment
is one that could be characterised as a crisis for neoliberal globalisation, particularly with the
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Great Recession of 2008,215 and this may be an opportune moment to begin thinking about
alternatives from the periphery including from the perspective of war-torn societies.

Transitions and Temporal Dynamics
The concept of transition is often deployed in the discourse on “post-conflict”
societies (Del Castillo 2001, Collier 2009). Indeed, many argue either explicitly or implicitly
that what is going on in the North is a transition to a market economy and that this process is
set on the path of economic development.216 However, I argue that reconstruction policies in
Jaffna are leading to new forms dispossession and social exclusion.
In earlier scholarship on Sri Lanka, Newton Gunasinghe critiqued the singular
narrative of agrarian change, as a transition towards capitalist development, by analysing the
variations within agrarian systems and the contingent factors that lead to specific trajectories
(Gunasinghe 1985). More recently in the context of India, Kalyan Sanyal has made the
important point that neither the emergence of capitalism with primitive accumulation nor
capitalist growth necessarily leads to a process of transition to an economy centred on capital.
Rather a process of exclusion from capital is also possible, particularly in postcolonial
societies. In such cases, an informal sector and economies for subsistence removed from
capital can emerge (Sanyal 2009). Both these critiques are relevant for analysis of
contemporary Jaffna. There is no single transitional trajectory for the post-war rural
economy. Furthermore, the current context in Jaffna could be one of exclusion for sections of
society from both capital and the state; particularly with the absence of local employment
from capitalist production and the abandoning of marginalised communities by the state and
its services.
215

In June 2016, three researchers from the IMF itself have questioned some aspects of the earlier neoliberal
policy package of increasing capital market integration (Ostray 2016).
216
Despite the sustained critique of the concept of development (Edelman and Haugerud 2007, Sanyal 2007), in
most countries including Sri Lanka, the concept has tremendous power.
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One starting point for a critique of post-conflict transition is the importance of
historical specificity. The colonial legacy, the disruptive civil war, vulnerability of Sri
Lanka’s economy to global economic forces and neoliberal processes such as financialization
shape the path of post-war reconstruction in Jaffna and the war-torn regions. Furthermore, the
post-war period is not a complete break from war-time or the pre-war period. Rather there are
continuities in the social structure including productive and social relations, which even if
disrupted for long periods of time may be recovered or consolidated after the war-time
disruption. In this context, post-conflict reconstruction policies by the state with the support
of international donor agencies often impose a model that disregards the local social
structures and dynamics, as if it is a blank sheet after war-time destruction to be reconstructed
with an economic blue print. In Sri Lanka, such reconstruction policies are an intensified
extension of the policies of financialization and infrastructure buildout being carried out in
the rest of the country.
The discourse of transition also disregards historical conjunctures and the contingent
factors that shape societies even after the sudden end of protracted armed conflicts. The postwar years starting in May 2009, I argue were characterised by a second wave of neoliberalism
in Sri Lanka, particularly with post-war stability including the emergence of an authoritarian
regime and the influx of global capital into the emerging markets with the Great Recession of
2008. The sudden integration of war-torn Jaffna into such accelerating financialization had a
tremendous impact on society, particularly through increased indebtedness as discussed in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Contrary to the claim that this is merely a transition period that will
eventually lead to economic development to the benefit of much of the war-torn society,
economic processes unleashed by global economic changes and related policies at the
national level have resulted in dynamics of dispossession and social exclusion, which are
going to be hard to reverse and in any event have already had a tremendous impact on the
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war-torn communities. Therefore, the discourse on transition often ignores the broader global
economic changes and forces which overwhelm efforts to revive war-torn societies at the
local level.
I critique the long durée assumptions of the discourse of transitions by
conceptualising the dynamics during a period of flux. I argue that social and economic
developmnts in post-war Jaffna reveals hidden processes of debt creation that may not be
evident over the long durée. Furthermore, an analysis of the dynamic relationship between
financial flows, indebtedness and the changes to labor reveals new circuits of accumulation.
As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, rural debt during periods of rapid financialization can be
hidden. Household debts are cascaded, where bank debts are leveraged for leased hire
purchasing of vehicles or housing debt, which in turn can lead to the pawning of gold
jewellery for monthly payments on previous loans. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 2, gold
jewellery the primary liquid asset of the rural population which survived the war, has been
considerably depleted in the post-war years with the expansion of credit and a market for
pawning with the tremendous rise in global gold prices between 2009 and 2011. In this way,
such cascaded debts don’t immediately reveal the draining of household assets and the level
of debt, which require an analysis of the changes to stocks rather than flows of assets and
debts. Data for such analysis of the changes to the stock of wealth and debt is difficult to
come by. Given the hidden character of such cascaded debts, it is difficult to raise concerns
about the need for policies to counter such processes of indebtedness, until well after the
onset of a crisis, which may have done considerable damage, and hard to reverse.
The new circuit of accumulation that became apparent in my study, as discussed in
Chapter 2 and 3, is linked to this period of flux in the post-war years. Sri Lanka’s greater
integration after the war with the global capital markets led to deepening financialization. The
state encouraged banks to float euro and dollar bonds and capitalised on the increased flows
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of global finance capital in the form of sovereign bonds to expand credit in the entire country
and disproportionately higher levels in the war-torn regions. This expansion of credit,
augmented by pawning, lease hire purchasing and micro-finance loans, led to indebtedness in
the war-torn regions resulting in increased out migration of labor to the Middle East. The
remittances from such migrant workers in part is used to pay back the debt to banks and
finance companies, which in turn had to pay back their liabilities to global finance capital.
Financialization driving such a new circuit of accumulation is not just the expansion of
finance and the proliferation of loan instruments. It is also a structural shift in the workings of
finance in rural society, with rural households becoming deeply enmeshed in the formal
financial sector of banks and finance companies and increasingly connected to the global
financial system. Thus this form of financialization that accelerates after a society has been
economically uprooted by war requires a systemic analysis as opposed to analysis of a single
financial instrument and its working in a rural economy, for example like the proliferation of
microfinance schemes in rural societies. This new circuit of accumulation may not be
sustained for long periods of time, but it has considerable impact on local society by
displacing labor, particularly as migrant labor to work in the Middle East.
My critique of the concept of transition has two analytical implications relating to the
political economy of post-war societies. First, in assuming a progressive directionality after
the war, the concept of transition disregards new forms disruption and dislocation in the rural
economy after a war. That is the concept of transition legitimizes the falling incomes and lack
of employment and livelihoods to be some form of post-war adjustment to a market
economy, rather than as structural changes with dispossession leading to exclusion. Second,
in critiquing transition with its long durée assumptions, I find that dispossessing dynamics of
processes such as indebtedness due to recent post-war reconstruction policies may be
wrongly attributed to the long-term impact of war. In other words, the increased levels of
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indebtedness are blamed on the war and its devastation, but in fact they are due to the postwar reconstruction polices including deepening financialzsation. In this context, economic
anthropological inquiry through deeper analysis of the periods of flux, provides a critique of
the concept of “transition” as well as new insights and possibilities of addressing the
challenges facing post-war societies.

Spatial Relations and Caste Exclusion
The war in addition to the loss and maiming of lives, the destruction of assets and the
disruption of production, also involved tremendous displacement. Such displacement
involved both permanent emigration to form a Tamil diaspora in the West and internal
displacement with return to their villages after years and sometimes decades of living in other
regions. Such spatial movement of people had a considerable impact on social structure,
particularly caste relations. People belonging to various castes were uprooted from village
life embedded in caste quarters and proximity to caste-linked social institutions such as
temples, community centres and schools. Furthermore, there were major changes to the
demographic composition of caste communities, with a considerable section of the dominant
Vellala caste migrating out of the country to form the diaspora. In this context, the return to
land, both the dwellings in the caste quarters and for agriculture with the renewal of landed
caste relations, necessarily raised questions about the persistence and strengthening of caste
relations that were disrupted by the war. I argue that caste relations and its related oppression
do not end with displacement, rather, it requires a political movement towards the
annihilation of caste relations and emancipation of oppressed caste communities. This has
been both the experience in Jaffna in the 1960s and the experience of the Dalit movement
over the last many decades in India.
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The reliance on land is weakening due to the falling incomes in agriculture relative to
household expenditure and more generally the rural economic crisis in Jaffna. The changes to
landed productive relations are reducing the direct power of the Vellala caste over the
oppressed castes, as they employ less of oppressed caste labor on their land. On the other
hand, the oppressed caste community are being pushed further into pauperization, thus further
weakening their ability to organise themselves as they had done for example during the years
of the cash crop boom in the 1960s and the 1970s.
The failure of reconstruction with falling incomes and rising indebtedness have led to
further economic and social exclusion of the oppressed caste communities. Amartya Sen
makes a distinction between active and passive forms of social exclusion (Sen 2000), which
are relevant for my research. Active exclusion relates to the ways in which oppressed caste
communities have been historically denied access to temples and schools discussed in
Chapter 4. On the other hand, passive forms of exclusion can be understood as the
consequence of the failure of reconstruction whereby the economic consequences of lack of
employment and poverty lead to further exclusion, without it being identified as such. I
would argue that the subtle forms of caste exclusion prevalent in Jaffna are characteristic of
the passive forms, and are different from the more overt and coercive exclusion in India
characteristic of the active forms.
Next such social exclusion is also different from exploitation; a system could be
inclusive but exploitative (Sen 2000). For example with class exploitation, the worker is part
of a system where his labor is exploited by the capitalist. While caste relations are also
exploitative as with oppressed caste labor in agriculture and services provided by the
oppressed caste community in rural social life, it also has the other social dynamic of
exclusion from social life itself including the economic system. Even as agricultural work
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declines, people by virtue of their caste designation are also excluded from the other forms of
employment that survive in the countryside, namely government and private sector jobs.
One of the few options available for the oppressed caste community in contemporary
Jaffna suffering from such social exclusion, is outmigration for work in the Middle East. The
remittances of oppressed caste migrant labor do not necessarily strengthen the oppressed
caste community, as remittances typically go toward meeting day to day expenses and
payment of debts, rather than savings that could be invested including in the rural economy.
Furthermore, such migrant labor is inherently temporary and add to the exclusion of such
migrant workers from the local economy, because they lose their footing in the local labor
market.
While caste relations were disturbed by war-time displacement, in the post-war
context, there is a resurgence, albeit subtle forms of social exclusion as evident from the
increasing segregation in social institutions such as temples, schools and work places. The
absorption of wealth in the expansion and refurbishing of temples reflects strengthening of
caste relations through the assertion of a form of social power and pride reflected in caste
communities belonging to specific temples. The politics of such social power draws on the
remittances from the West, which is also constituted disproportionately, with much of the
remittances towards rebuilding of temples and to a lesser extent special facilities for schools
coming from the Vellala caste dominant in the demography of the Tamil diaspora. Next, caste
relations are also strengthening in schools where there is a subtle segregation of oppressed
caste children in rural schools as discussed in Chapter 4.
There have been incidents of discrimination in employment and promotions in the
state sector in Jaffna. While there is perhaps even more prevalent exclusion in the private
sector, it has not come to light, due to the absence of mechanisms of redress or a system to
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challenge such discriminatory hiring practices in the private sector. The silence on caste
relations in the public domain is an important reason for such unchecked discrimination.
Such social exclusion along caste lines is not challenged due to the absence of a
movement to confront caste oppression. War-time nationalist mobilisation and politics as
well as post-war militarised repression has stymied anti-caste agitation. In the post-war
context, the heavy military and intelligence presence suspects and discourages any form of
organising and even discussion of any possible movement; such is the singular security
objective of repressing any kind of independent organizing, instituted by the Rajapaksa
regime in the war-torn regions. The Sana Samuha Nilayam (community centers), once the
organizing core at the village level of anti-caste struggles are now weaker due to both the
deterioration of rural social life and the lack of a political movement to galvanise such social
institutions. Solidarities among oppressed caste communities in different villages
considerably weakened with the decline of the Communist Party, which once had a strong
oppressed caste base in Jaffna.
Tamil nationalist politics continues to press an exclusively ethnic agenda, and with
military repression in check following regime change in January 2015, there are more overt
mobilisations with a separatist agenda. Furthermore, the loud and powerful Tamil nationalist
forces effectively silence any discussion about caste oppression, particularly by shaping the
discourse in the Tamil media, other popular forums and even the local academic scene. The
representations towards a new Constitution in early 2016,217 led to a few groups raising caste
issues in Jaffna. However, the middle class opinion makers including journalists have
succeeded thus far in silencing caste in popular discourse.
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The Prime Minister appointed a Public Representations Committee to support efforts to draft a new
Constitution towards addressing the grievances of the minorities. The sittings of the Committee in every District
led to interesting and varied submissions. In Jaffna, the representations included a few submissions on caste
relations (Public Representations Committee on Constitutional Reform 2016).
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As discussed in Chapter 4, caste relations in Jaffna were historically unique in South
Asia due to the fact that a single upper caste, the Vellala caste, constitute a numerical
majority. The overwhelming power of the Vellala caste provided little room for resistance. In
this context, the anti-caste struggles of the late 1960s were characteristic of an exceptional
historical moment. Those anti-caste struggles emerged out of the conjuncture of a rural
economic boom strengthening the oppressed caste landless labor, an effervescence of
oppressed caste consciousness including increasing literacy and oppressed caste writers, and
decades of build-up of diverse anti-caste trends gaining militancy under the leadership of the
Communist Party. The momentum gained in the late 1960s and the 1970s including the social
base of the Communist Party and local social institutions such as the Sana Samuha Nilyam,
were marginalised with the ascendancy of Tamil nationalist mobilisations, repression of
social struggles and dissent and eventually the civil war and mass displacement.
Next, as discussed in Chapter 3, neoliberal policies – where individuals are expected
to fend for their livelihoods and address their debts in a monetised and financialized rural
economy – are seeking to atomise individuals and weakening the possibilities of collective
forms of organizing and work. Therefore, earlier solidarities constituted by the vibrancy of
village institutions such as community centres and co-operatives have eroded with state and
NGO programs that engage directly with individuals rather than community organizations.
The politics of caste has taken a very different trajectory in war-time and post-war
Jaffna compared to developments in India. Caste politics in India is characterized by castebased political parties and vibrant debates on caste relations and tremendous struggles that
have shaped political alliances in India. Furthermore, official state policies are addressing
caste discrimination including through affirmative action policies called reservation (Omvedt
1991). In India, a caste-based census was carried out in 2011, whereas in Jaffna even talking
about caste is taboo. In an important article by Sonalde Desai and Amaresh Dubey based on a
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survey of over 40,000 households in India in 2005, have come to some very important
conclusions that are relevant for understanding the differences and persistence of caste in
contemporary Jaffna (Desai 2012). In India caste is significant in political and civic
participation, however, as discussed above, this is not the case in Jaffna. However, as in
India, caste differences in Jaffna have a significant impact on capacities such as educational
levels and out comes such as earned incomes. The new forms of caste exclusion in Jaffna,
which as in India are less about untouchability, but nevertheless different in its contemporary
dynamics, may contribute to analysis of caste relations in South Asia.
The unique dynamics of caste relations in contemporary Jaffna are its subtle
character. Caste atrocities, which are common in India, have for the most part been subdued
in Jaffna, perhaps in part due to the widespread military presence that deters any kind of
violence. The discourse of caste relations in Jaffna, as put forward by upper caste academics
can best be characterised as a “culturalization” discourse, borrowing from Balmurli
Natrajan’s work in India (Natrajan 2011). This discourse claims caste is merely a difference
in identity and has been defanged of its oppressive and exclusionary character. Indeed, the
culturalization discourse of caste in Jaffna removes it from its material and political questions
and limits it to the realm of cultural differences that will fade with time. Therefore, even as
caste relations strengthen, there is a call from the Vellalar opinion makers to silence
discussions on caste. They claim caste oppression is in fact weakening and any incidents of
caste discrimination are merely abberations.
It is difficult to conclusively say if anti-caste consciousness and a movement may
come forth in the near future. For now, I would argue the subtle character of caste oppression
in Jaffna, the lack of caste atrocities and the silence of any discussion of caste, are unique
characteristics of the persistence of caste in Jaffna. It will be even more difficult to find such
a unique caste-ridden society that has also gone through a protracted armed conflict for
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comparative analysis. However, the broader impact of armed conflict, the complex
interaction of ethnic and caste relations, the silencing of social contradictions versus the
resurgence of mobilisations and armed conflicts may gain insights from comparative studies
of armed conflicts in South Asia and particularly places like Nepal.218

Critiquing the Present through the History of Co-operatives
An alternative path of reconstruction for Jaffna could have been considered. However,
neither the Rajapaksa regime, nor the international donors, nor even the Tamil political
leadership considered such possibilities. Reconstruction policies focused on the building of
infrastructure, expansion of credit and promotion of the market to bring in private business
have failed to improve the standard of living of the rural people in Jaffna. Rather, there
should have been greater efforts to rebuild local institutions and investment in the rural
economy, particularly in agriculture and fisheries. I have drawn on the history of cooperatives to critique the political economy of Jaffna after the civil war. The progressive
vision of cooperation did not weaken merely because of the protracted war, but due to a
conscious global project of promoting markets that determines policies and analysis of
economic development in post-war Sri Lanka.
One argument commonly made against most efforts towards a planned or for that
matter a co-operative vision of economic revitalisation is that the Sri Lankan economy with
its earlier emphasis on import substitution has now changed with globalization, and that such
efforts at planning will not work in contemporary Sri Lanka (World Bank 2015). With the
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The developments in Nepal in the late 2000s following the end of the protracted Maoist insurgency, with the
uprisings in the Terai by the Madeshi community, who due to ethnic grievances complicated the politics in
Nepal are a case in point. While any comparison is beyond the purview of this dissertation, a future comparative
study of post-conflict Nepal with Sri Lanka may provide some insights about the challenges of reconstruction
and avenues of addressing ethnic and caste grievances. In Nepal, such ethnic differences led to overt
mobilisations after the protracted armed conflict, where as in Sri Lanka, it has led to the silencing of differences
within the Tamil community (Miklian 2009).
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exception of the Japanese Government sponsored report on reconstruction for Jaffna (JICA
2011), there is for the most part silence on the role of the co-operatives by the donors and the
local policy makers. In fact, USAID provides subsidies for private businesses starting up in
Jaffna and the North, but has not provided any assistance to co-operatives. The World Bank
and Asian Development Bank have also completely failed to support the rejuvenation of cooperatives, and continue to insist on Public Private Partnerships with the emphasis on the
promotion of private businesses (World Bank 2016). The economic model of the donors and
think tanks calls for the further opening of the Sri Lankan economy to trade and increase
business confidence to invite Foreign Direct Investments towards export-led growth. The
proponents of this private sector-led model have little interest in the co-operative forms of
rural production and distribution that is mainly for domestic consumption.
For my dissertation research, I was working within the limits of a regional economy,
particularly war-torn Jaffna and to some extent the Northern Province, and therefore the
larger economic policy challenges for Sri Lanka as a whole are beyond the scope of this
discussion. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the problems and challenges with the
reconstruction of the war-torn districts are related to the larger economic development vision
in the country. The co-operative alternative requires state support which is not forthcoming,
but could make a major difference in the dignity of workers and equality in this post-war
caste-ridden society.219 However, I fully realise that the co-operative alternative is only one
important element of reconstruction, and that alone is limited without a major shift in Sri
Lanka’s neoliberal development trajectory.
The co-operative movement in Jaffna not only drew ideas about co-operation from
around the world but also took advantage of international factors in their development during
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In many parts of the world co-operatives are more egalitarian institutions with greater control of management
by the workers and much less pay differences between workers and managers (Blim 2004).
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the late colonial period. Thus the co-operative movement was not parochial and was always
open to global changes. The co-operative movement drew on international experience that
included study missions from Jaffna to England and Japan to learn about the workings of cooperatives. Furthermore, co-operatives in Jaffna drew on the social capital of Tamil
pensioners who had returned after employment in South East Asia under British colonial rule.
Such pensioners had a regular income and educational background allowing them to devote
time and energy to develop co-operatives. The Jaffna Malayalam Tobacco Cooperative Sales
Society created the infrastructure for exporting to India and the fisheries co-operatives at a
later date resorted to exporting sea food to an international market. Finally, it is confidence
gained from the co-operative movement and an openness towards experimentation that
pioneered the Moolai Co-operative Hospital in Jaffna in the 1930s, one of the first of its kind
in Asia. In this way, the co-operative movement in Jaffna from its inception drew on
international ideas and experience. Therefore, the question then is about the kind of global
integration and the forms of economic institutions that it creates.
The other argument put forward is that there is no way out of financialization, as
credit is important for any form of reconstruction. I argue that financialization in its
contemporary manifestation as discussed in Chapter 2 is characteristic of neoliberal
globalization with exploitative expansion of finance resulting in social harm in the form
indebtedness. Furthermore, credit comes in different forms and should be differentiated from
financialization (Fine 2013). Indeed, even at the inception of co-operatives a century ago, the
question of credit and indebtedness of the farmers was central to the colonial government’s
policies of initiating co-operatives. Significantly, the first co-operatives in Jaffna and Sri
Lanka more broadly, were formed mainly to address the problem of credit and to resist the
exploitation of the rural communities by money lenders. The efforts at co-operative banking
eventually led to a bottom up process culminating in the federation of rural banks in the
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North, which were able to ensure the availability of credit and also in the process ensure
growth of production and employment through the expansion of co-operatives.
In the post-war years starting in 2009, the formal financial institutions, including
finance companies involved in lease hire purchasing and micro credit institutions, have
become predatory lenders. In Chapter 3, I discussed the high interest rates and the
unsustainable levels of debt. Furthermore, I argued that the financial institutions while
recognising the rural economic crisis are merely competing with each other to make a quick
profit. A century ago, the state supported the formation of producer co-operatives and
cooperative banks to free people in the countryside from exploitation by money lenders and
small traders charging high interest on purchases. I argue, that a reversal of exploitative
financialization in the rural economy today can draw from the extensive network of rural
banks run by co-operatives.220 In Chapter 3, the low levels of indebtedness among the toddy
tapping community was analysed as a consequence of their loans mainly coming from cooperative rural banks linked to the palm development co-operatives, as opposed to those who
relied on private banks and financial institutions. There is considerable difference in both the
level of debt and the interest rates paid to co-operative rural banks compared to the private
financial sector. Co-operative banks with state assistance can provide credit and lessen the
financialized dispossession currently at work in Jaffna, provided there are clear policies of
reversing financialization including ending problematic financial mechanisms such as lease
hire purchasing and micro-finance schemes. In fact, in June 2016 the Jaffna District
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In conflict-ridden Asam in India, in the decade following liberalization, informal loans increased while cooperative loans decreased (Purkaystha 2001). This could also be the case in places like Jaffna that after the surge
of formal sector loans and their default, rural debt could again be captured in the future by money lenders. Thus
finding ways to reduce the impact of financialization and in turn strengthening co-operatives is a challenge for
the future.
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Federation of Women’s Societies took a decision to campaign for a ban on lease hire
purchasing and microfinance schemes in the Jaffna District.221
The co-operative vision drew on the strong foundation of education coupled with the
collective and democratic participation for economic empowerment. Co-operatives like
educational institutions and Sana Samuha Nilayam (community centers) were social
institutions that strengthened social resilience, and which I argue provided considerable
support for the survival of northern society during the war. I would further argue that the
cooperatives have considerable potential in the post-war era. Co-operative production and
distribution coupled with state support attenuates the fluctuations and ravages of the market,
even if they cannot completely control the crisis prone character of the market in a capitalist
economy or remedy all of the woes that have emerged since the war. The co-operatives can
contribute to empowering exploited communities and valorise their dignity, particularly
important for oppressed caste communities such as toddy tappers and landless laborers who
face the double attack of market forces and oppression of local caste structure. 222
The Sri Lankan state in the past not only supported co-operatives, it also supported
important social welfare programs. The state apparatus is wide and deep; it continued to
function in the conflict areas during the war, and has a wide presence in the war-torn regions
after the war. Every village, often correlating with a Grama Niladhari Division has a Grama
Sevaka (Village) Officer, a Samurdhi (Welfare) Officer and an Economic Development
Officer, and at the Divisional Secretary Level (a division of a District) there are a range
development officers including for women’s development. In this way, the state has the
robust capacity to address many of the challenges in the rural economy, but its institutional
workings have many problems, and do not address the concerns of the rural and minority
This was communicated to me by the Women’s Development Officer for Jaffna District.
Bina Aggarwal has shown the possibilities for collectivities and co-operatives when they organize farmers
and particularly women farmers, in contemporary times. Schemes that have been taken forward with land for the
landless in parallel with bottom up collectivities she claims have been successful (Agarwal 2010).
221
222
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communities. Therefore, these state institutions have to be directed through social
mobilisation, including by social institutions such as co-operatives and other community
organisations, for meaningful reconstruction in war-torn places like Jaffna.
In post-war Jaffna, the alternatives towards rejuvenating the war-torn society, though
constrained by the limitations of neoliberal policies by the Central Government in Colombo,
can draw on the following ideas for reconstruction:
1. Reversal of financialization, particularly curtailing the new financial instruments
such as lease hire purchasing and micro finance, and mobilizing more productive
forms of capital which leads to employment generating investment. Addressing
the high levels of indebtedness through some form of debt forgiveness or debt
deferral is a precondition for any new process of meaningful reconstruction. In
short, an exception has to be made for the war-torn districts to alleviate the
problem of widespread indebtedness.
2. Strengthening local social institutions and creation of co-operative led and other
small industries towards livelihood and job creation. In addition to increasing rural
incomes, the need is for regular monthly incomes as with jobs from small
industries and the service sector. Reviving rural incomes may depend on the
diversification of household incomes with at least one income earner getting a
regular monthly income with the rest of the household engaging in the rural
economy including agriculture and fisheries. Currently that option of diversifying
incomes is temporarily sought through migrant work in the Middle East; but with
considerable social cost including isolation from family life, lack of workers’
rights and difficult working conditions.
3. The state has an important role in post-war reconstruction including through
channelling or directly investing in the rural economy, so that a virtuous cycle of
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value-addition and accumulation begins within the war-torn regions. The
extensive presence of the state structure needs to be mobilised towards
reconstruction and strengthening local social institutions such as co-operatives.
4. Many households in the North are completely landless including lacking land to
qualify for state and donor housing grants. Therefore, some form of land grants
for the landless is critical. Furthermore, even small plots of land on the order of
quarter of an acre can ensure rural provisioning including the possibility of finding
firewood for cooking and produce from home gardens increasing food security.
Therefore, addressing landlessness in even a limited way contributes to
strengthening the war affected communities.

Resistance and Political Possibilities
The solutions for war-torn Jaffna are the path of moderation, given that any
revolutionary politics is on hold after decades of devastation, the utter exhaustion of the
people and the loss of an entire younger generation to the war. However, struggles in some
form are necessary to redress class and caste injustices. Furthermore, the struggles for
alternatives in Jaffna and the North more broadly, necessarily relate to progressive politics in
the country as a whole. Indeed, any radical shift from the now entrenched neoliberal
economic trajectory is dependent on major struggles outside the war-torn Northern and
Eastern Provinces. It is in the rest of the country that there are active social and political
formations, and it is there that as much as ninety percent of the population resides.
Tamil nationalist politics, with its ethnic exclusivism which isolates the Tamil
community in the war-torn regions from the rest of the country, and its indifference towards
the economic issues facing the dispossessed Tamil community, undermines reconstruction.
Similarly, the Sinhala Buddhist majoritarian politics at the national level and the militarised
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environment in the North and East, continue to undermine solidarities between the war-torn
communities and the rest of the country. In other words, the failure of reconstruction is
deeply political, and it is conservative politics of the Colombo and Tamil elites that isolates
the war-torn communities and keeps them mired in the social and economic crisis.
In Chapter 2, I critiqued reconstruction through the different forms of capital and an
understanding of capital as a social relation. The Central Government merely considers
capital necessary for infrastructure development, and that access to global finance is the way
to secure it. On the other hand, the Tamil nationalist leadership including the provincial
government have failed to even articulate the need for capital, and solely focus on legal and
constitutional demands relating to devolved powers of autonomy. Between these two
dominant perspectives, the assault by financialization and the market in the war-torn regions
are resulting in dispossession and increasing indebtedness.
The crisis in the global economy since 2008 have impacted Sri Lanka during the
following eight years. The ebbs and flows of global capital characterized by speculative
flows, including the cost of capital necessary for continued policies of financialization, are
creating difficulties for Sri Lanka’s external finances. The IMF Standby Agreement in 2009
discussed in Chapter 2, which I argued was central to the emergence of a second wave of
neoliberalism in Sri Lanka, has now been succeeded by an IMF Extended Fund Facility in
June 2016, as Sri Lanka slipped again into balance of payment problems. While the new
Government continues on the neoliberal path of financialized urbanisation223, the financial
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In Chapter 2, I discussed how urbanization in the form of beautification of Colombo was central to the
second wave of neoliberalism after the war. The new Government after regime change in January 2015
continues with that urbanization push with a massive Megapolis project, aiming to expand Colombo city
through urban sprawl to reach much of the Western Province, with expected investment of some US$ 30 billion
by 2030. In parallel the World Bank is funding what it is calling its Strategic Cities Project developing the cities
of Kandy and Galle, and in May 2016 added the city of Jaffna with an addition US$ 55 million. This World
Bank project for the development of Jaffna city for a total of US$ 65 million including funds of US$ 10 million
from the Government is one of the largest development projects for Jaffna District. While I argue about the
continuing crisis in the rural economy in Jaffna and the North, the World Bank prioritises the urban
development of Jaffna.

306

crisis in other parts of the world such as in Southern Europe are pointing to the difficulties of
sustaining capital flows necessary to continue with financialization in Sri Lanka. If the crisis
in the global economy spreads and deepens in the Middle East, the consequences for those
now depending on migrant labor in the Middle East and the attendant remittances will be
severe. The circuit of global capital accumulation discussed above with the expansion of
credit by global capital and debt payments facilitated by remittances may also fall apart.
Therefore, the contemporary moment continues to be one of flux, but for that reason it may
also engender new forms of political mobilizations and alternatives.
Few analysts considered the possibility of overthrowing the authoritarian Rajapaksa
regime through the electoral democratic process. However, regime change while it has
curtailed militarization and opened up democratic space, has brought in a government that is
unequivocally committed to neoliberal policies. For a country’s politics held hostage by a
civil war for three decades, there are tremendous political possibilities as economic issues
gain increasing importance. It took six years after the war for the population to throw out the
Rajapaksa regime and there may be many more political changes in the ensuing years in
national politics. The next phase of political mobilizations and movements may focus on the
rising inequalities and uneven development and thus challenge the political economic
trajectory of the country.
In the North and the East with the Tamil constituencies, the democratic possibilities
were further constrained as electoral politics was disrupted with the LTTE in totalitarian
control of the population and squashing any form of independent organizing or dissent. It is
only in the last three years that the once vibrant electoral political tradition in the North and
the East are slowly beginning to re-emerge. Central to revitalization of Tamil politics is the
need for a self-critical move questioning Tamil nationalist politics and the legacy of the
LTTE. How long it may take for the Tamil community to emerge out of Tamil nationalist
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politics, which has been ideologically dominant over the last six decades, is hard to predict.
However, such a challenge to Tamil nationalism, the emergence of a new political leadership
taking hold of the Northern Provincial Council and a democratic politics grounded in
economic concerns of the people are all central to the political foundation of rebuilding the
war-torn society. In this context, the mounting dispossession and crisis of indebtedness in the
countryside may put forward a challenge to Tamil electoral politics, which has long ignored
the economic problems of its constituencies.
It is radical changes to Tamil politics that may also finally address the persistence of
caste oppression in Tamil society. Such a shift in Tamil politics can also be stimulated by the
emergence of an anti-caste movement. To begin with the initiation of public discussions and
mobilisations on caste issues, including by identifying and addressing forms of caste
exclusion in education, employment and state services is a priority. The first step in this
process is to break the silence on caste in the public domain. In the medium term, much will
depend on the oppressed caste community forming an anti-caste movement, creating alliances
with progressive actors and taking forward struggles for dignity and equality.
A major weakness of Tamil nationalist politics was its exclusive character, where it
failed to seriously engage other communities like the Muslims and work with progressive
forces in the Sinhala community and address the national issues including the economic
issues, while demanding devolution of power to the regions. Any future anti-caste movement
should not make the same mistake of restricting itself to the caste issue alone. Rather, there is
a need for an anti-caste movement that can make links with other movements and trade
unions. Futhermore, such an anti-caste movement should consider a progressive position on
the “national question,” while demanding devolution of power to the regions, it should also
challenge the Tamil community to devolve some of those powers to the oppressed caste
villages and empower the oppressed caste communities. Caste was central to Tamil politics
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and any major shift in Tamil politics including to address the failure of reconstruction may
well depend on anti-caste politics coming to the fore.
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